Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Bill: Stage 1
The next item of business is a debate on motion S3M-7267, in the name of Kenny MacAskill, on the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Bill. I warn members that time is very limited and that they should stick to the times that they are given.
14:13
Yesterday, the United Kingdom Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Cadder v Her Majesty’s Advocate. The case considered the practice in Scotland of the police interviewing detained persons in a police station without ensuring that they have had access to legal advice. The Supreme Court decided that that practice was contrary to the European convention on human rights, changing decades of law in Scotland and overturning an earlier Scottish appeal court ruling by our highest court of criminal appeal just last year. The idiosyncrasies of the Scotland Act 1998 mean that Scotland is uniquely susceptible to the effect of ECHR challenges in criminal cases. Normally, in criminal matters, the Scottish court of appeal has the final say. However, this route of raising devolution issues is undermining its final authority. I will make clear to the UK Government our view that the centuries-old supremacy of the High Court as the final court of appeal in criminal matters must be restored.
In Parliament, we are always to pass laws on the basis of evidence that is presented to Parliament. Could the minister make any evidence at all available to Parliament to support the view that there is a requirement to increase the period of people’s detention in police stations? I am afraid that I cannot see that any evidence for that has been made available.
I am happy to advise that the Lord Advocate is happy to discuss such matters with any member in relation to any requirements for stage 2. If Mr Rumbles wishes, the Lord Advocate, as the senior law officer and prosecutor in Scotland, will explain why the Crown holds that view. Equally, we predicate our view on information from the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland. I would think that, if Mr Rumbles spoke to any police officer in his constituency, he would be advised that the scales of justice require to be balanced. When they are changed in one direction, in the interests of the rights of the accused, they require to be balanced in the other direction, in the interests of the rest of our community.
On the issue of balance, can the minister advise us who has been consulted by the Scottish Government? For example, have the Scottish Human Rights Commission and the Glasgow Bar Association been consulted? Apart from the prosecution interest, in the form of the Law Society of Scotland, which is the only body that is mentioned in the document, has anyone else been consulted?
There have been many meetings throughout the preparation period to discuss the difficulties that we knew would come, details of which were made available to us only at 9.45 yesterday. Obviously, those meetings included the Law Society, which represents the bulk of solicitors in Scotland. Also included were representatives from ACPOS, the Scottish Police Services Authority, the Crown and so on. I cannot confirm whether any of the other organisations that have been mentioned were contacted but, as I said previously, we cast our net widely to ensure that those who are part of the legal family—the court, the prosecution, the police and the defence—were all taken into account and had their views brought in.
We need to respond to the implications of the decision. I have announced my plans to establish a judicially led review of the law and criminal procedure in Scotland. However, we cannot wait for that to conclude. We need to act now.
The bill has four main aims. It will enshrine in statute a right to legal advice for suspects who are detained and questioned by the police. It will give us the necessary powers to ensure adequate provision of state-funded legal advice to suspects. It will extend the existing maximum six-hour period for detention to 12 hours, with the possibility of further extension to 24 hours, along with appropriate safeguards. Finally, it will make provision in relation to cases that occurred prior to the Cadder decision.
The provisions on legal advice create a right for suspects who have been detained to have access to advice from a solicitor before and during questioning by the police. That is necessary in order to bring statute into line with the Supreme Court judgment.
Does the cabinet secretary intend children to be treated in the same way as adults?
Children have never been treated in the same way as adults, and that will continue to be the case. Children are viewed in a special category as are, for example, those with learning difficulties. Clearly, they will be dealt with differently. Such matters are dealt with in the ACPOS and Crown guidelines. Children are dealt with according to their nature and are subject to the provisions around detention periods. However, they would usually be dealt with in the presence of a responsible adult, and that will continue.
The bill makes provision to ensure that we have the necessary powers to make the right to legal advice for suspects effective in practice. Section 2 will therefore amend the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 to give the Scottish ministers a regulation-making power to allow state-funded legal advice to be made available to suspects in certain circumstances without reference to the financial eligibility criteria.
Section 3 relates to the detention period. The six-hour maximum has been in place since 1980. Advice from ACPOS, the SPSA and the Crown is that the establishment of an automatic right to consult a solicitor places intolerable strain upon the six-hour limit. We believe that an immediate extension of the limit to 12 hours, with the possibility of extension to 24 hours, is essential to maintaining the effectiveness of police investigations. It will also assist with the practicalities of giving access, particularly in remote and rural locations.
The cabinet secretary referred earlier to safeguards that are built into the provision for the possible extension to 24 hours of the detention period. What are those safeguards?
Those safeguards are that the investigating officer will not be present; that the provision will be used only in relation to a serious crime; and that the officer who is present will be of an inspector grade or higher and will not have been involved in the case. Those are appropriate safeguards and they mirror those that are in place south of the border. As I said earlier, the parties’ business managers and justice spokespeople will have opportunities to discuss the guidance with ACPOS as it is produced.
To repeat, an extension to 24 hours will happen only in exceptional cases and only when a senior police officer confirms that it is needed. Justice requires checks and balances.
The final sections of the bill relate to appeals. The Supreme Court emphasises the importance of finality and legal certainty in concluded criminal cases, and the judgment takes us a long way towards that objective by ruling out statutory appeals on these grounds in concluded cases where time limits have elapsed.
On the question of finality and certainty, I have concerns about section 7. It appears to undermine the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission’s role and purpose by introducing what seems to be something new, which is
“the need for finality and certainty in the determination of criminal proceedings”.
That can apply to many cases. Section 7 will also allow the High Court, when it sits as an appeal court, to reject a reference from the SCCRC.
Lord Hope and Lord Rodger referred to those matters, and advised that they should be dealt with so that there was not a back route by which people would seek to bring through the SCCRC cases of some vintage that would not be brought in through the front door of the High Court of appeal.
That is appropriate where an appeal was made timeously or the relevant point was made, but we must balance matters. According to the Crown Office, there could be up to 120 appeals outstanding among the live cases that are currently affected, so we need to ensure that we protect the validity of those judgments and provide some certainty.
The bill applies the principle of finality through the remaining common-law appeal route and to consideration of cases by the SCCRC. That is why we have introduced section 7, which relates to the issues to which Lord Hope and Lord Rodger have referred. It makes clear that finality and certainty are essential for legal judgments, but it does not preclude the possibility of other factors being taken into account: it simply requires the SCCRC to take that factor—along with others—into account to decide whether a case should proceed through that body.
I urge Parliament to endorse that approach. We must ensure that we have the requisite checks and balances; when the scales of justice are tilted, it is necessary that we balance them.
I move,
That the Parliament agrees to the general principles of the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Bill.
