Enterprise and Culture Committee,

Meeting date: Tuesday, May 2, 2006

Official Report 339KB pdf

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Bankruptcy and Diligence etc (Scotland) Bill: Stage 1

Given the time that we have, we wish at this stage in proceedings to narrow our discussion down to the key issues, or rather to highlight them. I have received a request from one committee member on the possibility of delaying our consideration of the bill until next week. From our point of view, as we are not having a session on Scottish Enterprise, that would not be a problem, provided we were pretty near to agreeing our report. I believe that the Deputy Minister for Enterprise and Lifelong Learning will be in Australia next week, however.

Yes, I will be.

That would make things quite difficult.

As part of our discussions, we can proceed with our report and we can pursue some more issues. It might be useful to start by asking the minister to focus on the areas where the Executive might be changing its mind, altering its position or drafting amendments. We have identified 14 major areas that we want to ask you about. I suspect that you are aware of most of them, as your officials have been listening to the evidence. It might be useful if you could kick off the discussion, minister. We can then try to clarify what the key areas are. Is that all right, Jamie?

I am happy with that as long as I can come in with a question.

Of course.

I am happy to proceed according to that constructive approach. There are certain areas where we are reviewing the current position with Cabinet colleagues, and that may or may not result in changes. I cannot give details on those today, although there are a couple of areas where I can say that we have decided to make changes, and I could indicate in general terms the areas where we are reviewing what might go into regulations, assuming that the powers are given to us. Perhaps we could have a useful discussion around that. The committee will have been subject to the same representations from various interests as we have.

Four principles guide us in that regard. There should be more sharing of information in the enforcement system, with better-quality information; old and arguably ineffective diligences should be modernised; barriers to business, which we talked about last time, should go; and the right balance should be struck between the interests of debtors and those of creditors.

On sharing better information, people are often surprised to learn that the Executive does not collect debts for people, never mind guarantee their payment. On occasion, that lack of understanding can cost people time and money. For instance, people who can pay their debt but who do not know that they can get money advice are less likely to get time to pay, meaning that they will struggle on in a situation that they would be better advised to get out of.

The bill will fix that situation by establishing the new and independent Scottish civil enforcement commission, which the committee has discussed; creating a new information disclosure scheme, which we feel is important; and making better use of our dealing with debt package, which is linked to all the new money advisers that we have set up over the past few years. We are looking at the matter as part of our review of the operation of the entire debt arrangement scheme.

Modernisation of the system has long been needed; indeed, the bill will repeal acts of the old Scottish Parliament. Perhaps that is appropriate in the year in which we celebrate the union of the Crowns.

The union of the Parliaments.

My mistake.

Did you use the word "celebrate", minister?

Indeed. How could I make that mistake?

We are sharpening old, but still effective tools. Moreover, the bill replaces adjudication with land attachment and residual attachment, and we are considering the implications of such measures for creditors and debtors. The bill also modernises the law on floating charges, helping businesses that lend or borrow money, and new diligences such as land attachment will make it harder for the "can pay, won't pays" to avoid their debts.

We need to strike the right balance. As I said at the beginning of the process, I intend to carry that approach through all three consideration stages. After listening to the concerns that have been expressed and considering the representations that we have received, I can say publicly that, in light of sheriff officers' concerns, we will change the name of the new profession to judicial officer. The new officers will be appointed by a senior judge on the recommendation of the Scottish civil enforcement commission. I know that, like me, the committee has received other representations. I hope that these measures will not only modernise but clarify the process.

We are looking closely at issues such as debt arrangement, land attachment and apparent insolvency and expect to bring forward proposals for members' consideration at the stage 1 debate.

Have you had time to look at the Finance Committee's report? If so, have its comments on the proposed new commission caused you to rethink that part of the bill?

In the light of others' comments, we looked again at the report. However, we still believe that the commission remains the best route for addressing these matters.

If the commission is the best route, what other options were considered?

The first option was, of course, to leave the existing system as it was. However, we were persuaded that that was not a good approach, and the committee has heard from witnesses who acknowledge that there are difficulties with the current regulation of enforcement and support the commission's establishment.

