Council of the Law Society of Scotland Bill: Stage 1
Our next item of business, to which we come early, is a debate on motion S1M-3743, in the name of David McLetchie, on the general principles of the Council of the Law Society of Scotland Bill.
I will open the stage 1 debate on the Council of the Law Society of Scotland Bill by making two preliminary points. First, I declare a personal interest as a solicitor, and consequently as a member of the Law Society of Scotland, and draw members' attention to my entry in the Parliament's register of interests. Secondly, I record that, although I am the principal sponsor of that member's bill, it was co-sponsored by Pauline McNeill, Roseanna Cunningham and Donald Gorrie to signify the degree of cross-party support that the initial proposal enjoyed. I am grateful to them for their support and to the other members who assented to the proposal.
In its stage 1 inquiry, the Justice 1 Committee has rigorously examined the bill's principles and provisions. In so doing, it took evidence from the Scottish Consumer Council, the Scottish legal services ombudsman, the Minister for Justice on behalf of the Scottish Executive and, of course, the Law Society of Scotland itself. I record my thanks to the committee members and the committee staff for their diligence and efficacy in producing the stage 1 report within a commendably short time scale. I welcome the committee's support for the bill's general principles. I also acknowledge and welcome the Scottish Executive's support for the bill, as intimated to the committee by the Minister for Justice.
The Law Society of Scotland is a statutory body corporate governed by the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980. A number of statutory functions are therefore conferred on the council of the Law Society, including determining and dealing with complaints against the profession. That function has been the major focus of interest in the committee's consideration of the bill and in its wider inquiry into the regulation of the legal profession. The report on the inquiry into the regulation of the legal profession was published on 27 November and, not surprisingly, the recommendations that the committee made in its stage 1 report on the bill reflect recommendations in the inquiry report.
The genesis of the bill is that, in 1999, questions arose as to whether the council of the Law Society had power under the 1980 act to delegate or arrange for the discharge of its statutory functions by some other person or body. No express provision in the 1980 act enables the council to delegate functions even to its own committees or sub-committees or to a member of the staff of the Law Society.
In response to that, having taken counsel's opinion, the council decided that until the situation could be rectified by amending legislation, the safer course would be to make arrangements for functions to be discharged by the council. However, the burden of doing so is adversely affecting the council's ability to regulate the profession effectively. In particular, it is a source of delay in dealing with complaints about the conduct of and services rendered by solicitors in Scotland.
Does Mr McLetchie share my concern about the profession regulating itself per se and in principle? Given his declaration of interests, he probably will not share that concern. There have been a number of cases in which the Law Society has not covered itself in glory in dealing with complaints from individual constituents of mine. What will the bill do to improve matters and address the concerns that exist about the principle and practice of the Law Society's handling of complaints?
The term "self-regulation" is something of a misnomer. It is more appropriate to say that there is a measure of co-regulation—indeed, a substantial measure of external regulation—where the Law Society is concerned. For example, the Law Society is ultimately accountable to the Parliament. It is also responsible to the courts. Indeed, many of its rule-making powers are subject to court approval. In respect of professional misconduct, solicitors are subject to the Scottish Solicitors Discipline Tribunal, which is a separately constituted statutory body. We also have the legal services ombudsman and, of course, the general civil and criminal law of the land, which deals with cases in which there has been criminal conduct on the part of solicitors or negligent conduct founding the basis of an action. It is therefore not appropriate to say that the matter is purely one of self-regulation.
I cannot deal with the specifics of the concerns that Tavish Scott's constituents have raised with him. I cannot comment on specific cases, nor would it be appropriate for me to do so. However, I suggest that the bill will improve matters. In conjunction with the Law Society's implementation scheme, it will ensure equal representation of lay and professional members on the Law Society's complaints committees, which will make the system more transparent and increase public confidence. It will also ensure that complaints are delegated to committees with such a balance of representation, whereas the present requirement is that all complaints be referred to the council. That should speed up the process of dealing with complaints, which is one of the major sources of concern.
There are broader aspects to the situation. The committee highlighted those in its stage 1 report and the report on the inquiry into the regulation of the legal profession. A number of other recommendations were made in that context. The bill does not address those wider issues, partly because we did not have the inquiry report before us when the bill was first drafted and introduced to Parliament. I am sure that that is a subject to which the Scottish Executive, the committee and perhaps Parliament would like to return at some point in future.
I will summarise the bill's purpose, which is threefold: to enable the council to delegate statutory functions to a committee or sub-committee or some other person, albeit subject to certain exceptions; to provide for the appointment of sub-committees in the scheme for the constitution of the council; and to provide for the appointment of lay members to a committee or a sub-committee of the council and, as appropriate, for such lay members to form a majority in the committee or sub-committee to which they have been appointed.
The bill is an empowering rather than a prescriptive measure. Accordingly, the committee properly focused attention on the implementation plan that the Law Society is to draw up in exercise of the new statutory powers of delegation and appointment that the bill, if enacted, will confer on it.
It might be helpful for me to summarise briefly the bill's empowering provisions, which command widespread approval, and then consider the committee's recommendations in light of the decisions that the council of the Law Society has subsequently taken on its implementation plan.
Section 1 of the bill inserts a new section 3A into the 1980 act. That proposed new section makes provision for the discharge of the functions of the council. Proposed new section 3A(1) enables the council to delegate any of its functions to any committee or sub-committee of the council or to an individual. However, certain functions cannot be delegated. Those are called "excepted functions" and are defined in proposed new subsection (10). Those are the legislative functions of the council under the 1980 act, which consist of the council's power to make rules or regulations under that act and to prepare a constitution.
Proposed new sections 3A(3) and 3A(4) deal with powers of sub-delegation to sub-committees and individuals, the approvals required to exercise such powers and the restrictions or conditions that may be imposed on the delegate committee or individual. Under proposed new subsection (5), certain functions cannot be delegated to an individual. The functions concerned are to investigate and determine complaints that a solicitor has been guilty of professional misconduct or has provided inadequate professional services.
However, it is envisaged that a case manager should ascertain whether correspondence received by the Law Society meets the criteria for a conduct complaint. An amendment clarifying that will be lodged at stage 2 if Parliament approves the general principles. That amendment will result in the case manager determining such questions as whether the information is provided by a person with a relevant interest, and whether the information amounts to a complaint that a solicitor has been guilty of professional misconduct or has provided inadequate professional services. If it is not considered to be a complaint, the correspondent will be so advised by the society's case manager, but they will also be advised that if they are dissatisfied with the decision, they may refer it to the Scottish legal services ombudsman.