14:22
We on the Labour side of the chamber are keenly aware of the momentous nature of the United Kingdom Supreme Court ruling with regard to our justice system. Today we are debating the issues that require our urgent action and attention, but the wider ramifications for Scots law will need much greater deliberation in the Parliament at a later date.
We can debate now whether the situation in which we find ourselves is fair to our legal system, of which we are rightly proud. We can debate how we got here, and whether ministers should have done more at the time of the European Court ruling in the Salduz case. However, we agree that today we must deal with the actions that we must take urgently and rightly to minimise the judgment’s effect on our courts and on the victims of crime.
There is no doubt that the fact that the ruling is not, broadly speaking, retrospective in effect means that we will be dealing with fewer cases than may have been feared. However, there will still be cases that involve very serious offences, and that is why we recognise the need to act.
We have seen the comments from the chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission that counsel against emergency legislation, and the solicitor advocate John Scott has made the point that legislation that is made in haste is often repented at leisure. As members have said, this is not an easy issue; we agree.
I do not believe that any member views as desirable the fact that we have to consider emergency legislation. However, while we are always ready to provide opposition to Government measures when it is the right thing to do, we believe that in this situation it is responsible to accept the cabinet secretary’s argument for emergency legislation and the broader direction that he has decided to take as a result of the judgment.
The more I examine the detail of the judgment, the more I accept the case that the cabinet secretary has made for the legislation. Although I understand the restrictions that emergency legislation necessarily places on debate, some of my concerns would have been afforded reassurance by more dialogue and more notice of the detail of some proposals. However, I understand that we are where we are.
Does the member share the concern that I have expressed? Since July, we have been operating a system whereby the police service has had six hours in which to interview suspects. Is he aware of any evidence that has been produced to us in the Parliament today that shows that that has been a problem and that the time should be increased at the police’s request to 24 hours?
I am simply aware of the advice that ACPOS has given. I would have liked us to have had more debate and dialogue on the issue, but there are practical considerations about the time for which people can be detained if they are to access legal representation. I am sure that we will debate some of those issues during today’s debate.
I am persuaded that we should act quickly to change our laws on access to legal representation during detention and, as a consequence, the time limits for detention. I do not believe that we should continue with our laws if they have been deemed to be incompatible with European law. I also believe that it is important to act quickly to legislate to include the need for finality and certainty in the factors that the SCCRC must consider when it deals with applications, as I understand that that will have a material impact on how many appeals can go ahead. I accept the case that the cabinet secretary made in his response to Christine Grahame’s question.
However, that is not to say that we should not debate the issues in the limited time that is afforded to us today. Specifically, we question whether there should not be greater debate on whether it should be possible for an application to extend the period of detention from 12 hours to 24 hours to be determined by a police officer of the rank of inspector or above. If such extensions are to be made only in exceptional circumstances, perhaps the role would be more appropriately performed by a sheriff. I understand from the legislation team that we will be able to debate that proposal through an amendment from Robert Brown. I ask the cabinet secretary to give the matter serious consideration and provide a response during the debate.
The financial memorandum suggests that the costs to the public purse might be higher than was previously indicated, not only because of the cost of legal aid but because the provision of the necessary police staff will cost the police some £20 million. My colleague James Kelly will raise more questions on that.
I mentioned the concerns that many have understandably expressed about the emergency legislation. It is important that we allay some of those fears by ensuring that the Parliament has an opportunity in the near future to consider these important issues in the normal detail and timescale that we afford to legislation.
There are, of course, far broader implications for Scots law, particularly with regard to our long-established laws on corroboration. In that context, we welcome the cabinet secretary’s request for Lord Carloway to undertake his review.
Many will argue that we should not be in a position where we have to review the operation of such key tenets of our well-established legal system. However, we must recognise that, although our own court of appeal made its view on the matter clear, the UK Supreme Court, including the Scottish senators, had to reflect on what the European court said on the matter. The ruling on Salduz is already affecting other European jurisdictions such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Ireland. In any circumstance, we cannot be immune to that. Unless people are suggesting that we opt out of the ECHR, or out of Europe entirely, this is where we were always going to be. I do not dispute that it would be good to see an ECHR issue discussed that was not about the rights of the offender but more about the rights of victims, but the idea of having human rights guaranteed throughout Europe is important.
Those broad debates are for the future. We have important issues to resolve today, and our approach is that the Parliament should work together to do that.
14:28
The Supreme Court’s decision is of importance to Scotland’s criminal law—of that there can be little doubt. However, it would be wrong to suggest that it was the decision of some foreign court that was imposing its will on Scottish law. I detected more than a hint of that in some of the comments from the Cabinet Secretary for Justice during his various media interviews in the past 24 hours. I do not remember the Scottish National Party raising any of those concerns when the Scotland Act 1998 or the Human Rights Act 1998 were passing through Parliament. We should also remember that the leading judgments were given by Scottish law lords.
I would like to deal with two points in my speech. The first is the suggestion by some in the legal profession that the Supreme Court’s decision is itself not compliant with the human rights convention in so far as it does not apply to all cases, even those that are subject to final determination.
In my view, that argument flies in the face of the long-established principle of the rule of law, the basic intuition of which is that the law must be capable of guiding those who are subject to it. It must provide certainty and predictability; after all, we must know what the law is if we are to plan our lives and organise our affairs, and that applies as much to public officials as to private individuals. In other words, judicial decisions must enable public officials to administer the criminal law and requiring all judicial decisions in criminal matters to apply to all prior decisions would be a radical departure from the simple truth that lies at the heart of the rule of law.
That truth is captured in paragraph 103 of Lord Rodger’s opinion, in which he cites Chief Justice Murray’s judgment in the Supreme Court of Ireland’s decision in the Arbour Hill prison case. This useful analysis illustrates not only how the law can effectively operate retrospectively but, more important, how new judgments can affect previously closed cases. Chief Justice Murray said:
“No one has ever suggested that every time there is a judicial adjudication clarifying or interpreting the law in a particular manner which could have had some bearing on previous and finally decided cases, civil or criminal, that such cases be reopened or the decisions set aside.”
The reason that it has not been suggested is that no legal system comprehends such an absolute or complete retroactive effect of judicial decisions. To do so would render a legal system uncertain, incoherent and dysfunctional, the consequences of which would cause widespread injustices. On that basis, I do not accept the view that the judgment itself should be retrospective in terms of reopening previous cases, and I hope that the legal profession does not use it as the basis for future challenges.
Of more concern, however, is the SCCRC’s position. Does it have the power to reopen closed cases, as is perhaps suggested in the Supreme Court judgment? In paragraph 62 of the Cadder judgment, Lord Hope notes that it is for the commission to
“make up its own mind, if it is asked to do so, as to whether it would be in the public interest for ... cases”
already subject to final determination
“to be referred to the High Court.”