Once we had decided that it was best to reform this area, we considered a range of options from expanding the civil service and carrying out more work in-house to establishing a system of independent or quasi-independent regulators. For example, we considered whether it would be appropriate to add the functions to an existing public body such as the Scottish Court Service or the Accountant in Bankruptcy. We considered co-hosting the commission with an existing public body so that the commission would be a separate legal entity, but it would share offices with the Scottish Court Service or some other existing public body. The final option we considered was a fully independent commission, which is the model that appears in the bill. We considered six options in total, and I believe that a letter that sets those out will be sent to the committee so that you can see what they are and how we costed them.

The key point about value for money, which seems to be what you are driving at, but you will correct me if I am wrong—

It might be.

In that particular area, because we are dealing with court functions and because debt is a very large area of economic activity—hundreds of millions of pounds are at stake; the figures might be surprising—we concluded that by far the best way to tackle it was to have an independent commission that would be clearly separate from the Executive and which would have an independent voice. Most of the other options would not provide that. Compared with that of most of the other options, the additional cost of having an independent commission was getting on for £100,000 per year; I think that we projected a figure of £98,000. We concluded that that would be good value for money. Independence in this area is so important that it is worth paying that much extra over the other options that we considered, not least because as well as regulating court offices, which is the main thrust of what the commission will do, it will provide other information and research benefits and the kind of evidence-based policy to which we will all aspire in the future as well as today.

It will be interesting to receive that letter and to see the detailed analysis of the six different options. I am not necessarily persuaded that the commission's independence would be compromised by its cohabiting with another body in the same building. It might be that some economies could be gained through the sharing of some common resources, which could help to reduce the operating costs of such a body.

I was not persuaded of that either.

I was labouring under the misapprehension that the committee had received the letter, but obviously not. It will address in some considerable detail the issues that I and others have raised about the process, and I hope that it will allay some of the concerns that have been expressed about how we came to the conclusion that not only is this the optimum means of addressing the issue, but a cost-effective means of so doing.

I presume that we will have the letter before we start our stage 1 report.

I hope that it will be circulated before the Official Report is.

My second point is about land attachments and the introduction of a form of diligence in that area. The minister will be aware that the committee has expressed concerns about the matter and the possibility of someone's house being sold as part of the process of recovering debts that they have acquired.

I have no problem with someone who has accrued debts and has property being properly pursued for the recovery of the debts. I am, however, concerned about the possibility of a family losing their house and potentially being left homeless, especially if, under current homelessness legislation, they could be considered to be intentionally homeless. Minister, have you considered the possibility of some type of homelessness test for when this form of land attachment could be used, so that we can make sure that families do not find themselves being considered to be intentionally homeless if a land attachment is made on their property?

I undoubtedly share some of those concerns. Revisions have been made to current proposals on debtor protection and the provisions of the Mortgage Rights (Scotland) Act 2001.

We are considering land attachment more generally. If the measures in the bill were introduced, and if we compared what would probably happen here with what has happened south of the border, we might find that the number of people affected here was very small. However, I accept that among that cohort of people would be people whom no one in the process would wish to be made homeless. We have to consider the existing legislation on people's rights to be rehoused if they have found themselves in such a position. We also have to consider the interests of special groups of people within that cohort and ensure that the number of people affected is minimised. However, we have to do that in such a way as to ensure that the interests of creditors are protected—especially as there is support for debtor protection measures among creditors.

We propose a number of safeguards, not least of which is a process by which any land attachment could be stopped if the debtor entered into an arrangement through the debt arrangement scheme. That is tied into our general review of debt arrangement. We are considering ways of incentivising the process and avoiding the threat of land attachment.

I assure the committee that all those issues are being considered and that—if not at stage 1, shortly thereafter—we intend to introduce proposals that address all the concerns that have been raised.

That was a helpful answer.

My next question on this issue concerns the minimum level of debt that should enable a debtor's home to be sold. Have you decided what that minimum level of debt should be?

No, but we are considering whether the proposed minimum level is appropriate and how it relates to the minimum level for sequestration. The convener has raised a point in that regard and, without pre-empting the outcome of our considerations, that point has some merit.

Will that sort of information be available before we start stage 2?

It should be.

It will be or it should be?

It is not for me to say.

I would like to be able to give a definitive yes, but as I said when talking about judicial officers and appointments, I cannot give you a definitive yes. I would hope to be able to provide such information at stage 1, but the issue is out of my hands. It has to go through the Cabinet process for approval, which it does not yet have.

So if we do not have it by stage 2 we will blame the Cabinet.

I would hope and expect that you would have it by stage 1, not stage 2.

