Environment and Rural Development Committee, 14 Dec 2005

Meeting date: Wednesday, December 14, 2005

Official Report 282KB pdf

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Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Bill: Stage 1

This is the fourth of our six planned evidence sessions at stage 1 of the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Bill, which was introduced in the Scottish Parliament on 5 October. Our role as the lead committee at stage 1 is to consider the provisions and to report to Parliament to recommend whether the general principles of the bill should be agreed to.

We will hear evidence from expert witnesses and from those who have an interest in issues that are raised in the bill. We made an open call for written evidence, in response to which we have received a number of submissions. They have been circulated to members and posted on the committee's web page for the benefit of the public. The date for making such submissions has passed, and we will notify people of that on our website.

I introduce and welcome our first panel of witnesses. Lou Leather is the chairperson of the Pet Advisory Committee; Janet Nunn is the chief executive of the Pet Care Trust; Helene Mauchlen is the Scottish development officer of the British Horse Society; and Diarmid MacLean is the manager of the Scottish Sea Life Sanctuary.

Thank you for coming and for giving us your written evidence in advance; members have had the opportunity to read it.

One of the interesting issues for those of us who are not experts on horses has been the question of couping in agricultural horses such as Clydesdales. What is the purpose of couping? How would it be handled under the provisions of the bill?

I think that couping is handled under the Farriers (Registration) Act 1975, which could be extended into Scotland after the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Bill is enacted. Couping is seen as almost cosmetic in some cases. Farriers who shoe Clydesdale horses that plough have traditionally shod the horses' back hooves with shoes that have high steps—big calkins—at the back. Horses that are shod in that way will plait their back legs and walk within the furrow. However, the practice is considered to harm the horse by damaging the hock joints further up its legs.

The bill's provisions on mutilation come to mind. At the moment, anyone can trim a horse's foot, but someone who shoes a horse—apart from in Scotland, which is a derogated area—must be registered with the Farriers Registration Council. The welfare organisations whose views I represent today—the British Horse Society, the International League for the Protection of Horses, the British Equine Veterinary Association and the National Equine Welfare Council—believe that anyone who trims a horse's foot and interferes with its sensitive tissue should have a qualification.

Couping is slightly different, because it deals with the horse's joints and it is a specialist procedure. A lot of self-policing goes on among Scottish farriers and the procedure does not happen as much as it did.

Are you saying that nowadays, because most horses do not pull ploughs or walk down furrows, such procedures are cosmetic and are performed to make the horse's legs conform in a particular way?

It is a cosmetic thing, the purpose of which is to make the horse trot with its back legs plaited in the showing ring. Many heavy horses are shown at the highland show, for example, and it is a question of what the judges are looking for. If a horse shows extravagant back leg action or has been shod wrongly, it should be put out of the ring. The Clydesdale Horse Society is taking action to ensure that horses that are extravagantly shod and whose action has been affected by shoeing are not accepted in the ring. That is what I think is happening.

The bill deals with the possibility of horses being poisoned with ragwort. What are the views of the British Horse Society on that? Is the argument coherent and do you welcome that possibility being covered in the bill?

Absolutely. Ragwort is a highly pernicious poisonous weed, which grows all over Scotland and causes a lot of damage to horses; it is sometimes called the yellow peril. At stage 2, we would like an amendment to be lodged to section 20 to deal with people who knowingly expose their equines to ragwort. Ragwort poisoning causes terrible liver damage and the symptoms are very distressing.

Our problem is proving the number of ragwort deaths that happen in Scotland. One would have to do a liver biopsy on every horse that died. Derek Knottenbelt at the University of Liverpool has developed a skin test; as soon as March comes along, that test will allow us to test a horse's skin to show that is it suffering from ragwort poisoning. We will then be able to show quite quickly what we believe, which is that many more horses die of ragwort poisoning than we are able to prove.

My colleague Rob Gibson has pointed out to me that the phrase "plants like ragwort" is used in the evidence. Do other plants in that family cause the same kind of poisoning?

Yes. Other poisonous plants will also kill a horse quickly. For example, if a horse owner knowingly exposes their pony to a yew tree, a single bite will kill it. There are several poisonous plants that can kill horses and if owners practise good pasture management, they do not expose them to such plants.

Should all those plants be contained in the bill?

Definitely. It is quite easy to get hold of that information.

If someone is out horse riding in an area that they do not know well, would you expect them to know ragwort when they see it? Should such knowledge be assumed?

It would be hard for anyone who owns horses to have escaped the knowledge that ragwort is damaging to horses. That also applies to anyone who manages land. Under the criteria for good agricultural and environmental condition, farmers who receive payment for keeping the land in good condition know that ragwort is named. In addition, we run a massive education programme.

We support the notion of statutory improvement notices. If an inspector, an animal health officer or one of our welfare representatives visited a horse in a ragwort situation, it would be more difficult to say, "We expect to see an improvement in this situation" than to take the person responsible to court. However, if they were to say, "This horse is exposed to a terrible amount of ragwort, there's a fair chance the horse is eating it and we want to see it cleared up or the horse moved", that would be an example of a good statutory improvement notice. I think that members are considering that in the bill.

Thank you. It is helpful to have clarity on how the issue might be addressed.

I have a question for Janet Nunn and Lou Leather. In your submissions, you both talk about local authorities' and ministers' powers to appoint inspectors under section 44. How are animal inspectors appointed at the moment?

It might be done in a series of ways. Inspectors tend to be professional officers, such as trading standards officers and environmental health officers. Animal health legislation is usually covered by trading standards officers, because it usually involves port or market work, although environmental health officers would do market work.

There is a series of local authority-based people who have background expertise in inspection. They are well trained, but not necessarily in the detail of animal welfare. If they do specific work such as market work or controlling port importations, they are aware of animal welfare through experience, but if their work is to be extended into general animal welfare, there will be a need for much more training of everybody who is involved, on both the trade and inspection sides.

In part, our concerns are to do with the fact that there seems to be a lack of clarity with regard to who would be an approved inspector. If environmental health officers were so classified, would they pass on that responsibility to animal welfare officers as they do under dog control legislation? What is the training and expertise of animal welfare officers? They might know about collecting stray dogs but, if we get on to other species, there is a clear need for better training. There is a need for a list of Government-approved organisations or bodies as a basis for determining who might be an approved inspector.

Does that need to be included in the bill? You seem to suggest that the bill is not clear enough in that regard. The committee is anxious to create bills that are not too complex but which, at the same time, do the job and implement the policy objectives. What legislative provisions are you requesting? Is legislation needed?

The Pet Care Trust's concern is what would happen if it was decided that inspection should be outsourced from statutory bodies with no financial interest—such as local authorities—to other organisations. I suppose that the Scottish Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals would be a prime candidate for such work. It does some excellent work, but it raises funds for its own work. We would be concerned if powers were to be given to such a body to perform statutory inspections when it would also stand to gain from fundraising for work that it does in the public eye.

Does Diarmid MacLean want to comment?

At the Scottish Sea Life Sanctuary, we have a good relationship with the local environmental health officer, who is accompanied for inspections by an appointed vet from, for example, Edinburgh zoo. We would be worried if an environmental health officer who was new to the job was an appointed officer, because he might be required to make a judgment on specialist care. In our case, that might concern care for seals, and we are the only people on the west coast who look after seals. There should at least be a register of appointed inspectors for certain species, who could be called upon to do inspections with environmental health officers. That happens at the moment under the Zoo Licensing Act 1981, but I do not know whether that provision could be transferred into the bill.

