The next item of business is evidence on a supplementary legislative consent memorandum on the Serious Crime Bill.
I welcome to the meeting the Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs, Paul Wheelhouse, and officials Craig McGuffie, who is from the Scottish Government’s directorate for legal services, and Jim O'Neill, who is senior legal services manager at the Scottish Prison Service. I also welcome Nigel Don, who is the convener of the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee, which I understand considered the LCM at its meeting earlier this morning.
I invite the minister to make a brief opening statement; then before the committee discusses matters, I will invite the convener of the DPLR Committee to tell us what happened at that committee’s meeting earlier.
Good morning. I thank the committee for giving me the opportunity to discuss the Government’s supplementary legislative consent memorandum in relation to amendments to the United Kingdom Parliament’s Serious Crime Bill.
I will begin by addressing the purpose and effect of the amendments to the bill. The bill was introduced in the House of Lords on 6 June 2014. The relevant amendments to the bill were announced by the UK Government during the bill’s second reading in the House of Commons on 5 January 2015, and were tabled at Westminster on 8 January. The amendments provide a regulation-making power for the Scottish ministers to make provision to confer on a court the power to order a communications provider to take action to prevent, or to restrict, the use of communications devices by persons who are detained in prisons or in young offenders institutions. Such action could include disconnecting unauthorised handsets and SIM cards that are held and used in prisons.
The unauthorised use of mobile phones in prisons presents a range of serious risks to the security of prisons and the safety of the public. They can be used to plan from behind bars escape or indiscipline, or to conduct serious organised crime, including drug imports and serious violence. The powers in the bill will help to deal with the challenging problem of illicit mobile phone use in prisons. They will support our commitment to tackling serious and organised crime as part of the “Letting Our Communities Flourish” strategy for tackling serious organised crime, which was published in 2009 on behalf of the serious and organised crime task force. Mobile telephone network operators support the bill and have told us that they welcome a clear legal instrument that compels them to act. The new power will provide that clarity.
The amendments to the bill will allow the Scottish ministers to make provision by regulations that will allow a court to make what will be known as telecommunications restriction orders, or TROs. A TRO will require a communications provider to take the action that is specified in the order for the purpose of preventing or restricting use of communications devices by people who are detained in prisons or in young offenders institutions.
The regulations must address a number of matters in relation to applications for a TRO: rights to make representations in response to an application, the granting of a TRO, the duration, variation and discharge of a TRO, and appeals against decisions that are made on an application for a TRO. Regulations that will be made under the new power may make provision on, among other things, the cost of complying with a TRO and legal expenses of the application process, and they may make exceptions from compliance with the TRO. The regulations may also make incidental, consequential, supplementary or transitional provisions. They will be subject to affirmative procedure.
I will set out the rationale for the LCM. Wireless telegraphy is a reserved matter under paragraph C10 of schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998. However, management of prisons is devolved. As the bill confers functions on the Scottish ministers, it is a “relevant Bill”, as defined in standing orders. As the UK bill has already been introduced, the LCM route offers a resource-efficient and timely legislative vehicle by which to confer the required powers.
We are committed to minimising the number of phones entering prisons, to finding phones that have got in, to blocking phones that we have yet to find and to removing them from the networks, thus rendering them worthless, and to stopping prisoners using phones to engage in criminal activities from prisons. That will help both the police and prison authorities to maintain the security of our prisons and the safety of our communities.
Parliament has previously considered and agreed an LCM in this policy area with regard to the Prisons (Interference with Wireless Telegraphy) Act 2012, which allowed the Scottish Prison Service to procure and install mobile signal denial technology in two pilot sites—HMP Shotts and HMP Glenochil. The technology was installed and operational by the end of the financial year 2013-14. The amendments that are covered by this LCM will help to bolster the policy that was previously agreed by the Scottish Parliament via the previous LCM.
The Justice Committee considered an LCM for the Serious Crime Bill on 2 December, when I gave evidence. The committee published its report on 10 December 2014, stating that it was content to support that LCM. The Scottish Parliament agreed to the LCM for the bill on 6 January 2015.