If I want to introduce amendments at stage 2, it is helpful if I understand where the Executive is going. The danger is that I could go away and expend energy drafting amendments only to find that the Executive intended to do everything that I wanted to be done anyway. I and other committee members would find it helpful if we could receive information as early as possible, before we start stage 2, so that we can decide whether we want to lodge amendments.

It would also make things easier from my point of view—I have been through this process before. I would want you to have information as early as possible so that, when you come to consider stage 2 amendments, you do so with the information that you need. That would help me as well as helping the committee.

It might be useful to mention the informal discussions that we have had about the timescale for stage 2. If we assume that the bill passes stage 1, I hope to take at stage 2 the second and third themes of the bill before the summer recess and the first and fourth themes—what you have said relates to them—after the summer recess. The likely changes are all to the first and fourth themes. You and I have discussed that informally.

I am happy with that.

Much depends on the Executive's processes. I am happy to share with the committee clerks our thinking about when we will release information, which depends on ministerial decisions. That might also assist the committee.

That would be extremely helpful.

I am confident that the timescale that you and we envisage can be met and that the process will be improved as a consequence. The last thing that I want is for members to produce stage 2 amendments that are uninformed by our proposals.

Many matters will not lend themselves to substantial amendment at stage 3 in such detail; amendment must happen at stage 2.

I agree entirely. We want to sort out matters as far as possible at stage 2.

I will take up an issue that relates to court or sheriff officers, which I raised at a previous meeting and which members will recall. What evidence led the Executive to say in paragraph 380 of the policy memorandum that each partner in an officer firm or sheriff officer will be required to be a messenger of court? I do not quite follow the logic. I note that Stirling Park referred to that in its evidence.

I am familiar with the representations that Stirling Park has made to the committee; it has made the same representations to me. I have said publicly that we do not intend to be restrictive. We want to take a flexible approach and we do not want anything that we introduce to interfere with officers' ability to function effectively. I ask Andy Crawley to outline the thinking behind our proposal.

Perhaps it would help if I gave an example, although I cannot use names because of confidentiality in the enforcement system. Two officers from a firm of sheriff officers were disciplined by the courts—the existing regulatory authority—for cutting corners in enforcement practices, which meant that debtors did not receive the notice that they needed to try to protect their position. The courts decided that a large part of the reason for cutting corners was the actions of the sheriff officer firm's owners. However, the owners were not sheriff officers or members of any other profession, so the courts could not discipline or regulate them. That is a structural problem in the enforcement system. People who make money from enforcement services are not necessarily subject to regulation, unlike their colleagues, which is wrong in principle. That is part of the evidential background to our decision to make the reform. I suggest that even one example was a sufficient reason for reviewing the policy.

Minister, you spoke about the debt arrangement scheme in a reply to Michael Matheson. I will ask about the proposed cascade of arrangements, which involves protected trust deeds, on which consultation continues, and the debt arrangement scheme. It is suggested that because you are still consulting on protected trust deeds, we will be far into the bill process before we have clarity about how the cascade might work.

The no income, no assets group is not covered by protected trust deeds and the debt arrangement scheme, which rely on some income and assets. What is your thinking on that group?

Finally, I have a specific point. The credit unions have made representations to me and, I think, to you, about the potential impact of a minimum repayment level of 20-odd pence in the pound, given the market in which they operate. Where has your thinking got to on that?

We discussed that matter earlier this afternoon, partly in anticipation that I might be asked about it. Obviously, we are happy to consider suggestions from the credit unions, among others, about their ability to function in the revised environment. However, some of the issues that they have raised have cross-departmental implications. As I understand the matter, there is pressure for them to operate more commercially, as lenders of finance as well as creditors. It is important that we co-ordinate our response with other ministerial portfolios. However, we will consider seriously the proposed solution and examine whether a case can be made for the credit unions to be treated separately from other creditors, given what they see as their important role in the wider social inclusion agenda.

As the member knows, we are involved in discussions on protected trust deeds with insolvency practitioners and others who have responded, vociferously in some cases, to the proposals, particularly that for a minimum payment. We are considering the proposals that practitioners have made, which might continue to meet our objectives but which, from their perspective, would be a more workable solution. We are engaged in parallel discussions with organisations such as Citizens Advice Scotland on the workings of the existing debt arrangement scheme and on whether the introduction of an element of debt relief into that process might be possible in the package that I wish to achieve. We want the package that we ultimately present to Parliament to cater for everybody, from those with no income and no assets right through to those who have the ability to meet their debts but refuse to do so—I hope that the Parliament will support that.