As an organisation that runs an inspectorate—we run quality assurance schemes for riding schools and livery stables—the British Horse Society enjoys a very good relationship with the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities when it comes to running courses such as those on the welfare of animals in transport. Our organisation and others like it appreciate the parts of the bill that talk about interagency co-operation.

Inspectors require fairly specific equine knowledge. The SSPCA offers the opportunity for people to spend a day with the International League for the Protection of Horses, which has a well-equipped rescue centre at Belwade farm in Aberdeenshire; great examples can be shown there. Organisations such as the ILPH and the BHS would be very willing to run a system of continuing professional development, whereby local authority inspectors could build up their equine knowledge as they progressed. Such development could be achieved through co-operation without costing loads of money. We have fairly positive experience of working with COSLA. Inspections could be facilitated by people working together.

Is the issue about training and best practice rather than about including a provision in the bill? Diarmid MacLean referred to vets accompanying inspectors. Would you like that to be a statutory requirement?

Such a statutory requirement would give us protection as a business. I presume that an appointed officer who came on to site could close down the business on, at best, poor information. Such a decision would not be their fault, but it would be made because they had not been trained or did not have the expertise or experience. It would be better if there was a mandatory requirement for an inspector to have a representative with them, perhaps an experienced vet, who could provide them with specific expertise and knowledge.

The Pet Care Trust would be concerned if a vet were to become a statutory part of licensing inspection visits, because of the oncosts, which would need to be picked up. The hourly rate for a vet is expensive and given that there would be inspections for places such as pet shops, kennels and catteries—premises where healthy animals are kept—we would see such a statutory requirement as an undue burden.

I am an environmental health officer by training. At the start of anybody's career, it is difficult for them to know the detail of what is going on, but the inspection system takes that into account. If an inexperienced person goes out on an inspection, they go with an experienced person and therefore learn through the process of making visits with an experienced person.

In practice, environmental health officers have the ability under different legislation to appoint people to attend with them according to what is required at the time. The person who attends with the EHO might be a policeman, a vet or anybody else. We agree with Janet Nunn that it may not be necessary to make a veterinary visit a prerequisite, because if an inspector is used to examining a particular type of premises, they will be aware of the standard and what is required. In some cases, a veterinary visit might be deemed excessive, but in other cases it might be seen as advantageous.

Mark Ruskell asked what we would like to be included in the bill. We would look for an appropriate category of person and a requirement with regard to who might be an appointed person. As has been said, rightly, the bill could not go into too much depth, but we are trying to prevent confusion. If the bill is not sufficiently clear, there is a danger that there might be lots of subsequent claims by different people that different things should be done in the secondary legislation.

As I understand it, the principal requirement is on the environmental health officer to act for the council to enforce the legislation. It is about the EHO's judgment, accountability and ability to draw on a range of expertise. As Helen Mauchlen said, there may be the potential for CPD. The issue is whether the bill should stipulate local authority officers or whether it should state that local authorities will have to draw on expertise—either in-house expertise or expertise from outside. I am trying to get a sense of exactly what you want to be included in the bill and what would be more appropriate in guidance.

Our understanding is that the bill should at least specify the appropriate categories of person or the characteristics of the person. The detail of their qualification and the discretion for appointment would rightly be matters for secondary legislation.

Confusion has arisen about whether organisations such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals might be enforcement bodies. I do not know about the SSPCA, but the RSPCA has certainly said that it does not wish to be an enforcing body and that it wishes to continue to do what it has always done under the Protection of Animals Act 1911 and the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912. Those bodies carry out visits and bring court cases—if they did not do so, nothing would be done whatever. As they have experience that certainly does not exist in local authorities, it seems practical to call upon them to utilise it.

I have a related question. The submission from the Scottish Sea Life Sanctuary raises a good point about the use of specialised equipment; it says that the bill should state that people should not use equipment that they are not trained to use. Will you expand on that?

An officer who comes on to premises and sees an animal in distress may want to treat the animal there and then if they think that it is an emergency or that it is critical to treat the animal. Who would be responsible for the health and safety aspects or the proper use of the equipment by an untrained officer? Would the owner of the premises be responsible, or would the officer take on the responsibility for using the equipment without proper training and supervision? Under the bill, officers will be able to enter premises at any time, whether the owner is there or not, and make use of equipment there without any supervision. That provision needs to be tightened up.

I have a question that follows on from that, as it is about the power of slaughter. The Scottish Sea Life Sanctuary wants a stricter definition of the type of diseases that might lead to the use of that power. Another issue is the persons who will form the group that decides whether the power will be used. Will you expand on that?

Phocine distemper virus—PDV—recently swept through seals in Europe. It started in Norway, came in through the Wash and up through England and Scotland, and resulted in the death of about 30,000 animals. We took part in a study that involved rescuing animals with PDV to allow us to examine the feasibility of vaccinating them and building up resistance to the disease, as it is cyclical and returns every 15 years or so. If an officer came on to the premises and culled animals that were part of a vaccine trial, that would negate any value from the study, which could prevent the disease or reduce its impact in future years. Provision must be made for organisations that carry out responsible vaccine trials under quarantine, or which work towards controlling diseases. In such cases, officers should not have a 100 per cent right to stop the trial, if the organisation can demonstrate that it has an effective quarantine system.

I presume that that issue would be covered in secondary legislation, not in the bill.

Under the zoo licensing regime, we must demonstrate an effective quarantine procedure to get a licence. Responsible bodies that can demonstrate effective quarantine procedures should have protection against the powers of entry and slaughter.

Just as there are reasons for keeping alive animals that have diseases, there are reasons other than welfare for putting them down. It is of slight concern to the equine industry that the bill does not seem to make provision for situations in which horses have become dangerous for whatever reason. Some organisations rescue animals but then have to destroy them humanely because they are unmanageable. We would like that issue to be addressed.

That is sufficient evidence for us to consider.

Do you want to follow up on the same issue, Richard?

It is not exactly the same one.

I will take Elaine Smith first and then come to you, Richard.

My question is on a slightly different issue, but it relates to a point that the Scottish Sea Life Sanctuary made in its submission on the powers of slaughter. In essence, the question is a general one for the panel. Are the definitions of "animal" and "protected animal" that are in the bill acceptable and clear? I am picking on the Scottish Sea Life Sanctuary because its submission says:

"It is not clear from the Bill in its draft form whether species held by us would come under the terms of what constitutes an ‘animal'."

Perhaps Diarmid MacLean will expand on that.

As an aquarium and a zoo, we keep a wide variety of animals from jellyfish to mammals—I was discussing that with other panel members before the meeting—and every one of them is susceptible to some sort of communicable disease. The question is where to draw the line: for example, is a fish an animal? We can have 30,000 herring on display in the sea life centre. If that fish population is displaying signs of disease, can we be forced to cull the whole shoal or population? Does the bill relate only to mammals or does it cover birds in aviaries, for example? The definitions should be made clearer.

Part 2 of the bill, which addresses animal welfare, says:

"‘animal' means a vertebrate other than man."