Under the 1980 act, some functions require to be carried out by the council in its own right, while others are to be dealt with by the society, but are, in practice, exercisable by the council. Thus, proposed subsections (7) and (8) provide that the powers of delegation apply to functions of both types.
Proposed subsection (9) makes it clear that delegation of a function by the council does not affect the responsibility or liability of the council, does not prevent the council from exercising the function that has been delegated, and may be revoked at any time.
The effect of new subsection (11) is to preserve whatever arguments there may have been for saying that the council may already have powers to delegate its functions.
Section 2 seeks to amend schedule 1 to the 1980 act to the following effect: to provide for the appointment of sub-committees in the scheme for the constitution of the council; and to allow the scheme to provide for the appointment of lay persons as members of a committee or sub-committee, and to allow such lay persons to form a majority on the committee or sub-committee to which they have been appointed. The provision is necessary because the council is required by the 1980 act to prepare a scheme providing for various matters, including the constitution, election and proceedings of the council, as well as the appointment and constitution of committees.
The existing scheme for the constitution of the council will require to be amended to remove finally any doubt about the power of the council to provide for the appointment of sub-committees, and to enable the scheme to make provision for the appointment of lay members to a committee or sub-committee. It should be noted, however, that lay members—who are not solicitors—feature as members of the society's committees at the moment but, to avoid any element of doubt, it is thought appropriate to provide a statutory basis. It also allows non-solicitors to form a majority of the members of a committee or sub-committee.
Section 3 is the short title and commencement provision of the bill. It is proposed that if the bill is enacted, it should come into effect one month after royal assent is received. That period will enable the council to prepare final arrangements for the delegation of functions that will come into force when the act is in force.
I return to the report on the bill by the Justice 1 Committee. The report and its recommendations were considered by the council of the Law Society at its meeting on 20 December, which I attended as an observer. The following conclusions were reached by the council in its deliberations. First, paragraph 18 of the stage 1 report, in line with the recommendation in paragraph 23 of the Justice 1 Committee's report on the regulation of the legal profession, seeks a commitment that lay representation on complaints committees will be at least 50 per cent. At the 20 December meeting, the council agreed to 50 per cent lay representation on such committees. That will be provided for in the implementation scheme.
Secondly, at paragraph 19 of the stage 1 report, the Justice 1 Committee recommended that the society should consider paying an honorarium to lay members of its committees. I confirm that that is being actively considered by the council.
Thirdly, at paragraph 25 of the stage 1 report, in line with the recommendation in paragraph 21 of its regulation of the legal profession report, the Justice 1 Committee recommended that the power to determine the outcome of all complaints should be delegated to committees of the society. It was not considered necessary for that to appear in the bill, but it should be part of the society's implementation plan.
When will the implementation plan be published?
I think that it is intended that the draft should be available to the Justice 1 Committee within the next couple of months, before the conclusion of the parliamentary proceedings, but I will get an update on that and give Christine Grahame a definitive answer in my winding-up speech.
In relation to the recommendation in paragraph 25 of the stage 1 report, it would be appropriate to point out that the outcome of professional misconduct cases is by law decided by the Scottish Solicitors Discipline Tribunal, and not by the council of the society or any committee of the society. Accordingly, the council of the society interpreted that recommendation to mean that the decision whether to refer a complaint of professional misconduct to one of the society's fiscals, with a view to prosecution before the Scottish Solicitors Discipline Tribunal, should be delegated to a complaints committee and not be taken by the council. On that basis, the council accepted the recommendation in the stage 1 report. Thus, tribunal cases aside, the council has agreed that in its implementation plan the final determination of complaints of professional misconduct and inadequate professional service will be delegated to its complaints committees.
Fourthly, at paragraph 30 of its stage 1 report, the Justice 1 Committee sought an assurance from the society that adequate safeguards will be in place to ensure that complaints are properly considered in the first instance. The council of the society has agreed to endeavour in its implementation plan to ensure that more than one person will consider complaints where there is a difficulty over jurisdiction, while being mindful of the need to avoid undue delay in dealing with such issues. It should be noted, as I indicated earlier, that a refusal to proceed can be referred to the Scottish legal services ombudsman, and that complainers are to be advised of that right of referral.
Finally, in paragraph 33 of its stage 1 report, the Justice 1 Committee indicated its support for an oversight committee to co-ordinate an approach to dealing with complaints. It also sought clarification from the society on how it proposes to provide for such oversight, and on whether it intends to create a committee to fulfil that role.
The society is of the view that it already has an oversight committee that performs that function, in the form of its client care committee, which has the following remit: to consider and promote initiatives to improve client care standards within the profession; to give guidance and directions to committees handling complaints in relation to procedures to ensure transparency, consistency and balance; to give direction and guidance to the client relations office in relation to the determination of procedures for handling complaints; and to consider and deal with points of policy and principle arising from specific cases, and to give guidance as appropriate.
In adopting the recommendations in the Justice 1 Committee report on the bill, the Law Society is signifying that it is open to change. The limited scope of the bill does not enable it to address all the recommendations made by the Justice 1 Committee in its wider report on the regulation of the legal profession nor, in my opinion, would it be appropriate for Parliament to legislate on those recommendations until the policy and financial implications have been fully considered by the Scottish Executive and other interested parties. However, I firmly believe that the bill, coupled with the commitments that have been made by the society relative to its implementation plan, is a significant step forward that will improve the efficiency of the system for dealing with client complaints, be more transparent and increase public confidence in the system.
The Justice 1 Committee recommends that the general principles of the bill be agreed to, and I commend the bill to members.
I move,
That the Parliament agrees to the general principles of the Council of the Law Society of Scotland Bill.
I say at the outset that Scotland has one of the best justice systems in the world—that extends to the legal profession—but that does not mean that any of it is perfect, hence this bill. As with any measure that refers to legal technicalities, I know that there will be a temptation for those members who are not lawyers or members of the justice committees to allow their eyes to glaze over and simply leave it to those in the know. I advise the chamber that sometimes even lawyers' eyes glaze over. We are not immune from that reaction. I urge members not to let their eyes glaze over today, because the bill is one of those rarely sighted beasts—a truly cross-party bill. David McLetchie proposed it, but it is no accident that Donald Gorrie, Pauline McNeill and I support it.
