Civil Contingencies
The next item of business is a debate on motion S1M-2918, in the name of Dr Richard Simpson, on civil contingencies. I call Dr Simpson to speak to and move the motion.
Civil contingency planning is part of the everyday business of Government, the emergency services, health boards, the utilities and the local authorities, as it is for the private sector and others. That planning, which is rooted in the principle of integrated emergency management, has served us well in responding to a range of incidents throughout Scotland over many years. Incidents might differ in scale, from an atrocity as horrendous as the Lockerbie disaster to the potential threat that was posed by the millennium date change. However, it is through the process of identifying the risks, planning the responses and practising the procedures that are to be followed in an emergency that we can be prepared for any eventuality.
The unprecedented nature of the events of 11 September last year has necessitated a review of our emergency planning and a fundamental reassessment of what needs to be done to enable us to respond to a new scale of potential threat.
The public rightly have a high expectation of the protective measures that should be in place, particularly in the light of the attacks on Washington and New York and the subsequent anthrax fatalities in America. For the next few minutes, I will outline the contingency planning arrangements that we will follow in Scotland and how they will link with such planning throughout the United Kingdom. I will also detail the actions that we have taken since the dreadful events of 11 September.
I want clarification on an important point in relation to the atmosphere that was created by the situation after 11 September. Will the minister confirm that the anthrax deaths to which he referred were not caused by external actions, but by internal, American actions?
That is a matter for the American Government. I do not have the information to confirm or reject that point. Investigations are being pursued. However, a significant number of dubious packages were received in Scotland, but they all turned out to be either hoaxes or false alarms.
We are fortunate in Scotland that we have tried and tested structures in place that have served us well. We have a top-down and bottom-up approach that is based on the principle that the response to major emergencies should be primarily at local level, but should be supported as necessary by central emergency machinery.
At national level, the central machinery is led by the Scottish emergencies co-ordinating committee, which is chaired by the head of the justice department. That committee brings together senior representation from all the emergency services and other key organisations, such as the health service, the local authorities, the military, the utilities and a wide range of other players. The committee can deal with an immediate emergency or consider what must be done in the longer term to upgrade our capacity to respond to the widest range of possible threats. The committee commissioned much of the new work that has been undertaken in Scotland since 11 September.
At regional level, there are eight strategic emergency co-ordinating groups, which are based on police and fire authority boundaries. Those involve chief constables, fire-masters, local authority chief executives and others. They have a key role in planning and co-ordinating civil contingency planning across geographical and sectoral boundaries and in organising training, in developing exercises, and in promoting mutual aid.
At local level, each of the 32 local authorities in Scotland has a council emergency planning officer. Those officers mainly report directly to their council's chief executive. Their roles vary slightly from authority to authority, but their primary purpose is to ensure that the full range of local authority services and resources can be brought to bear in an emergency. In that context, planning must embrace the full range of possible emergencies, from bad weather in winter to a full-blown emergency, such as the recent example in Perth, in which an oxyacetylene tank was found in a lock-up garage that had caught fire. The emergency planning officer responded, along with the fire brigade, and the area was cleared. I want to praise the authorities for their excellent work in protecting the public in that situation. That was exactly the sort of locally co-ordinated response that we expect in an emergency of that sort.
At each level, the emergency planning machinery has been at full alert since 11 September. The single fundamental philosophy that runs through the emergency planning structure in Scotland is that there should be a planned and integrated approach to all disasters, irrespective of their causes.
It is not only in Scotland that arrangements have been reviewed. Central Government, led by the civil contingencies secretariat in the Cabinet Office, has significantly increased examination of the ability to protect the public from, and to respond to, the terrorist threat. The Scottish Executive has been involved in the full range of initiatives that have emanated from London. The Executive is represented by either the First Minister or by the Deputy First Minister on the Civil Contingencies Committee, which is chaired by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. We are also represented on two sub-committees that the Civil Contingencies Committee set up in the wake of 11 September. One committee is looking in particular at the threat from biological and chemical terrorism. The other is promoting improvements in the overall level of resilience across all sectors in our society.
In the event of the threat of attack by a weapon of mass destruction, which members of the Scottish Executive and which officials would have access to the bunker?
I have not been introduced to the bunker yet, so I cannot answer that question. However, I will write to Mr Canavan and tell him whether the bunker still exists and which officials and members would go into it.
Resilience, which is important, is a paradox. Although it appears to be necessary that we are ready for anything, such a level of preparedness cannot realistically be delivered. That paradox is an inherent and unavoidable part of the modern world in which daily life is sustained by a network of unprecedented complexities and interdependencies. Resolution of the resilience paradox relies on the most adaptable components of any system—people and their knowledge.