We recognise that the legislation is only the first step and that we will need to introduce regulations for Parliament to consider further how we will exercise the powers that have been introduced to the bill by amendment. The evolving technology, the location of the equipment, the type of equipment to be deployed and the opening up of more parts of the wireless spectrum are just some of the factors that need to be kept under consideration. However, the provisions and the ensuing regulations are another important key to tackling illicit mobile phone use in prisons and to keeping up to date our ability to respond.
We will continue to work with colleagues in the National Offender Management Service, Ofcom and the mobile network operators to ensure that the powers are exercised not only effectively but responsibly. I therefore ask the committee to support the legislative consent motion that has been laid before it. I am happy to answer questions.
This is just an evidence session, of course; we are not debating a motion.
Good morning, convener, minister and everyone else. The Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee considered the bill only this morning. Because of the time constraints that we are working in, we are unable to write to the committee, as we would have done normally, which is why I am here to discuss the issue. I am grateful for the opportunity to do so.
As the minister said, the new clause 11 will enable the Scottish ministers by regulations to confer on Scottish courts a power to make a telecommunications restriction order. The power will enable the Scottish ministers to create offences for breach of a telecommunications restriction order without specifying the maximum penalty that may be imposed for such an offence.
11:45In principle, the DPLR Committee considers that the delegated powers should not contain unlimited power to set penalties. Indeed, that committee expressed the same view in relation to the Tribunals (Scotland) Bill. My first question to the minister, therefore, is this: why has no maximum penalty been set as a matter of principle? What that penalty might reasonably be is, of course, a matter of policy, which is for the Justice Committee, but the principle is an issue that concerns the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee.
Perhaps I will just give you the full story, minister, and then you can come back to me on the matter. In addition, the LCM states that the new clause 11 will enable the Scottish ministers to make regulations that will confer on the sheriff court discretion, in making telecommunications restriction orders, regarding matters such as accessibility of court documents and proceedings, the holding of meetings in private and matters relating to proof in evidence.
It appears to the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee that the power is not drafted in a way that will enable such provision about court proceedings to be made, because the matters do not fall under the list of items in proposed new clause 11(3) and (4) on which regulations may make provisions. It therefore appears to the DPLR Committee that there is a discrepancy between the policy intention as stated in the LCM and the scope of the proposed power that appears in it. Moreover, I note that this kind of provision about court proceedings would normally be made under court rules rather than by ministers, because in general ministers do not have the power to do so.
I know that it is quite hard to take all that in, minister. I do not know whether you were listening in to the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee’s meeting this morning.
Indeed we were, convener, and I hope to be able to respond to the two points that Nigel Don has raised.
On the first point, which was about the lack of specification of a maximum penalty, although it would clearly have been preferable for that to have been included in the amendments, the decision to lodge them was taken by the UK Government at a very late stage of the bill’s passage. As a result, there has been less opportunity than we—and, I am sure, the UK Government—would have liked to make the provisions perfect.
It is, however, envisaged that breach of a telecommunications restriction order is likely to be prosecuted as contempt of court. Under section 15(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, the current penalty for contempt of court is up to two years’ imprisonment, or a fine, or both. However, in the sheriff court, the penalty for contempt of court is, in most cases, up to three months’ imprisonment or a fine of up to £2,500 or both. It is worth stressing that it is thought that the need for the court to impose such penalties will be rare, as this legislation is the preferred option of the communication providers and has been taken forward after consultation with them and at their request.
Further amendments will allow the Scottish ministers to make provision by subordinate legislation for enforcement of telecommunications restriction orders, which might include the creation of offences. It would therefore be open to ministers to create a bespoke offence of breaching a TRO and specific penalties for that offence, although the current intention is to rely on contempt of court as a means of enforcing TROs. Alternative means of enforcement, should they be considered necessary, are available to ministers. I hope that that tackles the point that the DPLR Committee has very fairly raised about the lack of specification of a maximum penalty at this stage.
Do you wish to respond to that, Mr Don?