Before the bill was introduced, much work was done to ensure that there would be cross-party support for it and that bodies such as the Scottish Consumer Council and the Scottish legal services ombudsman would welcome the bill in the main. Much of the credit for that work goes to Michael Clancy, who is a director of the Law Society, and to his colleagues. He is well known to all of us and I applaud him for his work on the bill.
The bill's genesis was in three proposals by the council of the Law Society of Scotland to amend the council's powers, which it requires legislative action to do. The bill will promote awareness, improve efficiency and formalise non-lawyers' involvement in the council's decision-making process. If the wider public think about the matter at all, they want non-lawyers to be involved in the processes.
Through the bill, the Law Society seeks to be open about the regulation process. The Law Society views the bill as part of that process. The bill will allow the council's functions to be delegated to committees, sub-committees or individuals and will provide for the appointment of sub-committees. It will provide for the appointment of lay persons to committees or sub-committees of the council and for such lay persons to form a majority on the committee or sub-committee to which they have been appointed. That is important, because it means that committees and sub-committees of the council might have a majority of lay members. Non-lawyers might be surprised to hear that, in general, lawyers want the regulation of their profession to be considered as fair and as open as possible. The bill is one small way to achieve that better.
I emphasise that, as David McLetchie said, the Law Society is legally bound in its present operations. Perhaps that is not widely known. It is assumed out there that the Law Society operates on the basis of rules that it made up itself. In fact, the Law Society does not operate in that way. Much of what it does is dictated by statute and it cannot move outside those statutory boundaries.
Because the council is barred by law from delegating various functions, it gives the impression of being a closed-shop, star-chamber kind of operation and the council as a whole must decide on almost every quasi-judicial function that it has. That slows the process considerably and makes it unwieldy. That matter needs to be addressed. If we allow the council to delegate its functions, it will be able to devolve its decision-making power to committees, which will speed up the process and make it more consumer friendly. That is what the bill is all about.
With the aim of making the council's processes more consumer friendly, one of the bill's most important aspects is that it will enable the Law Society to involve non-lawyers more widely in its decision making in a more formalised way than is currently permitted. The society has lay members on some committees. Even at present, it is not the case that no lay members are involved. With the bill, the society wants to expand its ability to appoint more lay members and to allow lay members to form majorities on some committees.
Each of the society's five client relations committees has 10 members, four of whom are lay members. Non-lawyers are also members of the society's mental health and disability, tax law, intellectual property, law reform and admissions committees and of its pensions law working party. The society greatly values non-lawyers' contributions to the decision-making process. If the bill is passed, it will provide a solid basis in law for the further deployment of non-lawyers in the society's committees. Crucially, it will also allow lay persons to form a majority on any Law Society committee to which they are appointed.
It is probably the Law Society's consideration of complaints that causes most people concern about the way in which the society discharges its business—that has been mentioned. The legal services ombudsman has argued strongly for the majority of members of complaints committees to be lay people and recommends 75 per cent as the ideal figure for lay involvement. The Scottish Conveyancing and Executry Services Board has 75 per cent lay representation in its complaints procedures, and as the board is soon to be abolished, with its functions transferred to the Law Society, it would be incongruous and unacceptable if the practitioners who are registered with the board were subject to a different regime simply because of an administrative change, as the board has said.
The Scottish Consumer Council was clear in its evidence to the Justice 1 Committee that the council should not consider conduct complaints and it shared the legal services ombudsman's view that they should be a task for a specialist committee or sub-committee. The Scottish Consumer Council supported the bill, because it will mean that complaints are dealt with more quickly. The ombudsman's view in supporting the bill's general aims was that, as things stand, the council could not manage its amount of work without the power to delegate. That alone should be enough to convince anyone of the bill's necessity.
I am one of the members who is not a lawyer and who has had many complaints about the Law Society, so I have not glazed over—I have taken a keen interest in the bill. The papers that I read the other day on the issue said that the legal services ombudsman had continuing concerns. Will Roseanna Cunningham expand on them? I got the impression that he was not satisfied that his views were being taken on board.
The legal services ombudsman has concerns about the way in which the Law Society operates. David McLetchie explained that other discussions are being held. The bill was produced before the Justice 1 Committee had finalised its report on the regulation of the legal profession, so it might not be fair to say that the bill fails to deal with some of the criticisms. The legal services ombudsman—who is a she—has made some fair points, which I am sure that the Law Society is examining carefully.
The bill is not the end of the process. In effect, it is the start of a process. We should welcome that, but not imagine that we can change everything overnight so that everybody is satisfied. All members are approached by people who have concerns and complaints about solicitors or how the Law Society operates. Some of those complaints might be justified and some might not be. It is often difficult for us to ascertain where the initial fault might have lain, particularly with situations that might have continued for more than 10 years. A bigger issue needs to be considered carefully. I am sure that the Law Society will do that.
The bill is a useful and welcome small measure. It is not the be-all and end-all of changes. It will permit the Law Society to function more effectively, more speedily and more openly. I think that we all welcome that, however small the changes might seem. It is almost inconceivable that we could have introduced the bill at Westminster, because it would never have been considered a legislative priority. Perhaps it is not considered a legislative priority even here, but because it has widespread support, we can get it through our parliamentary process. It would not have reached even the starting blocks at Westminster. We must remember our ability to undertake smaller but nevertheless important measures speedily.
I commend the bill to Parliament. I hope that its initial cross-party support and the consensus in the debate will result in overwhelming support for the bill at decision time.
I refer to my entry in the register of interests anent my membership of the Faculty of Advocates. I intimate that my wife is a member of the Law Society of Scotland and is in full-time practice as a partner in a Glasgow law firm.
I welcome David McLetchie's for once gainful and purposeful employment in the Parliament. I commend him for attaching his support to the bill; I, too, attach my support for the bill's general principles.
Having given a kind of admission of guilt in respect of my association with the legal profession, I want also to associate myself with the views of members who find themselves dealing with correspondence from constituents who are aggrieved or upset as a result of their dealings with members of the legal profession. We are also not unused to having people coming to us with complaints about their dealings with other politicians.
We have to be aware of how difficult the relationships involved in the provision of professional services can be at times. People are often distressed because of the difficult circumstances in which they find themselves. It is often the case that parliamentary involvement comes at the end of the process, when Parliament can appear to be the final court of appeal. That difficult relationship has been referred to as having the nature of a distressed purchase. It is therefore not surprising that people will come away from their interactions with either a solicitor or a professional body and find themselves aggrieved as a result. Anything that can be done to speed up the procedure is to be welcomed.