Furthermore, I note that under section 194C of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, as amended, the commission
“may refer a case to the High Court”
where it believes
“that a miscarriage of justice”
has
“occurred”
and that
“it is in the interests of justice that a reference should be made”.
Given my earlier argument about the need of retrospective judicial decisions in a common law system, it is not clear whether there is anything amounting to a “miscarriage of justice” in cases that are already subject to a final determination. In any event, it would surely not be
“in the interests of justice”
for the commission to refer any such cases. Ultimately, there might be concerns about chilling the courts in that, if the commission referred cases after the Cadder judgment, future courts might be reluctant to make decisions on criminal matters that would involve important changes to the law in case such a move led to a flood of cases under the SCCRC process.
Will the member give way?
No. Mr Lamont is closing.
It is critical that we legislate as far as possible to limit the commission’s ability to reopen decided cases. Although we certainly hope that the bill achieves that aim, I am not sure that it does. Indeed, I know that the Law Society of Scotland has a number of concerns in that respect. I hope that my concerns do not prove to be legitimate, but only time will tell.
14:33
Now that the terms of the judgment are available, it is clear that the decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Peter Cadder v HMA is neither an isolated spasm of eccentricity from judges unversed in Scots law nor an overreaction to a ruling in the Salduz case by the Grand Chamber of the European Court, on which it was based. In fact, the two lead judgments in the UK Supreme Court were given in uncompromising terms by Lord Hope and Lord Rodger, Scottish judges of significant calibre on the Supreme Court, and follow a substantial body of jurisprudence that has required changes to practice in a considerable number of European countries, leaving Scotland increasingly isolated.
As a result, the chamber should take issue with—and take with a large pinch of salt—not only the indignant claims that we have heard in the past 24 hours that the European Court of Human Rights is unwarrantably trampling over our rights in this country but the strident claims that in some way the integrity of the Scottish criminal justice system is being impugned. Such claims are nonsense. It is absolutely right that Scots law be judged by the same standards of justice, procedure and respect for human rights that apply in other European countries.
Liberal Democrats were ready to back action to close off a flood of retrospective appeals, but the judgment rightly does not have retrospective effect. Live cases could not be affected by the legislation, of course, and the interim action that the Lord Advocate took with the agreement of the Scottish Government in July was timely and appropriate to halt problems with future cases.
I have listened with care to the cabinet secretary and am grateful to him for keeping Opposition parties briefed over the summer, but I am astonished that no consultation has taken place with the Scottish Human Rights Commission on one of the Parliament’s biggest human rights issues. The Scottish Human Rights Commission was set up by the Parliament with exactly the sort of situation that we discussing in mind. Its advice would have been the same as the view of the Law Society of Scotland: that there is no problem with the bill undergoing a proper process of development and consultation. Such discussion as has taken place has been highly unbalanced and has been primarily with the police and prosecution interests. That is an extraordinary fact about a basic civil liberty issue.
I have come to the view that the bill is ill considered, not justified by evidence and unsuitable for emergency legislation. The explanatory notes add nothing to the sum of human knowledge, and the policy memorandum is extraordinarily tentative on the evidence base for extending the six-hour detention period. It refers to “limited empirical statistical evidence”, securing the attendance of responsible adults in juvenile cases—that is adduced as an argument, but is, in fact, irrelevant—and additional options for police investigation by putting forensic evidence to the suspect. All those issues may be valid, but they are no justification whatever for emergency legislation.
Section 1 gives a detained suspect a statutory right to have access to a solicitor, but that right is watered down by defining such access not as a private interview; rather, the right is satisfied by other means such as a telephone call, perhaps even an e-mail exchange, “as may be appropriate”. Appropriate to whom? Subsection (8) of proposed new section 15A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 then takes that right away entirely by stipulating that the police can start the interview and questioning anyway with no solicitor present if that is necessary to the interests of the investigation. It seems to me to be questionable at the very least whether that is compliant with the ECHR and the judgment.
Section 3 allows the extension of the period of detention from six to 12 or 24 hours. It is not obvious to me that the net result is an extension of civil liberties, but the extension manifestly requires to be consulted on and justified. Six hours should remain the normal maximum, and the extension to 24 hours should be allowed only with the approval of an independent judicial official, such as a sheriff or magistrate. Richard Baker touched on that.
In summary, Liberal Democrats are unpersuaded of the need for emergency legislation and regard the bill as unnecessary in part and meaningless in part. We regard the need for the extension of the detention period as unproven at best, and wider issues are tacked on by the appeal procedures in sections 5 and 6. Christine Grahame touched on that. I will lodge amendments to tackle the most obvious deficiencies, but the Liberal Democrats will oppose the bill at stage 3 if it is not substantially changed to meet our concerns.
The bill raises vital issues relating to the proper balance between the rights of a suspect and the interests of the public in convicting people who have committed serious criminal acts. I am not convinced that it is ECHR compliant. Those serious matters need proper scrutiny by the Parliament in the normal way.
14:38
Today, we are in a predicament that has been forced on us by the UK Supreme Court, which is a folly built by Labour and supported by other unionist parties. Creating the Supreme Court took a historical anomaly whereby civil appeal cases were heard in the House of Lords and hard-wired it into the system. There should be no UK Supreme Court, as we simply do not have a single legal system within the UK. We warned those who supported its creation that it would result in a diminution in the independence of Scots law at the very least, and that is what we are now seeing.
I am slightly concerned by the tone of Mr Maxwell’s opening remarks. Is he saying that the Scottish National Party is now against the ECHR?
Mr Butler must have misheard me. I said that we are against the UK Supreme Court. We were against it when it was created: we have been against it from the beginning and we are against it now. It is Labour’s folly.
At the point of its creation, we were told that the Supreme Court would deal only with civil cases, yet it is dealing with an issue in a criminal case. The promises that were made about how it would act have been broken. It is time that we rid ourselves of the so-called Supreme Court and returned Scots law to where it belongs: Scotland.
In the past 24 hours, I have heard various reports about the matter, insinuating that, because our law is different from that of England, we are obviously in the wrong. That notion is simply mistaken.
Detention in Scotland is for a maximum of six hours. In England, it is 24 hours and can be extended to 36 hours or even 72 hours. In Scotland, a person can remain silent during detention, with no inference whatever being drawn from that silence. That is not the case in England. In Scotland, all interviews are recorded and, of course, there is the requirement for corroboration. The system is different from that in England and has served us well for decades. Although it is not perfect, it has provided a balance between the various parties’ rights.
Will the member give way?
Sorry, but I do not have time.