Contingency planning, new or old, is about enabling organisations to manage their own risks better. I know that the Deputy First Minister was engaged in an exercise in Inverness in recent months, which involved UK elements as well as Scottish elements. I will take part in a desktop exercise in the near future. Those two types of approach are used regularly.
Much work is under way on improving risk management within Government and in the public and private sectors.
Will the minister take an intervention?
I am getting through my time, so I had better not.
Will the minister give way on one small point?
No. I am sorry, but I must go on.
Because much work is under way on improving risk management within Government and in the public and private sectors, contingency planning to address identified risks becomes a routine part of business.
In my last few minutes I will address some of the issues that the Scottish emergencies co-ordinating committee has considered recently. Our recent work has resulted in increased activity by all members of the emergency planning machinery at all levels. We have improved guidance on dealing with the threat of chemical and biological terrorism, which has been issued to health boards and local authorities. Specific guidance on anthrax has been issued to general practitioners. We have put in place protocols through which laboratory facilities in Scotland will undertake analyses of suspect packages, the number of which, as I said, has increased since the 11 September incident.
Provision of resources for personal protective equipment has been extended to police and ambulance workers as well as fire service workers, so that the emergency services and first-line responders to chemical or biological incidents are protected appropriately. The provision of new resources for the fire service to enhance its ability to carry out heavy rescue work was the subject of recent special funding, as was the provision of decontamination equipment.
Will the minister take an intervention?
I think that I am into my last minute.
You have two minutes, minister.
In that case I will take an intervention from Mr Quinan.
On decontamination equipment, will the minister tell us how many facilities we have in Scotland to deal with civilian nuclear radiation leaks? How many decontamination centres for nuclear accidents do we have in Scotland?
I propose to return to that point in my summing up, if I may.
Much of the work that has been done has been groundbreaking. We have come a considerable way in the past five months, but there is a long way to go and we are in no way complacent. The forces have been on a state of alert since 11 September last year. It is important that that momentum is maintained so that Scotland's reputation and ability to respond to threats is enhanced. The public will expect and accept nothing less.
I am sure that the Parliament will join me in paying tribute to all the organisations that are working to ensure that Scotland is prepared for any contingency that might arise.
I move,
That the Parliament acknowledges the importance of civil contingency planning and, in the light of the atrocities in the United States of America on 11 September 2001, approves the ongoing work by the Scottish Executive, the police, fire and ambulance services, the National Health Service, the local authorities and others, in promoting measures to enhance the safety and protection of the people of Scotland.
I feel as though I have been on permanent duty in the chamber yesterday and today.
I endorse—as, I suspect, does everybody in the chamber—the minister's comments on what happened on 11 September and what that means for emergency planning. The Parliament met on the Wednesday immediately following that appalling event to express our condolences to the people of America and to all those who were bereaved. The following month, my party used some of its debating time to allow the Parliament to focus on the developing international situation and Scotland's role in it. As I pointed out then, the attack on the World Trade Center affected not only the USA; citizens of many nations and people of many religions were killed.
The events of that day also brought home with terrifying clarity how susceptible our day-to-day lives are to being completely and totally overturned by the actions of a few determined individuals. The shock waves of the events of 11 September are still being felt and I have no doubt that it will take a long time for the aviation industry, in particular, to recover.
The prevention of such atrocities must always be our priority, but we need to be pragmatic and to realise the importance of civil contingency planning and the ability to react in the most practical and efficient way possible in the event of any major incident. It is about thinking the unthinkable. The importance of the role that is played by those who must think the unthinkable should not be overlooked. It must be a strange and difficult job constantly to refine plans and preparations that such people hope fervently will never have to be put into practice.
However, those plans do get put into practice. We are talking not only about wilful acts of terrorism, but about the destructive acts of God that strike communities throughout the country from time to time, and situations such as that which occurred in my constituency on Sunday night. I know that my constituents are grateful for the way in which that situation was dealt with. I know that they are also grateful for the way in which local council officials, alongside the emergency services and the armed forces, reacted to deal with the aftermath of the dreadful flooding that struck Perth in 1993. I have no doubt that other members will have stories from their constituencies that demonstrate the importance of an efficient plan's being put into operation as soon as disaster strikes.
Although I acknowledge the importance of that work and am glad to take the opportunity to applaud those often unsung heroes who are involved in it, I am a little puzzled about why the motion has been brought before us as Executive business. No specific document or strategy is promoted in the motion, nor does the motion focus on any one aspect of contingency planning, which is a wide-ranging subject.
