International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill: Stage 1
Our first item of business is a debate on motion S1M-1838, in the name of Mr Jim Wallace, on the general principles of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill.
I thank the Justice 2 Committee for its careful consideration of the bill and for its report, which, I acknowledge, was produced to a tight timetable. The report provides a considered assessment of a complex subject and I welcome its broad agreement with the general principles of the bill. However, the committee identified some points on which I hope I can provide some reassurance.
The International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill, along with the United Kingdom International Criminal Court Act 2001, which received royal assent on 11 May, will allow the UK to fulfil its obligations under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and thus to ratify the statute.
The Rome statute, which was finalised on 17 July 1998 after three years of preparatory work, has been criticised by some for going too far into areas that are normally dealt with by national jurisdictions and by others for not going far enough in setting the jurisdiction of the new court. Nevertheless, the statute represents the current consensus of the international community and marks a significant new stage in the international response to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In that context, it is worth remembering that the first serious proposal for an international criminal court was made more than half a century ago, after the second world war. It is important that the international community grasps the opportunity to take this step forward in the new millennium.
It is interesting to note that, to date, 139 countries have signed the statute, including all the European Union countries, all the NATO countries except Turkey, two thirds of the Commonwealth and four of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Of those 139 countries, 32 have ratified the statute, which means that we are now more than halfway to the 60 ratifications that are required to get the ICC up and running.
Will the minister comment on why so few countries have ratified the statute, given the amount of support that has been signalled for it?
I am afraid that I cannot give the reasons why a range of countries have not yet ratified the statute. However, as Mr Gallie is aware, it often takes a considerable time for countries to ratify international treaties. Indeed, the UK has not ratified the statute, because we have not yet passed the bill. Other countries may also be progressing ratification procedures in their own way. The third anniversary of the treaty occurs next month—perhaps that will be an opportunity for other countries to announce their ratification of the treaty.
The bill contains 4 parts and has 6 schedules. Part 1 incorporates war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide into domestic Scots law. Although that is not required under the terms of the statute, it is important that it is done so that the principle of complementarity can work fully. That principle means that ICC crimes should normally be investigated and prosecuted in the country in which they took place, or where there is a connection with a citizen of that country. Incorporating those crimes in exactly the same terms as in the Rome statute means that the UK will always be in a position to investigate and prosecute allegations made against UK nationals or residents.
Part 2 provides for assistance to be given by the Scottish justice system to the ICC. That is a requirement of the statute and includes a variety of measures, ranging from taking evidence to locating and freezing the proceeds of ICC crimes. Many of the practical details are described in schedules 4 to 6.
Part 3 provides for the enforcement of sentences and orders. The enforcement of orders for fines, forfeitures and reparations against those found guilty by the ICC is an obligation under the statute and the provisions in part 3 will allow us to meet that obligation. Although states that ratify the statute are under no obligation to accept ICC prisoners, it is important for the court to have a list of countries that are willing to accept those prisoners, given that it will not have its own prison. It is perfectly reasonable and appropriate for Scotland to help out in that regard. A request from the ICC to take a prisoner would come first to the UK Government. Thereafter, if it was thought that it was suitable for such a prisoner to serve his or her sentence in Scotland, the secretary of state would consult the Scottish ministers, who would have the final say on whether the prisoner was to come here.
Part 4 deals with administrative matters. For example, it includes a provision to make commencement orders and defines the terms used in the rest of the bill.
I have mentioned some of the schedules. To complete the summary of the bill's provisions, I should also mention schedules 1 and 2, which reproduce the ICC crimes from the Rome statute, and schedule 3, which details the rights of the accused during an investigation.
I know that the matter of universal jurisdiction has been the source of considerable discussion within the committee and receives a deal of attention in the committee's report. It is undoubtedly a key issue and it certainly deserves the Parliament's attention in the debate.
Some have argued that we should take universal jurisdiction—that is, we should be willing to investigate and prosecute all ICC crimes, regardless of where they are committed or by whom they are committed. It is said that that would have the merit of dealing with a range of difficult situations in a relatively straightforward and simple way. However, in the view of ministers and in the context of the legislation, that is not the best way forward.
In evidence to the committee, we set out three key arguments, which are summarised in the committee's report. First, universal jurisdiction is not consistent with the traditions of Scots law, which is based on territorial principles. Secondly, we have taken universal jurisdiction in the past only where it was required by international treaty. Thirdly, we have no wish to take universal jurisdiction in this case, as we do not think it appropriate to assume the role of global prosecutor. I will take this opportunity to expand on those arguments a little further.
On the issue of the traditional approach taken in Scots law, it is instructive to note what the Justice 2 Committee report says, at paragraph 25, on the importance of maintaining
"internal consistency within domestic law, rather than trying to harmonise with the International Criminal Court in circumstances where that is not required".
We all agree that such an approach is highly commendable and I suggest that it should also extend to the issue of jurisdiction, where the fundamental point is that Scots law, unlike the law of a number of other jurisdictions, is based on the premise of territoriality, not universality.
What evidence did the Minister for Justice and his team take on universal jurisdiction prior to presenting the bill?
I am not quite sure what Christine Grahame means by "evidence". The consideration that we gave to whether the notion of universal jurisdiction should be incorporated in the bill related to a number of points of principle. A key principle is that the application of universal jurisdiction is not the part of the tradition of Scots law—the tradition of Scots law is territoriality.
Perhaps I should clarify my point. Whose views did the minister seek in relation to universal jurisdiction and the Scottish legal system and practice before he made the decision not to incorporate it into the bill? In the evidence that the Justice 2 Committee took, only the ministerial team was opposed to universal jurisdiction—everyone else was fairly relaxed and some witnesses were quite positive about it.
I do not think that one needs to seek views on a matter that is a principle of Scots law, and this is about the principle of territoriality, on which Scots law has been based for generations. That principle is part of our law and we did not think that it required to be changed, particularly as there was no requirement under the treaty to have universal jurisdiction. I accept that the principle of universal jurisdiction—
Will the minister give way?
I would like to develop my point—I will come back to Margo MacDonald.
My question is on this point.
All right.
We would like to think that that decision was taken for the reason outlined by the minister—that is, on the basis of the territorial principle in Scots law—rather than because universal jurisdiction was not included in the United Kingdom International Criminal Court Act 2001. I start from an even more fundamental principle than that contained in Scots law: doing the right thing.
The fact that we are legislating in this Parliament is indicative that we believe that the matter is properly for the Scottish Parliament. Given our distinctive legal system, it is right that we should legislate and that considerations should be based in Scots law.
As I indicated, the tradition of Scots law is territoriality. If, for example, a Scot is murdered on a tourist trip to a foreign country, traditionally we have not sought to extend jurisdiction in respect of that murder. The case has been left to the territorial jurisdiction of the country where the murder took place. There have been some exceptions in highly specific instances where action has been required by treaty commitments that the UK has entered into.
The Rome statute represents a consensus in the international community. If the consensus was that countries should take universal jurisdiction, that would surely have been required by the statute. It is not required and we should take universal jurisdiction only where it is the clear will of the international community as expressed by international treaty. The Rome statute represents the clear will of the international community after many years of careful deliberation and discussion by experts in international law and it does not stipulate universal jurisdiction.
Legal experts carried out much research into universal jurisdiction in compiling the Rome statute. The statute is in many respects a hybrid measure involving politics and law. Political considerations entered into the framing of the original Rome statute. The fact that the United States, for example, would never have accepted universal jurisdiction at that stage coloured the determination that eventually led to the statute as published. However, we can go back to first principles and say that it is much better to have universal jurisdiction if we wish to pursue international criminals in an equitable fashion.
The basis of the bill is the implementation of an international treaty. Inevitably, in any negotiation of an international treaty, there is give and take and detailed and complex negotiations. We are honouring not only the spirit, but the letter of the international treaty. In doing so, we are showing ourselves to be good members of the international community and we are going along with the consensus—the agreement that allowed the treaty to be signed and that will in the near future, I hope, allow it to be ratified by enough member states to be up and running.
If the international community thought that the best approach to deal with the crimes in question was for individual countries to take universal jurisdiction, there would be no need for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court, as states could prosecute the nationals of any country for offences committed anywhere. Universal jurisdiction and an international court are alternative approaches. The consensus was that issues are best dealt with on an international rather than on a unilateral basis.
There is a risk that widespread universal jurisdiction could undermine the ICC. That could happen if countries with universal jurisdiction decided, for example, that they were not content with the decision of the ICC prosecutor not to proceed in a particular case and took action themselves. It is not hard to see how just a few such actions could work to undermine—perhaps unwittingly and without intent, but nevertheless in real terms—the position and legitimacy of the ICC as the court that deals with war crimes.
There is also an issue of resources and expertise. Whereas individual countries would face enormous practical difficulties in mounting an investigation and prosecution of a crime that was committed in a remote location with which they had no connection, the ICC, as a permanent organisation, will—perhaps unfortunately—quickly build up expertise in such potentially complex investigations and prosecutions. In such cases, there could be enormous difficulties for the Scottish criminal justice system, with its strict time limits on bringing proceedings. If we were to go down the route of universal jurisdiction in the context of ICC crimes, we could come under pressure to proceed against individuals with little or no connection with Scotland. Inevitably, collecting evidence in such circumstances would be complex and there would always be the danger that a case had to be abandoned if, for instance, the 110-day time limit could not be met.
The minister will be aware that there have recently been considerable pressures on the Crown Office and the prosecution service in getting cases in our own jurisdiction into the courts. What priority will be given to the ICC over and above our priorities in dealing with difficulties in this country?
As I indicated, that is one reason why—in terms of the volume of work that could be required—it is not appropriate to take universal jurisdiction. In the bill, there are some obligations on us to facilitate the work of the ICC. As good, upstanding members of the international community, we do not enter into such obligations lightly. We would make every endeavour to ensure that ICC requests that are facilitated and made legal by the provisions of the bill are met with timeously and with proper diligence.
I accept the minister's good intent, but he must recognise that we have problems in our own court and procurator service. I asked him what priority our cases would be given. Would he consider international obligations before domestic obligations?