In the nature of many complaints is the fact that delay in and of itself becomes a feature of the complaint. The delay might be caused first by the agent who is pursuing or investigating a matter properly, or who is asserting a claim or seeking to find some sort of remedy to it. In the event that the matter proceeds, a reporter for the Law Society obtains a report on it.
One of the difficulties that was uncovered sometime around 1999 was that what might be described as a sclerosis set in around the functions of the council of the Law Society in respect of its acting on the findings of reports that were made by its committees or sub-committees. That situation is not right and the fact that the bill seeks to remedy it and remove part of that sclerosis has to be welcomed.
We are not talking merely about having tame members of the public coming along. Some of the submissions from individuals who gave written evidence to the Justice 1 Committee are extraordinarily pitched. The notion that lay members will come along and sit in on committees as patsies who will not open their mouths or take part in proceedings is misconceived. Even at present, that does not seem to be a feature of lay participation in the Law Society's proceedings. The important point is to ensure that there is openness in relation to the council's proceedings; we need to see that lay people are involved and that they have a statutory role.
I read with interest the Justice 1 Committee's 12th report. I know that that committee will revisit and review the implementation programme that the Law Society will adopt. That is very much to be welcomed. Without offering too many welcomes, I think the fact that the Law Society is ready to welcome the Justice 1 Committee's oversight of that is an important feature of how we go forward.
The context of the bill is that we have had various run-ins regarding regulation of the profession and handling of complaints. In 1980, the Royal Commission on Legal Services examined the circumstances of the Law Society's proceedings in England and Wales and those of the Law Society of Scotland. It is interesting to note that that commission's review reflected some of the issues that we have heard about today. We need to ask what is the proper balance between the Law Society as a professional organisation and statutory regulator—it acts, in effect, as a trade union for lawyers—and its role on behalf of the interests of the public. That relationship is changing as people's expectations of their dealings with the profession change.
We revisited the subject in the early 1990s in respect of various interventions on the workings of the legal profession; the fact that we have returned to the matter is not the end of the process. There is the wider work that is being undertaken in respect of regulation and the Law Society, and those who are charged with overseeing the actions of solicitors take a continuing interest in the matters that are under discussion.
I look forward to the fuller detail of the Law Society of Scotland's implementation plan—Christine Grahame also raised that important point. I do not detect any unwillingness or slowness of pace in that connection. With those remarks, I lend my support to the general principles of the bill.
I am not sure whether I have to declare an interest as one of the signatories to the bill, but I do so. With other colleagues, I carry the weight of being one of the non-lawyers on the Justice 1 Committee. That is a two-way street: first, one does not understand a lot of what goes on and is confused—deliberately or otherwise—by those who do, or think that they do; and secondly, the public sees us as being on the committee to keep the lawyers in check.
One interesting aspect of the bill is that more than half of the pages in the Justice 1 Committee's report are taken up with representations from people who have had a very raw deal from lawyers. Many of those people believe that the legal profession is a huge plot, but in my view the profession is not sufficiently well organised to represent a plot. I do not think that the profession is a plot; neither is the profession collectively corrupt. There is no doubt that, as is the very nature of life, lawyers often make tragic mistakes, but we have to be protected against those lawyers who are grossly incompetent and against the few who are dishonest.
The bill is a useful step forward in improving the machinery. As other members have said, greater lay representation on committees that deal with complaints will reduce delays. It is important to stress that the bill is not a pre-emptive strike; neither will the Parliament abandon its efforts to re-examine regulation of the legal profession. Indeed, the Justice 1 Committee has set out to report on that. I hope that the next Parliament, and those of us who are lucky enough to be elected to it, will pursue the issue.
It is clear to me that the unanimous view of the Justice 1 Committee is that more far-reaching improvements to the system must be made. That includes having a genuinely mixed method of dealing with complaints in which the final say lies with an external person, who we propose should be the legal services ombudsman. The bill is an improved form of sticking plaster on the wound; it is not the solution, which will be the medicine that will heal the wound. The bill is, however, a step forward.
I spent a morning with other colleagues listening to evidence from the council of the Law Society of Scotland. It was obvious that its members take the issue of complaints seriously. In respect of complaints, however, it is unfair that the legal firm against which a complaint is made can have spokespersons at council meetings, although that is the case with some firms only. It seems that if a firm has friends at court, it gets a better deal. That the people who make complaints do not have a spokesperson is a fault in the council system. The meeting produced one of the most bizarre arguments that I have ever heard, which was that if someone was given a pamphlet it was assumed that the person would read it. That is quite the daftest proposition that I have ever heard, although I have to say that it was defeated.
Although the council of the Law Society does its best in a conscientious fashion, it is not the way to deal with complaints. The use of committees, including some sort of regulatory committee, is the way forward. David McLetchie said that he thought the existing regulatory committee was adequate, and we can examine that issue, but there has to be some sort of consistency. One possible disadvantage of committees acting with greater powers is that one committee might take issues more seriously than another.
I repeat that the bill is not the answer to the problem. Some of the provisions in the bill can be improved, but the points that David McLetchie said had been agreed by the Law Society of Scotland represent a considerable step forward. I am happy to be one of the sponsors of the bill.
We move to the open part of the debate. I call Christine Grahame to be followed by Lord James Douglas-Hamilton.
As every politician knows that no one reads their leaflets, Donald Gorrie's remarks about pamphlets were very apt. I declare an interest as a member of the Law Society of Scotland and mention that I have been a non-practising solicitor since I entered the Parliament.
I should say in passing that pretty well every reasonable solicitor I know has even less time than the general public for bad and corrupt solicitors, who bring the profession into disrepute in the same way that bad and corrupt people bring disrepute to the plumbing and brickie trades, to farming and so on. None of us feels differently about that.
I speak as convener of the Justice 1 Committee and will refer both to the committee's report on the bill and to our legal profession inquiry, which should address some of the questions that Helen Eadie asked. After all, the larger issues in question centre on the disaffection of people who have been treated in a certain way by the legal profession's complaints procedure, or who have a certain perception of that procedure. I include in that the Faculty of Advocates, because I see some members who are former advocates.
The Justice 1 Committee's report on the bill does not usurp or pre-empt the committee's very full report on the legal profession. Although our inquiry concerned regulation of the legal profession, it also focused on the complaints procedure. The larger issue, which was the one that the public was understandably most concerned about, was too great for the committee to address at one step. However, committee members and I believe that our inquiry prompted the bill and that it oiled the wheels of this enabling change within what one might call the constitution of the Law Society's functions.