If the motion had proposed that more resources, for example, were to be provided, I would see why we are having the debate. I know that the money for the fire service that has been boasted about recently is just one of the Executive's famous reannouncements. The Executive's budget for civil defence and emergency planning actually remains static over the four years from 2000-01 to 2003-04. The Executive might at least commit to index-linked increases.
I could understand why we are having the debate if the priorities for contingency planning were being re-evaluated or if the command structure in the event of an emergency was to be reorganised. Even if the motion did something other than merely acknowledge the importance of civil contingency planning and approve of the extremely important work that is done by the diverse agencies that are involved in civil contingency planning in Scotland, I would have understood the purpose of the debate.
The debate should have a point. I therefore take the opportunity to voice concerns that have been expressed about the potential for an incident for which no amount of planning could possibly prepare us. As contingency planning must be as much about prevention as it is about reaction, I urge the minister to read the fact sheet on nuclear time bombs that Greenpeace has circulated, and to bear it in mind at any future Cabinet discussions on nuclear power. Given Kevin Dunion's new role as an adviser to the Executive, I dare say that the minister would find it easy enough to get hold of a copy of that fact sheet. I will be happy to send him one if he wants to see it. That paper puts it thus:
"Since September 11th, the world is facing a new dimension of threat; aviation risks multiplied by nuclear risks; a plane crash on a nuclear installation, in the past seen as ‘improbable' is now a ‘credible' scenario. From now on nuclear plants have to be seen as nuclear timebombs waiting to be detonated, by themselves—or by terrorists."
Lothar Hahn, the chairman of Germany's reactor security commission, which advises the country's Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, has warned
"against the illusion of believing that it is possible to effectively protect reactors against events like those in New York or Washington".
He further explains that preparations can at best be realistic against minor occurrences. He says that strengthening the reinforced concrete cupolas or containment over existing reactors makes little sense.
The report continues to inform us that, in most countries, an aircraft crash on a nuclear reactor has not been taken into consideration. Indeed, such events have been dismissed as improbable. In most countries, risk assessments of plane crashes have been limited to the investigation of the impact of a small aeroplane, such as a Cessna 210, crashing into a nuclear reactor. Members will not need to be reminded that the aircraft that ploughed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center on September 11 were two Boeing 767s.
The kinetic energy of a Boeing 767 is more than 650 times greater than that of a Cessna 210 with a full fuel tank, and the amount of fuel on board each Boeing aircraft was almost 250 times greater than the maximum amount of fuel that can be carried by a Cessna 210. That means that the current design and construction requirements and regulations in countries that operate nuclear reactors are at a level of protection that is far below that which is required to withstand an attack such as that which was carried out on 11 September.
I think the answer to the question that Lloyd Quinan asked about the number of decontamination units in Scotland is that there is none.
We should, by all means, recognise the importance of contingency planning, and we should of course applaud the often unseen work that the various authorities do but, please, let us have no more vague motions such as the one that is before us; rather let us have more practical debate in the Parliament.
It is right that high priority is given to civil contingencies and that there should be the closest co-operation between central Government, local government and the emergency services.
Civil contingencies can arise for any number of reasons: for example, an aircraft disintegrating and crashing, as happened at Lockerbie; an oil rig exploding, as happened at Piper Alpha; radioactive clouds and rainfall over Scotland, as occurred after Chernobyl; flooding, which occurred in Perth following a rapid melt of snow; infection to livestock, as happened with foot-and-mouth disease; or food poisoning, which gave rise to food hazard-warning notices.
For each such case, it is essential that emergency systems should switch into top gear. In that regard, I ask for the following reassurances about problems that have arisen in the past. At the time of the Lockerbie disaster, the telephone system in the south-west of Scotland was jammed with calls following the tragedy. It was very difficult for the Secretary of State for Scotland's office to get through to the local police. Can we be certain that emergency communications will be immune from being jammed and that they will operate effectively? That might really matter, and I cannot help recalling that, following the events of 11 September, the Speaker of the House of Representatives had difficulty getting through to the President's office. It is obvious that communications must work.
Counselling will be necessary in cases of emergencies that involve great trauma or stress for those who perform essential services. My eyes were spared the worst of what happened at Lockerbie, but I know from social workers, from those who identified the deceased, and from some of the police who worked—literally—around the clock, that they were deeply affected by their experiences at the sharp end of the ordeal.
High-speed responses will save lives. I am president of the International Rescue Corps and, after an earthquake or comparable disaster, if the corps gets a team in really quickly, it will be extremely effective. The IRC has charitable status, which assists Governments. I am grateful for the support that is given to it by the Department for International Development. The doctrine of rapid response applies not just to the IRC; it should apply to all emergency services.