As you know, we now have the report of the working group on no income, no asset clients and we are considering what proposals we will make to accommodate those people's specific needs. Those proposals must match our proposals for debt arrangement and debt relief, protected trust deeds as a softer form of sequestration, land attachment and, ultimately, sequestration. We want a clear path that creditors and debtors can understand and from which both parties will get the optimum value. The process will be difficult and will involve balancing different interests, but we are confident that we can achieve that. Credit unions will be a part of the process.

You were asked earlier about when the information on the changes and the results of all the consultation will be available to us. It is obvious that the information on protected trust deeds will not be available in advance of the stage 1 debate on the bill, unless you say differently. When might we have sight of a coherent package?

We will be able to publish information from the consultation exercise, but we are unlikely to have finalised our conclusions on what that is likely to mean for the shape of the regulations. It is important that we continue to consult the interested parties—insolvency practitioners, credit unions and others—on different sides of the various divides.

More generally, on policy, I intend to be able to make definitive statements in the stage 1 debate on where we intend to go with the regulations—certainly on matters such as land attachment, debt arrangement and apparent insolvency. I also hope at least to be able to outline where protected trust deeds fit into the process.

I have one last caveat. As I have sat on the Subordinate Legislation Committee, I do not like matters being left to subordinate legislation. Can you say what will appear in the bill about those regulations?

I am happy to brief the convener and committee members informally on the difficulties that arise and on where our thinking on the general direction of travel is taking us. I point out that I require to take Cabinet colleagues with me on the matter.

Christine May's question is a fair one and it is one that many stakeholders have asked us. We can certainly say that the direction of travel on trust deed reform is that the number of trust deeds will fall. That seems pretty clear, whether we bring in the scheme that is in the draft regulations or develop an alternative model in our on-going discussions with the insolvency profession.

The number of trust deeds will fall because many are poor value for creditors. One argument is that trust deeds cannot be justified as a soft form of bankruptcy because nobody wins, apart from the people who do not deserve to win. If the number of trust deeds falls, the obvious question—it is the one that Christine May poses—is what happens to people who are getting debt relief through them. We have given the matter a lot of thought. As the minister has said, many of the matters on which we are developing policy relate to such issues.

Some people who would get debt relief through a trust deed might be able to get into the debt arrangement scheme, but perhaps not into the scheme as it stands—for some of the reasons that have been brought before the committee. We are examining the matter closely and the Cabinet will consider the new policy.

We are conducting a separate and very extensive review with the money advice sector to examine all sorts of issues around the debt arrangement scheme. We may well bring forward other changes, including administrative ones, in secondary legislation to make the scheme more attractive to money advisers and to debtors. That would deal with some of the people who might otherwise have got debt relief through a trust deed.

Some of the people who might have signed a trust deed will be able to bankrupt themselves, but only if they are apparently insolvent. A person can go bankrupt themselves only if a creditor has tried to enforce a debt. That brings us back to the first point that you raised. What happens to people whose creditors have not chased them, perhaps because they have no income and no assets?

That has always been a problem in the Scottish system, which has not been joined up in that sense. The problem is that people who are actually insolvent cannot go bankrupt because they are not apparently insolvent. That is an odd situation. We set up the debt relief working group to examine the problem. We are considering closely what we should do through the debt relief working group because, first, we have always known about the problem and we are trying to find the best way to tackle it; and, secondly, as stakeholders and committee members have fairly pointed out, if we cut down the number of trust deeds and people are not apparently insolvent, what happens to them? We are, rightly, being pushed in two directions. We all agree that there are questions that we need to resolve, as far as we can, although they are not easy ones. Therefore, we are talking to as many people as we can about how best to tackle the problem, and we welcome people's views.

I have a couple of questions that, for the purpose of brevity, I will ask together. When the Executive introduced the bill, the justification for it was that it would encourage a more entrepreneurial approach to business. It is pretty clear from the evidence that we have taken that there is little to support that view. The minister may disagree, but I am sure that committee members agree with me that any effect that the bill will have on entrepreneurship will be entirely marginal. In the light of that, what is the point of changing the period of bankruptcy from three years to one year except to bring Scots law into line with English law? As a unionist, I would not disagree with that policy objective, but I am interested to hear the minister's comments on that.