In October 2009, seven appellate judges in the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland unanimously ruled that Scots law and practice provide adequate safeguards to protect the interests of suspects during detention. Among the seven judges were the two most senior judges in Scotland—the Lord Justice General and the Lord Justice Clerk. I have more confidence in the decision of seven judges with a lifetime of experience in the law of Scotland than I have in a decision of the UK Supreme Court sitting in London with a majority of English judges.
On that point about English judges ruling on issues of Scots law, I remind members of what the Lib Dems told us back in 2004, when the Supreme Court was being created. Margaret Smith stated:
“if the supreme court is considering a peculiarly Scottish case, there is no question of Scottish judges being in the minority.”—[Official Report, 29 January 2004; c 5300.]
That has been proved to be completely wrong and Margaret Smith should withdraw that wholly inaccurate statement.
Underlying all the difficulties is the relationship between the ECHR and Scottish legislation. If there is an ECHR issue in a case, that should be taken to the European Court of Human Rights to rule on, as happens in any other jurisdiction. If that court rules against our procedures, that should be a matter for the Parliament to deal with, after due consideration. However, we are in the invidious position of having to suffer at the hands of the UK Supreme Court while we have it embedded into our rules that all legislation must be ECHR compliant. That is very different from the situation of every other country and it has the effect of leaving us extremely vulnerable to such cases and to the consequences that follow.
That is not to be against the ECHR; it is to be against the way in which the convention is implemented particularly and peculiarly in Scotland. As things stand, any ruling against us on ECHR grounds has the effect of making our legislation null and void—it is as if it never existed. That is not how the system operates elsewhere and it is not how it should operate in Scotland.
14:42
I regret the tenor of Mr Maxwell’s speech, which was unhelpful. We should be considering the issue in terms of the rule of law and not through any nationalistic prism.
Will the member give way?
No, thank you.
Instances of emergency legislation such as the proposed legislation that is before the Parliament are mercifully rare. Given the unicameral nature of this legislature, it is a necessary prerequisite, in all but the most exceptional of circumstances, that legislation should undergo exhaustive examination in committee after a period of extensive public consultation. That is correct and entirely sensible. However, there is little doubt that today is one of those exceptional occasions when circumstances dictate that the Parliament must act swiftly but try to act sensibly in a short space of time.
The UK Supreme Court has overturned a unanimous decision of seven judges sitting in the Scottish appeal court last October. However, two of the senior judges in the Supreme Court were members of the Scottish senate. We should consider the situation as we have it today.
The First Minister (Alex Salmond) rose—
No, thank you.
The Cadder judgment has to be dealt with, which means that we must act quickly. On that point, I agree with the cabinet secretary. However, I wonder why, when the verdict in the Salduz v Turkey case was made known in 2008, the Government did not use the two years following that to consult the public and to exhaust the parliamentary procedure so that we could have a sensible and timely examination of the serious matters that are before the Parliament today.
Stewart Maxwell rose—
No, thank you.
Given the few hours that are available to us because of the emergency nature of the proposed legislation, it will be difficult to discharge that important duty to act sensibly, but we must try. In the course of the afternoon’s business, we must test as far as is humanly possible the effectiveness of the proposals and try to ensure that they contain no unintended consequences.
We must try to remedy matters by way of the emergency legislation; there is no other way. Labour is willing to work with the Government to introduce appropriate reforms to deal with the serious issues that need to be addressed following yesterday’s ruling. In particular, I see no reason why agreement cannot be reached on the provision that will introduce a right of access to legal advice before and during questioning in police detention. That is a most sensible provision that is surely worthy of support across the chamber. The provision of an enabling power to allow for the adjustment of legal aid eligibility rules for legal advice and assistance, which will allow new arrangements to be designed for the provision of legal advice at police stations, is an aspect of the bill that seems both necessary and rational and is worthy of support.
However, I am not convinced of the need for the provision that would allow a person to be detained for a further 12 hours, making 24 hours in total, on the say-so of a senior police officer, where necessary and proportionate. I am concerned that such an extension might be disproportionate, with insufficient checks and balances. Perhaps during today’s proceedings the Government will offer some comfort on that aspect of the bill, and I will listen with interest to what ministers have to say on the matter. I hope that they can engage positively on the issue with parties across the chamber, especially with regard to the amendment that will be lodged by my Justice Committee colleague, Robert Brown.
14:46
On one level, I welcome the eagerness to bring the law into compliance with the ECHR as soon as possible. However, I have concerns about the possible risks that we might run by introducing the bill as emergency legislation. I am also concerned that whenever we discuss human rights legislation, there is a general tendency for some people to view it as an inconvenience to be worked around rather than as an important principle in our society.
It is essential that people have a right to bring a challenge where they feel that human rights violations might have occurred. That is a mark of a civilised society. The cabinet secretary seems concerned that there is some kind of overactive human rights mischievousness going on among a number of lawyers. Even if that concern were valid and the challenge were not the exercise of a necessary right in a human rights-based system, it would only deepen my concern about the haste with which we are legislating. If we make mistakes in a piece of emergency legislation, we could be making law without consultation or considered scrutiny and we might run the risk of further challenges that could be avoided but for a few weeks or months of scrutiny.
On the wider concern about how human rights are considered, and in reply to Stewart Maxwell in particular, we should be proud in Scotland and as members of the Scottish Parliament that Scottish Parliament legislation is not permitted to violate the ECHR—that is the correct relationship between this Parliament and the law. I was surprised that Stewart Maxwell seemed to imply that we should do things the way that Westminster does them, when Westminster so clearly has it wrong.
I will explain briefly why Scotland is in a difficult position. In a normal country, when the Supreme Court and, in our case, the Court of Session—
First Minister, I am sorry, but I must ask you to speak into the microphone.
If the Court of Session ruled against a person, they would have recourse to the Strasbourg court and we would be able to argue our case in front of that court. The reason why Scotland is uniquely vulnerable is that the system in Scotland does not even allow us the right to argue the case in front of the court in whose name we are required to make the changes to Scots law.
That only makes me wonder further why the criticism seems to be directed at the Supreme Court, but I will pass over that aspect.
An argument has been made about balance. The cabinet secretary’s idea is that, in bringing the law into compliance with the ECHR, we have to do so in a way that offers balance. I see no clear reason why time limits need to be extended in response to the recent case. The cabinet secretary seemed to imply that whatever change is necessary for human rights reasons must, for purely perception-based reasons of balance, be countered by a quite separate change in the other direction.
Of course the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland says that the time limits ought to be extended. When the Scottish Parliament asks security consultants what we should do, they tell us to spend more money on security measures. When any of us ask a life insurance salesperson whether we should get more life insurance, they say yes. In the same way, if we ask the police whether there are circumstances in which longer time limits would be useful to them, they will say yes. However, that does not mean that it is the right thing to do.