I do not think that this is a question of either/or—it is a question of both/and. It is highly unlikely that any request will be such that the entire resources—the manpower and the womanpower—of the Crown Office will have to be given over to dealing with the case. If there is a request for particular information and procedures, that would not be just for the Crown Office. The police might also be involved. Such a request would be treated seriously and be given a good, fair wind, but it is not a question of setting everything else aside or putting a case to the bottom of the pile. A lot of other work would have to be done, but the request would be dealt with properly, timeously and with the proper diligence that one would expect of a country that takes seriously the international obligations into which it enters.
It has been suggested by some that, if we do not have universal jurisdiction, Scotland could become a safe haven. That will not be the case. Where there is a connection with Scotland, through residence or nationality, alleged war criminals could be prosecuted for the crimes detailed in schedule 1 to the bill. On Mr Gallie's point, where a suspected fugitive is wanted by the ICC, he or she could be arrested and transferred to The Hague. There are arrangements for an expedited procedure leading to provisional arrest where the ICC believes that there are urgent grounds to act and that the person sought is either in the UK or simply on his way to the UK. In addition, measures have been strengthened to prevent such undesirable individuals from entering the country and enhanced extradition arrangements apply to those being sought for such crimes.
The Justice 2 Committee report makes a number of interesting observations of a more general nature. It comments on how the interface between our domestic law and that being established at the ICC will develop in practice and on whether there are implications for domestic proceedings in relation to the age of criminal responsibility, ICC case law and general ICC rules on procedure and evidence.
By and large, the ICC will operate according to the Rome statute and its own rules of procedure and evidence—which have been laid out in draft—while we will continue to investigate and prosecute those new offences in line with our own traditions where a case is brought before the Scottish courts. The statute does not provide for prosecution of those under 18, for instance, but we are clear that the age of criminal responsibility in Scottish courts will remain as it is for other domestic crimes. The introductory section of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court's draft rules of procedure and evidence helpfully states:
"The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court do not affect the procedural rules for any national court or legal system for the purpose of national proceedings."
The Law Society of Scotland has been active in scrutinising the detail of the bill. It made a number of helpful suggestions in its evidence and, as Iain Gray indicated in his 17 May written submission to the Justice 2 Committee, the Executive is actively considering a number of amendments in the light of the society's comments.
Points have been made about the timing of the bill and the consultation process. Scotland was fully involved in the UK-wide consultation exercise that took place last year. That was the most appropriate way to proceed in this instance, given that many of the most important issues—such as arrest and surrender—have UK-wide implications and that the general principles behind both bills were identical. A total of 19 individuals and organisations in Scotland were invited to comment, including those in the academic community and interested non-governmental organisations.
It is regrettable that the timetable has ended up being so tight, but a number of factors outwith our control are at work. For instance, when the initial date of July 2002 was set for the first 60 countries to come on board, most commentators felt that that was an unrealistic target. However, the international community has warmed to the proposed ICC with welcome enthusiasm and, as I have said, we are already more than halfway to the target, with several more states on the verge of ratifying.
Moreover, the legislation proved to be very complex, involving a number of cross-border issues, both reserved and devolved, which were eventually the subject of the Sewel motion in the Parliament on 18 January. As it is essential that our bill and the UK act mesh together to give watertight provision across the UK, it was crucial that we took account of the arrangements in the UK bill—as it then was—and were in a position to take action in the light of significant amendments that were made to the UK bill during its passage through Westminster. It was thus inevitable and, indeed, desirable in the interests of producing robust legislation that our bill was introduced after the UK legislation and that our bill followed the UK legislation.
Time constraints notwithstanding, the Justice 2 Committee has produced a lucid and detailed report. It has managed to point up for the Parliament the key issues in this important bill and I pay tribute to the committee and the clerks for their work. I am glad that the committee approves the general principles of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill and I note that it strongly believes that the establishment of an international criminal court will be of great benefit to Scotland and the international community. I am sure that all members would endorse such a statement. I commend the motion to the Parliament.
I move,
That the Parliament agrees to the general principles of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill.
It is worth reminding ourselves, at this early stage in the debate, of the overriding principle that has driven the whole idea of an international criminal court. Who better to quote than Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General? He has stated:
"In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of universal justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision. We are close to its realisation. We will do our part to see it through till the end. We ask you … to do yours in our struggle to ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity.
Only then will the innocents of distant wars and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep under the cover of justice; that they, too, have rights, and that those who violate those rights will be punished."
It is worth emphasising the phrase that
"no ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity."
That is, of course, a lofty ideal. Perhaps we will always fall short of reaching the ideal, but I hope that we agree that it is an ideal worth striving for. An international criminal court should be part of that process.
As an effective and responsible Opposition in this Parliament, we will debate the issues and scrutinise the proposals. However, we will not forget the higher purpose as laid out so clearly in that quotation from Kofi Annan. His statement can be taken as an exhortation to the legislatures of the world to finish the job that could be described as having been started in 1948 when the UN General Assembly, in the wake of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the second world war, first recognised the need for such a court. The pity is, I suppose, that it has taken so long to reach the point that we have now reached.
A total of 139 countries have signed the Rome statute, which was adopted in 1998. The policy memorandum for the bill tells us that, as of 12 February 2001, 29 states had ratified—including South Africa, whose President Thabo Mbeki addressed this Parliament yesterday. I understand that, to date, some 33 of the 139 signatories have now ratified their original signature. The UN's website tells me that, as of 21 May, that number was up to 32. The 33rd country on the list will be Ireland, whose Taoiseach will address us next week. Members could be forgiven for missing the Irish agreement, which took place last week. All the publicity about the referendum focused on the Irish electorate's reaction to the Nice treaty. There was little or no media interest in the constitutional amendments that were agreed relating to the international criminal court.
Meanwhile, at the Westminster end of the legislation was one of those bills that were signed off in the rush to beat the election deadline. I hope that that does not reflect a view in the UK Government that the bill was just something to be gotten over quickly. In this Parliament, we still have important issues to deal with and important questions to consider. One of those issues is the one that the minister dealt with at some length—universal jurisdiction.
I am concerned that the Justice 2 Committee felt constrained by the lack of time available for scrutiny of the bill. A whole section of its report is entitled "Time constraints and quality of scrutiny". Although I recollect from my time on the Justice and Home Affairs Committee that that was a perennial issue, it is nonetheless a matter of concern that the issue is raised time and again. I understand that the reason why things moved so quickly was to ensure that the UK was among the first 60 countries to ratify—it was seen as important to be at the heart of the process of establishing the court. However, I wonder whether that could not have been achieved a bit more efficiently and in a slightly better fashion that would have allowed fuller scrutiny of the bill. After all, we are introducing our bill considerably later than the one that has gone through Westminster. I wonder whether another few weeks would really have made an enormous difference.
The Justice 2 Committee's report specifically highlights the effect that the lack of time has had on consideration of the question of universal jurisdiction—a concept that is described in the report as the
"most complex, and most frequently raised, issue before the Committee".
Putting it as simply as I can, I would say that the bill provides for offences to be prosecuted in Scottish courts if they are committed in Scotland or outwith the United Kingdom by UK nationals or UK residents. Crimes committed outwith Scotland by a non-UK national or resident could not be tried in Scotland even if the accused was currently present in Scotland. That is my understanding.
The minister is correct: the Rome statute does not require states to adopt universal jurisdiction. However, it does not prohibit it. As the committee's report makes clear, the bill is consistent with the minimum standard required for compliance. We should be aiming for better than the minimum standard. If we can see an opportunity for improvement, we should take it and be one of those countries that is taking a lead in the development of international law.
It is telling that the only witness whom the committee heard from on the issue who opposed the adoption of universal jurisdiction was the minister. All the others who addressed the issue were of the view that universal jurisdiction should be adopted. The Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, the Scottish Human Rights Centre and, indeed, the Law Society of Scotland all identified loopholes that could be addressed by the introduction of universal jurisdiction. Dr Iain Scobbie of the University of Glasgow made it clear that universal jurisdiction was already an accepted principle in international law for torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the written submission from the Scottish Human Rights Centre, Dr Scobbie concludes:
"In sum, international law appears to be developing in favour of the assertion of universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed during armed conflicts, whether these are international or non-international. The intention of the authors of the ICC Statute aims at the suppression of these crimes using prosecution at both the domestic and international levels. It would be in accordance with this if the Scottish Parliament were to assert universal jurisdiction over ICC crimes in the legislation it enacts."
We have to ask why Scotland should not follow the path that has been taken by the likes of Finland, New Zealand, Belgium, Spain and Sweden in opting for universal jurisdiction. Is the minister saying that those countries are wrong to do what they have done? Are we to pressure them into reversing the decisions that they have made in opting for universal jurisdiction? Surely, at this stage of the bill, the real issue is whether sufficient time has been made available to explore the issue in detail. This morning's debate suggests that that has not been the case. I suggest that that lack of scrutiny and detailed consideration is the real problem. The committee could have had a lot more time in order to go into the issue in the detail required.
Another issue on which all the organisations that gave evidence expressed concern was the absence of any mention of a UN trust fund for victims. Given the importance that this Parliament has attached in recent months to the rights of victims, it would be useful to have confirmation that the UN fund will indeed be created and that no separate legislation will be needed in Scotland.
When the Parliament approves the bill, as I am sure that it will, it will not be the First Minister's name that will go on the treaty. Although this Parliament is responsible for the administration of justice in Scotland, the UK speaks for us on the world stage. I urge the Minister for Justice to ensure that the distinctive nature of the Scottish legal system and the role of this Parliament are recognised by Westminster when the UK ratifies the treaty on the international criminal court. That should include giving Scottish judges due consideration in the nomination process for the court's judiciary.
With independence, Scots law would be individually recognised in the international criminal court's procedures. In the meantime, we can only hope that, when Westminster speaks on our behalf, Scots law is given equal weight with English law in the UK's negotiations on procedure and the appointment of judges. I am pleased to note that the Justice 2 Committee report recognises the importance of that point and that, because of the difference between English and Scots law, the terms "UK courts" or "UK law" are meaningless concepts.