I hear what the minister has said. With the greatest of respect to the present Government, regardless of its political hue, my committee is always concerned with looking beyond what the present Government thinks it will do and with ensuring that what we put in legislation is watertight. It is on that basis that my committee will always say that if you are going to create an offence about absolutely anything, the maximum penalty should be on the face of the bill.
That said, I have heard what the minister has said, and I see exactly why one might well want to prosecute breaches as contempt of court. That protocol already exists and is well understood.
As I understand it, it might very well be an interim position.
Indeed. It is open to ministers to create a specified offence, which might give more comfort to this committee and the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee.
Convener, would it be helpful if I addressed the second point that Mr Don raised?
Certainly.
On the discrepancy between the scope of the power and what the policy memorandum says about the accessibility of court documents and hearings, the early draft provisions contained regulation-making powers in relation to the accessibility of court documents, and to allow court hearings to be heard in private. The early draft LCM provided the general principles of the amendments, as no final provisions had been agreed and received.
The final provisions do not contain any power to allow court hearings to be held in private, as powers to regulate court procedures are already set out in section 32 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 and section 5 of the Court of Session Act 1988. The SPS has no plans to seek that a court exercise the powers in order to hold hearings in private, and it has been open about the deployment of technologies in HMP Shotts and HMP Glenochil and its intention to pilot mobile phone blocking technology.
I hope that that helps, convener.
We will move on to questions from members.
Good morning, minister. I have previously been very exercised about this issue for the very particular reason that in the town where I live, which contains the only prison in the region, houses are closer to the prison’s perimeter wall than I am to you, and I am very concerned about the intrusion that could happen. I note the pilot projects that have been mentioned, but I do not know whether you are in a position to reassure the committee about the standard of the phone blocking and intervention and the fact that, for example, many people rely on telecare.
Such issues are important. As Mr Finnie has pointed out, the two pilot projects are under way. The project at HMP Shotts has been implemented very successfully without any technical difficulties. I will invite my colleague Jim O’Neill to talk about the project at HMP Glenochil, where implementation has proved to be more difficult because of the need to ensure that the equipment does not interfere with external signals. The powers that we are discussing today would allow us potentially to use more mobile technology that would be easier to update as other technologies emerged and as 4G and 5G, for example, develop. The existing regulations do not allow us to deploy the technology to tackle those things, and the regulations that would be developed and the approach that would be taken to implementing the legislation would allow us to have, in a sense, more sophisticated technology that could be targeted at a particular part of a prison instead of our having to cover an entire prison simultaneously.
Jim O’Neill will explain the technical difficulties and challenges that we face in ensuring that the problem that Mr Finnie has fairly raised does not occur in practice.
If it is a technical issue, please make sure that I can understand it.
I will do my best, convener. The issue is fairly technical, so please forgive me if I stray off.
I reassure the committee and Mr Finnie that before the equipment is switched on it is tested by the centre for applied science and technology at the Home Office. That testing, which is part of the memorandum of understanding between Ofcom, the mobile network operators and the Scottish ministers, is very robust and involves a 10,000-point perimeter test of the prison to ensure that there is no interference outwith its perimeter; in other words, we check the perimeter of the prison at 10,000 points to ensure that there is no interference with the properties that are close by.
I want to share with the committee a very brief experience that I think demonstrates the commitment of those involved. During the testing at HMP Shotts, we found some interference creeping over the fence at a particular corner of the prison. It was happening on only one network, and before we tweaked the equipment, we looked at the properties in the area and found only one that was within, or could have been within, the reach of the interference. We visited the person in that property and when we asked them whether they had experienced interference on their mobile phones they told us, “None whatsoever.” The quite simple reason was that the network that was slipping over the prison perimeter was not the network that the person was on. From time to time, we find that sort of thing happening because of environmental conditions and what have you, but the interference is subject to a 10,000-point check, and to the satisfaction of the mobile network operators and Ofcom.
How would somebody know that their phone was being interfered with? Would they simply not be able to use it?
Yes. They would not be able to use their phone.
Would there be no signal?
They would have no signal.
That gives me zero reassurance. The way that somebody would know that their emergency alarm was not working would be if they fell and got no response.