I should point out that the Justice 1 Committee had no hand in the bill or in the procedures that it proposes. Those who believe that there is a conspiracy in that respect might wonder why the bill was referred to the Justice 1 Committee—after all, its convener is a former solicitor. I declare that I had nothing to do with the bill. It is a member's bill, and the procedures for such bills and their allocation are matters for Parliament. The committee just did the same job with this bill as it does with any other bill that comes before it. Indeed, I sometimes think that committee members who were previously in the legal profession bend over backwards to attack our former colleagues and to ensure that we are seen to do justice.
Perhaps I defend myself too rigorously in that respect. As a result, I will abandon that line of argument to say that I am grateful to David McLetchie for picking up and addressing some of our recommendations, for example that it should be stipulated that 50 per cent of the membership of complaints committees be lay representatives and that it should be ensured that honorariums are paid to lay members, among other matters.
It is also terribly important to point out that the bill's enabling measures will speed up the complaints procedure. Perhaps Mr McLetchie will assist me, but I understand that the introduction of the procedures will knock some six to eight weeks off the time that it takes to proceed with a complaint. That must be a good thing, because many substantive complaints are directed at that matter. Some people think that the Justice 1 Committee can act as a court of final appeal in individual cases, which it cannot. However, the committee is aware—because of cases that have been raised with it—that the time that it takes to proceed with a complaint is one of the general problems that has arisen.
That said, we want certain other matters to be addressed in due course. Brian Fitzpatrick quite rightly drew, as I do, attention to the implementation plan. If the full plan cannot be submitted to the Justice 1 Committee before stage 2, the committee would at the very least wish to see the firm principles of the plan at that point and see the full plan itself before stage 3. That is essential, because the plan will deal with many important issues.
As far as lay membership of the council is concerned, I think that we should consider representatives from the Scottish Consumer Council, Citizens Advice Scotland and so on. Such people understand what is happening at grass-roots level and are articulate about matters, so they could represent at the complaints committees clients who are ordinary people. However, that will be a matter for the Law Society.
As I said, the report on our inquiry into the regulation of the legal profession deals with the complaints procedure and in fact recommends a single gateway for complaints. After all, a complaint is a complaint because ordinary people say so. People do not understand the difference between professional misconduct and inadequate professional service. As a result, those matters should be simplified. Furthermore, we want the role of the legal ombudsperson—who, as Roseanna Cunningham pointed out, is a woman—to be strengthened to ensure that they can consider the substance of complaints as well as the complaints procedure itself. He or she should also be able to nip in and out of cases if he or she feels that they are not being adequately dealt with.
However, that issue will be our legacy to the next Parliament's Justice 1 Committee, who will no doubt proceed with it. The bill is a first stage in that process and is welcomed by the committee.
I should mention at the outset that I am a non-practising QC.
I welcome the opportunity to speak in support of the bill, which was introduced by David McLetchie. Although the bill is largely technical, and has the aim of improving the workings of the Law Society of Scotland, it has received cross-party support and the Justice 1 Committee supported its general principles.
The bill should clear up several doubts surrounding whether the law as it stands allows the council of the Law Society of Scotland to delegate its statutory functions to committees and sub-committees. That lack of clarity led to the council suspending such delegation in 1999. Although the suspension of delegation did not wholly prevent the use of committees in advancing the council's work, it had a negative effect on the council's speed and effectiveness.
In his remarks, Donald Gorrie said that he had visited the Law Society council. I was pleased to accompany him on that occasion. The council appeared to handle affairs and complaints with efficiency, dedication, fairness and thoroughness. However, it is arguable that the council as it now exists is overburdened with too much business, so its ability to delegate will be important.
Donald Gorrie raised the issue of conflicts of interest. That was addressed by the Justice 1 Committee in its 11th report. Page 15 of that report includes the following recommendation:
"The Committee recommends that the Law Society consider the creation of firewalls, namely by establishing procedures where there is a clear separation of interests and demarcation between the interests of the complainer and the solicitor subject to the complaint."
I am glad that the Law Society of Scotland, through a letter from Mr Michael Clancy to all its members, sent a positive reply in which attention was drawn to the recommendations of the committee. In the letter, dated 7 January, Mr Clancy said:
"The Law Society is working to meet those recommendations."
That is a positive and hopeful reply.
I believe strongly that the bill will speed up the process of handling complaints, and that it will allow the involvement of lay people in that process. That will greatly increase consumer confidence in, and transparency of, the way in which complaints are handled.
On the issue of lay involvement, it was recommended that the membership of the Scottish Solicitors Discipline Tribunal should be 50 per cent lay people. That would be a considerable change.
The bill is a good bill, which will be of benefit to clients throughout Scotland by speeding up the legal process. As Christine Grahame said, we have given thorough consideration to the bill, and it should be welcomed. Perhaps it would assist members if the minister, when he replies, will say whether he will give a response to the Justice 1 Committee report, and what the time scale for that might be.
The bill is an efficient, fair and comprehensive measure and I commend it to the Parliament.
I declare an interest at the outset: I am a former practising solicitor. I have ceased to practise and have no financial or business interests in my former firm. Indeed, I think that my membership of the Law Society has lapsed, although I was a member for 20 years.
Most of our debate has dealt with complaints. However, as other members have said, the bill is about more than that. To some extent, it is about addressing anachronisms. Roseanna Cunningham was right to say that one of the benefits of this Parliament is that we are able to address a gap or oversight more speedily than could have been achieved were we still required to go through Westminster. The downside is that the bill will receive much more public scrutiny and will, to some extent, be more in the public glare. We can argue that we should accept that that is a much better situation.
However, some matters clearly require to be dealt with, such as the inability of the Law Society to delegate. It might be that that preclusion has come to the society's attention belatedly, but it requires to be addressed because the bill requires to deal with more than complaints.
The bill is about enabling provisions—we must wait to see whether the Law Society deals with matters in a way that the Parliament and the public regard as satisfactory. I have always believed that the position of the Law Society was to try to ensure that matters are dealt with on the basis that, if it does not address matters adequately, others will. The driver has been the knowledge that if the Law Society fails to deliver what is acceptable to the public and to parliamentarians, other measures will be brought in over and above its head, whether the society likes it or not. That is the imperative that drives the Law Society.
Lay membership is to be welcomed, as Lord James Douglas-Hamilton and others mentioned. There are arguments for and against it, but the bottom line is that justice must be done and must be seen to be done. In the circumstances, it is necessary that we accept lay membership.