Many of the countries that have ratified the treaty have issued declarations in which they make clear the basis on which the international criminal court should dovetail with their own legal systems. Norway stated that its Ministry of Justice and the Police is the designated channel for the transmission of requests from the international criminal court. Spain declared
"that, without prejudice to the fields of competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice shall be the competent authority to transmit requests for cooperation made by the Court".
Finland declared
"that requests for cooperation shall be transmitted either through the diplomatic channel or directly to the Ministry of Justice, which is the authority competent to receive such requests."
I see no reason why the declaration from the UK Government should not make it clear that the Scottish Parliament or the Scottish Executive justice department is designated as the competent authority to deal with requests from the international criminal court in matters relating to Scotland. I hope that the minister will comment on that in his closing remarks.
In an earlier debate, I expressed concern about the extent to which we were allowing Westminster to legislate for us on this matter. Today, I have expressed my concern about the amount of time that is available for scrutiny of the bill. That concern is shared by the Justice 2 Committee. However, I understand and appreciate the desire to be one of the first 60 countries to ratify—a desire that does not appear to be shared by one of the countries that we all agree should be on board. Unfortunately, the USA—the country that wants to establish itself as the world's policeman—looks as though it will turn its back on the need for a world court, just as it seems to want to turn its back on so many of its previously agreed international commitments.
As Bush junior visits Europe, it is apparent that his language anent the Kyoto treaty is softening. Perhaps that is just cosmetic; perhaps he does not realise that people in Europe are perfectly capable of reading and hearing the speeches that he makes to a domestic American audience. However, if the softer language is indicative of a shift in his outright opposition to Kyoto, I sincerely hope that he is facing pressure as strong—if less public—over his backtracking from the international criminal court.
The irony is that only through an international criminal court will there ever be a chance of bringing people such as Saddam Hussein and his deputy Tariq Aziz to justice for their actions during the Gulf war. Of course, bookshops are currently selling a powerful polemic against Henry Kissinger, which makes a case for his indictment as a war criminal because of decisions such as the bombing of Cambodia. Perhaps US nervousness about an international criminal court is based on the fear that the court could just as easily be used against former allies such as General Pinochet, never mind Henry Kissinger.
That belief—if I may refer to Phil Gallie's comments—might lie behind the reluctance to agree in practice something that countries have agreed in the past in principle. We know that agreeing with things in principle can be easy. Facing up to the reality of what that might mean in practice is when the chickens come home to roost. I suggest what lies behind America's reluctance is the fact that it would not necessarily be immune to interest from the international criminal court.
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the international criminal court would be immeasurably strengthened by US ratification. I hope that the UK Government will keep up the diplomatic pressure to get the US on board. Either way, the truth is that the international criminal court will be a huge step forward in international justice.
Jose Ayala-Lasso, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, said that
"a person stands a better chance of being tried and judged for killing one human being than for killing 100,000."
That has always been the case, but we should be doing all in our power to change that balance. The international criminal court will do that.
Not unexpectedly, after our marathon sitting yesterday, our numbers are somewhat depleted today. Perhaps the opportunity to debate the stage 1 report on the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill this early in the morning has failed to entice many colleagues beyond the Justice 2 Committee to join us. That is a pity, because we had a number of interesting evidence-taking sessions. One of the features of sitting on the former Justice and Home Affairs Committee, or the new Justice 1 Committee or Justice 2 Committee, is the frequency with which we see regular contributors to our evidence-taking sessions. We think of them fondly as our usual suspects, and we are genuinely grateful to them; however, for stage 1 of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill, we were advised in our evidence sessions by people and sources who were new to us.
As a side issue, it is about time that we were more aware of the financial burden that we place on charities when we ask them to give evidence to committees. We were pleased to welcome in person Dr Iain Scobbie, who did not have far to travel, but Mr Sherman Carroll of the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture travelled some distance.
Members who have read our report will know that the Justice 2 Committee was concerned about the time scale of the bill, as Roseanna Cunningham said, particularly in the light of the date of introduction at the Westminster Parliament. We understand the eagerness to be among the first 60 states to ratify the treaty, but that is not an excuse to expect the committee to gallop through the bill.
While the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill is broadly similar to the UK legislation, it must be borne in mind that we are dealing with a distinctive legal system. Many of our inquiries prior to stage 1 centred on protecting the integrity of our current practice. We wanted to ensure that there was no seepage to the detriment of the Scottish legal system. For those who are not legally qualified, that was technically demanding. For my part, I am happy to admit that. I leave to others the opportunity to take members through the minute details of those aspects. I hope that there will be some takers.
Now to the main issues in the bill. The universal approval of the bill by those who gave evidence was welcome, and allowed us to go into greater detail in examining its finer points. Universal jurisdiction—this is the third time that it has been mentioned, and I am sure that it will be mentioned again—was a discussion point at every meeting, and for a good reason: it is not a requirement of the Rome statute, but neither does the Rome statute prohibit it. I suppose that sounds like wanting to have one's cake and eat it. We are presented with the opportunity for Scottish courts to prosecute offences such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes if they are committed in Scotland, or beyond UK borders by UK nationals or residents. Here follows the technical part, which caused the committee much deliberation. I quote from the Justice 2 Committee's report:
"Crimes committed outwith Scotland, by a non-UK national or resident, could not be tried in Scotland even if the accused was currently present in Scotland."
Defining residence is no easy matter. I remember from my previous experience in the Inland Revenue that under tax legislation, 40 days is the critical figure—so critical that people would provide airline tickets showing dates of departure and return to justify why they should not be liable for UK tax. However, the concept of residence is not a regular feature of criminal law here. The issue was eased somewhat on the basis of evidence from the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, which presented another option:
"Universal jurisdiction would allow the pursuit of any person suspected of an ICC crime, regardless of their connection with Scotland. There are two different forms: ‘pure' universal jurisdiction where an arrest warrant could be issued regardless of whether the suspect was in Scotland and a more limited ‘presence test' which requires the person (if not a UK national or if the crime was not committed in Scotland) to be present in Scotland before an arrest warrant could be issued".
We were urged several times to go the whole hog and opt for universal jurisdiction. The Law Society was especially encouraging with its advice that
"we should not be shy about embracing it if there is the political will."—[Official Report, Justice 2 Committee, 15 May 2001; c 187.]
Perhaps that is the acid test. The weight of opinion fell heavily in favour of universal jurisdiction to close potential loopholes, and it appears that the concept is readily accepted internationally, as several countries have plumped for it.
I will take Scott Barrie's intervention first.
Sorry, minister.
Given what Lyndsay McIntosh has said and given that she has taken members through the evidence that the Justice 2 Committee took, am I right to think that she supports universal jurisdiction?
I am waiting to hear why we should not support the idea. I am waiting to be advised and informed. That is part of the process. We will hear about that at stage 2, but we have the opportunity to debate the issue today.
The deputy minister was next to intervene.
My intervention follows on from Scott Barrie's. I want to ask Lyndsay McIntosh—
Have I clarified the matter? I said that the issue was part of the debate.
Surely Lyndsay McIntosh has answered her own question in considering the evidence that was provided. Is there not a conflict between the desire to maintain the consistency and traditions of Scots law and the idea of moving towards universal jurisdiction, which is manifestly not part of those traditions or the principles behind them?
I make it clear that members should not speak to one another across the chamber, except through interventions that a member has accepted.
I apologise, Presiding Officer.
It was a surprise that the Deputy Minister for Justice was not persuaded to accept the point of view that I described. The Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture foresaw cases that the international criminal court might be unable or unwilling to take up, and cited the example of an aid worker from Scotland who could be caught between two stools. Given all that the Justice 2 Committee heard in evidence, I hope that when the deputy minister sums up, he will take the opportunity to convince members beyond doubt that universal jurisdiction is not the best way forward.
Scottish Conservatives welcome any measure that will assist in bringing to book those who have committed crimes against humanity. The international criminal court will be permanent and will be situated in The Hague. It will be complementary to national judicial systems. The court will try individuals, not states. A prosecutor will be authorised to initiate proceedings on his own motion. The court will have jurisdiction over crimes that are committed in internal armed conflict and will give no immunity to heads of state or other Government officials.
Conservatives want to ensure that the international criminal court remains true to four principles. The permanent court should be a powerful deterrent. Its broad reach should end accusations of selective justice. The Justice 2 Committee considered that in great detail, because we had plenty of such examples to consider. We want to ensure that the court is based on global fundamental principles of justice and that it can respond quickly as a permanent institution.
On that basis, we offer the bill a fair wind and look forward to further examination—
Will the member give way?
I am a few words from the end of my speech.
We look forward to further examination at stage 2. Before I finish, I say that I am terribly sorry, but I will not be present to hear Tavish Scott's speech. I do not mean that to be disrespectful.
It is apt that we debate the principles of the international criminal court on the day after the momentous occasion of President Mbeki's addressing the Parliament and reminding us of our international obligations. We should all be enthusiastic about such a historic proposal for legislation, because, as Jim Wallace said, it has taken efforts since 1948 to get this far.
We are attempting to ensure that no safe havens exist for international criminals who are guilty of crimes against humanity, genocide or war crimes. Although each country's legal system is respected, the meeting of those jurisdictions to form a permanent international criminal court is a major step forward in international co-operation. It is pleasing that Scotland is to be part of that process.
It must be noted that the UK Government has worked especially hard in pressing for advances in the definition of war crimes. The British delegation achieved much in the negotiation of the Rome statute. Crimes now include those that are committed during non-international conflict. The enlistment or conscription of children under 15 is made a war crime. Some sexual and gender-related offences, such as the use of mass rape as an instrument of ethnic cleansing, are criminalised. Crimes against humanity also now include torture, enforced disappearance and forced pregnancy.
The court will be complementary to national judicial systems and will be able to assume jurisdiction only after a national system has determined whether a prosecution should take place.
It is fair to say that the Justice 2 Committee felt that the bill raised several complex issues that, on the face of it, seemed quite straightforward. I must admit that when we heard evidence, it took a while for the penny to drop on several of those issues. I know that I was not alone in feeling that.