I remember the flooding in Perth, when the River Tay broke its flood banks. Within about nine hours, the council house scheme to the north of Perth was flooded. I could not help feeling unqualified admiration for the police and soldiers who managed to rescue those who were affected, some by boat. If they had not acted quickly, lives could have been lost.
Does the member agree that any idea of replacing stand-by boats with helicopters, which is being mooted by one of the oil companies, must be condemned?
It is absolutely essential that the effectiveness of proposals is tested and proved before those proposals are put into operation. If a system is not working effectively and in the best interests of our country, it should not continue.
We must be prepared for threats of incidents that we have never experienced, and I am glad that local emergency planning networks have been on alert since 11 September, and that Scottish ministers have been attending meetings of the UK Civil Contingencies Committee. It is important that new guidance on how to deal with chemical, biological and radioactive substances has been issued, and that guidance on dealing with anthrax has been forwarded to doctors. It is also welcome that the police have their own centre for improving security and intelligence. I understand that the Scottish emergencies co-ordination committee has met to review arrangements throughout the emergency services.
Prevention is, of course, much better than cure, as Roseanna Cunningham said. Will the minister confirm that, whatever might arise, communications will function with maximum effectiveness? The speed of response must be like lightning, with those concerned having been trained to a very high state of readiness. We must be fully prepared for all contingencies so that full recovery can, and will, take place speedily. In other words, we must concentrate on prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.
Counselling might be a lesser priority but, in a compassionate society, nobody should have too great a burden to bear. In the wake of a great tragedy, counselling as well as time can be a great help in healing scars.
I welcome the minister's statement and hope that he can give us appropriate reassurances.
I am sorry that Dennis Canavan is not still here because I wished to assure him that, to the best of my knowledge, the bunker—which is on Corstorphine hill in the area that Margaret Smith now represents and that I used to represent at Westminster—has been closed down and is, I think, used for storage or something similarly mundane. To the best of my knowledge, the list of people who are privileged to use the bunker included very few elected politicians. It consisted of serious people—generals, chief executives of councils, senior civil servants and so on. The elected peasantry were kept well away.
I would like to approach the debate from a different angle. What the minister and other members have said is sensible, but as well as concentrating on the possibility—the unlikely possibility, we hope—of a really major disaster, I hope that we can concentrate as much, if not more, on minor disasters.
James Douglas-Hamilton mentioned the floods at Perth; an area that I used to represent as a councillor suffered floods two years out of three. There was improvement in the way those floods were dealt with, but there was certainly a lot of room for improvement.
We need more practice in dealing with, for example, railway smashes. If, as we hope, there is not a real one, people could practice on pretend ones. Other examples on which there should be practice are an explosion at the Grangemouth chemical works or a slight radiation leak. I hope that we will not examine so fiercely the possibility of major disasters that we do not practice for, and implement a really good system for, the minor disasters that are much more likely to happen. We should be able to co-ordinate better our responses to such disasters, and the people concerned should be able to learn about the system for dealing with them.
What the minister said was very sensible and I am happy to leave my contribution at that.
Three members have indicated that they wish to speak in the open debate. I ask them to keep their speeches to four minutes.
Most people would agree that civil contingencies will seldom, if ever, be the hot topic of conversation as people go about their daily lives—that is, until something happens or goes wrong, at which point the public quite rightly expect a comprehensive and professional response that will not only save lives, but will minimise disruption and distress for any people who are affected.
It is only right to acknowledge that, for a long time, we in Scotland have had the plans, the facilities, the training and the communications to ensure that we are able to deal with whatever happens in any part of Scotland. Mention has been made of the Lockerbie disaster. That is a classic case of the emergency services kicking into action in a very professional and co-ordinated way. They attracted praise from around the world for the way in which they were able to deal with what can only be described as a major tragedy and a major incident here in Scotland.
We have the facilities and have had them for a long time. As was rightly pointed out by the minister, every local authority in Scotland has an emergency planning officer and emergency planning procedures, which are reviewed regularly. The Scottish Executive is represented on the United Kingdom's Civil Contingencies Committee by, I believe, the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister.
I know from experience that major exercises take place to simulate live situations so that all our emergency services and public services can come together and test their readiness and their procedures for dealing with any incident that they might face. Those exercises attract observers from around the world and we have gained considerable recognition for the way in which we try to prepare for any eventuality. Roseanna Cunningham was correct to acknowledge that all such activity is put together by professionals who do their best to ensure that we are as prepared for a civil emergency as we can be, yet do so in the sincere hope that all their work will never be put into action. We must acknowledge that the people who do such work do it in exceptionally difficult circumstances and require extraordinary motivation. All the evidence suggests that such people are motivated and that their work is useful and valued.