On a more general note, it is perceived that lawyers belong to only one genre, but it was not simply our political affiliations that divided David McLetchie and I before 1999; the Law Society is a broad church. The clientele who graced Mr McLetchie's offices were unlikely ever to darken the door of my offices and vice versa. Lawyers tend to associate with others and I have no doubt that practising solicitors in Mr McLetchie's offices were as likely to associate themselves with accountants as the solicitors in my offices were to associate themselves with procurators fiscal or social workers. The legal profession is deep and wide. In the latter part of my career, I was represented less by the Law Society of Scotland than I was by the Edinburgh Bar Association and, perhaps more important, the Glasgow Bar Association, which stood up for legal aid lawyers, although I remained a member of the Law Society of Scotland.
My final point was touched on by Helen Eadie. There is a perception among the public that if we make sure that we take away the complaints procedure from the Law Society and give it to an independent body, things will be much better and fairer. There is an argument in favour of that proposal, but there is an equally valid argument against it. The reason for taking that action is that the Law Society would change.
At present, if a complaint is made against a solicitor, the Law Society is duty bound to investigate it, irrespective of whether the complaint appears to be entirely spurious and nonsensical. The Law Society is required to give the complaint due consideration, to inform the lawyer, to ask the lawyer for comments and views and to process the complaint as if it were fundamentally correct. If that process were taken out of the hands of the Law Society and given to an independent tribunal, we would find that the Law Society would change.
If I were a practising solicitor against whom a complaint was made—I may return to practice at some stage, perhaps following the upcoming elections in May, depending on what happens—I would be the first to go to Douglas Mill and Michael Clancy to say, "I pay your wages, so whether the complaint has any legitimacy, you represent my interests and I want you to stand up for me." At present, the Law Society is impartial in such matters. If that were to change, the Law Society would veer more towards the position that is taken by the Medical and Dental Defence Union of Scotland. As somebody who has dealt with that union through representation of clients and constituents who have made complaints against doctors and dentists, I say that if people think trades unions are formidable, they should see the powers that are brought to bear when a complaint is lodged against a doctor or dentist: the shutters come down and it is difficult to gain access.
The nature and ethos of the Law Society would change if the complaints process were removed. We are heading towards the correct balance—complaints should be dealt with in-house, but with the provision of including lay representatives in the majority to ensure the problem is dealt with. The grass would not be greener if we removed control of the complaints process from the Law Society and the Law Society was to change. It would still process spurious complaints, but not by dealing with every complaint and not by subjecting every matter to the laws of defamation. If that were the case, I would be saying to the likes of Douglas Mill and Michael Clancy, for example, that such a letter of complaint was potentially defamatory and that I want it dealt with as opposed to having it considered with all due scrutiny.
I am more than happy to support the bill and to see matters develop within the domain of the Law Society.
I agree with Kenny MacAskill that the Law Society is impartial, but that it also has to be seen to be impartial. That is a crucial point.
I have an interest to declare: my husband is a practising solicitor and a former member of the council of the Law Society of Scotland.
I welcome the member's bill because it removes any doubt that the council of the Law Society is able to delegate its statutory functions to a committee or sub-committee, to appoint sub-committees and to provide for lay persons to be members of such committees.
Those matters are more than technicalities. Douglas Mill, the chief executive of the Law Society of Scotland, said they are an essential part of the Law Society's modernisation programme to make it more accountable and streamlined. A great deal of debate in committee centred on how far we should consider the bill as a technical bill and how far it should be used for the Law Society to state explicitly how it proposes to use those delegated powers. For example, how many and what percentage of lay people should be appointed to its committees? As we have heard today, that is particularly relevant for its complaints procedures because it is on those that the public focus and it is on the reputation of the society's handling of complaints that the public base their assessment of the profession.
I was pleased to hear David McLetchie say that the Law Society has accepted the committee's 50 per cent recommendation. As Christine Grahame did, I ask the Law Society to consider whether those lay people should include representatives of bodies such as the Scottish Consumer Council.
Public scrutiny is not confined to the Law Society; the public expects independent scrutiny of all professions and, in the matter under discussion, perception is paramount.
Douglas Mill's point about streamlining was raised in the committee's inquiry into the regulation of the legal profession. Individuals expressed concerns about the inordinate amount of time that it takes for complaints to be dealt with. The ombudsman told us that the average time it takes for a complaint to be dealt with is 90 weeks, which is nearly two years. The six or eight weeks that the Law Society believes would be saved by delegation of powers will not make much impact on those 90 weeks. I accept that the reduction is a start, but the Law Society must consider further how the complaints process can be speeded up because such delays are unacceptable in today's society where consumers rightly expect to have their complaints dealt with quickly and transparently.
The need for transparency and the need for the public to perceive that complaints are dealt with properly in the first instance will oblige the Law Society to consider how complaints are sifted initially and the definition of complaints, and to set standards against which each complaint can be assessed. Despite the helpline and the well-produced leaflets from the Law Society, there is a great deal of public confusion over what is a bona fide complaint. What exactly is professional misconduct as opposed to inadequate professional services? There is confusion in the public mind about when a solicitor can be prosecuted in the criminal courts as opposed to being sued in the civil courts. That confusion was evident in the committee's inquiry into the regulation of the legal profession when we took evidence from Scotland Against Crooked Lawyers, a group we have come to know well during the years and whose legal jokes we appreciate in its pamphlets. The initial decision about what is a complaint should be taken out of the hands of the Law Society and be given to the legal services ombudsman's office. That would reassure the public that complaints are being considered properly in the first instance before being passed on to the Law Society to be dealt with.
Concerns have been expressed recently, albeit anecdotally, that it is not always possible to find a lawyer who will sue another lawyer. That is the case in some parts of Scotland. The Law Society is aware of such issues and it is discussing how to address them. I note what David McLetchie had to say about the decisions that were taken recently in response to the Justice 1 Committee's report. I am also aware that the Law Society does not feel that those issues should be addressed in the bill; I concur with that. However, I have sympathy with what the ombudsman said when she made the point that lawyers are creatures of statute who will do only what they are required to do by law.
It is now up to the Law Society to prove that it is able to raise its eyes from the statute book and consider how it can institute the best possible procedures for customer care. That is why the committee awaits with interest the Law Society's implementation plan, which will give us an indication of how the delegated powers are to be used to increase transparency and promote consumer confidence.
I realise that such details cannot be included in the bill—much as we would wish them to be—but it is an enabling bill and I support its general principles.