Part 2 also says:

"The Scottish Ministers may by regulations … make provision which … extends the definition of ‘animal' so as to include invertebrates of any description".

Does it give you any comfort that ministers could do that or should the wording be stronger?

That wording is very strong. Basically, it covers all animals and that is what we are looking for. We do not want any species to be excluded because people think that it is not worth saving or looking after. We are concerned about the care of all the animals for which we are responsible, whether it be a jellyfish, a herring or a seal that has been with us for a number of years. We welcome the fact that the measures extend to all animals.

Does any other panel member have a comment on the "animal" and "protected animal" definitions?

I do not have a problem with the definitions. However, I point out that, under proposed new section 36X of the Animal Health Act 1981, on interpretation, the definition of "livestock" does not allow for pets; it focuses on farmed animals. Perhaps that oversight can be corrected before the Parliament finalises the bill.

A couple of people told me that animal sanctuaries should be licensed in the way that pet shops, for instance, are. Does the panel have any views on that?

As a sea life sanctuary, we are licensed under the Zoo Licensing Act 1981.

You are licensed.

We hold a zoo licence. We do so voluntarily; we do not need to do that, but we think that it is good practice to do so under the principle of responsible husbandry. We open ourselves up for inspection and are very open about what we do. Licensing should become mandatory. I could lose my licence tomorrow and open up again as a community farm. We could simply change the name above the door. Licensing should be mandatory; anyone who is responsible for the care of animals should be licensed.

No matter the size of sanctuary.

No, because even a small sanctuary is still responsible for the care of sentient animals. If animals are not looked after properly, they can become depressed and exhibit all sorts of behaviours. It is only responsible for us to be licensed and to be open for inspection whether by environmental health inspections or another means. The appointed vets who come in to assess our work practices look at everything from health and safety to animal husbandry. They are independent of our company. Licensing is a responsible part of the bill.

What would trigger that process? Presumably, there would be voluntary or professional staff who would be involved in looking after animals. Richard Lochhead's point is about how far one would extend the requirement. As you said, if somewhere calls itself a sanctuary one day and a farm the next, is it just the terminology or is it what it does that should be covered?

As a business, we could continue trading in exactly the same vein and just change our description, and there would be no requirement whatsoever for us to have a licence under the Zoo Licensing Act 1981. The environmental health system in place under that act has worked well for us. I do not know how far down that goes, or whether it would apply to someone who was looking after just one horse or to someone who was running a farm. That would have to be open to discussion.

Perhaps we can bring in Helene Mauchlen on that point. The bill will introduce registration, but not licensing, of livery stables. What would the practical difference be between being licensed and being registered for the pair of you and for your businesses?

The difference between registration and licensing is something that I wanted to bring up. At the final stage of consultation on the draft bill, comments were sought on licensing and there was a great deal of support for that, but the bill as introduced used the word "registration", whereas in England they are going for licensing, as I understand it. Registration is a way of knowing where the horses are. Obviously, someone will have to be registered to operate, but a licence, entailing powers of entry and inspection, is much stronger. We think that if we go for registration in Scotland, horses in livery yards in Scotland will have less protection than horses in England have, and that would not be appropriate. However, having spoken to officials, I think that the plan could be to go for licensing for livery yards.

To return to the original question, animal sanctuaries should be licensed, regardless of size, because many horse owners will not take responsibility for their equines when they become old or infirm. We get a good number of calls saying, "I've got a horse with navicular and we can't ride him any more. Can you tell me where I can put him?" We have to talk those people sensitively through the process of humane destruction, because taking the final decision for their horse is the best thing that they can do, rather than allowing him to enter a downward spiral of neglect and abuse in a sanctuary where nobody is watching what goes on. The people who run sanctuaries tend to open their doors to take in all the horses whose owners cannot face having them put down, so the horses that end up getting lost in sanctuaries are the ones in greatest need, because they may be old, arthritic or suffering from bone disease. The welfare of those equines must be monitored.

The difference that I see between registration and licensing is that licensing entails a requirement for a minimum standard. As Helene Mauchlen has said, there is a problem about animals disappearing into sanctuaries with no further regard being given to their care as they spiral downwards. If the sanctuary is licensed and is required to provide a certain level of care, people will have the confidence to hand over an animal to a sanctuary knowing that that is the best place to look after the animal in its declining years. If the animal is injured, a sanctuary may be the best place for that animal. A sanctuary that is licensed will be overseen and inspected, so those running it will be made more responsible.

If you look in a dictionary, you will see that sanctuaries are defined as places that are above the law, and we do not think that they should be. Our view is that all sanctuaries ought to be licensed. The larger charities will have far larger facilities than many of the people who are required to license their operations. What we need is a definition of sanctuary, and licensing thereafter. The issue arose from the number and sizes of premises, which varied immensely, particularly as there are many well-meaning people who take in animals but do not start out aiming to be a sanctuary. Many people will decide to take in an animal, but the scale of their operation can build so that it ends up far larger than they ever intended it to be, and they frequently do not have the ability or expertise to manage or plan for development for the proper care of the animals. A solution to the dilemma was included in a Companion Animal Welfare Council report entitled "The Report on Companion Animal Welfare Establishments: Sanctuaries, Shelters and Re-Homing Centres". Pages 39 to 43 of that report in particular deal with licensing and registration and might be worth reading.

The report's main aim was to require licences for larger premises but not necessarily for smaller premises that do a service. The concern was that putting too many restrictive licensing requirements on well-meaning people with small premises would mean that they would be unable to cope and that there would be considerable demands on the rest of the system. It was proposed that smaller premises should register and should have to notify the local authority that they exist. Local authorities could then apply discretion in their inspection procedures and say, "Okay. You are of a certain size and are doing a certain job." They would not have to go into too much detail about how people should be operating the system. They should have the discretion to require at some stage that something should have a licence rather than be registered. As a result, many people who are doing a lot of good will not be pushed out of the market and the playing field will be levelled for the rest of the sanctuaries. I absolutely agree that all sanctuaries should be licensed.

That is helpful.

If a licensing regime is introduced, will some sanctuaries in Scotland not meet the conditions and have to close? I expect that you do not want to give the names of sanctuaries, but you probably know much more about sanctuaries than we do. Are there sanctuaries out there that should be shut down?

It is true that some sanctuaries ought not to exist. Trying to improve animal welfare is about trying to create a level playing field and trying to apply equal standards for people who are doing the same sorts of job, and not allowing people to avoid the law by devious means.

We have heard about one premises that made itself a charity and allegedly stole dogs. It gave the animals away but required a donation, so it was able to collect money for charitable purposes. It had no overheads and made immense profits. That is not what the work is about or what a sanctuary should be. Anybody who is involved in such activities should be subject to proper licensing controls.

I saw Helene Mauchlen and Diarmid MacLean nodding vigorously. Do you have anything to add to what has been said?

We are more concerned with marine mammals and our community in Scotland is very small. There is, of course, a spectrum of care levels in that community and I am sure that we are all aware of certain parts of that spectrum that should not be operating. If licensing were required, the case for closing down those places would be strengthened.

Some sanctuaries in Scotland's horse world seem to take an awful lot of horses willy-nilly, and one worries about the number of horses that go to them. However, on the whole, people who care enough about horses to give them a home tend to look after them.