Mention has been made of the terrible incidents that took place on 11 September last year. There is no doubt that those incidents have prompted requirements for new precautions and have refocused aspects of our civil contingencies planning. As the minister acknowledged, those events have caused some obscure groups to make real and hoax threats against individuals in Scotland. The purpose of today's debate is not only to allow people to examine our level of readiness, but to explain that readiness and to offer reassurance to the general public in Scotland that the necessary procedures are in place.
It is important that we strike a balance so as to give proper reassurance to the public that adequate attention is being paid to civil contingencies, while avoiding the danger of creating unnecessary anxiety. I hope that we can use today's debate to strike that balance. Public servants should account for the plans that they make on our behalf, but they should also be allowed to get on with that important task without undue interference, without scaremongering and, most important of all, without politicians making political capital at the expense of people's peace of mind.
I approve of all the efforts that have been made to date by the emergency services, which were alerted by the tragedy of 11 September.
In the aftermath of 11 September, I asked the Scottish Executive several questions because I was concerned to establish what had and had not been done. A Scottish Executive answer on 13 December established how much money had been allocated to emergency planning under the civil protection element of the grant-aided allocation. The sums seem small: £76,000 for Inverclyde, £99,000 for Renfrewshire and £78,000 for West Dunbartonshire. I presume that the money is allocated on a population basis, rather than on an area's proximity to a potential risk.
I assume that the sums are based on a risk assessment that presupposes an extremely low possibility of a civil emergency. It appears that councils are satisfied with the allocations; an answer on 7 January from Richard Simpson to one of my parliamentary questions indicated that no local authorities have requested additional funds for emergency planning following the events of 11 September. As Roseanna Cunningham said, civil emergency financial provision for this year and the next two years is the same as it was last year. I wonder whether there is some complacency among councils and the Scottish Executive.
On 25 September, I received a reply from Iain Gray to a question on the nuclear emergency exercises in which the emergency services, local authorities and other agencies took part. There were six exercises in 1999, eight exercises in 2000 and six exercises in 2001. In the light of 11 September, I asked what non-nuclear emergency planning exercises had taken place since 1990, where they took place, what the purpose was and what organisations and staff had taken part. I expected at least to get answers from the start of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. However, the answer that I received was:
"This information is not held centrally."—[Official Report, Written Answers, 20 November 2001; p 171.]
That information is essential and should be in the hands of the Scottish Executive to inform its future decisions.
There are eight regional strategic emergency planning groups in Scotland, which are usually chaired by chief constables. The groups meet twice a year. The Scottish Executive's aim, which is a little underambitious, is to attend at least one annual meeting of each group. Scottish Executive representation at all such meetings would add to the sense of purpose and seriousness that those meetings demand. I would like to know how many of those meetings Scottish Executive representatives have attended.
A question about Scottish Executive consultation with the Ministry of Defence on the security of key installations brought the expected response that security is a matter for the UK Government and that
"emergency planning policy relates to planning for the consequences of incidents not to security issues."—[Official Report, Written Answers, 13 December 2001; p 382.]
I would have thought that the police would have some locus on security and that they would be in liaison with the armed forces. I do not expect to learn the details, but there must be clear guidelines for the overlapping spheres of influence, in emergencies, of the military and the police. I am sure that the reality is not as unco-ordinated as the reply would suggest.
As Tom McCabe said, a balance must be struck between reality and fantasy. September 11 was both, and it was terrifying. A balance must be struck between overanxiety and complacency. I would like to move the existing balance towards constant caution and vigilance.
There is now a perception that the world is a more dangerous place than at any time since the Cuban crisis of the 1960s. As we have heard, we face the unpredictability of post-September 11, with terrorists using hitherto unbelievable weapons against civilians. As ever, the minnows of the terrorist world leap on to the bandwagon of fear.
We have also heard that, in Scotland, caustic substances were sent to some of our MSP colleagues and staff, and threatening e-mails were sent to some members. That despicable behaviour means that we all have to be more vigilant.
The need for updated civil contingency planning has now reached a new high, not only as the result of potential terrorist outrages. Global warming might change weather patterns to an extent that we can only guess at. As others have mentioned, flood warnings, which were formerly comparatively rare, are now commonplace. Places in Scotland that never suffered floods are now looking to the authorities to make sandbags readily available. In Coatbridge, there have been increasingly disruptive incidents of flooding.
So far, the emergency services have responded well to whatever crisis has arisen. National major emergencies are handled through the Scottish Executive emergencies room—SEER—in Edinburgh. Depending upon the scale of the situation affecting Scotland, Executive ministers meet under the chairmanship of the First Minister.