I feel a bit unusual in this debate, because I have nothing to declare. Just about all the members who have spoken so far have had something to declare in their opening remarks. However, like most members who have contributed to the debate, I very much welcome the bill. As David McLetchie said, the bill is not controversial and, as Roseanna Cunningham said, it has cross-party support.
Like Donald Gorrie and Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, I had the pleasure of sitting in on a council meeting of the Law Society of Scotland, as well as on a complaints committee meeting. I was impressed by the way in which complaints are handled and rigorously investigated. I was particularly impressed by the role that is played by the lay members who take part in the process. There is a general view that the lay members are there, to some extent, as a token gesture. However, in my experience, the lay members were probably the most outspoken and were driving the process more than the legally qualified members of the complaints committee were. I was somewhat reassured by being able to witness that process taking place.
When I attended the council meeting, I was struck by the fact that the process is extremely bureaucratic. There seems to be paperwork galore, and cases are referred to constantly, with members having limited time to consider the papers in great detail. Like Donald Gorrie, I was concerned about the way in which the council of the Law Society is able, in effect, to overturn a recommendation of the complaints committee of the Law Society, which has often examined an issue in considerable detail and discussed for some time the decision that has been arrived at. In the course of a half-hour meeting of the council of the Law Society, a complaints committee recommendation can be overturned because someone is there to make representations on behalf of the solicitor or practice against which the complaint was made.
I welcome the fact that the Law Society has decided to accept the majority of the Justice 1 Committee's recommendations on the bill. I believe that that will enhance some of the bill's provisions. Like some of my fellow members of the Justice 1 Committee, I would welcome the opportunity to consider the implementation plan at the earliest possible stage, so that we can consider how it would work in practice.
A number of members have highlighted how the bill will probably speed up the process of handling complaints against solicitors. One of the most common complaints that I receive from constituents is about the time that it takes to deal with a complaint about a specific solicitor. Enhancing the system to shorten the time in which complaints are dealt with is something that I would welcome.
As Tavish Scott, Helen Eadie, Maureen Macmillan and Donald Gorrie have said, the bill by itself will not address the wider public concern about the way in which self-regulation of the legal profession operates, particularly when it comes to dealing with complaints. When the Justice 1 Committee started its inquiry into the regulation of the legal profession, my personal view was that I would like to end self-regulation of the legal profession. In the course of considering the evidence that we received, I was reassured that self-regulation actually has merits and should remain. That is why the committee was able to make the unanimous recommendation that self-regulation should continue, but that there should be an improvement in the role of the ombudsman. The ombudsman should be given greater powers to examine the way in which complaints are handled and, if necessary, to deal with the complaints.
There is little doubt that there will continue to be concern and a public perception that the Law Society is, to some extent, a law unto itself and a closed shop that will not investigate complaints against its members properly until it accepts further reform. As members have said, the bill is the start of the process. Given the Law Society's willingness to accept into the bill the recommendations of the Justice 1 Committee, I hope that the society will see fit to accept a number of the recommendations in the committee's report on the regulation of the legal profession. I believe that that would enhance the professional reputation of lawyers in Scotland, if that is possible. It would also be an important step in signifying that the Law Society is prepared to reform yet further to ensure that the clients whom its members serve are properly protected and that their complaints will be investigated rigorously
I welcome the bill. Like all the members who have spoken so far, I will support its general principles.
I am grateful for this opportunity to confirm to the Parliament the Executive's position on the Council of the Law Society of Scotland Bill. The Executive fully supports the principles of the bill. Its enactment will remedy a defect in the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980, which has meant that the council of the Law Society of Scotland has been unable to delegate its functions under that act. That constraint has disrupted the efficient discharge of the council's business in the past two years and has imposed a heavy and unnecessary burden on council members. The bill will relieve those pressures and provide the Law Society of Scotland with powers to delegate its functions. The English Law Society already enjoys such powers under the Solicitors Act 1974.
The bill will increase the speed at which the society can handle its business. In the context of complaints handling, faster processing will be of substantial benefit to complainers. The society anticipates that the average time taken to resolve complaints about inadequate professional service will be reduced by up to two months. From the perspective of the complainer, that will certainly be a significant gain. Members will be aware that the bill is supported by the Scottish Consumer Council.
We want to ensure that David McLetchie's bill, which has cross-party support, has safe and certain passage to the statute book in what remains of the current parliamentary session. It is significant that the Justice 1 Committee reported at the end of November on its inquiry into the regulation of the legal profession. There is, of course, some common ground between the subject matter of the bill and the recommendations that were made by the Justice 1 Committee in that report. The bill has the simple purpose of remedying a statutory defect and, for that reason, its scope has been narrowly defined in the long title. The Executive's view is that we should guard against the bill's being regarded as a suitable vehicle for implementing the wide-ranging agenda that was raised by the committee's report on its inquiry into regulation.
The detailed recommendations that flow from the committee's inquiry require full and careful consideration, and I share the views that were expressed by David McLetchie about the need to separate the two. It would be inappropriate to seek to take on board in the bill some or all of that agenda and doing so could jeopardise the safe passage of the bill in what remains of the current session. Lord James Douglas-Hamilton asked when the Executive would respond to the committee's report. The report is a comprehensive and thorough piece of work, which deserves careful consideration. We intend to give our initial response within the next month to six weeks, and a more detailed reply will follow thereafter.
The Executive supports lay representation on the society's complaints committees, which ensures that consumer interest is kept to the forefront, and the bill confirms that the society's committees can include lay representation. Indeed, the bill expressly provides that lay representatives can form the majority on the committees. Lay representation on committees helps to boost public confidence in the transparency and fairness of committee processes. We were pleased by the society's ready agreement on 20 December to increase lay representation on its complaints committees from 40 per cent to 50 per cent, as recommended in the Justice 1 Committee's stage 1 report.
As members have said, it is possible to debate exactly where the optimum balance should lie. The Executive's view is that it is best to avoid a prescriptive approach to the matter if the resulting statute is to stand the test of time. We consider that the council should have flexibility in this area and that the bill should not fix a required ratio.
To which of the committee's reports was the minister referring when he mentioned the timetable for responding? Did he mean the Justice 1 Committee's report on the regulation of the legal profession or our report on the bill?
I am sorry. I meant the report on the regulation of the legal profession. That is what I understood Lord James Douglas-Hamilton to be referring to.