Perhaps we can get more information on the pilot projects. Literally within a stone’s throw of the prison in the centre of Inverness, there are hundreds of properties and in many of them will be people who benefit from telecare. I am not a technical person. It may be that the intervention has no impact but I suspect that, given that it uses blocking technology, it has the potential to have an impact.
None of that is to suggest anything other than that I appreciate the significant threat that the possession of mobile phones by prisoners poses. We want to do everything possible to assist in eradicating that challenge to the Prison Service and people outwith the prison walls.
I take Mr Finnie’s point. To pick up on the points that Jim O’Neill made about the proactive nature of the checks, I stress that it will not be left entirely to chance for us to find out that the equipment is unintentionally interfering with someone’s phone. Rather, we will check proactively all the way round the perimeter, ensure that we identify any signals that might interfere with equipment and then find out where they come from. That is the process that was gone through at Shotts.
However, I entirely take the point and understand that members will want reassurance about the interests of their constituents who are around prisons that are juxtaposed with urban settlements. We propose that, as we develop the regulations that will implement the policy, we offer the committee an informal private discussion with technical officials so that members can explore and interrogate the issues in the level of detail that they wish. I believe that that was done previously in relation to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000—RIPSA—and human trafficking. That will offer the committee the chance to discuss with officials any technical questions that they have to ensure that they are ironed out in the regulations as they are implemented.
I am grateful, minister. That would be helpful. I appreciate that technology moves quickly and that equipment might come on the market that will make things easier.
I move on to other issues. You mentioned RIPSA. In paragraph 12(c) of the supplementary legislative consent memorandum, we are told that the UK act, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—RIPA—will be used to
“analyse the patterns of usage to establish that the phone is in use within a relevant institution”.
There is potential for collateral damage—or collateral interference—there as well, is there not?
My understanding is that, if the SPS made a request for a TRO to be implemented that necessitated getting mobile phone communications data from a mobile phone operator, that would be done via Police Scotland using RIPSA rather than RIPA. I appreciate that the drafting of the notes is perhaps not helpful in that respect, but that would be the case with the possible exception of an instance of terrorism. It would be unlikely that the individual in a terrorism case would be housed in Scotland, but there is a chance that they could be, so we will have to examine that and come back to you about under what circumstances, if any, RIPA would apply rather than RIPSA.
It is a perennial interest of mine, as you know, minister.
I appreciate that. To some extent, I had anticipated that question from Mr Finnie and asked the questions myself. I believe that the procedures, such as they are, would involve using Police Scotland to seek the data from the mobile phone operator and, assuming that Police Scotland did that, it would be done through RIPSA rather than RIPA. Unfortunately, that is not clear in the documentation that the committee has seen.
That might, indeed, be accurate and it is RIPSA rather than RIPA.
We are also told in paragraph 12(f):
“Scope to make provision within the body of an order about the circumstances in which a CP”—
that is, a communications provider—
“or person specified in the order must take steps to re-establish operation of the device—this is designed to deal with the scenario where it becomes clear an error has been made and the wrong phone has been disconnected.”
Will you explain a scenario in which the wrong phone could be disconnected?
There is a risk that a phone might be incorrectly identified and the signal shut down. We would need to correct that error. No specific examples have been given to me, but I ask Jim O’Neill to give an example; he is more familiar with the use of phones in the prison environment.
Not personally.
No, from a Scottish Prison Service perspective.
12:00
As the committee is aware, the pilot of this technology is going on at the two sites. So far we have found no evidence and have had no complaints about any phones being affected by the deployment of the technology.
The provisions are important because, in some way, they try to focus on what future technologies might do. Mr Finnie is correct to say that we need to put in place much greater safeguards to ensure that, where properties are in close proximity to a prison, there is no disproportionate interference or effect on mobile phones outwith the prison. The technology is challenging and complex. The powers envisage the possibility of such an effect and therefore provide an avenue of redress. However, the pilot indicates that there is little likelihood of such interference. There is an element of future proofing, so that people may take the technology into prisons that are in close proximity to communities and there is scope for errors.