Like any other court, the international criminal court will require rules and procedures to be adopted. We did not go into much detail about that. We simply noted that we would need to keep our eye on that, because it has been said that in the development of international criminal court jurisprudence, the court will adopt the principles of the main legal systems of the countries that have ratified the Rome statute. Therefore, it is likely that the court will adopt some of the practices of those legal systems.
I thank the convener of the Justice 2 Committee for giving way. It seems that there was a feeling in the Justice 2 Committee that it lacked the time to pursue some of the important issues to which Pauline McNeill referred. Before stage 2 scrutiny of the bill by the committee could the committee take further evidence and probe the issues more to the bill's overall benefit?
As we said in our stage 1 report, we felt that we were under a bit of pressure to complete the report. However, we understood the reasons for the time scale. We want to be one of the first 60 countries to ratify the Rome statute.
It would not be possible to take more evidence that would help the committee on the point that I made about rules and procedures, because we would be trying to predict how the court would work. We simply say that we must monitor how the court develops its procedures. I will make the point later that we hope that some of the good legal practices in Scotland will be taken up through the adoption of some of the system's legal principles.
Eighteen judges with relevant qualifications will sit in the international criminal court full time and will be chosen by election. That means that a UK judge may not be a member of the court. However, as we might be one of the first 60 countries to ratify the statute, it is a distinct possibility that a UK judge will be a member. A Scottish judge may not be present, but it is important to note that the court's decisions will be those of the court and not those of the member states. Therefore, it is not absolutely necessary to have a UK or Scottish judge there. However, as witnesses told the committee, several eligible Scottish candidates exist, and the possibility remains that a UK judge could be Scottish. I look forward to seeing the outcome of that.
We urge Scottish ministers to make appropriate representations to UK ministers to reflect the fact that Scotland's system is regarded as one of the principal legal systems in the world. Roseanna Cunningham spoke about that.
Witnesses raised several technical points. I do not intend to cover them all. The Justice 2 Committee dealt with some of those issues in correspondence, because they concern a bit of tidying of the bill. The issues include points about the role of the Lord Advocate as opposed to the role of Scottish ministers, the inclusion of the Court of Session and the Court of Session's role as opposed to that of the criminal courts.
The Justice 2 Committee had some issues with the age of criminal responsibility. It took us some time to understand that domestic law on that matter would not be changed by adoption of the bill. Members will know that, under Scots law, the Lord Advocate can prosecute all those in Scotland above the age of eight. Those above the age of 16 can be prosecuted in the Scottish courts, unless they are the subject of a supervision order. However, it is important to note that Scots law will not change as a result of its adoption of international criminal court law. That fact took the committee about two meetings to note. We were concerned that there would not be seepage into Scotland from law that would be decided by the international criminal court.
That said, we took the view that, perhaps in 20 or 30 years' time, when the international criminal court is more established, there would be seepage into Scots law, as Scottish courts would be required to implement the decisions of the international criminal court. Those decisions will be influenced by other legal systems.
With respect, the Scottish courts are not required to follow the decisions of the international criminal court. The evidence that we heard was that that court would be persuasive.
It would be fair to say that that was one of the points that was made. I wanted to make the point that, in years to come, there could be some seepage. That is not a bad thing, as we can always learn from other legal systems.
We have had a sizeable debate about the issue of universal jurisdiction because, as has been said by other speakers, we heard from a number of witnesses who took the view that it was important. Had we had more time to take evidence, we might have been able to take evidence from witnesses who would have given us another point of view. I am sorry that we were not able to do that. Speaking as an individual, I have not been convinced by the argument about universal jurisdiction. However, it has to be acknowledged that the witnesses that we heard from strongly urged the Executive to incorporate universal jurisdiction into the bill.
I agree with Pauline McNeill, the convener of the Justice 2 Committee, that we were under pressure of time. However, although we heard evidence of excellent quality, does she agree that it would have been nice to have heard from someone from New Zealand or Canada or some of those other strange places that have adopted universal jurisdiction?
I am not sure what the Parliamentary Bureau would think of the committee calling witnesses from New Zealand or Canada. On the other hand, if the member is suggesting that the committee could have gone to those countries, that might have found favour with the rest of the committee.
I simply want to make the point that, had we had more time, we might like to have heard from other witnesses. Several witnesses said—
Will the member take an intervention?
No, if the member does not mind I would like to get on with my speech.
Several witnesses said that there is always a danger that Scotland will become the safe haven in the world. I do not accept that argument. If only a minority of countries have signed up to universal jurisdiction, it must follow that any country that is not signed up could also be a safe haven for international criminals. The Scottish Human Rights Centre and others have urged Scotland to take a lead. That is a perfectly acceptable request, as it is acceptable for us to go down that road, even although England and Wales have not adopted universal jurisdiction. Jim Wallace rightly said that one consideration for the committee is that it would be contrary to the principles of Scots law to adopt universal jurisdiction. That has to be a consideration, given that the committee said that it wants to protect the principles of Scots law.
One of the questions that gives rise to concern is the scenario that has been put to us many times: a Scottish national who has played a minor role in a war crime may be living in Scotland alongside someone who has had a more senior role in a war crime and who cannot be prosecuted by the Scottish courts. It is a nonsense to ignore the diplomatic issues that would arise if Scotland gave itself the powers to prosecute a person who is not a UK national. As France is not signed up to universal jurisdiction, if we were to prosecute a French national, there would be international problems with France as a result.
I am unclear as to whether Pauline McNeill is speaking as convener of the Justice 2 Committee. The last point that she made is not the view of the committee.
When I began to speak about universal jurisdiction, I made clear that the views that I was about to express were my personal views. The committee report shows that the committee was undecided on that matter. We wish to press Scottish ministers today to give us some convincing arguments as to why Scotland should not adopt universal jurisdiction.
Will Pauline McNeill also accept that the idea of the safe haven cannot apply if, under the UK act, a request is made by the international criminal court to execute a warrant for the arrest of a person who is to be prosecuted? Such a warrant can be effected in Scotland, as it can in any other part of the United Kingdom. One advantage of having an international criminal court is that there will be fewer safe havens, as the international criminal court will have its jurisdiction on a more universal basis.
Before Pauline McNeill responds, I want to clarify that the debate is a Parliament and not a committee debate. Pauline McNeill is opening for the Labour party. I remind her that she is in her last minute.
I said earlier that I do not accept that Scotland would be the only safe haven. However, there are a number of points on which ministers are to be pressed.
I return to Lyndsay McIntosh's point about residency. Given the problems of defining UK residency, if we are not to adopt universal jurisdiction we need to have guidance on how that will be adopted in practice. As yet, we have not had those answers.
The bill is important because taking part in the prosecution of international crimes is an important and progressive principle. A number of technical issues need to be addressed. We should continue to debate the issue of universal jurisdiction until we are satisfied that, if we adopt it, we will have done the right thing under Scots law, whether or not England and Wales have adopted that principle.
I, too, echo comments that have been made about the time constraints that led to difficulties for the Justice 2 Committee. I want to underline that committees cannot continue to be put into that situation. We had only two evidence-taking sessions, held on 9 and 15 May, on what is a complex matter, one that was made more complex because of the interaction with UK legislation.
In paragraph 9 of our report, we make a recommendation to the minister. We said:
"The Committee also recommends as best practice that, where there is parallel UK and Scottish legislation as in this case, both sets of legislation should be considered simultaneously. This would ensure compatibility between them and allow the highest level of scrutiny, to the benefit of both pieces of legislation."
I would like to hear whether the minister has considered that part of our report.
Much has been said on the subject of universal jurisdiction. At this stage in the debate, I pity the speakers who are coming behind me, as I do not know what will be left in the pickings. Dr Scobbie, reader in international law at the University of Glasgow, gave us interesting evidence on the subject of universal jurisdiction. He said:
"The trend is in favour of universal jurisdiction. The problems arise if we stay with the bill as drafted and go for a very vague notion of asserting jurisdiction on the basis of residence. What does residence mean? That is problematic. Residence means different things in different situations."
Dr Scobbie also highlighted the fact that a bill that covers universal jurisdiction is going through the Norwegian Parliament. He said:
"A coalition of non-governmental organisations put a strong argument to the Norwegian Parliament that Norway should adopt universal jurisdiction."—[Official Report, Justice 2 Committee, 9 May 2001; c 164.]
I say to Pauline McNeill that we could have made a quick trip to Norway to take evidence. That would not have given us such a big bill as going to New Zealand.
A committee has used videoconferencing.
No. I do not want a videoconference. I want a trip. So far, as a member of the Justice 2 Committee, I have visited only prisons—in a professional capacity I hasten to add.
The problems of residence were put to us clearly in evidence. I quote from paragraph 17 of the report:
"The Law Society of Scotland noted that the difficulty with residence was that it was not a common concept in criminal law … Residence is interpreted differently in different legislation … for the purposes of taxation law."
I also refer to the quotation about universal jurisdiction that Lyndsay McIntosh included:
"we should not be shy about embracing it if there is the political will."—[Official Report, Justice 2 Committee, 15 May 2001; c 187.]
We are stuck at that point. The International Criminal Court Act 2001 has not dealt with universal jurisdiction. We are not being given an honest chance to explore or consider universal jurisdiction. That is my view.
The minister refers to paragraph 25 of the committee's report, which says:
"We consider it preferable that there is internal consistency within domestic law, rather than trying to harmonise with the International Criminal Court in circumstances where that is not required."
It is naughty of the minister to refer to that, because it is under the heading "Age of criminal responsibility". That was the area in which we were concerned about seepage. We were concerned about effecting such seepage, particularly in the current climate of opinion about the age of criminal responsibility. We were not referring to universal jurisdiction. We make the point clearly on universal jurisdiction that we did not have a proper opportunity to investigate it. I have no doubt that I and other SNP members will return to the matter at stage 2.