My second question is about the time period for payment. Although the bill will reduce the period of bankruptcy to one year, the period for payment will remain three years. A lot of the evidence that we have heard suggests that people will find that confusing. However, it is in line with the position in England. Has the Executive considered that and has it thought about lodging an amendment to bring the period for payment into line with the period of bankruptcy?

I think that we have, but that is another area in which we are considering the bill's implications. The substantive point was raised the last time that I was before the committee, when I said that we would look for more empirical evidence that might convince you of the case, irrespective of what was being argued in the rest of the UK. As I said at that meeting, the bill is part of the process of the Lisbon agenda in general across the European Union. It is seen as one measure, although not the only measure—

I should clarify that the European Union was not the union that I was talking about.

I am sure that that is the case.

For the purpose of evidence taking and for policy formulation, the Lisbon agenda is important not only in Scotland but throughout the UK and in Europe, regarding how we stimulate entrepreneurial activity. Part of that process, as it was represented to me, came down in favour of the one-year discharge. We are working on a response for you.

There is also anecdotal evidence. David Watt, of the Institute of Directors Scotland—who, I am sure, is known to you—has welcomed the bill. He said:

"To be successful in business you have to be prepared to take risks, yet Scotland tends to have a rather risk-averse culture … these reforms will help to lessen this attitude."

I do not always agree with David Watt but, on this occasion, I do. It is important that we address Scotland's historically risk-averse culture and seek to change it. The bill is only one measure by which we hope to do that.

I also asked about the time period for payment.

Are you referring to the idea that all the periods in the bill should be synchronised at one year?

Yes.

We gave a lot of thought to that. In my view, that idea is superficially attractive but does not stack up. When one starts to think about how such a system would be made to work, one can see the holes. For example, what would one-year payment, one-year discharge mean? Experience of the system in England has shown that it would take between four and six months of the one year to set up an income payment arrangement. Would that mean that the one-year payment period would continue for six months after the discharge, or would the person pay for six months and then be discharged—which would mean that it was not a one-year payment period?

There are many other connections that are obvious to people who work here, but which might not be so obvious to people who gave evidence to the committee. For example, the whole point of having a one-year discharge period is to encourage restart, not to make things hard for creditors. If we move from a system of three-year payment to a system of one-year payment, creditors will pay. If the debtor can afford to pay towards their debts, they should. If they can afford to pay over three years—the court will judge whether that is the case—they should.

Another reason why synchronisation would cause difficulty relates to protected trust deeds, which we still want to have because we think they are valuable and perform a useful service. Under a protected trust deed, payment is made over three years. Why should someone who is bankrupt have to pay for only a year when someone who is subject to a protected trust deed has to pay for three years? Essentially, both sets of people are in the same position—they cannot pay their debts. For all those reasons, our view is that there is no merit in synchronising the period for discharge and the period for payment.

In many ways, we are not moving to a system of one-year discharge; we are moving from a system of three-year discharge to a system of flexible discharge. For most people, the discharge period will be one year, but some people—those whom we might call the culpable debtors—could be subject to bankruptcy restrictions for up to 15 years. Does that mean that they should pay towards their debts for 15 years? Our view is that obviously they should not. That shows why the synchronisation argument, although superficially attractive, does not stack up when one considers what its consequences might be for the behaviour of debtors and creditors.

Thank you; that was very helpful.

Another consideration that you might be interested in is that, in the scenario that you propose, we estimate that smaller businesses would be more likely to be losers than their larger counterparts. I am sure that that is just as important a consideration for you as it was for us.

You will be pleased to know that some of the broader issues that I wanted to raise have already been covered. I will focus on money attachment—on which we had an extremely interesting evidence session—and wider, related matters. Nearly everyone to whom we spoke said that money attachment had its place but what was important was how the regime that was put in place operated in practice. The safety of sheriff officers and how heavy-handed creditors were in using that form of diligence were issues that were raised.

I have two questions, the first of which is specific. Where has your thinking gone on money attachment? My second question is more general and it echoes previous discussions that we have had. How will you bottom out some of the practical issues? In particular, how will you minimise the use of secondary legislation? On money attachment, as with other aspects of the bill, there is a genuine concern—which the committee shares—that too much of the detail will be left to secondary legislation.

I can understand that concern. Ideally, we would want to minimise the use of secondary legislation, but the bill undoubtedly covers areas in relation to which we need to take powers and, through secondary legislation, regulate for their enforcement. I will let Andy Crawley talk about our direction of travel on money attachment. It is a form of diligence that, in general, continues to be supported by creditors. We are aware of the issues that it raises and have discussed them with sheriff officers and others.