Although SEER is regularly open for planning exercises—obviously with new concerns since September 11—the facility was last used in earnest for handling the fuel crisis in September 2000. Before that, it was used in the anticipation—happily unrealised—of problems arising from the 2000 date change, or the millennium bug.
It is a nice touch of irony that "Scottish Executive emergencies room" produces the acronym "SEER", because it is never possible to foretell and plan in detail for every contingency. What can be done is to consider known potential dangers and plan for the possible effects of different scenarios. The causes of any given event can be investigated at a later stage, but the priority must be to tackle a situation as it arises, in line with earlier contingency planning.
There is a linked structure of emergency planners throughout the UK: from the London Cabinet Office civil contingency secretariat down to the emergency planning officers of each of Scotland's local authorities. North Lanarkshire Council has an emergency planning unit, with two dedicated staff. The unit takes its duties seriously, and continuously tests and evaluates its methods and practices in consultation with all partners. Training and exercise events covering a range of scenarios and issues are tackled all year round. The council tells me that each year it responds to approximately a dozen incidents that require a co-ordinated and integrated approach. I take the opportunity to congratulate North Lanarkshire Council on the work that it does in contingency planning.
Throughout Scotland, planning sessions entail liaison with police, fire and health authorities, as well as, on occasion, water boards, the nuclear and chemical industries, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, the power and gas industries, the telecommunications industry, railway companies and the military. They might also entail co-ordination with major local industries, most of which have disaster recovery plans. We can be satisfied that such an approach is taken by all emergency planning authorities in Scotland, whether the event is a nuclear accident, a terrorist attack or a local flooding problem.
Since spring of last year, at the request of the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, funding for civil defence expenditure, although it has been maintained at £2.7 million, has been mainstreamed into the general grant arrangements for local government. Local authorities can decide how that allocation is spent and use it to provide emergency planning resources that are in excess of the previous grant provided under regulations. I hope that that level of expenditure will continue and perhaps increase, and I would welcome the minister's comments on that.
As a general precept, "be prepared" has much to recommend it. I am sure that everyone who has some responsibility for the safety and well-being of the people of Scotland appreciates the continuing work and would take the opportunity to congratulate the people who are specifically charged with planning for and coping with the unthinkable.
We are on schedule, so times for closing speeches should be as indicated—three minutes, three minutes, five minutes and eight minutes.
I agree with everything that most members have said about the need to step up our precautions and ensure that all necessary measures are taken to prevent any major terrorist incident—indeed, any major incident—from taking place in Scotland.
Since September 11 and the declaration of war on terrorism, the risks of terrorist attacks or retaliation against the coalition countries have increased. It is vital that the Executive take every precaution to ensure that we safeguard our people and our property.
It is interesting to note that a Government review of the issue in 1989 concluded that a disaster response would not be helped by the creation of anything in the nature of a national disaster squad. The review suggested that prime responsibility for handling disasters should remain at the local level, where the resources and expertise were to be found. That important point was demonstrated in Scotland by the way in which the Scottish Executive responded to the massive disaster that hit rural Scotland only a year ago.
Foot-and-mouth disease was the first major disaster that the Scottish Executive had had to deal with since devolution. Most independent commentators would agree that foot-and-mouth was dealt with relatively well in Scotland. I have spoken to many of those who were involved at the sharp end—farmers, vets, hauliers, local government officials and members of the army. Time and again, they made the same key points about why the response in Scotland was relatively successful and why we were able to tackle and overcome the disease, which was a major disaster, in such a short space of time.
The first and most important factor was the fact that the lines of communication between Edinburgh and those who were dealing with the disease at the front line were short. Local government played a key role, especially Dumfries and Galloway Council, which organised the response. An excellent partnership was forged among the Executive, local government, the army, the police and all the other services that were involved in responding to the disease.
Dumfries and Galloway Council started with an advantage, in that it had gained huge experience from the Lockerbie disaster—the disaster room and the plan of action were in place, which was helpful. There was good local co-ordination of services. The ability to feed back good local knowledge on the huge practical problems that were involved in culling and burning thousands of animals was crucial. The members of the council's leadership who had an intimate knowledge of the farming industry played a key role. The quick decision-making process was also important in our handling of the crisis.
We must learn those lessons and I hope that they will feed into the plans and contingencies that the Executive puts in place.
Elaine Smith was correct to point out that we live in a changing world. That, in itself, is justification for the debate. All members are well aware that the world changed irrevocably on September 11. Although we must not overdramatise the threat, we must recognise that the threat exists and is potent.