I have one final point, which is very important. It was made to us in passing. I do not know whether I can find it—I have so many bits of paper. I would like the minister to comment on the point because we did not follow it up. It is about extradition. Asked about extradition and extradition warrants, Dr Scobbie said:
"It depends on how a country's extradition system is set up. Currently, in the United Kingdom there is Executive discretion in deciding whether to extradite. I believe that the extradition law will be changed to remove that discretion."—[Official Report, Justice 2 Committee, 9 May 2001; c 165.]
We did not follow that up because of the constraints of time. The minister might like to comment on those remarks.
As probably the newest member of the Justice 2 Committee, I found it interesting to be launched straight into the investigation into the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill. Listening to the speeches this morning, I note that we have all been quickly united by some concerns that have arisen. Members will forgive me if I repeat some of them. If we come at them from a slightly different angle, we may get to the bottom of some of the issues that remain.
The International Criminal Court Bill was introduced in Westminster on 14 December 2000. The International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill was introduced to the Scottish Parliament on 4 April 2001. I listened to what the minister said in his opening comments about the timing of the two Parliaments' consideration of those bills. It might have been more satisfactory if the two Parliaments had been able to consider the bills at similar times. That would have affected two of the issues that have arisen in the debate. One is universal jurisdiction. As that was not included in the International Criminal Court Act 2001, it would be inconsistent for us to proceed with universal jurisdiction through our deliberations. I will return to universal jurisdiction.
The Scottish Parliament has prided itself on consultation on legislation. We hear that only two of the 45 submissions received on the International Criminal Court Act 2001 were from Scottish organisations: the Law Society of Scotland and the Faculty of Advocates. The Justice 2 Committee has been able to hear evidence from additional witnesses. It might have been more effective for our UK colleagues to have had that evidence before they dealt with the International Criminal Court Act 2001 under the Sewel motion that was moved in the Parliament on 18 January.
I stress that I do not want to take powers away from Westminster. I want the two Parliaments to be able to work together to create the most effective legislation.
I will raise the two issues with which we have had most difficulty. They have already been raised but are in need of further examination. The first is universal jurisdiction. The possibility of loopholes has been raised. For example, it has been suggested that if somebody comes to the UK but is not resident, the lack of universal jurisdiction would make the UK a safe haven. I agree with the minister's response to that. Because a claim of residence would have to be interpreted in the courts, there are still discussions to be had on residence. That uncertainty may mean that the UK might not be seen as a safe haven.
Another possible loophole concerns two people who were involved in an offence, of whom one was resident and the other was not. They would have to be tried separately and might blame each other. That has happened in Scotland in recent years. We have not yet addressed that issue. Universal jurisdiction may address it.
Rosemarie McIlwhan from the Scottish Human Rights Centre said:
"The system would work if states tried only their nationals and residents".—[Official Report, Justice 2 Committee, 9 May 2001; c 155.]
However, she went on to say that universal jurisdiction would be of assistance. We still have some ground to cover on universal jurisdiction.
The other area in which we had difficulties was seepage. That came back to the age of criminal responsibility, as has just been mentioned. Dr Scobbie pointed out that
"all that means is that such people cannot be tried for crimes that are defined in the bill. People under 18 would still be liable for prosecution under common law."—[Official Report, Justice 2 Committee, 9 May 2001; c 161.]
There are still some issues about whether anything can be inferred on the age of criminal responsibility from the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill. The committee will need to discuss that further.
The establishment of the ICC is the right move. It can act as a deterrent or it can go to its full measures and try people. All the witnesses whom the Justice 2 Committee heard said that the establishment of the ICC was the right way to go. At stage 2, the committee will need to take further evidence and consider the issues that have been raised.
The Conservatives give a broad welcome to the international criminal court, which will bring justice to those who have committed crimes against humanity. We note that a court will be permanently situated in The Hague and that it will be in addition to and complement our own judicial system.
We understand that the international criminal court should be true to four principles. First, it should ensure that the work of the permanent court constitutes an effective deterrent to those who are minded to commit atrocities. Secondly, the court's jurisdiction should be sufficiently wide to end the charges of selective justice. Thirdly, the court should be based on fundamental principles of justice that are accepted globally. Fourthly, the court must be able to respond quickly in its capacity as a permanent institution.
Will the member give way?
I will give way briefly. I have a lot to say.
I simply want to add to the list of four basic principles. Does Lord James agree that completion of the abilities of the ICC would require the reconstitution of the war crimes unit of the police force?
That is for the minister to answer. To the best of my knowledge, if a crime such as Lockerbie is committed in the Scottish jurisdiction, the police have the resources to follow it up effectively. Whether there should be any adjustment to police structure is definitely for the minister to answer in his closing speech.
In our cautious support of the principle of the ICC, we are supporting the development of the precedent that was laid down at the end of the second world war, when the international court at Nuremberg tried and sentenced the Nazi war criminals. I believe that we were right to do that. Indeed, if we had not taken that action there would have been attempts to settle old scores by those who had been subject to bondage, cruelty, persecution, genocide and abominable treatment of all kinds. It is right that the ICC should exist, so that victims of oppression, degradation and inhumanity should not feel compelled to take the law into their own hands. The existence of the ICC makes it much easier for scars to be healed over a prolonged period, because justice is done and seen to be done.
Nonetheless, the bill gives rise to a number of questions. I will ask some of them. Will victims be able to bring their plights to the ICC and will prosecutions be launched on their behalf if circumstances warrant that? Will there be a sifting process to ensure that when an alleged victim has committed a crime, that victim, or victims with a grudge, cannot raise cases? Examples of that might be armed robbery or when police officers who are being threatened defend themselves. Surely if members of the army or the police defend themselves when lack of action would have cost them their lives, they should not be arraigned before the international court. I would be grateful if the Deputy First Minister will confirm that atrocities and genuine crimes against humanity rather than frivolous cases, and crimes of the kind that occurred in the case of Lockerbie will brought before the court.
Will the Deputy First Minister address in particular the vexed question of where jurisdiction will begin and end? That must be spelled out clearly, as there may be endless disputes if jurisdiction is in question. It appears that many countries will not recognise the court. Which countries will? Roseanna Cunningham said that one of the world's largest democracies, the United States of America, might not do so. The world's dictatorships, which do not have even extradition treaties with this country, are hardly likely to recognise the jurisdiction of the international court.
I would especially like to ask the Deputy First Minister how cases of conflict, where there is concurrent jurisdiction, would be resolved. In the case of Lockerbie, Scotland had jurisdiction. But America also had jurisdiction because the crime was committed on board an American airliner. The case was eventually tried in Holland. Many cases will involve reserved matters and international relations. The Lord Advocate was strongly opposed to a trial in Holland, but the influence of Robin Cook and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office played a key role in bringing the case to justice.
We would like to know how the costs and maintenance charges of the court will be paid for. Would we be expected to pay more than our fair share? How will the costs be allocated? We welcome in principle a measure that will be complementary to our national courts. In that welcome, we are supported by the law reform committee of the Law Society of Scotland, which says:
"the ICC will mark a move from a political to a judicial approach in the enforcement of international humanitarian law."
We support that and believe that the principle is good and worthy, even if there will inevitably be great difficulties with the practicalities, especially in relation to dictatorships.
The bill will provide reassurance and hope to vulnerable communities that are threatened with harassment, persecution and terror. At the end of the day, in the event of inhumanity rearing its ugly head, there is the hope that justice will be done.
In her opening remarks, Roseanna Cunningham described the establishment of the international criminal court as a lofty ideal of which we might fall somewhat short. I echo her sentiment that the fact that we may fall short of that ideal should not stop us trying to achieve it.
I agree with Christine Grahame that those of us who are further down the pecking order in the debate may go over some of the same ground as those who have spoken before us. I do not want to take up time unnecessarily, but I have three points to raise. The first, which has not really been touched on yet, is the deterrent effect of the establishment of the international criminal court. The way we proceed on the court—even though we are doing so about 50 years after we should have acted on the matter—is important.
The fact that we can have a system that may stop people committing the sort of atrocities that have been referred to is to be welcomed. That is why I was somewhat disappointed by Phil Gallie's intervention on the Minister for Justice: he seemed to say that there is a conflict between the resources that might be taken to implement prosecutions under the act, should it come into force, and what is going on in our domestic law and criminal procedures in Scotland. That was a bit of a red herring and it was unworthy of the debate—a debate that should perhaps be more concerned with the lofty ideals to which Roseanna Cunningham referred.
My second point is that one of the reasons people are talking so much about universal jurisdiction is that insufficient time was given to the Justice 2 Committee to tease out the pros and cons of the approach. Most of the evidence that was received was persuasive that universal jurisdiction would be a good thing. It should be acknowledged that four member states of the European Union have included it when they have ratified the international criminal court through their domestic law, but we have not fully heard the other side of the argument. Pauline McNeill touched on her reservations. For what it is worth, I am agnostic on the subject. We must return to the matter in greater detail at stage 2, as it is the issue that has given the committee the most difficulty in formulating its stage 1 report.
Finally, a small but important matter that exercised the committee at one point, although we later had it clarified, was the issue of private prosecution. The committee's attention was drawn to a difference between the UK act and the Scottish bill in that respect. Evidence received from Dr Scobbie of Glasgow University suggested that undertaking a private prosecution might be permissible under the bill. It would appear that there is a slight difference between the actions of the Attorney General in England and Wales and the Lord Advocate in Scotland. Although the wording in the two pieces of legislation is not entirely consistent, the effect may be the same.
Given the committee's lack of time and that the evidence, which suggested one thing, had to be clarified at a later stage, it is important that we return to the more substantive issues at stage 2.
While welcoming the initiative represented by the international criminal court, we should recognise the different nature of Scots law. It is essential for Scots law to be a party to any international treaty, in as much as Scots law informs any legal structures from a different perspective. It is a code very different from the Napoleonic code of France and the Roman code used in many other parts of Europe. Essentially, Scots law has influenced other legal codes over eight to nine centuries.
Our current legal system does not match the requirements of the circumstances we find ourselves in, specifically with regard to the use of extradition orders. Over my lifetime, without an international criminal court a number of cases in Scotland involving extradition and the committing of war crimes or crimes against humanity have failed to come to court and prosecution.