The general principles of the bill were asked about at the outset. The duty of care and the positive responsibilities that the bill will put in place are welcome because everyone who takes responsibility for an animal will have to look after it. That will make a big difference to the regime that we have been dealing with. The British Horse Society as a welfare organisation has had to stand back and see horses suffer before any action can be taken. Some sanctuaries might have to change their ways and one or two might have to close down, but everyone who looks after horses will have to do so properly.

Is that a useful point to end on?

No. I would like to ask a question on an issue that interests me. The bill proposes that animals should not be given as prizes, but NFU Scotland thinks that giving animals as prizes can sometimes be appropriate and the Showmen's Guild of Great Britain, whose members give out goldfish as prizes, believes that it puts enough safeguards in place. The vets who gave us evidence last week thought that animals could be offered as prizes as long as safeguards were in place. What do members of the panel think?

My impression is that the goldfish as prizes provision has been dropped from the English bill, but that is a particularly bad practice. We are against it.

So you are in favour of a ban.

We are absolutely in favour of a ban. The problem is not just that animals are given as prizes, but that the prize that people win is often an animal that they do not want. They do not know what to do with it or how to care for it, but they are given no help on how to look after it. Generally, the giving of animals as prizes is not a good thing.

I acknowledge that the point that has been raised by the NFU might be a different situation. Personally, I do not know about the activities that take place at agricultural shows, but I understand that animals are given as prizes at large, national shows. Perhaps in some circumstances that might be appropriate, but we are against the general concept that animals should be given as prizes.

We believe that animals should not be given as prizes. Briefly, it should be borne in mind that there is a difference between winning a horse and winning a share of a syndicate.

Do other members of the panel have any comments?

My only comment is that the fact that a person has won a competition does not qualify them to look after an animal. I am not sure about the farming shows that the NFU has highlighted, but it is generally true that winning a prize does not make a person qualified to look after an animal.

The Pet Care Trust has not taken a view as such on the issue, but vendors in our members' pet shops give away care leaflets whenever they sell an animal. One way of dealing with the issue might be to go down the route that pet vendors have taken. I suppose that such competitions at fêtes are an invitation to provide one's children with a treat. Certainly for our family, our first pet was a goldfish, from which we moved on to have a hamster, a dog and, now, two rabbits—we might have gerbils next year—so I suppose that that has been part of our culture. However, we perhaps need to do things more responsibly than was the case heretofore.

I really cannot see the difference between buying a pet and winning a pet, as the person selling a pet cannot know what the person who buys it will be like. The vendor can only perhaps provide a leaflet on how to look after the kitten, puppy or goldfish.

We normally talk things through with people. In our pet shops, we employ people who are qualified and who have completed a course such as the foundation course that we run with Barony College here in Scotland. That has moved up the standards of animal husbandry even further. We suggest to our retailers 10 tips to check whether someone is buying on impulse. We know that there are ways of running through things with people. However, people often make more than one visit to the pet shop before buying a pet, even if the pet is just a small mammal. We encourage people to read widely—they do not necessarily have to buy literature from shops as they can go to the library—before they buy.

That is a bit different from entering a raffle.

Yes, it is.

As a basic principle, people value things that they purchase much more than things that they get free. For instance, buying a pet through a reputable chain of pet shops that are overseen and follow good practice guidelines will be very different from winning an animal at a circus or a fair. There is a large difference between winning an animal and buying an animal.

Thank you very much. Those answers have been useful.

We have no further questions at this stage, so I thank the witnesses very much. It has been useful to be able to go into some depth on the licensing issues so that we can get a sense of how people perceive that the bill will make a difference in practice. It is good to be able to get different perspectives on those issues.

We will have a short suspension to allow the first panel to go and the second panel to arrive.

Meeting suspended.

On resuming—

I welcome panel 2: Joseph Holmes is honorary veterinary surgeon for the council of docked breeds; Chris Laurence is the veterinary director of the Dogs Trust; and Holly Lee is the public affairs officer of the Scottish Kennel Club. We invited the anti-docking alliance, but it was unable to attend this morning's meeting. I thank the panellists for coming. We found your written evidence helpful. We will not ask you to repeat it; instead, I invite members to ask questions. Who would like to kick off?

It has been alleged in evidence to us that the docking of dogs and of other animals, such as farm animals, causes them pain. I am sure that we will not come to agreement on that, but I ask the panel members to give their thoughts on the view that, although the tails of working dogs should be docked so that they are not caused pain as a result of their tails being torn or ripped, it is more difficult to make an argument for cosmetic tail docking.

Who would like to go first?

I can go first, if you would like.

It depends on how evidence of pain is defined in the first place. The problem that I have is that what is often referred to as evidence is not scientific evidence. There is quite a difference, in that scientific experiment has its own format and its own way of producing the correct evidence. The evidence that the anti-docking lobby has produced is not borne out on closer inspection. If one looks at what is said in that evidence, one finds that it is not really proper evidence. I will not go into great detail, but there are two or three points that I want to make on that.

First, the anti-docking lobby has asserted that there is good evidence to show that the act of docking causes pain, but if one goes through the information on the anti-docking alliance website, one finds the following statement by the Australian veterinary surgeon, Robert Wansbrough:

"there have been no studies that measure the initial pain and the ongoing pathological pain inflicted on docked dogs."

Secondly, in Mr Laurence's written submission, he says:

"While there is … evidence of the effects of docking in other species we consider this to be less reliable, as extrapolation from species to species is often so."

In other words, there is a danger in jumping from one species to the next. The submission to the committee from Mr Bower, who is another veterinary surgeon, states that

"Pain is present, however … fleeting, and it can be measured. Pain is possibly the least powerful argument as it is so slight."

When Professor Morton gave evidence in front of a similar committee at Westminster, he said:

"By far and away, the bulk of evidence is on lambs and mice".

The primary allegation that pain is a feature of docking is not borne out by any evidence that one could call scientific. Much of the evidence for the allegations that are made is anecdotal and is not based on scientific experiment at all. That is my initial point on pain.

Chris Laurence took a totally different approach in his submission.

I will certainly not try to rubbish other people's evidence. What I have presented to the committee is what I believe to be proper, peer-reviewed, scientific evidence.

Pain is subjective. I cannot tell you whether whatever you are doing at the moment is hurting you. You cannot tell me whether my back hurts at the moment. If you hit your thumb with a hammer, you could get a very large bruise that might look awful, but might not be painful. Although one can never prove whether pain is perceived, one can prove two things: whether the ability to feel pain is there in simple physical terms and whether the physiological reaction of an animal is such that it relates to what is likely to be pain.

It has been shown that, neurologically, puppies' systems are sufficiently developed at birth to produce the sensation of pain. In other words, the receptors are there, and they are joined up to the brain. If that is the case, my logic says that those receptors are capable of firing off and producing some sort of sensation in the brain. I cannot prove that that is pain, however. I can also show that the reaction that we find in an animal that perceives pain, which includes the release of stress hormones, happens in dogs. That is an indication not only that the system is joined up but that it is actually working.