We must also recognise that we are becoming much more prone to natural disasters. As Elaine Smith highlighted, climate change has the potential to cause significant problems. We must ensure that the right mechanisms are in place to ensure that in the event of any problem—man-made or natural—the appropriate response can be effected swiftly and certainly to the benefit of the citizens of Scotland.
Lord James Douglas-Hamilton was correct to highlight one or two of the issues that arise. For example, those who assist at times of great natural or man-made disasters frequently find themselves in a traumatising situation. I know personally some people who were involved at Lockerbie and, although they are pretty robust individuals, they were all considerably affected by that situation. Counselling is important, but perhaps we need to recognise that, if counselling is to be effective, it must be offered to those who are likely to be exposed to such traumas prior to the event. Counselling should be part of the training process for all those who are involved in the services that are required to respond to such emergencies.
Speed of response is absolutely vital. Along with that, there needs to be a proper communications system that is robust enough to be able to withstand anything that might be thrown at it. Clearly, it is difficult for those who must make decisions on the steps that are necessary to safeguard the population if they cannot be apprised of the situation on the ground. Another issue that must be considered is the possibility of chemical and germ warfare. Steps have been taken to deal with anthrax, but perhaps we also need to examine how smallpox would be dealt with.
We all hope that we shall never need to return to this debate; nonetheless, the debate is necessary. If we have highlighted the importance of civil contingencies, the debate will have been worth while. I found what the minister said reassuring, but we must guard against complacency.
In preparing for today's debate, I was interested to note that the Executive's website appears to contain only one publication that refers to civil emergencies. Although the Parliament is debating civil emergencies this afternoon, the subject does not appear to have been at the top of the Executive's agenda in years gone by.
Members have covered most of the issues that required to be addressed. The minister's speech was relatively reassuring. Several members have highlighted that the planning process for dealing with civil emergencies is crucial in ensuring that there is an effective response when an emergency occurs. Sadly, effective planning for an emergency can be tested only when the emergency itself takes place, but we are fortunate that such emergencies rarely occur. However, there is always a need to ensure that the plans are updated and, where possible, reviewed to consider whether changes and improvements can be made.
A lot of staff commitment is required for emergencies. Several members have referred to the role of the police, the fire service and the ambulance service but, as members have indicated, local authorities and health board staff also have a role to play. However, many local authority and health board staff have not been given a dedicated role in emergency planning. The staff are often officers of the council or members of the health board who have volunteered to take up a role during a civil emergency. For many of them, that involves a considerable level of commitment and dedication as they need to be trained for an event that they hope will never occur. By volunteering, the staff put themselves on 24-hour call, 365 days a year. Although they are not called upon often, the Parliament should record its recognition of the dedication that many members of staff display.
Climate change was mentioned. Flooding seems to be an increasing problem in several areas across Scotland. The best known of those areas is probably Perth, although considerable work has been done there to address that problem. The Executive has produced figures for the potential rise in the cost of flood damage from the present figure of £28 million. The figures show an increase of 27 per cent by 2020, and by 2050 the increase will be some 86 per cent. Many of us will not be around in 2080, but the cost will have increased by 115 per cent by then. Adequate preventive measures need to be put in place to ensure that such flood damage does not take place.
I will not be around in 2080. Is the member aware that two or three weeks ago the Dutch Government indicated that, due to the vast increase in water levels in the North sea, one third of Holland will be under water within the next 300 years?
That example illustrates the very real issues that relate to climate change and the on-going problem of flooding, which is not only a Scottish or a UK issue, but one that affects countries across the world. Holland has a particular problem in that respect.
It is interesting to note that, under the Flood Prevention (Scotland) Act 1961, local authorities have a clear and wide-ranging responsibility for the issue. I hope that ministers will ensure that local authorities have the resources that they need to tackle the problem.
I turn briefly to the issue of terrorism. A number of members highlighted concerns about the possibility of a threat to nuclear power stations and nuclear weapons. I was interested to hear that, in Devonport and Plymouth, schools near the nuclear military facilities have radiation alarms. Medication—I believe that it is potassium iodide tablets—is also provided for children if an alarm goes off.
Will the minister inform members whether schools near a nuclear power station or a military facility such as Faslane will be offered a similar facility? It is essential that, if such an event were to happen, the appropriate measures would be taken to reduce the harm that it could cause to the local community.
Like Bill Aitken, I hope that the issue is one that we do not have to return to. However, it is essential to ensure that we have the proper plans and services in place to deal with emergencies.
The debate has been interesting and, contrary to Roseanna Cunningham's suggestion, it has been worth while.