I am mindful of a case in 1975, for those who are old enough to remember it. A number of Scottish citizens were arrested and tried for war crimes in Angola in connection with the liberation war there. Others, who were not captured in Angola but came back to live in Scotland, effectively got off scot-free. If we had had the ICC then, we could have dealt with those individuals, who brought shame on this country. The fact that we had no treaty with the incoming Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola Government meant that the men were never extradited. Some of the crimes that they committed during the civil war in Angola were as appalling as the crimes of the Nazi war criminals who are living in Scotland.
That obviously brings me to the failures of extradition. We have a requirement to pass this bill, but I suggest that we must also look again at universal jurisdiction. We currently have a situation in Scotland where, despite our separate legal code, our international treaty obligations are the treaty obligations of the United Kingdom. Extradition therefore has to be processed initially through the Home Office.
I have to bring up the specific case of Antanas Gecas, the Nazi war criminal and murderer of Jewish and Belarussian citizens who lives in Edinburgh. An extradition order was served on the United Kingdom Home Office on 29 March. It was passed within a few days to the Crown Office, which sought clarification of the treaty with the Lithuanian Government. The Lithuanian Government tells me that it has given the clarification that was sought, but Antanas Gecas—
Will Mr Quinan give way?
I shall give way on that point.
I think that you should be a little careful when talking about this case, Mr Quinan.
That is the point that I wanted to make. Perhaps it would be in Lloyd Quinan's own interests to rephrase what he is saying about Mr Gecas. My interpretation of what he said is that he is suggesting that Mr Gecas is guilty. I suggest that he is alleged to have committed those crimes. It might be better for Lloyd to rephrase his comments.
I agree with that view. The word "alleged" would be helpful, Mr Quinan.
I fully appreciate what you and Phil Gallie are suggesting, Presiding Officer, but I refer you to Lord Milligan's 1992 defamation case judgment, when he made it very clear that he believes that Mr Gecas is guilty. If, on the basis that he is being defamed by me here in this chamber today, Mr Gecas wishes to take me to court, I will be more than happy to go to court and stand by exactly what I am saying at the moment, because Antanas Gecas is a Nazi war criminal who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.
I think that you should now move on, Mr Quinan.
That case makes it clear to us that extradition is not the best means by which to deal with cases of crimes against humanity or war crimes. At the institution of the bill, I urge the Executive to look again at the concept of universal jurisdiction. The introduction of the bill will take away some of the shame that is upon this country for our failure to recognise our international obligations and to hand over Nazi war criminals to the countries where they committed those crimes.
We start from the basic presumption that anything that will deter genocide and crimes against humanity is a good thing. We can all cheerfully and willingly sign up to that principle, but we must recognise that a number of issues have to be addressed.
I agree with Scott Barrie that the bill will be a deterrent, but to what extent I am a little uncertain. If we examine the lamentable catalogue of human crime over the past 60 or 70 years and those who have perpetrated it, we find not only that they were bad and evil people but that they were also, in many cases, mad and psychotic—from Hitler, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot and Idi Amin to the warlords of Rwanda. The list is endless. I am not convinced that those people would have been deterred by the principles that we are debating today, but that does not mean that the principles are not correct.
The idea is that the court's principles will be based on a global principle of fundamental justice. Again, we can all quite cheerfully and willingly sign up to that, but I suggest that there is a degree of selective justice, which is inevitable given the vast number of nations that have not, as yet, signed up to it.
I listened carefully to the words of Kofi Annan as enunciated by Roseanna Cunningham. They express lofty and worthwhile principles. I wonder how many members of the United Nations carry out those principles in their own jurisdictions. A considerable number do not. The legislation is to be applied even-handedly. Are we seriously suggesting that a warrant might be issued for the President of the People's Republic of China to be arraigned before the international court in The Hague? That simply would not happen, but it does not necessarily mean that we should not advance the bill further.
A great many technicalities will have to be addressed at stage 2. I listened with interest to the comments about the limited time available to the Justice 2 Committee to address the issues when the bill first came before it. I certainly hope that more thorough scrutiny will be undertaken at stage 2. I have no doubt that reassurances on that will be forthcoming. The difficulties are complex and must be reconciled. The issue of resources has been dealt with. I do not think that that is a matter that need concern us too deeply at this time. Nevertheless, we must recognise that there is a resource implication and that we may have to take corrective action.
What worries me more than anything else is just how effective the bill will be. Let us examine the situation that arose in Rwanda. Many of us will remember the stark horror of the newsreel film of that conflict. It is hard to understand that people can behave in such an inhuman manner. The causes of that conflict—like many others in the third world and nearer to home—were steeped in ethnic and tribal hatreds that have advanced over the centuries. There is always the possibility that attempts will be made to use international tribunals to settle old scores. There will be severe evidential difficulties to overcome. It is questionable whether they will ever be overcome. That must be taken into consideration.
The question of jurisdiction and extradition procedures has not been resolved. That, too, will have to be considered. We have to ask whether this is a principle that is worth pursuing. I think we take the view, almost unanimously, that it is worth pursuing—but we should not delude ourselves by thinking that there are not considerable difficulties and technicalities to overcome. We must recognise that the international criminal court may not be terribly effective in achieving what we are seeking to do.
I want to comment on what Bill Aitken said about the difficulties in the bill that remain to be ironed out. I am not referring only to universal jurisdiction, which has taken up most of this morning's debate: there are many more areas of detail that need to be considered at stage 2.
Several members have suggested that we are in a pickle tackling the huge concept behind this important piece of legislation. We are squeezed for time because we must march in step with the UK legislation. Well, why? Is it not more important to get it right than to get it at the right time? I know that there is a desire to be among the first 60 signatories to the statute, but we will probably manage that anyway without too much trouble. It is much more important that we get it right, rather than at the right time. We are altogether far too mindful of Robin Cook's late signing and decision to bring a bill into the Westminster system. We should determine our own timetable, which should be conditioned by doing things to the best possible standard in producing legislation, particularly legislation that will take part of Scotland into the international arena. We should not short-change ourselves or our legislation.
It is pretty obvious from what the minister said this morning that the absence of universal jurisdiction from the Scottish bill is entirely due to the fact that it is not in the UK legislation. We must ask why it is not in the UK legislation, because many of the countries whose legal systems and societies the UK has influenced have adopted that principle without any problem at all.
Many of our new partners in the European Union have adopted the principle of universal jurisdiction. Why have we not? Could that indicate a parallel with what Roseanna Cunningham suggested might underlie the United States' decision not to sign up—if we no longer have victor's justice, but have the concept of victim's justice in international law, a number of people could be called to account, such as Henry Kissinger for his policies in Cambodia?
We should not be too sniffy about this. People in the former Yugoslavia have been indicted under current international criminal law, but NATO has not. If the universal jurisdiction that we are asking for existed and there was equity in apportioning blame for acts that were outwith what we would consider the usual rules of warfare, NATO might well have been indicted for the type of bombing it undertook in Serbia.
The UK might have a vested interest in ensuring that there is not universal jurisdiction. Is that why the UK Government is fighting shy of it? Even if it is, we should not fight shy of it; that would be wrong. We are trying to right the world's ills in this bill. We are trying to make justice equitable throughout the world, so our actions should be conditioned only by what would be the right thing to do. It is rather feeble for Jim Wallace—a man whom I admire in this field of activity—to say that universal jurisdiction would compromise the principles of Scots law. It would enhance the principles of Scottish justice. That is why we want to see it incorporated. I presume that that is why Alastair Duff from the Law Society of Scotland made it clear on page 76 of the Justice 2 Committee's report that lawyers such as him, who share with the Minister for Justice an appreciation of Scots law and a determination to protect it, believe that universal jurisdiction is "a matter of policy", which is for politicians to decide.
It is right that we spend time discussing universal jurisdiction. We all have our own reasons for wanting to examine it. The key reason is that the witnesses have asked us to consider that, when there is a non-UK national, we might not be able to prosecute. That is why I am interested in the issue of residence. Does the member agree that if we define properly what we mean by residency, it might be possible to achieve part of the objective because a non-UK national could be prosecuted if they remained in Scotland for a certain period of time? There has to come a point when a person who is living in Scotland—even if they are not a UK national—can be prosecuted because they are deemed to be resident. When they are deemed to be resident we are able to prosecute them. Does the member agree that there might be ways other than universal jurisdiction to deal with this point?
With all due respect to the convener of the Justice 2 Committee, that would not clear up the anomalies that we have uncovered in the brief discussion this morning and that the committee began to find in its pre-legislative scrutiny.
After reading the evidence and listening to the witnesses, I think that the most effective way of introducing the concept of deterrence—presumably that is one of the reasons we want to introduce international criminal legislation—is to make the law as simple as we can so that it is understood throughout the world that no one who breaks it is safe anywhere. The notion of universal jurisdiction is simpler and easier to apply than residency tests and so forth.
I am asking, as I did at the start of my speech, for more time to consider the bill. Please do not be influenced too much by the UK Government's requirements. That is not a narrow nationalist point; it is an internationalist point. This is international legislation so we should be looking to the rest of the world, not only to London.
Some pertinent points have been made in the debate—especially by Bill Aitken—about the effectiveness of the apparatus that we seek to set up. He said that dictatorships might not co-operate with it. That is true. It is also true that the Government of Israel would not co-operate with it now. We do not consider it to be a dictatorship. However, a signal would be sent out that the perpetrators of the barbarities that are currently being carried out in some parts of the middle east would not be safe for all time. That is another reason for introducing the bill.
On resourcing, we should not think small. One of the gifts that we tell ourselves we give the world is our humanity as expressed through our legal system. We should not think small by being concerned about what the Procedures Committee, or whoever doles out the money, would say about our asking a visitor from New Zealand or Norway to tell us what their thinking is on the matter. This is not small legislation; please do not think small about introducing it.
I congratulate the Justice 2 Committee, of which I admit to being a less than perfect member, on the work that it has done on the bill. Rather than sharing the concern that some colleagues have expressed about what has been contributed to the committee evidence and today's proceedings, I think that many members have shown a commendable grasp of an extremely complex and difficult matter.