There is also the question whether the pain suppression system is working properly in dogs of a very young age. I mention that in my evidence and will give an example. If we sit and rub the back of our hand for a couple of minutes, we find that, after some time, we lose some of the sensation in that hand. If we then apply a painful stimulus, the pain is far less than it would be in normal circumstances. When a vet injects a horse—at least, this was done when I was in horse practice many years ago—they first slap their hand on the side of the horse's neck a couple of times, then they stick the needle in. The horse does not react to the needle any more than it does to the slap. That is a pain suppression system in action. There is good evidence that pain suppression systems are not active in new-born puppies. Not only do I think that there is good physical and physiological evidence for pain perception in puppies, but I believe that it might be worse in puppies than it is in adult dogs.

Like me, you come from a generation that was vaccinated during childhood. My arm looked a mess, and I am sure that, as a child, I experienced massive pain at the time, although I have no recollection of it—and, presumably, it did me some good in later years.

Recollection of pain is not the issue; I cannot remember every time that I hurt myself as a child. The issue is whether pain is perceived at the time—it is about the simple perception of pain at the instant it happens.

Puppies scream when they are docked. I practised for nearly 30 years—I cannot claim 30 years, because I am about three months short, so I cannot quite keep up with Mr Holmes. When I practised—before only veterinary surgeons were allowed to dock—I used to dock puppies, on the principle that I would rather do it and know that it was done properly rather than have a lay person do it badly. I saw some of the consequences of poor docking. I can assure you that 99 out of 100—if not 999 out of 1,000—puppies scream when their tail is cut off. It does not matter which technique is used, and I have used a number of different techniques.

It is not the memory of pain, but the perception of pain at the time that is ethically wrong.

That brings us on to the next point. Presumably, the docking of working dogs to avoid their experiencing pain in later life with torn tails and so on might be justifiable. Holly Lee might be able to tell us why it should be done for cosmetic reasons.

If a dog is defined as a working dog, that does not necessarily mean that it will work throughout its life. It could be a working dog that is kept as a pet. It will still have the same characteristics as a working dog that is sent out to work, so its tail will be very active and will be prone to injury. Similarly, tails of breeds that are not working dogs are also prone to injury. Boxers and Dobermanns are not working dogs, but they have active tails, which can smash into coffee tables or get caught in doors, for example.

I want to pick up on the point that you raised about being vaccinated as a child. It is a common perception that docking is cruel, because people compare it to a human situation. If we ask whether it is ethical to cut off someone's limb, people will say no, because it will hurt—the person will feel that. All the scientific evidence that we have seen does not contradict the fact that a human feels pain in such situations. The evidence also makes some distinctions. It puts lambs, calves and pigs in the same category as humans; puppies are born at a different neo-natal stage, and are in the same category as mice and rats. Their senses and nervous systems are not fully developed. Tests have been done to prove that that is the case.

For example, Professor Hales touched very young puppies on their mid-side skin. If the mid-side skin of an adult dog is touched, its hind paw responds, but the puppies did not behave in that way, because their nervous systems are not developed. A puppy's nervous system does not develop fully until it is about 14 days old. That is why the Kennel Club and the council of docked breeds say that, provided that docking is done early in a dog's life, there is no reason why the dog should feel pain. A puppy should make no sound when it is docked; it should return to its mother to begin feeding and the mother should be able to lick its wound without a problem.

So your argument is that because some pets have active tails, which they might hit against a table in future, for example, their tails should be docked at birth.

Not necessarily. Our argument is simply that the decision to dock a litter of puppies should be up to the breeder. Breeders are not cruel people; it is in their interest to protect their animals. They will keep dogs for themselves or sell them on—either way, they do not want their animals to be injured. However, they know their breed best—it is their area of expertise. If they feel that dogs of that breed are likely to injure their tails, why should they not have the right to decide whether to have tails cut off?

I recognise that I speak purely from personal experience, but my experience comes from 30 years in practice. The great majority of tail injuries that I saw were on Great Danes, greyhounds and Labradors. As has been suggested, those injuries resulted from their whacking their tails against a wall or the side of a coffee table, for example. Nobody suggests that we should cut off their tails, so where is the logic? Of course working dogs cut their tails; they also cut their feet, flanks, ears, noses and all sorts of other bits, but nobody suggests cutting those off.

The system for producing reflexes is different from that for simple sensation. For a reflex, a complete loop is needed from the bit that does the sensing up to the brain and back down to a fairly complicated muscular system. That may well not be developed in neonatal puppies, but that does not mean that they do not perceive pain.

Enshrined in the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 is the principle that, when there is doubt about whether an animal will feel pain from a procedure, it must be given appropriate analgesia or anaesthesia. That principle is enshrined in law and it would be wrong if the bill went against it and caused unnecessary pain in neonatal puppies that were destined never to damage their tails.

Spaniels are working dogs. My knowledge is that they often have problems with their ears. If we are talking about a working standard, why has no standard evolved for docking spaniels' ears?

Ears are injured in a completely different way from tails. An injury towards the end of a tail creates circulation problems and is more of a moving wound than an injury to an ear would be, because a tail has momentum. That is particularly noticeable in a heavy-tailed breed such as the Dobermann or Rottweiler, or even in a very enthusiastic spaniel, because the tail is thrown from side to side. If a tail has a cut or a nick, it will be banged and knocked more, and the dog will chew it, too.

An ear injury is treated more or less as a cut or abrasion is anywhere else on the body. It does not involve the circulation problems that accompany a tail injury. The factors are the position of the injury relative to the dog, the fact that the tail moves around a great deal and the weak circulation at the end of the tail. If that is breached, it is difficult to restore.

What about a thick-tailed dog such as a Labrador?

Labradors have short tails.

Is there a docking standard for Labradors?

There is no docking standard for Labradors, but they have shorter tails, which affects the risk of damage to the tip. Heavy-tailed dogs—boxers, Dobermanns, Weimaraners and Rottweilers—are docked in particular because they all have muscular, heavy and long tails.

Can I hear other views?

We have said that docking a puppy's tail is not as painful because its senses are not fully developed, but those senses are certainly fully developed later in life. If a dog injures its tail later in life, that is extremely painful. It will suffer not only pain from the injury, but pain from docking that it would not have suffered if it had been docked as a puppy. That is the reason that a working dog should be docked in the first instance: prevention is better than cure. In addition, dogs with tails rely on those tails to communicate. If a dog that once relied on its tail for communication were docked, it would be distressed because it would have to find other means of communication.

Why do you not have a standard for working Labradors, for example?

Because we think that it should be for breeders to decide whether they have their dogs docked.

Why do you not have a standard to allow breeders to choose whether they want to dock a Labrador for working purposes?

I am not sure that I understand the question. Are you asking whether some Labradors should be docked and others should not?

I am asking why there are docking standards for some breeds of working dogs and not for others. A Labrador is a working breed, so why is there no standard to ensure that owners can choose to dock the tail earlier in life?

At the moment docking is legal, so a standard has not been needed.

So why do you have standards for tail docking of other dogs?

Because some breeds that are docked have traditionally been docked for certain reasons. That has always been the case.

Are those health reasons?

Yes.

The health reason for a Labrador would be that, if it is a working dog and has to have its tail amputated later in life because it has been damaged, that causes distress. Why is there not a standard for docking Labradors as puppies?

Because some Labradors are not bred to go out to work. They may be bred as domestic pets, and some people may not see the need to dock them. If they believe that they will not be prone to injuring their tails in the environment that they are entering, they will not see docking as a necessary preventive measure. Others will.