There are wider questions of detail, which we do not have time to go into—that is part of the problem—including concerns about section 7. Even in older cases, there must be the possibility of challenge, as Parliament was reminded only yesterday.
If the bill is passed in its current form, we will run the risk not only of facing further challenges as a result of errors that we might be making but of having to go back and rewrite the whole thing again next year.
14:50
The Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Bill is a very important piece of legislation that we should not even be considering. Unfortunately, the UK Supreme Court did not respect the position and decision of the Scottish criminal appeal court, where seven senior and highly respected Scottish High Court judges, each with a strong grasp and deep understanding of Scottish law, ruled that Scots law pertaining to detention and questioning did not breach the European convention on human rights. That is the response to what Patrick Harvie said: our senior judges made a ruling that Scots law did not breach the ECHR. However, the UK Supreme Court chose to muscle in on our criminal law by using its power under civil law and the ECHR. Importantly, that crucial decision was taken by five Supreme Court judges, only two of whom have a background in Scots law. [Interruption.]
Order. Mr Thompson, I would be grateful if you could address more directly the general principles of the bill, which is what we are supposed to be debating at this point.
We are dealing with the decision and the ECHR, but I will do that, Presiding Officer.
A court with limited Scottish representation has overruled a court consisting of very senior Scottish judges.
The UK Supreme Court was established in October 2009 to deal with civil matters, despite opposition from the SNP. We warned that it was irrational for a court without a majority of Scottish judges to decide on cases involving Scots law. We also pointed out that the practice of hearing Scots civil cases in the House of Lords was a historical anomaly and that that role should be repatriated to Scotland. What other legal jurisdiction allows its appeals to be heard in another jurisdiction?
Unfortunately, the previous Labour-led Administration failed utterly to stand up to Westminster and protect the independence of Scots law. Cathy Jamieson, the then Minister for Justice, said at the time:
“The proposal for the creation of a new supreme court for the UK does not impact on the integrity and independence of Scots law”.
Unfortunately, she was wrong. Our warning that the UK Supreme Court was a threat to the integrity of Scots law has come to fruition. The complacency of Opposition parties has led us to this situation.
Mr Thompson, could you come now to the general principles of the bill, please?
Okay.
Robert Brown mentioned the 12-hour limit. Does he know that in England, under the Lib Dems—where they are in government—the limit is 24 hours? Does he support that?
This is Scotland.
Why is Robert Brown arguing against the 12-hour limit here, when the Lib Dems are in favour of a 24-hour limit south of the border?
The Scottish Human Rights Commission has claimed that this is no time for emergency legislation, but it fails to acknowledge that, in anticipation of the Supreme Court finding, the Scottish Government had already prepared emergency legislation that is intended to protect the victims of crime and minimise the possible number of appeals.
Indeed, for more than a year, the Scottish Government, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, the Scottish Legal Aid Board and ACPOS have been working on the contingency plans. The Lord Advocate issued interim guidance to the police on 9 June, requiring them to offer detained suspects access to a solicitor before and during an interview in serious cases. That was rolled out to all cases on 8 July. The reality is that the SNP Government has been preparing for all possible decisions and, as a consequence, is ready to act immediately to protect the Scottish legal system and taxpayers alike.
It is ludicrous to suggest that the change should have been introduced a couple of years ago—we had to wait for the decision before we knew what we had to do.
Will Dave Thompson give way?
No. Dave Thompson must close now, please.
The case highlights dangers for the independence and integrity of Scots law.
14:55
The Scottish Government has the Scottish Labour Party’s full co-operation in examining the bill today, which is all the more reason why the cabinet secretary should be embarrassed by his back benchers’ speeches. Stewart Maxwell should be aware—as I am sure that he is—that, before the Supreme Court was established, more than 300 cases on devolution points were considered under the same mechanism. Does he not know that?
Dave Thompson asked what other country allows another jurisdiction to hear appeals on its cases. If members are not aware of it, I tell them that every country that signs up to the European convention on human rights signs up to the declaration—[Interruption]—that there can be a court judgment based on the convention.
Government members’ ignorance is staggering. If the point that the First Minister has made all day is about special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which was given in the Cadder case, there is scope for discussion. I do not want the special leave provisions to be used in every case. However, we must be clear that, as we are signed up to the convention on human rights, even if the Cadder case had not gone to the Supreme Court, it would have gone to the European Court of Human Rights. I am pretty certain that that court would have ruled in the same way as the Supreme Court did.
If the case had been heard before the European court, the checks and balances of the Scots system could have been examined before that court.
When the Scotland Act 1998 was passed, no one envisaged that the devolution route of appeal—whether to the House of Lords or now to the Supreme Court—would be used in criminal cases to second-guess the Court of Session. Neither Donald Dewar nor anyone else envisaged that unintended consequence—that is what is wrong.
If that is the Government’s position, why did it say nothing when 300 cases on devolution points went to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? Is the First Minister not aware of that system?
I will address the issues that are pertinent to scrutiny in the stage 1 debate. Whether or not we agree with the decision in Cadder v HMA, it is a judgment of the Supreme Court that is based on the court’s view of the convention on human rights. It is down to the Parliament to deliver on that.
New guidelines that relate to the six-hour provision have operated for six months. A pertinent question that the Government should answer in the stage 1 debate is what has gone wrong—if anything—in the six months during which the guidelines have operated and why moving to a 12-hour limit is necessary. I remain open-minded about that, but I want to be convinced that the extension is necessary.
I share the concerns of Richard Baker and other members about allowing the period of detention to be extended to 24 hours in some circumstances. If we are to change the provisions, we must have clarity. The bill says that, if an extension is necessary, a person of inspector level can sign that off, provided that they are not involved in the case. That proposal needs serious scrutiny. The suggestion that it would be better for a sheriff to decide on an extension is worthy of consideration. A sheriff is available 24/7. Involving a sheriff would build safeguards into the system.
I think back to my experience of when the Parliament debated custody time limits and the Bonomy reforms. Courts are now repeatedly breaching the custody time limits that we in the Parliament set, because of how the legislation is worded. I do not want us to make the same mistake. The detention period must be extended to 24 hours only in exceptional circumstances, and the decision must be taken by someone at an appropriate level.
We come to the closing speeches.
14:59
We are, of course, in the chamber today to debate an emergency bill, as a result of an appeal in the 2009 case of McLean v HMA. That was followed by an appeal brought by Peter Cadder in which he claimed that, under European human rights laws, because he had no lawyer present during his police interview, his human rights had been breached. In the McLean appeal, a full bench of seven of Scotland’s most senior judges ruled that the position was not in conflict with human rights laws and that it complied with the ECHR. It was therefore perhaps a surprise to some that the UK court then got involved in the Cadder case. I am pleased that the cabinet secretary will take up the issue of the independence of the criminal law in Scotland with the UK Government. I am concerned about the subject.