I am grateful to members throughout the chamber for their constructive speeches. In that respect, Colin Campbell's measured tones were particularly helpful. I believe that the new interaction between central UK authorities and the devolved authority has to be tested—indeed, it was tested in our last exercise. The relationship between central Scottish and the eight regional authorities is also important. The boundary areas, to which Colin Campbell referred, are important.
I thank Tom McCabe, Bill Aitken and others for saying that the debate was worth while. I believe that the debate has given members the opportunity to make an input, which is useful. As Tom McCabe said, the debate has also given us an opportunity to reassure the people of Scotland that we are tackling the possibility of threats that we may face.
We have only to look at the past two years or so. Threats have included the millennium bug, which turned out not to be a problem, but for which careful planning was involved. The fuel protest, innocuous though it was, could have had a significant effect on our infrastructure had it been allowed to continue. Elaine Smith mentioned that.
George Lyon referred to the foot-and-mouth outbreak. It is true to say that Scotland handled the outbreak well. Our colleagues in the rest of the United Kingdom have considered some of the measures that we took and found them to be helpful.
A number of members referred to Lockerbie. Lord James Douglas-Hamilton and Bill Aitken made special mention of counselling. I was involved in a neighbouring practice to Dunblane when that nasty incident, which involved a lot of people, took place. I counselled some of the police officers who were involved in the Lockerbie incident and was involved in research on post-traumatic stress counselling that followed on from the Dunblane incident. We have learned a lot from the Lockerbie and Dunblane incidents and counselling is now available. However, some organisations such as the police require to make a culture change so that counselling is seen not as a measure of weakness, but as something that is important. I thank members for their comments on that subject.
Lord James Douglas-Hamilton mentioned communications systems. A variety of measures are available and they are reviewed regularly. Encrypted measures are now available, but I will not go into any great detail about them. However, I will say that the emergency communication network, which is a series of private wires, now interconnects the Scottish Executive, local authorities, police, fire and ambulance services and other agencies such as nuclear off-site centres, water authorities and several large industrial complexes. As a result, I hope that I can reassure Lord James on that issue.
Lloyd Quinan, Roseanna Cunningham and Michael Matheson referred to the energy sector. A plane crash on a nuclear installation has been recognised as a possible, not improbable, threat. Indeed, UK Government committees have been carefully examining that specific issue. Moreover, the operators of installations have for some time been required to draw up plans for the treatment of people in the immediate area of a nuclear incident, although such steps would obviously depend on the scale of the radiation release. The health authorities have just made available eight mobile decontamination units for use in an emergency. That measure is supported by the fire service, which can provide the necessary equipment and personnel to deal with a large number of casualties. I hope that that will reassure Lloyd Quinan and Roseanna Cunningham.
Bill Aitken referred to natural disasters. Members will know that I produced a report on flu vaccination, part of which dealt with pandemics, and I can assure the Parliament that Scotland is prepared for such a disaster and that health authorities have plans to deal with it. However, now that I am a minister, I will ask those authorities to dust down their files and have another look at the matter.
Donald Gorrie, Elaine Smith, Michael Matheson and other members mentioned floods. I should point out that Ross Finnie opened SEPA's floodline, which provides flood warning information. That said, we are concerned by the current climate changes and will continue to watch the situation very carefully. The Executive and Whitehall departments are also working with the water industry to find out to what extent current resources could cope with a major water-related incident.
No members have referred to the security of our MSPs, even though some of them have been threatened. In particular, we are looking at and trying to deal with hoaxes. I want to state very clearly to any hoaxers who are out there that this is not a laughing matter or a joke. For example, the services in Strathclyde deal with 6 million telephone communications a year; however, they also have to deal with a vast number of hoax calls, which cause huge problems for our emergency services. One day, those hoax calls will cause major difficulties. I hope that the Parliament sends out a message that hoaxers should stop their joking and that anyone who is found to have made such a call will be prosecuted.
I believe that good structures exist, although I agree with the members who have said that we must not be complacent. As Scotland is a small country, with a small population and a small number of organisations, the lines of communication are tighter and we are able to work together. However, complacency is not an option.
I hope that all members will join me in praising the emergency services; indeed, many members did so in their speeches. Their work is important. For example, their response to the recent incident in Perth demonstrates their watchfulness and the effectiveness of their planning. The officers are all full time, not volunteers, although I understand Michael Matheson's comment in that respect. However, they have to perform other duties, and we must ensure that those duties are balanced.
I thank members for their speeches. The debate has been useful; I have certainly learned something from it. I realise that I have not answered all the points that have been raised—indeed, I am aware that I have not responded to one of Michael Matheson's points—but if members put their questions in writing, I will try to get back to them in writing. I will just end by saying that I hope that Scotland is well prepared for any emergency.