Presumably, some pups from a litter of spaniels, for example, may become working dogs, whereas others will become pets. However, there is a standard for that breed.

There is no standard that demands that the dogs be docked. However, if they are to be worked, they will be docked.

I would like to hear Chris Laurence's view on the issue.

I will make a number of points. If any member would like pink-spotted wallpaper, I suggest that they acquire a dog with either a cut ear or a cut tail. They will then have pink-spotted wallpaper very quickly, because blood supply is very adequate in both ears and tails and they tend to get shaken and wagged, which spreads the blood a long way.

With adequate analgesia and anaesthesia during the surgery and afterwards, pain resulting from amputation of tails in adults is minimal. Modern analgesics are extremely effective and the veterinary profession is now very good at using them. That applies to any injury.

I return to the point that was made about communication. There is good evidence that dogs use their tails as a means of communication, and the Dogs Trust believes that that is the case. In a number of instances when people have been mobbed by cows, the dogs present have been frightened and their low tail carriage has encouraged the mobbing. If the dog is confident and holds up its tail, generally cows will not mob. Animals see how other animals carry their tail.

I have a relatively large garden, in which there is a plague of rabbits. If a fox walks through the garden in normal daylight, when the rabbits can see it, they will look at its tail carriage. If its tail carriage is low, it is indicating that it is not interested in eating, so the rabbits will carry on eating the grass. Tail carriage and the way in which the tail is wagged are an intrinsic part of a dog's communication system. In human terms, I liken it to someone not being able to use their eyebrows to express themselves. I suspect that that would be a considerable disadvantage to all of us.

We must deal with scientific, not anecdotal, evidence with regard to communication. Despite what Mr Laurence said earlier, I do not mean to rubbish anything; indeed, I am trying to be constructive. However, we need to look at the matter dispassionately and ask whether there is any scientific evidence to substantiate this difficulty in communicating. Mr Laurence himself wrote in his submission:

"evidence that docked dogs find it more difficult to communicate with other dogs is anecdotal".

That is the essential point: the evidence is anecdotal, not scientific. It does not matter how you describe what might happen; if Mr Laurence is correct about communication deficiencies in docked dogs, hundreds of them would be getting mugged at night by dogs with tails because they would not be able to send the right signals. That patently does not happen. Experience has shown that docked dogs receive no more injuries in fights than dogs with full tails.

In your submission, you say:

"No competent docking operation has ever produced imbalance … urinary incontinence or adverse social interaction. Docked and undocked dogs are equally happy."

Have you proven that scientifically? Has your research been peer reviewed?

I have seen hundreds and hundreds of docked dogs in my career, and have never isolated a single case of incontinence, perineal hernia and so on. Those conditions affect dogs with and without tails. If docked dogs had exhibited a high percentage of such secondary problems, the magazine for the profession, The Veterinary Record, would have called for the practice to be stopped well before now.

The assertion that docked dogs are "equally happy" is not very scientific.

I was really talking about dogs expressing themselves. Docked dogs do not get depressed because they have lost the means to communicate.

As for phantom limb pain, Mr Laurence's submission says:

"There is no direct evidence for this and it is difficult to perceive how the hypothesis could be proven."

Again, the submission raises a particular issue, only to conclude that it cannot be proven. As I have said repeatedly, if the matter is to be judged in legislative commitments that are based on a scientific background, we must examine all the experiments that have been carried out and decide whether they are valid and whether the evidence that they have produced is anecdotal or reliable. There is a big difference between anecdotal evidence and reliable scientific evidence.

In response to Chris Laurence, I have to say that the Scottish Kennel Club does not deny that dogs use their tails to communicate. However, if a dog started its life without a tail, it would find other means to communicate. Just like a person, it would communicate with its whole body: its rear, its face and its ears. I agree that if a dog that had relied on its tail to communicate was docked, it would be distressed. After all, it would have to find new means of communication. However, if humans started life without eyebrows, we would get used to communicating without them.

If we employed Joseph Holmes's argument on that point, we would have to conclude that there was no scientific evidence to support it because no controlled studies have been carried out on any of those issues. No one has tried to dock a dog later in life to find out its reactions. The scientific evidence does not exist for any of the arguments that have just been advanced.

Quite a few other countries permit docking only on therapeutic grounds. Has experience in those countries shown that dogs suffer many more injuries because their tails have not been docked?

The number of tail injuries has increased in countries where docking has been banned. For example, since docking was banned in Sweden about 12 years ago, 23 per cent of boxer dogs have had their tail-ends cut off because of tail damage, and 16 per cent of those have required a second operation to amputate the whole tail because, initially, only the damaged part of the tail was removed.

A Kennel Club survey showed that 98 per cent of working gun dogs were docked and that, of the undocked 2 per cent, a high proportion suffered tail damage. In fact, 75 per cent of undocked Clumber spaniels suffered such damage.

Are those statistics from Sweden?

No, they are from the UK Kennel Club.

I was asking for evidence from other countries that have banned docking.

The statistics that I mentioned are from Sweden. I raised my second point because it covers the number of working dogs that are not docked and which suffer tail injuries as a result.

What about animals that were traditionally bred as working animals but are now pets?

The statistics from Sweden show that tail injuries in such cases have increased by 23 per cent.

Will you provide a copy of that evidence?

Yes.

That is just one paper and it covers only a small number of dogs, so there is some doubt about the statistical significance of the results. However, I am no statistician, so please do not ask me questions about it.

Is there any general evidence on the issue? For example, I note that Norway banned non-therapeutic tail docking in 1987, which is quite a long time ago. I presume that, if there were significant problems, Norway would not have been followed by the other 14 countries that have gone down the same route. I am trying to get a sense of the evidence from other countries of taking the route that the bill proposes.

I know of no professional veterinary body in a country that has banned tail docking that is clamouring for its return because of a high rate of tail injuries.

If we could get the Swedish evidence, that would be useful.

We have had correspondence to the Kennel Club which shows that, if tail docking was banned in the UK, many breeders would stop breeding dogs. That could also have an impact on the statistics. However, I will get the statistics from Sweden to you.

Thank you.

I have one final question on tail docking. As I understand it, the English bill and the Scottish bill contain different proposals and the English bill does not go down the tail docking route. If there is a difference in the law, might that cause problems with people taking animals to England to be docked and all kinds of cross-border shenanigans?

I do not think that we should prejudge the Westminster bill—that is my first comment.

That appears to be the way it is going.

The minister said that there will be a free vote in the Commons on the issue. Our view is that we will win that vote and that tail docking will be banned.

I agree that there would be a significant problem if docking was banned on one side of the border but not on the other. I foresee that puppies would be transported miles up the road to have their tails cut off. Anybody who is prepared to cut tails off puppies will be prepared to go a long way, I am afraid.

The UK Government has adopted its preferred position, but it is interesting to note the wording that it has used to justify that. Its preference is to allow continued freedom of choice. Scientists from across the globe agree that tail docking does not cause pain, as research distinguishes between groups of newborn animals, including dogs, and confirms that they are relatively immature at birth and up to around two weeks of age, and so cannot feel the same degree of pain as human babies, lambs and calves. Therefore, it seems unnecessary to amend current legislation. It is pretty clear that the UK Government has not rushed its decision. It has obviously taken a lot of evidence and come to a considered view on the matter. I recommend its position to the committee.