The Lord Advocate appeared for the Crown in front of the Supreme Court. She was obviously concerned by what she perceived the result of the process might be. She therefore immediately put into effect interim guidelines under which suspects were allowed to insist on being given legal advice before and while being interviewed. We believe that that approach has worked well in the majority of cases. Of course, we really do not have any information about that, so it would be interesting to know the exact results of the guidelines and how they have worked.
There is concern that we are rushing into this legislation too quickly. This morning, I received an email from Professor Alan Miller, chair of the Scottish Human Rights Commission, in which he shows that concern and from which I think it worth while to quote:
“The Commission welcomes the UK Supreme Court’s careful and considered decision in the case of Cadder v HMA.
This is no time for emergency legislation as there is no emergency. The floodgates have not been opened—this decision clearly does not apply to concluded cases. Rather, now it’s time to get it right, and we have the time to get it right.
Interim steps which are already in place provide an adequate basis on which to launch a broad based consultation so that the practical implications of the decision are properly understood before a response is adopted. This should take into account experience so far in implementing the Lord Advocate’s interim guidance as well experience elsewhere in Europe, including our near neighbours, which already have increased access to legal advice for those who are questioned by the police.
The Commission is concerned by a number of elements of the response announced today by the Cabinet Secretary for Justice. Not only does the timetable present no reasonable prospect for a considered response, but the proposed extension of the six hour time limit for detention on reasonable suspicion to twelve and then possibly twenty four hours at the discretion of the police seems a disproportionate response to a decision which was based on the need to recognise the vulnerability of those questioned in police detention.”
Like my colleague Robert Brown and the rest of the Liberal Democrat group, I am a strong supporter of the ECHR. However, we have concerns about rushing through this legislation just 24 hours after the Supreme Court ruling. The new system is likely to be considerably more costly. If the reports are correct, it may add up to £4 million pounds to the legal aid bill. Our greater concern is that it will allow suspects to be locked up for up to 24 hours, which could be a breach of their civil liberties.
I agree that the judgment is binding and that we have to accept it, but, in accepting it, we have to make as good a job of things as we can. As my colleague Robert Brown said, the Liberal Democrats will lodge a number of amendments at stage 2 that we believe will improve the bill.
Scots law stands on its own. There are at least two principles of Scots law: first, that corroboration is needed to get a conviction; and, secondly, that silence is not an admission of guilt and cannot be taken as such. As two lawyers suggested on “Newsnight Scotland” last night, yesterday’s judgment might bring both those principles into question. If that were to be the case, it could result in a fundamental change to Scots law. I am sure that we all would agree that none of us wants that unintended consequence. I am therefore very pleased that Lord Carloway is to conduct a review. I am sure that he will look at both those aspects.
Like Professor Alan Miller, the Liberal Democrats have concerns about our rushing through this legislation the day after the judgment in London. It is too hasty, and a period of reflection and consideration would have been a more considered response.
15:04
This afternoon’s exercise is one of fire fighting. We accept Robert Brown’s point that we are dealing with the matter rather more speedily than was necessary and have some criticisms of the way in which the Government has handled the matter, but it was confronted with a problem and it had to act. We fully accept that, which is why—in general terms—we will support the bill at decision time.
That said, I cannot but respond to some of the issues that Government back benchers have raised. The problem is not yesterday’s judgment or the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the original Salduz case, but the fact that we signed up to the European convention on human rights in a manner that has undoubtedly prejudiced Scotland. The Salduz case came from Turkey, which is a jurisdiction in which human rights have been treated in a somewhat cavalier fashion over many years. The case demonstrated oppression: a 16-year-old boy was held for three days for a politically related offence. The justices in Strasbourg had no option but to accept that that was wrong.
Unlike certain Scottish football managers, I do not think that there is much percentage in criticising the referees. Once the decision had been made in Strasbourg, it was inevitable that the Supreme Court would reach a similar verdict, as it did yesterday. It is a bit much for members who criticise the Supreme Court not to recognise that the problem arose much earlier, when they enthusiastically committed themselves to including the European convention in Scots law.
We find the bill unobjectionable in many instances. No one wishes anyone to be held in custody for any longer than is necessary, but we must recognise the practicalities. If someone is charged with a section 1 offence on the Isle of Skye, there is no possibility—especially in January—of getting a solicitor there from Inverness, Fort William or wherever within the time limits that have been laid down. We have no option but to extend those limits.
That is complete rubbish.
I am sorry, but time is restricted and I cannot take interventions.
There are unresolved issues. I have already mentioned to the cabinet secretary that there is a problem with section 7, which deals with appeals. I intend to lodge amendments, pending clarification of the matter. I hope that it can be resolved.
We must recognise that we are where we are and that there is no possibility of dealing with the matter other than by legislation. There is genuine and unanimous agreement on that. However, I express regret and some resentment at the fact that, as a result of the judgments, the Scottish law system—which, for all of its imperfections, is recognised throughout the world as, if not a paragon, at least one of the best justice systems—is being equated with the legal systems of Turkey and other countries in which human rights are not upheld. The Labour Government was responsible for the Human Rights Act 1998, which was supported by the SNP. That is a matter of considerable regret.
15:08
There is no doubt that this is a unique parliamentary occasion. We meet in emergency session as a result of yesterday’s Supreme Court ruling, which has serious implications for the Scottish legal system. The matters that are before us this afternoon require a serious debate. It is regrettable that some of the speeches by nationalist members did not address the issues that are before us in the bill. The cabinet secretary has spoken the language of consensus throughout the process, but Dave Thompson did not address the general principles of the bill and Stewart Maxwell’s speech was akin to something that would be heard at the SNP conference.
Patrick Harvie and Robert Brown expressed fears about passing emergency legislation. The decision that has been made is a landmark ruling that changes a central feature of Scottish law relating to suspects’ access to a solicitor. The Scottish Government is right to act. We have received representations from Alan Miller and others who say that it is wrong for us to rush into legislation, but my view and the view of Scottish Labour is that we cannot operate in a vacuum.
Will the member take an intervention?
No. I am sorry, I am rushed for time.
In my view, yesterday’s judgment means that our law is incompatible, in this aspect, with ECHR. Taking that view, it is not enough simply to have the guidelines that the Lord Advocate introduced in the summer. There is a vacuum, and we need legislation. We need certainty for the judiciary, for the police and for suspects. Above all, we need to legislate for victims. We must not expose ourselves to unsafe verdicts.
A number of serious representations have been made, and I have reflected on them overnight, but I think that the Government is right to introduce the emergency bill.