Over the past few years, the Law Society has responded positively to recommendations made by the Scottish legal services ombudsman on increasing lay representation. The society has progressively raised the level of lay representation from 20 per cent to 50 per cent over that period.
The bill will be enabling legislation and therefore avoids an unduly prescriptive approach. We are aware that the Justice 1 Committee has identified some detailed issues that the Law Society has been asked to address regarding an implementation scheme that will be considered at subsequent stages of the bill. Those detailed issues include whether the council of the Law Society should delegate all decision making to committees, as recommended by the Justice 1 Committee, including decisions in cases of serious professional misconduct that have previously been taken only by the council; whether an individual should be able to decide whether a complaint should be investigated by the Law Society; and how the handling of complaints by the Law Society's client relations committees should best be co-ordinated.
At later stages of the bill, it will be relevant to consider how the Law Society plans to exercise the discretion that the bill provides. However, for the purpose of this debate, I confirm that the Executive fully supports the principles underlying the bill.
I thank all members who have contributed to the debate. The bill meets all the criteria for an ideal piece of legislation emanating from the Scottish Parliament. It is short, to the point and is desired by the body that is directly affected—in this case, the Law Society of Scotland. It is of public utility and will not spawn a plethora of subordinate legislation. Last but not least, it will not cost the taxpayer a penny.
It is a rare experience for me for one of my proposals to meet with such accord in the chamber. I suspect that it will remain a rare—if not unique—experience, but I genuinely welcome the fact that colleagues from different political parties and perspectives support the bill.
I will deal with some comments that have been made. Christine Grahame, in her role as convener of the Justice 1 Committee, asked about the implementation scheme—Michael Matheson and Hugh Henry also mentioned it. Before stage 2, it is intended that a paper setting out the principles of the implementation scheme will be provided to the Justice 1 Committee and that a draft scheme will be made available to the committee and the Parliament before stage 3. I hope that that will assist.
Will there be provision in the implementation scheme for the training or induction of new lay members? Complaints should not be handled ad lib—certain skills are involved.
In that context, I note that the financial memorandum says that costs to the council will be minimal. That might be the case if there is some in-house training, but the buying-in of training provision might not have been considered in the financial memorandum. Could that matter be considered in relation to the implementation scheme?
That is a fair question. I will ask the Law Society about the training of new members and training costs, and ask it to advise the committee before stage 2 consideration. Lay members are, of course, already on the committees and I will try to ascertain what induction and training processes they undergo before they set to work and deal with complaints.
A number of members, including Christine Grahame, made the point well that the bill does not pre-empt consideration of the Justice 1 Committee's recommendations in its wider report on regulation of the legal profession. That report will require further careful study by the Executive and other interested parties, not least the Law Society. I hope that the willingness that the Law Society has demonstrated in responding to the committee's recommendations on the bill will herald an equal responsiveness in respect of some proposals in the wider inquiry and report.
Roseanna Cunningham appropriately drew attention to the advance work on consultation on the bill's proposals and the support that that enjoyed across the spectrum, particularly from the Scottish Consumer Council in respect of consumer interests. Roseanna Cunningham, Christine Grahame and Kenny MacAskill made the wholly appropriate point that the legal profession, like other professions, is jealous of its reputation. The profession demands high standards of conduct and integrity from its members and it is as much in the interests of the profession to root out those who fall short of and do not live up to such standards as it is in the interests of members of the public.
Helen Eadie referred to the concerns that the legal services ombudsman expressed. I think that she referred to a specific concern about a desire to increase the compensation that is payable for inadequate professional services. The Justice 1 Committee's report on the regulation of the profession also refers to that matter, which would be best dealt with in a wider review.
Brian Fitzpatrick made the important point that complaints often arise from a consultation with a solicitor—he spoke of a "distressed purchase" whereby a person might well be unhappy with the outcome of a litigation or transaction. In such circumstances, many people, convinced of the justice and merits of their case, naturally look around for someone to blame when things do not turn out as they had expected or anticipated. That is only human nature and we must respond to such problems. Brian Fitzpatrick pointed out, rightly, that a complaint about the initial conduct of a case—whether it is well founded or not—is often compounded on the part of the solicitor complained of by a delay in dealing with the client's concerns. It is further compounded when it reaches the Law Society by complaints about delays in the process of dealing with complaints. Delay is a major source of complaints and a major complaint about the complaints process. In a modest way, the bill endeavours to rectify and accelerate the process.
As Brian Fitzpatrick pointed out, there has been a wider, on-going debate about the role of the Law Society since the 1980 Royal Commission on Legal Services—Kenny MacAskill and Maureen Macmillan also drew attention to that debate. There has been a debate about self-regulation and the dual role of the Law Society. By statute, the society is required to represent the interests of the profession as well as the interests of the public in relation to that profession. There is a balance. I think that Kenny MacAskill pointed out that the perception of that balance is changing over the years. Measures must be taken to reaffirm the public interest in relation to the profession and provide for more transparent procedures to improve public confidence in how the Law Society fulfils its statutory role.
I was interested in the experiences of Donald Gorrie, Michael Matheson and Lord James Douglas-Hamilton—they spoke about attending meetings of the council of the Law Society. Michael Matheson also mentioned attending a meeting of one of the Law Society's complaints committees.
I think that Donald Gorrie and Michael Matheson said that, in respect of a decision on whether a solicitor should be prosecuted for professional misconduct, it is inappropriate that there should be a perception that a solicitor who is complained of should have a friend at court in the council of the Law Society, whereas a complainer will not have an opportunity to put his or her point of view. I hope that the fact that a decision on whether a solicitor should be prosecuted for professional misconduct will be delegated to a committee of the Law Society on which there will be equal lay and professional representation under the implementation scheme will address the concern about friends at court, which both members highlighted.
That covers most of the issues that members have raised. I welcome the Scottish Executive's support for the bill, which Hugh Henry re-emphasised.
The bill will improve the Law Society's working procedures and the service that it can render to the public in respect of regulation of the profession. The complaints process should be expedited and the bill will improve the transparency of the system and increase public confidence in it. The bill will also enable the council of the Law Society of Scotland to focus, in the time that it spends on its affairs, on wider policy issues in relation to the profession in Scotland and the legal system—of which solicitors are an important part—that we in this Parliament cherish as one of the distinct features of Scotland and for which we, as a legislative body, are responsible.
I invite members to support the bill. As I said, when the bill is taken in conjunction with the implementation scheme, to which the Law Society of Scotland is now committed, it will represent a modest but nonetheless significant step forward.