The committee will have to consider the evidence. We are looking not only to the current panel for evidence; we are taking evidence over a number of weeks and the minister is still to come before us. There will be a chance for the committee to review the evidence in the light of the views of other witnesses.

I am conscious that you also have expertise on other matters, so I want us to explore one or two other areas.

I have a question for Chris Laurence. On section 17, you state in your submission:

"Dogs Trust supports the retention of the offence of unnecessary suffering but consider that it should be further defined to include physical and mental suffering."

I suppose that that relates to the question of whether tail docking causes continued mental suffering. You might want to comment on that, but I also wonder what further provisions you think should be included in the bill to address mental suffering.

I do not see the link with docking at all. That was not the intention behind our comment. We want the words "mental or physical suffering"—rather than just "suffering"—to be included in the bill.

The legislation of 1911 or 1912, which is where the concept of unnecessary suffering comes from, talks about "terrifying" and uses various other 19th century phrases to describe what a person may or may not be doing to a dog. However, courts find it difficult to accept that mental suffering is suffering. The way in which a dog is kept can certainly lead to mental suffering. If a dog is tied up on the end of a chain most of the day—even though someone may feed it, water it, clear up after it and exercise it a couple of times—the dog's mental state is likely to suffer because the dog is so physically restricted. The Dogs Trust takes in large numbers of dogs and we see the mental consequences of such physical restrictions.

In many rehoming centres, including ours, one finds that dogs that have been there for a while—being well fed and watered, and receiving excellent health care—will start to spin or wall-bounce if one approaches their cage. Those are what are called stereotypic behaviours, and could be used as evidence of mental suffering. The dog is restricted and has no choice in what it can do or where it can go, and that is a mental issue. To exclude "mental suffering" from "suffering" leaves a hole in the legislation that we feel should be filled.

Would mental suffering be easy to define? I go back to tail docking: I might think that it is a cause of mental suffering for a dog not to have a tail or not to be able to express itself by wagging its tail, but that would be my opinion. How would you define mental suffering?

To be blunt, that is not the issue. The issue is whether the ability exists to prosecute on the ground of mental suffering. Then it would be up to the court to decide, from the evidence presented to it, whether there was mental suffering or not. If the phrase "mental suffering" is excluded from the bill, there will never be a prosecution on the ground of purely mental suffering.

So you would not define it; you would just include the phrase "mental suffering".

Absolutely. The bill should simply refer to "mental or physical suffering". As soon as one starts to define such concepts, it is a field day for lawyers.

Yes, that is a problem, and that is why I am asking you about it.

And it is why we simply want the three words "mental or physical" to be included in the section on unnecessary suffering.

My original question was based on the written submission from the Dogs Trust, but other witnesses may wish to comment. I also want to put a question to the witness from the Scottish Kennel Club.

Perhaps we should move on to that.

The submission from the Scottish Kennel Club mentions electric shock collars and the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. I take it that it would like electric shock collars to be made illegal by the enactment of the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Bill. Where would such a provision go in the bill? I also take it that the Kennel Club feels that the current legislation on dangerous dogs is not robust enough, but perhaps we could come back to the question on the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.

Yes, let us take the question on collars first, because it is linked to the issue of suffering.

In the bill as it stands, I cannot see a place for a provision on banning electric shock collars. Therefore, we feel that secondary legislation should contain a provision to ban electric shock collars—we understand that the bill is an enabling bill.

Electric shock collars are undoubtedly cruel. There is no need for them in today's society in which alternative training methods exist. Clear scientific evidence has proved that electric shock collars are cruel. Of even more concern is the fact that they are freely available for anybody to use to give their dog an electric shock. The collars are also ineffective. They train dogs to respond out of fear of being punished rather than out of willingness to obey. They are a highly aversive training method.

Dogs are easily trained; they respond to being rewarded. For example, in clicker training, when a dog hears a sound and associates it with a resultant reward, it will repeat the action that led to its receiving that reward. Electric shock collars are simply painful. If they were not painful, they would not work. The dog responds, if it responds at all, to the pain, not to the person using the shock collar. The dog might not know where the shock comes from. If it knows that it comes from its handler, the relationship between dog and handler will certainly be damaged. If the dog does not know where the shock comes from, it is likely to associate the shock with something totally different. That will damage the dog mentally.

Section 17, which I have just discussed with Chris Laurence, is about unnecessary suffering and mental and physical cruelty. Does it cover what you are talking about?

It goes wider than that. To me, section 17 is about obvious cruelty, such as a dog not being fed properly or not getting out to socialise with other dogs. However, an electric shock collar is not obvious cruelty, because it is around a dog's neck. People who use them could say, "I use them to train my dog. I did not realise that they were so cruel." That is why people need to be aware of other training methods. Many case studies show the immense suffering that electric shock collars cause dogs, by burning their necks for example. Electric shock collars are one size fits all, so there would be no difference between one for a Yorkshire terrier and one for a huge dog. The person who controls the remote that administers the shock would not necessarily know what they were doing. If they knew about training methods, they certainly would not use one that is so aversive.

Perhaps we could look into that.

Just to show that Holly Lee and I do not spend our lives scratching each other's eyes out, I should say that the Dogs Trust supports the view that shock collars should be banned. We see no place for them in training, and there are many other and better ways to train dogs. The bill should regulate against shock collars or call for a complete ban.

The second part of my question was about the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. Will the Scottish Kennel Club expand on what the bill should include? Why does the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 not meet its requirements? I presume from your evidence that breeds of dog are not necessarily dangerous. For example, all Rottweilers may not be dangerous dogs even though they may be defined as such. Whether the dog is dangerous is down to its keeper. Is that correct? What could the bill do about that?

Originally, the bill was meant to update and consolidate all existing legislation. The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 is current legislation, and it was not reviewed when the bill was introduced. It should have been, because it has proven to be ineffective, and breed-specific legislation is not the way forward. The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 applies after an incident has occurred; therefore, many dog attacks are not prevented. Millions of pounds have been spent on implementing the act with no real effect. The Scottish Kennel Club and other animal welfare organisations are part of a dog legislation advisory group that has researched the deficiencies of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. It is widely accepted that genetics play only a small part in an animal's behaviour. The environment in which an animal has been reared is likely to have a greater effect. Therefore, we propose that breed-specific legislation is not the way forward. In the wrong hands, any dog could be dangerous. However, every dog of every breed that has ever done something dangerous cannot be outlawed because of one dog. That dog may have been exposed to a certain environment and trained in a certain way.

What should we include in the bill?

Section 1 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which is the breed-specific section, should be repealed. At the very least, the entire act should be reviewed.

That act partly covers human welfare. The bill looks more at animal welfare. The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 is less about animals and more about the welfare of humans, is it not?

Yes, if a dog bites a human, the dog is considered to be dangerous.

However, the bill deals with the duty of care of animal owners, so should we not focus on whether that duty of care is sufficient, whether there are safeguards and whether the inspection regime is correct for people who own dogs?

The bill is also about the welfare of animals—it is about how people treat and train their dogs.

The bill is, yes.

That is what we would like to see from the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 as well. We would like the duty of care to mean that, rather than dogs being destroyed just because of their breed, the person who is in control of a dog has a duty to stop it being dangerous in the first place.