We were quite surprised by the strength of feeling that was evident in some of the evidence that the committee took. As you will appreciate, the legislative process does not happen in a vacuum. We have had extensive discussions with many stakeholders and, although we may have been wrong, our view was that money attachment was a fairly technical measure that some creditors—especially public creditors—found useful and, as such, was a useful addition to the toolkit. That is still our view. However, given that people have expressed those views to the committee, I am happy to say that we will go away and have discussions with them, in particular with the sheriff officers who have to do the deed on the ground. We will ensure that their concerns about health and safety are addressed.

I am not sure that I agree that the issue that you raised is to do with secondary legislation. Money attachment is not an area of the bill in which we are trying to do a lot by secondary legislation—what you see is what you get in this regard. Although the committee may disagree, I suggest that in this regard we are looking at administrative issues such as the way in which people will go about using the diligence. Perhaps we need only to provide reassurance that the Executive does not expect anyone to put their life and limb at risk. We would also want to reassure people that we recognise the duty that employers have to their staff not to send them into dangerous situations.

Most people who become sheriff officers probably accept that there is an element of what we might call hardness in what they do. After all, sheriff officers have to take people's property away from them and that is never going to be a popular thing to do, whether we are talking about money or anything else. The Executive wants to see a modern and effective system of enforcement. We no more want sheriff officers to come off badly than anyone else wants them to do. We will review the provisions and consider whether we need to bring forward changes at stage 2.

Some of the other things that were said in evidence are covered in the bill. For example, I recall that someone said that it was not much use having money attachment if the process had to stop at 8 pm. We have covered that by saying that someone can apply to a sheriff for permission to execute a money attachment at some other time. As far as possible, we have tried to build flexibility into the bill. That said, we may have to speak to stakeholders to bottom out their concerns and ensure that we have discussed changes with them—and perhaps with the committee—before we bring those changes forward.

I am grateful for the reply. I am reassured by much of what was said, but it raises a number of wider questions about how we can get to the bottom of and resolve what are essentially practical issues—as distinct from differences of opinion about policy, which are obviously quite another matter, or differences between vested interests, which will always occur. If we are in terrain where people right across the different interest groups are broadly in agreement on the policy intent and are agreed that the bill is something that we want to do, surely all of us need to work together to resolve the issues. I accept the point that all the issues may come down to legislative detail and administrative arrangements.

The bill is exceptional in the number of issues that it raises that fall into those categories. I believe that we—by which I mean the collective "we"—should work together through the stages of the bill that lie ahead and the months to come to ensure that we come up with solutions that are as effective as possible. Frankly, I believe that we should also not waste—I use that term advisedly—hours and hours of everybody's time and energy, and taxpayers' money, in raking over practical details. We should instead ensure that we use the due process of committee scrutiny to bottom out views about policy. You touched on some of that earlier, minister, but what are your thoughts about where we should go from here?

It will not surprise Susan Deacon to hear that I agree entirely with what she has said. However, to some extent, she and the convener will have to come to their own conclusions. Michael Matheson mentioned the process for lodging stage 2 amendments, but the dichotomy that he highlighted always arises in any piece of legislation. Questions such as what should be in the bill, what should be put into regulations and what are administrative matters are always raised. I agree entirely that, in this instance—as in most others—there are clear dividing lines. I suggest that, as legislators, we should stick to policy and its implementation through regulations. We should try to minimise the type of manuscript amendments that put things in the bill simply to complicate the process.

I will leave it at that for now, convener.

That covers all the questions and points that we wanted to put to the minister. No doubt there will be others, particularly in our report in more detail. We will complete our report on 16 May for publication on 17 May. I believe that the stage 1 debate is on 24 or 25 May. I thank the minister and his officials once again for coming before the committee. That was a useful session.

I reiterate our willingness to engage in off-court discussions, so to speak, on the issues. We are happy to discuss the issues that Susan Deacon and others raised. We want to try to secure consensus on the issues.

Good. Thank you again, minister.

We move to item 4. Do you have anything to highlight, Nicholas?

No. I am sure that no one wants me to highlight anything. I know my place.

I think that we are fairly clear about everything. The clerks will produce a draft report for consideration next week and we will finalise it the following week. Are we agreed?

Members indicated agreement.

Meeting closed at 17:35.