A central aspect is the introduction in statute of access to a lawyer. Like other Labour members, I recognise the guidelines that have been in force concerning the six hours of detention. The bill seeks to increase that to 12 hours. Bill Aitken pinpointed some of the practical issues in that regard, and spoke about the reason for there being support and sympathy for the proposal. As for the move from 12 to 24 hours, I am not unsympathetic to it, but so far I have not been totally convinced by the cabinet secretary’s explanation as to why that needs to be encompassed in emergency legislation.
Will the member give way?
I am sorry, but I do not have time.
I urge the cabinet secretary to address those concerns, as well as the concerns that Bill Butler, Pauline McNeill and other members have raised regarding further authorisations being built into the bill.
One of the untold stories in this morning’s press is that of the cost implications of the bill. We were told that the potential legal aid costs are £4 million, and that is covered in the financial memorandum. On police costs, there could be £7 million of set-up costs for police consultation rooms. The requirement for the police to be on site to administer the new arrangements will mean that 480 officers will be required—144 sergeants and 336 constables. That will come at a cost of £20 million per year. That is a matter of serious concern, and its implications need to be considered. We need an impact assessment to assess what that means for front-line policing, and that requirement lends weight to demands for early publication of the budget.
The bill is necessary legislation. There are reservations about some aspects of it, but Scottish Labour is pleased to support the general principles of the bill.
15:13
I am grateful to members for their contributions. It is appropriate to touch on three matters that have been raised in the debate. First is the reason for the urgency; second is the action that is being taken and why it is being taken now; and third is the extension of the period of detention.
On the urgency of the situation, the judgment is clearly not as cataclysmic as one of the scenarios that we planned for. Had the judgment been retrospective, it would have been calamitous—that is accepted. That said, the decision is not simply prospective. There are current, pending and live appeals, so the consequences are still severe. We already have 3,420 devolution minutes relating to the Cadder case, but thankfully, according to the Crown Office, the serious cases number only 120. However, we should not underestimate the significant changes that require to be made to Scots law. The consequences—for victims, the courts, the police and everyone else—require us to act urgently. The world changed at 9.45 am yesterday.
Moving to the action to be taken, we require to clarify some of the points that Pauline McNeill and other members have made. As the First Minister correctly said, the normal situation in most jurisdictions is that there is a final court of appeal. That court of appeal in Scotland is the High Court of appeal, in which the case of McLean v HMA was dealt with. The First Minister was also quite correct to say that when the Scotland Bill was being considered and it was envisaged that human rights would be part of it in the context of the ECHR, nobody anticipated that solicitors would seek to take appeals on criminal law matters to the Supreme Court, which had not even been envisaged at that juncture.
However, we find ourselves having to take action, as happened with Somerville—I was grateful to members, whatever their party, for bringing in the one-year period of limitation, because without that protection from ECHR challenges we were exposed. Equally, in the current circumstances, people can use a devolution minute to deal with matters that are fundamentally meant to be dealt with by the criminal law and the highest court in Scotland.
On Pauline McNeill’s comments, I think that the First Minister made the position clear. The question is whether other jurisdictions are affected and find themselves challenged in respect of the ECHR. The answer is, of course, yes, because those who sign up to the ECHR accept that it is binding. We accept that it is incumbent on us—indeed it is part of our founding principles—to abide by the ECHR. However, other jurisdictions have the opportunity to go to the European Court of Human Rights, put forward their case and reflect on matters. Such an opportunity is precluded for the Government and law officers of Scotland. The decision of the UK Supreme Court was based on an interpretation of a Strasbourg decision. It was not a decision of Strasbourg on Scots law, so we do not have the opportunity to go to Strasbourg.
Bill Butler suggested that we should have addressed matters after Salduz v Turkey in 2008. It is clear that matters relating to Salduz v Turkey were considered in McLean v HMA in October 2009, when, as Stewart Maxwell said, the High Court of Scotland, presided over by the Lord Justice General, who was supported by his deputy the Lord Justice Clerk and by five other High Court judges of significance and stature in Scotland, found that Scots law in relation to the period of detention and lack of access to a solicitor was not incompatible with the ECHR.
I do not know whether Mr Butler was suggesting that we should have second-guessed the High Court’s decision before October 2009 or that after 2009 the Government should have unilaterally said, “Well, the Lord Justice General has got it wrong.” It would be scandalous for a justice minister to second-guess, never mind criticise, a decision of a supreme court sitting on a criminal appeal matter in Scotland.
Will the cabinet secretary give way?
No. I do not have time.
The period of detention clearly requires to be addressed. First and foremost, let us remember the circumstances and where we are being taken by the UK Supreme Court, which is down the road to replicating the position south of the border under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. South of the border—a Labour Government presided over this situation; I used to meet Jack Straw and others—the period of detention is initially 24 hours, and on cause shown and by request of a senior officer to another senior officer it can be extended to 36 hours. At 36 hours, the case can be put before a magistrate and the period of detention extended to 72 hours.
In Scotland, as I said, there has been a significant change, with a lawyer being in for the interview that takes place. We simply seek to strike a balance by extending the period to 12 hours. Only on cause shown and in the most serious cases and indictable matters will that period be extended. It will not be extended on the basis that a breach of the peace or anything like that is being investigated. However, in cases such as attempted murder, rape and serious assault, there can be forensic and ballistic investigations. Mr Brown should consider that. If someone has been detained for 12 hours in a rape case and forensic and other investigations are taking place, must the person be released because we have not managed to secure a report of significance, which would allow an officer to put questions of fundamental importance to the accused? Is the person to be liberated just because he has been detained for 12 hours?
The question is how the extension is to be signed off. South of the border it is simply a matter of going to an equivalent senior officer. To require the issue to go before a judge or a justice of the peace seems to me to undermine the police investigation. It is a matter of balance, which is why we have introduced the bill as a matter of urgency. The scales of justice require that we acknowledge the importance of having a lawyer in for an interrogation during an investigation. Equally, we must remember the rights of victims and ensure that a fair balance is struck for those who police our communities and prosecute. If there is no extension, we undermine that balance.
The question is, that motion S3M-7267, in the name of Kenny MacAskill, on the general principles of the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Bill, be agreed to. Are we agreed?
Members: No.
There will be a division. As this is the first division, it will be five minutes.
15:19
Meeting suspended.
15:25
On resuming—
Members can vote now on the general principles of the bill.
On a point of order, Presiding Officer. Can you clarify where we are? I thought that we had been in the process of actually recording our votes.
No. There was a suspension of five minutes, and we are now in the vote. If you have voted, it is all right. [Interruption.]
Right, can you listen carefully? There has been a slight hiccup. Will everybody vote again, please? The hiccup was not—[Interruption.] That’s it now.