I do not know whether it is appropriate for us to use the bill that we are discussing to deal with another piece of legislation. We are not taking evidence on the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. The debate would have to be reopened to get evidence on that issue. We can reflect on that.

Chris Laurence, did you have a comment to make?

I think that we have said enough about the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. I will not say any more about it.

I want to ask the witnesses for their comments on inspectors. How should they be trained? What should the bill say about inspections?

I was sitting in the public gallery twitching during the earlier discussion about that. It is important that there is a means of assessing the competence of inspectors. The Dogs Trust's view is that the best way of doing that would be for the minister to keep a list and for him to define how people get on that list—which would be to do with their competence—and for local authorities and the Scottish Executive to be bound to use somebody off that list to carry out inspections.

It has been suggested that vets make perfect inspectors. As a vet, I disagree. Most vets specialise in the area of practice that they go into. I last saw a horse in anger in 1969 or so, so patently it would be stupid to send me along to inspect a livery yard. Equally, a vet who has been in equine practice will not have the level of competence that they would need to inspect a dog-breeding establishment. It is true that they would have a view on welfare, but they would not have the specialist knowledge. That becomes even more important for the more exotic species, such as reptiles and so on. Even minor variations in some of those species can mean that they should be kept in quite significantly different ways.

The new situation in Scotland could parallel the zoo licensing legislation that is currently in place, which requires the minister at Westminster to keep a list that combines names of specialist veterinary surgeons who work in zoos and of senior keepers for specific species. For example, the reptile keeper at London zoo is probably a good inspector of reptiles in zoos and would be equally good at inspecting reptiles in pet shops and so on.

The Kennel Club largely agrees with the Dogs Trust that welfare inspectors need to be competent and trained to a certain standard. There might need to be some sort of national minimum qualification. I would not like to say what that qualification should be, as it should be for all animal welfare organisations to decide that rather than one that has a view on dogs specifically. Certainly, however, animal inspectors will need to be trained to a high standard if they are to know what they are dealing with.

I concur with my fellow panellists.

That was a highly efficient use of time, Mr Holmes.

I want to ask about the slaughter powers in part 1, which could be used to kill dogs in the event of an outbreak of rabies, although, obviously, there are other ways of controlling rabies, such as vaccination. Do those powers cause the panel anxiety? How might that part of the bill be addressed?

That part does cause us anxiety. I am old enough to remember the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. At that time, I was the chief veterinary officer for the RSPCA, so I was pretty intimately involved in all of the things that went wrong during that outbreak. It is now generally accepted that the contiguous cull during the epidemic was a mistake. It diverted resources away from what was important, which was killing infected animals quickly and disposing of them.

What concerns us most about the provisions in part 1 is that, if someone happens to have a dog that has been vaccinated against rabies and their next-door neighbour's dog contracts rabies and has been in direct contact with their dog, the authorities are allowed to come and kill their dog. That is an invitation for the person to smuggle their dog away, which, if, by chance, the dog is infected, will spread the infection even further. Rather than a power to destroy dogs that have had contact with infected dogs, we want control mechanisms to be put in place for a specified period—the dog could be muzzled and on a lead when it is out for a walk—until it is clear that the dog is not infected. It does not make sense to kill a vaccinated dog simply because it happens to live next door to one that has been infected.

You talked about a vaccinated dog that might get rabies, but if it is vaccinated—

It is extremely unlikely to get rabies, which is a good reason for not killing it. Without going into too much technical detail, I should say that the problem is that, from a blood test, it is impossible to tell the difference between a vaccinated dog and an infected one. Other than sitting and waiting to see whether a dog shows symptoms of rabies, we cannot tell whether it has the virus. The progress of the disease relates to where the virus has been picked up—it crawls up the nerves at 3mm a day. If somebody is bitten on their nose, they will die fairly quickly, but if they are bitten on their big toe, it will take some time for them to die. Therefore, we would have to lock up the dog for some time to be sure that it did not have rabies, but most responsible dog owners would far rather do that than have their dogs put down.

So you envisage quarantine restrictions.

Absolutely. I am thinking about house arrest, if you like, with a provision on control of the dog when it is outside the house.

I am not sure that I would like to be under house arrest with a dog that might have rabies.

That would be your choice but, under the bill as drafted, you would not have the choice: somebody would come and kill your dog, whether you liked it or not. That is our worry.

Do the other panellists have a view?

We agree with the Dogs Trust on that.

I agree with the Dogs Trust once again.

Peace breaks out again.

I have a question about dog fights and animal fights generally. The Scottish Kennel Club believes that section 21 is drafted too narrowly. Your submission asks

"the Executive to consider classifying as an offence the possession of anything capable of being used in connection with an animal fight with a view to its being so used and anything that has been used in connection with an animal fight."

Will you give examples of how you think the bill is inadequate? Will dog fights not be identified properly or will people not be correctly prosecuted?

I made that comment because we are worried about how many people could be prosecuted under section 21, given that animal fights, or certainly dog fights, do not last very long—they might last for only a couple of minutes. The bill implies that somebody must be caught in the act if they are to be prosecuted. However, we say that if a person does any preparation for an animal fight or possesses equipment that might have been used in a fight, it is almost certain that they will be or have been involved in a fight and they should be prosecuted. The provision should not be simply that people have to be caught observing a fight, because the fight will be over in a couple of minutes, whereas preparing for it might take a few weeks.

The bill states:

"A person commits an offence if the person … participates in making, or carrying out, arrangements for an animal fight (including allowing premises to be used for, or charging admission to attend, an animal fight)".

I presume that that provision covers somebody who has equipment, but we can clarify that with the minister. It seems as though a person does not have to be at a fight, because if a person has made arrangements for a fight, that would be an offence.

We would be grateful if that could be clarified. A further point that we would like clarified is whether it will be an offence to keep or train animals for the purposes of a fight or to train animals to be dangerous.

Section 21 states:

"A person commits an offence if the person … keeps or trains an animal for an animal fight".

The issue is how to prove that. The offence will exist; the question is how somebody would know that.

The Dogs Trust wants to take the provisions a little further. We believe that there is a direct parallel with child pornography.

Part of the profitability of dog fights is the sale of recordings. It is an offence to have possession of any child pornography—pictures or anything else—and we would like to see an exact parallel put in place for dog fights. That would get rid of the entire industry. If it was still possible to record dog fights and to sell the recordings, the business would still be possible. We would like to do away with the whole thing.

That is another specific point. Section 40 deals with animal fighting offences and the penalties for them. It says that proceedings may not be brought more than three years after the commission of an offence. Is that an appropriate time limit?

Yes.

Those were my extra questions.

The Kennel Club seemed to think that there should be no time limit on bringing proceedings in relation to animal fights.

That is why I asked.

I did not comment because since drafting our written submission, the Scottish Kennel Club has changed its position. I apologise. That is the only section that has changed. We understand from outside advice that three years should be long enough.

I thank the witnesses for putting their evidence in writing and answering questions for us. Some of the issues will also be discussed with other witnesses and with the minister.

At our next meeting on 21 December, we will hear from witnesses who have countryside interests and from organisations that are involved in the enforcement and regulation of the bill's provisions.

Meeting suspended.

On resuming—