In Margo MacDonald's words, we should not think small; we should think international. That was reflected in the honour that was bestowed on the Parliament yesterday by the President of South Africa, which Pauline McNeill mentioned. He challenged the Parliament to think international and to be international in its outlook. By enshrining the bill in Scots law, we take a step towards meeting that challenge.
Roseanna Cunningham began by quoting Kofi Annan. I want to reiterate the point that she made. He said that we should seek
"to ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta and no army anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity."
That assurance is at the heart of the measures that we seek to introduce through the bill. We should take an international approach—a joint approach. The Minister for Justice, when he introduced the bill this morning, listed those countries that have ratified the Rome statute. To answer Lord James Douglas-Hamilton's fair point about those that have not yet ratified, nations and countries that want to ratify must put as great a moral pressure as possible on those who have decided not to be part of the process.
The Deputy First Minister mentioned that four of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have signed the treaty. The one that has not is the United States. Several members have mentioned the position that the US has taken on this matter. The US has not always been reluctant to get involved in establishing an international criminal jurisdiction to deal with crimes against humanity. The Americans persuaded Churchill and the British Government to bring top Nazis to justice, rather than lining them up against a wall and shooting them as a political act.
The US is keen to ensure that any steps that it takes do not result in a denial of due process to its own citizens. However, its current stance does little to protect American citizens. States that adhere to the Rome statute will be able to prosecute American citizens under their domestic arrangements, whether or not the United States decides to adhere to the system. It will be open to the international criminal court to prosecute American citizens who have committed international criminal offences. It is therefore hard to see the argument that lies behind the current American position. All of us who want to bring moral pressure to bear on states who have yet to take the step of ratification would want to make that point to the United States and the new American Administration.
There has been a detailed discussion this morning of universal jurisdiction. I will review a couple of the points that I think are important. Scott Barrie made the fair point that there will be an opportunity at stage 2 to properly scrutinise these matters, take more evidence and reflect on the fact that, in the pre-legislative scrutiny at stage 1, the Justice 2 Committee heard one side of the argument from several witnesses and the other from the ministerial team. However, as Iain Gray said in response to Phil Gallie, there appears to be a contradiction between upholding the traditions and principles of Scots law and moving considerably beyond that approach. Perhaps the committee should spend some time considering that during stage 2.
Pauline McNeill made an important point about safe havens, into which category the nations that have not chosen to ratify will logically fall.
Mary Mulligan highlighted the importance of UK legislatures dealing in parallel with the timing and scrutiny of the bill to ensure consistency. As Scott Barrie rightly pointed out, there will be an opportunity to develop those issues at stage 2, and I am sure that the committee will do so.
The committee has also highlighted time constraints and the pressure to produce reports in order to meet the ratification objectives. However, it is invariably the case that members on the Opposition benches will criticise the timing of such matters. Furthermore, I imagine that many will wish to jump up and down and say that the Parliament and the Executive have not done what needs to be done to ratify the statute, especially since—as Roseanna Cunningham said—the Irish Prime Minister is visiting the Parliament next week and Ireland has already ratified the statute. Such an obvious example will be brought to everyone's attention, and it is important to bear in mind that there is a balance to these arguments.
As Margo MacDonald pointed out, Bill Aitken made an important point about the effectiveness of the ICC. It would be helpful if the committee could take evidence on that at stage 2 and I hope that such an opportunity presents itself.
It is a matter of regret that international law has been impotent in the face of the most monstrous crimes in history, committed in the previous century. Surely it is right to do more than simply denounce such offences. We must address our failure to bring to justice the Pol Pots, the Idi Amins, the Saddam Husseins and others whose names will reverberate throughout history for the atrocities they have perpetrated. The bill gives us the chance to take appropriate action, and I urge the chamber to endorse the stage 1 proceedings.
Before I call Phil Gallie, I should tell any whips in the chamber that we are about half an hour ahead of ourselves and I therefore expect the debate on the Procedures Committee report to start at around 11:35.
All members broadly support the bill, which is the correct approach. Lord James Douglas-Hamilton highlighted several key points about the ICC. First, it will be a permanent court that will provide an effective deterrent. At the same time, however, I wonder just how much of a deterrent it will be, given the number of countries that are not ratifying the treaty. The fact that those who are likely to commit the crimes and abuses that the bill addresses will try to find shelter in such countries is an issue that the international community will have to address in the longer term. I welcome the UK's commitment to ratify the treaty and commit to the ICC, because the fact that countries are signing up to the idea is perhaps a step along the road.
Although I acknowledge Margo MacDonald's position, Scotland is not ratifying the treaty itself. We are adding to a UK act and once we have done that the UK will take the matter forward.
I could not disagree more with Phil Gallie. We are not adding to a UK act. Scotland is contributing to an international cause. We are not tail-end Charlies. We are seeking to place our distinctive legal system on the world stage—where it should be—so that it can make a contribution.
I accept Margo MacDonald's point. There is no doubt that Scots law is distinct from the legal system in England and Wales. However, the UK Government will ratify the treaty and commit us to the ICC. Of course, Scotland will play its part and the Parliament will send a clear message today about Scotland's commitment to the principles of the bill and the ICC.
Roseanna Cunningham made a very good point about the number of countries that have agreed in principle to the ICC, but that have not yet ratified the treaty. We will wait with some interest to find out how many countries will commit in future.
Instead of repeating many of the arguments that have been made, I will make some points that the minister might address in his summing-up. First, Scotland has recently incorporated the European convention on human rights. Part 3 of the bill, however, mentions prisoners serving out ICC sentences in Scotland. Although I recognise that almost all European countries have signed up to the ECHR, other countries outside Europe might not have done so, which means that their systems of sentencing could well be different. How would that affect prisoners who are convicted under ICC sentencing policy and who return to Scotland, as far as our recently-adopted sentencing policies are concerned? I ask the minister to address that serious question.
Much concern has been expressed this morning about the important issue of universal jurisdiction and it is regrettable that the Justice 2 Committee did not have more time to investigate it any further. I return to comments made by Margo MacDonald and others about various individuals who could perhaps escape justice if we do not accept universal jurisdiction. However, I will mention a slightly controversial name. We have recently signed agreements that will lead to the creation of a council of the isles in the UK. What would happen if Martin McGuinness were to come to Scotland and be charged under the bill by a private witness?
Will the member give way?
I will give way to Lloyd Quinan in a moment. I ask that particular question to highlight one of the dangers of signing up to universal jurisdiction. I will mention one or two other reservations in a moment, but I will now give way to Lloyd.
Mr Quinan indicated disagreement.
Fair enough. I am sorry that I allowed that point to run on so long after he wanted to intervene.
I believe that a number of other dangers might be built into the concept of universal jurisdiction. For a start, the bill's specific cost implications have not been identified. Although the minister accepts the bill as it currently stands, the cost of accepting universal jurisdiction might well be exorbitant. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why the ministers have hung back on that issue, and I ask Iain Gray to address that point in his summing-up.
Scott Barrie said that it was unfortunate that I had raised the issue of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service. It might be unfortunate, but I am trying to address the issues in a practical way. We cannot just bury our heads in the sand. The minister will mention additional costs in his summing-up. As he well knows, introducing such legislation will mean additional resource implications for the COPFS and the police. Will Angus MacKay address such costs in his motion on the bill's financial resolution? We must seriously address such points as we proceed with the matter.
I have some concerns about the points that Christine Grahame raised on the age of criminal responsibility. The minister is currently intent on protecting the Scottish position. I welcome that. On that basis, the minister will have our support.
There is another area about which I have some concerns. I recognise that I am over time, Presiding Officer, but you said that we were running early. I was taking advantage of that.
We do not have an infinity of time, Mr Gallie.
That is unfortunate, because I have an infinity of notes. However, I respect what the Presiding Officer says.
I want to make a point about our armed services and the places where they serve. Currently, our armed services operate under the laws of the country in which they are serving. I believe that armed services personnel face up to their responsibilities and that the military accepts the jurisdiction of the areas in which it operates. However, I am concerned that, for example, Argentinians who have complaints against soldiers who served in the Falklands might take those up if a former soldier went on holiday to Spain, which has accepted universal jurisdiction. People with complaints might feel that, irrespective of the time that has passed, they could proceed with charges against soldiers who were involved in the Falklands escapade and against whom no charges had been brought under the jurisdiction of the land in which they were operating. That is a serious point that the minister may want to pick up in his closing remarks.
The Justice 2 Committee has a massive responsibility at stage 2. A range of issues will have to be debated in detail. Perhaps the convener will allow me to poke my nose in on occasion.
I call Michael Matheson to wind up on behalf of the Scottish National Party.
I welcome the debate. Several members said that they were finding it difficult to make new points, given the speeches that had already been made. I hope, therefore, that members will have sympathy for those of us who have to close the debate.
I welcome the fact that we will be among the first 60 countries to ratify the treaty. The Westminster act was given royal assent at the beginning of May. I particularly welcome the fact that we are dealing today with a distinctive Scottish bill. That highlights the fact that Scots law has a long, proud tradition and that it is held in high regard internationally.
Margo MacDonald made an important point in response to a comment by Phil Gallie. She noted that Scotland has a distinctive contribution to make to an international criminal court. I am sure that all members welcome the fact that the bill will make genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity offences under Scots law. We all recognise that there should be no hiding place anywhere for individuals who perpetrate such crimes.
A recurring issue in the debate, which also featured in the Justice 2 Committee's report, is that of time constraints. Several committee members highlighted that in their speeches. It is disappointing that we return to that problem time and again. We must ensure that our committees are given sufficient time at stage 1 to scrutinise legislation appropriately. If we do not provide them with the opportunity to do that, we undermine some of the founding principles on which the Parliament is based.
I do not believe that it is acceptable that we should be debating a distinctive Scottish bill, but having to content ourselves with the consultation exercise that was undertaken for the Westminster bill. We should have had proper consultation for the Scottish bill. The fact that only two Scottish organisations made submissions as part of the Westminster consultation process raises serious concerns.