Members: No, it’s not.
The vote will be rerun.
On a point of order, Presiding Officer. [Interruption.]
Will members please be quiet? There is a point of order that I would really like to hear.
There is some confusion about where we are in the process. Can we start everything again?
That is indeed what we are doing. Your vote will be on the general principles of the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Bill.
Members can vote now. It is working.
For
Adam, Brian (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
Aitken, Bill (Glasgow) (Con)
Alexander, Ms Wendy (Paisley North) (Lab)
Allan, Alasdair (Western Isles) (SNP)
Baillie, Jackie (Dumbarton) (Lab)
Baker, Claire (Mid Scotland and Fife) (Lab)
Baker, Richard (North East Scotland) (Lab)
Boyack, Sarah (Edinburgh Central) (Lab)
Brankin, Rhona (Midlothian) (Lab)
Brocklebank, Ted (Mid Scotland and Fife) (Con)
Brown, Gavin (Lothians) (Con)
Brown, Keith (Ochil) (SNP)
Brown, Robert (Glasgow) (LD)
Brownlee, Derek (South of Scotland) (Con)
Butler, Bill (Glasgow Anniesland) (Lab)
Campbell, Aileen (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Carlaw, Jackson (West of Scotland) (Con)
Chisholm, Malcolm (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab)
Coffey, Willie (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (SNP)
Constance, Angela (Livingston) (SNP)
Craigie, Cathie (Cumbernauld and Kilsyth) (Lab)
Crawford, Bruce (Stirling) (SNP)
Cunningham, Roseanna (Perth) (SNP)
Don, Nigel (North East Scotland) (SNP)
Doris, Bob (Glasgow) (SNP)
Eadie, Helen (Dunfermline East) (Lab)
Ewing, Fergus (Inverness East, Nairn and Lochaber) (SNP)
Fabiani, Linda (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Ferguson, Patricia (Glasgow Maryhill) (Lab)
Finnie, Ross (West of Scotland) (LD)
FitzPatrick, Joe (Dundee West) (SNP)
Foulkes, George (Lothians) (Lab)
Fraser, Murdo (Mid Scotland and Fife) (Con)
Gibson, Kenneth (Cunninghame North) (SNP)
Gibson, Rob (Highlands and Islands) (SNP)
Glen, Marlyn (North East Scotland) (Lab)
Gordon, Charlie (Glasgow Cathcart) (Lab)
Grahame, Christine (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Grant, Rhoda (Highlands and Islands) (Lab)
Harvie, Christopher (Mid Scotland and Fife) (SNP)
Henry, Hugh (Paisley South) (Lab)
Hepburn, Jamie (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Hyslop, Fiona (Lothians) (SNP)
Ingram, Adam (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Johnstone, Alex (North East Scotland) (Con)
Kelly, James (Glasgow Rutherglen) (Lab)
Kerr, Andy (East Kilbride) (Lab)
Kidd, Bill (Glasgow) (SNP)
Lamont, Johann (Glasgow Pollok) (Lab)
Lamont, John (Roxburgh and Berwickshire) (Con)
Livingstone, Marilyn (Kirkcaldy) (Lab)
Lochhead, Richard (Moray) (SNP)
MacAskill, Kenny (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (SNP)
Macdonald, Lewis (Aberdeen Central) (Lab)
Macintosh, Ken (Eastwood) (Lab)
Martin, Paul (Glasgow Springburn) (Lab)
Marwick, Tricia (Central Fife) (SNP)
Matheson, Michael (Falkirk West) (SNP)
Maxwell, Stewart (West of Scotland) (SNP)
McArthur, Liam (Orkney) (LD)
McAveety, Mr Frank (Glasgow Shettleston) (Lab)
McCabe, Tom (Hamilton South) (Lab)
McConnell, Jack (Motherwell and Wishaw) (Lab)
McInnes, Alison (North East Scotland) (LD)
McKee, Ian (Lothians) (SNP)
McKelvie, Christina (Central Scotland) (SNP)
McLaughlin, Anne (Glasgow) (SNP)
McLetchie, David (Edinburgh Pentlands) (Con)
McMahon, Michael (Hamilton North and Bellshill) (Lab)
McMillan, Stuart (West of Scotland) (SNP)
McNeil, Duncan (Greenock and Inverclyde) (Lab)
McNeill, Pauline (Glasgow Kelvin) (Lab)
McNulty, Des (Clydebank and Milngavie) (Lab)
Milne, Nanette (North East Scotland) (Con)
Mitchell, Margaret (Central Scotland) (Con)
Mulligan, Mary (Linlithgow) (Lab)
Munro, John Farquhar (Ross, Skye and Inverness West) (LD)
Murray, Elaine (Dumfries) (Lab)
Neil, Alex (Central Scotland) (SNP)
O’Donnell, Hugh (Central Scotland) (LD)
Oldfather, Irene (Cunninghame South) (Lab)
Park, John (Mid Scotland and Fife) (Lab)
Paterson, Gil (West of Scotland) (SNP)
Peacock, Peter (Highlands and Islands) (Lab)
Peattie, Cathy (Falkirk East) (Lab)
Pringle, Mike (Edinburgh South) (LD)
Purvis, Jeremy (Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale) (LD)
Rumbles, Mike (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD)
Russell, Michael (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Salmond, Alex (Gordon) (SNP)
Scanlon, Mary (Highlands and Islands) (Con)
Scott, John (Ayr) (Con)
Simpson, Dr Richard (Mid Scotland and Fife) (Lab)
Smith, Elizabeth (Mid Scotland and Fife) (Con)
Smith, Iain (North East Fife) (LD)
Smith, Margaret (Edinburgh West) (LD)
Somerville, Shirley-Anne (Lothians) (SNP)
Stephen, Nicol (Aberdeen South) (LD)
Stevenson, Stewart (Banff and Buchan) (SNP)
Stewart, David (Highlands and Islands) (Lab)
Stone, Jamie (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)
Sturgeon, Nicola (Glasgow Govan) (SNP)
Thompson, Dave (Highlands and Islands) (SNP)
Tolson, Jim (Dunfermline West) (LD)
Watt, Maureen (North East Scotland) (SNP)
Welsh, Andrew (Angus) (SNP)
White, Sandra (Glasgow) (SNP)
Whitefield, Karen (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab)
Whitton, David (Strathkelvin and Bearsden) (Lab)
Wilson, Bill (West of Scotland) (SNP)
Wilson, John (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Against
Harper, Robin (Lothians) (Green)
Harvie, Patrick (Glasgow) (Green)
MacDonald, Margo (Lothians) (Ind)
The result of the division is: For 111, Against 3, Abstentions 0.
Motion agreed to,
That the Parliament agrees to the general principles of the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Bill.