Mary Mulligan claimed that a considerable amount of consultation took place for the UK bill. However, this chamber is concerned with the Scottish legislation. It is incumbent on us to ensure that there is proper public consultation on the bill. Scotland has a distinctive legal system, and we have a responsibility to ensure that any legislation that will affect it is properly consulted on and scrutinised. The Justice 2 Committee has recognised that by suggesting how the problem could have been addressed. The two pieces of legislation should have been debated in parallel. While the International Criminal Court Act 2001 was going through Westminster, this bill could have been going through the Scottish Parliament. We could have considered the two bills in tandem. I would like to hear the minister's comments on that. We have a recurring problem of lack of time for some committees to consider legislation, but we never seem to come up with a solution to it.
Tavish Scott raised the issue of the consultation period and noted that Ireland has already ratified the treaty. He suggested that if we had not pushed ahead with the bill, the SNP would have complained that the Executive was taking too long to deal with it. No one would seriously suggest that two weeks for a committee to carry out stage 1 consideration of a bill is sufficient. We must ensure that the committees are protected and given time to carry out their role.
As several members have indicated, there is international experience of universal jurisdiction on which we could draw. New Zealand, some Scandinavian countries and Canada have all introduced universal jurisdiction. I would not advocate committees heading off to places such as New Zealand and Canada—
Why not?
Mr Jackson may suggest that, but I am not inclined to do so in the chamber. One committee has already used the Parliament's videoconferencing facility. That gives committees an opportunity to find out from other countries what their experience has been. We should not shy away from that when we are considering legislation.
Concern has also been expressed about the procedures for the ICC and the fact that the delegation from the UK will be UK-led. There is a concern that Scotland's distinctive legal system could be forgotten. The Justice 2 Committee summed that up well when it stated:
"‘UK courts' or ‘UK law' is a meaningless concept."
It is important that ministers ensure that the Scottish legal system is properly represented in any discussions that take place on establishing procedures for the ICC.
A number of members raised the issue of universal jurisdiction. There are concerns about whether we should adopt that or whether we should follow the course proposed in the bill. I regard that question much as I regard the debate about whether we should establish a human rights commission. In this chamber I pointed out that the founding principles of any human rights commission would be the Paris principles. Those are the minimum standard that we should set ourselves. The same issue was highlighted in evidence that was given recently to the Justice 1 Committee. When considering the establishment of an international criminal court and the practice that we should adopt in Scotland, we should aspire not to a minimalist approach but to the highest possible standard.
It is incumbent on the Executive and those who oppose the introduction of universal jurisdiction to provide good reasons for their stance. The Executive has not yet done that. I cannot see any evidence in the report of the Justice 2 Committee that suggests that we should not introduce universal jurisdiction.
Like Phil Gallie, I believe that the Justice 2 Committee has a considerable amount of work to do at stage 2, giving the limited time that was available to it at stage 1. A number of issues will require detailed consideration. However, I wish the committee well in the course of its consideration. I am pleased to say that the SNP will support the general principles of the bill.
I repeat the Deputy First Minister's thanks to the Justice 2 Committee for its consideration of the bill and for the comments and conclusions that are contained in its report.
Much criticism has been voiced about the timetable and the time that the committee had available for its consideration of the bill. It has been claimed that the bill was rushed through unnecessarily. However, I remind members that Jim Wallace sympathised with that point in his opening speech. It is ironic that such criticism was heard today from Roseanna Cunningham, who, during last year's debate on the legislative programme, was somewhat disparaging of the priority that had been given to the bill. The International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill is the first bill to be considered by the new Justice 2 Committee, which was set up to try to expedite business. It is therefore not true to say that no measures have been taken to address the problems of timing.
As many members have said, the bill is complex. It needed careful preparation and involves complicated cross-border provisions. Moreover, it followed the UK bill for good reasons. The two bills together had to provide a watertight package throughout the UK and, in preparing the Scottish bill, we have been able to take account of relevant developments in the passage of the UK bill. I see nothing wrong in that, as this is legislation for the world—the world that we live in, not the one that Opposition members would like to see. I agree with Phil Gallie, if only because that gives me the chance to say how pleased I am to see him back here with us, where he belongs.
As I said, we have some sympathy with the point about the tight timetable. Nevertheless, as many members have indicated, that is at least partly a consequence of the requirement for the UK to be among the first 60 nations to ratify the treaty. The Executive's desire for us to be among those first 60 nations comes not simply from our wish to express political willingness or to secure good public relations in playing our part in ratifying the treaty; the first 60 nations will form the assembly of state parties that will have a key role in shaping the structures and procedures of the new court. It is therefore more than important that the UK is among the first 60 nations to ratify the treaty. Pressure has been created by the fact that many countries are ratifying the treaty more quickly than was first anticipated. That is a welcome development, but it means that we must ensure that our ratification happens as quickly as possible.
I am pleased to close this debate, as I spent many years, in my previous job, campaigning for the formation of a criminal court. In the course of that work, I saw the after-effects of war crimes and genocide—the continuing effects some 20 years after the crimes took place in Cambodia and the situation in Rwanda only a couple of months after a significant proportion of the population had been murdered and more had been displaced from the country. The poet Hugh MacDiarmid wrote of the tragedy of an unevolved people. Perhaps he had in mind something closer to home, but anyone who was in Kigali—a city emptied of its people—in late 1994 will recognise what he meant.
The truth is that tyrants stalked such countries for 50 years after the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials, secure in the knowledge that they would never be held to account. Happily, for some of them that assumption proved to be wrong. Even in Cambodia, where Pol Pot escaped trial, the likes of Khieu Samphan eventually did not. Nevertheless, the difficulty and delay in setting up the specific tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate powerfully the need for a standing court and properly codified procedures.
We do not believe that the ICC will be some sort of panacea, as some members have said. It will not immediately put an end to war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. However, it should be remembered that the Yugoslav and Rwandan tribunals have led to a former Bosnian Serb president handing herself in and a former Rwandan prime minister pleading guilty to genocide. We can be too cynical about the impact that the ICC can have, and Pauline McNeill is right to say that the establishment of a permanent court after 50 years of gestation will be a significant step in the right direction.
I appreciate the fact that the minister has tremendous experience in this field, which many of us do not have. Nevertheless, does he agree that there is still an element of victor's justice in tribunals such as those that were set up for the former Yugoslavian territories, in which the only people who were arraigned came from the losing side? Many people throughout the world argue that the actions that were undertaken by NATO should be subjected to the same sort of scrutiny.
The key principle of any law is that it should apply equally to everyone. The infrastructures and codes of practice should be in place to ensure that anyone who is guilty of a war crime or genocide can be brought to justice. That is the purpose of our debate today.
The central issue in the debate has been universal jurisdiction. Jim Wallace and other members have put forward the Executive's arguments, but I shall summarise them. There are three reasons for opposing universal jurisdiction, which bear repetition, because Margo MacDonald, for one, seems not to have heard them. The first is that we should not accept universal jurisdiction unless it is clearly the will of the international community, as expressed in the treaty, that we do so. We have recognised that the clear will of the international community is not to incorporate universal jurisdiction in the ICC.
Both Mr Wallace and Iain Gray have referred to the general attitude of the international community. What test will they use to decide whether we should accept universal jurisdiction?
The test of international consensus in this case has been the Rome statute. The treaty does not require universal jurisdiction, unlike previous treaties in which the position was different.
The second argument against universal jurisdiction is the principle of territoriality in Scots law. Many members have spoken of the importance of maintaining the fundamental principles of Scots law in the bill, and territoriality is a fundamental principle of our law. The third argument concerns the practical difficulties of raising a prosecution in a case in which there are only tentative links to Scotland, and doing so within the strict time limits that are stipulated in Scots legal procedure.
Will the minister give a definition of residence, as no one has given us one? A key problem, which was raised by Dr Scobbie, is the fact that there is no definition of residence in criminal law. Will the minister give us such a definition now?
Nonetheless, the concept of residence, as interpreted by the courts, exists in other legislation—for example, in the Sex Offenders Act 1997 and the War Crimes Act 1991. There is no reason why that concept cannot be included in the bill.
Will the minister give way?
Given the time constraints, I should move on.
Of the three arguments, the most important is that which concerns international consensus. We should act according to, and reflect, that consensus. Reference has been made to evidence that was given to the committee that appeared to suggest that many other countries were accepting universal jurisdiction, but the situation is less than clear. An example that has been cited repeatedly is that of Canada, whereas, in fact, Canada has opted not for full universal jurisdiction, but for jurisdiction over persons who are present in Canada. I agree that that is different from what we propose, but nonetheless it is not universal jurisdiction. We know that other countries, such as France, will not accept universal jurisdiction and we understand that Australia will adopt the same position.
Neither our legal traditions nor the obligations that are placed on us by our international agreements support the arguments for universal jurisdiction. It is wrong to say that the bill represents the minimum standard for compliance. The Rome statute does not require domestic legislation to take jurisdiction over war criminals and many countries will ratify the statute without passing substantive domestic legislation.
In response to James Douglas-Hamilton and Phil Gallie, I point out that the combination of our domestic law and the ratification of the statute gives the reassurance that was sought. Our bill and the UK act together mean that there is no possible scenario in which the ICC would have jurisdiction over a British national or serviceman while the British courts did not. If serious allegations were made against British servicemen, the UK authorities would examine them. There is nothing new in that situation.
I do not have time to deal with all the issues that were raised in today's debate. However, in the stage 2 debate in the committee, we will address the concerns that have been expressed.
The key principle of the debate today is that the Scottish Executive is fully committed to playing its part in bringing the ICC into being. That is a noble purpose. We believe that the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill will allow us to fulfil that commitment and that, along with the International Criminal Court Act 2001, it will enable us to be among the first 60 countries to ratify the Rome statute and will bring nearer the day that the ICC is established.
I am pleased to note that, despite the concerns that have been raised today, the Justice 2 Committee's report recommends agreement with the general principles of the bill. I am happy to commend the bill to the Parliament this morning.