Indeed, that scope is acknowledged among the LCM’s financial implications, which refer to the compensation that could be paid for erroneous disconnections.
To return to RIPA or RIPSA, minister, how would an individual know that they have been the subject of a disconnection under the provisions? They might just think that their phone is faulty. How would they know to follow up this process?
That is a good question. We have to bear in mind that any use of a mobile phone in prison is currently illegal; therefore they should perhaps not be expecting normal consumer rights to be observed—
Absolutely, but the scope of the provisions clearly goes beyond prisoners. I would say, for the avoidance of any doubt, that the provisions are salutary punishment for those responsible for breaching prison law. However, the provisions cover the community, and perhaps a community impact assessment would have been helpful.
I take Mr Finnie’s point. Obviously, there is a risk. This is an important issue that we would need to take forward to ensure that, as we develop the regulations, they are as watertight as possible in that respect.
As I understand it, if a clear-cut observation of a signal is being captured by the grabbing equipment in Shotts—or in Glenochil, if it were to be fully deployed there—and if we are absolutely sure that the signal is coming from within the prison and there is no risk of it being from outside or from someone who is visiting the prison who has their phone on them, the signal can be stopped without going through the process of getting the communications data from a mobile phone operator. A degree of triangulation can be used by going through the route and using RIPSA through Police Scotland to get communications data from the mobile phone operator to double check the pattern of use and whether it is consistent with the phone being used illegally within the prison, to ensure that we are certain that this is a bona fide case in which the phone needs to be shut down.
In many cases, we are not talking about conventional mobile phones. Jim O’Neill has conveniently brought one along: believe it or not, this is a mobile phone, although it looks very much like a Mercedes Benz key fob. That can be secreted on someone who has gone into prison, potentially in a body cavity—hopefully not this particular phone—and as it has a very low amount of metal within it the internal aerial is not particularly strong, it has a weak signal and it would be unlike a smartphone in terms of its ability to capture a network. In the confines of a prison, the limited range of the signal from something like this would probably make it quite easy to pick up, whereas it might be more difficult to isolate a more modern smartphone from other phones.
The LCM uses the phrase “patterns of usage”. What concerns me—we would ignore this at our folly, given the wider implications—is that we are talking about potentially widespread surveillance, and it is not clear to me what redress an individual would have if their mobile phone were blocked. I also do not know whether the technology will live up to our expectations. I am not suggesting that it will be a man walking about with an aerial, but the use of RIPA and RIPSA suggests not immediate action but some pre-planning. Indeed, that is the basis of the evidence that is to be provided to the courts—evidence that, I notice, will meet the civil standard of proof, not the criminal standard of proof.
There are existing provisions under which it is already an offence to be in possession of and to use a mobile phone in the prison system. If it were possible to identify that someone had a handset on them, they could be prosecuted through the existing procedures. The problem is that people hide these devices in prison and it is difficult to track them down. It is one thing to be able to identify that a signal is being received in a certain area of the prison, but it is another to be able to prove exactly who has the handset and to capture it at the time. The ability to shut down the signal to the phone is very important.
There are two approaches that we can take to the problem. If someone is caught in the act of using the phone, the existing procedures can be used to deal with that because it is an offence. However, we also need the ability to shut down a phone if we know that it is potentially being used. Mobile phones are almost like currency in jail, and if individuals have them that gives them a certain amount of power over their fellow inmates. However, we may not be able to track down the particular individual who is using a mobile.
I assure you, for a third time, that I have no issue with that. I would want that very strongly. However, the public require to be protected from inappropriate surveillance and inappropriate intrusion into their privacy, and that is what we have at the moment through the existing limitations of the blocking mechanisms.
I am just wondering about product placement, minister, in case somebody has a zoom lens focused on the phone that you are showing us.
There are other automobiles.
The point has been well made—even by showing us that little handset—that this is a vexing problem. It has been going on for a long time and it seems that the criminals are always one step ahead, with technology helping them through smaller SIM cards that can be passed round and handsets that look like anything but a handset. It is important to bear in mind that such technology allows them to continue the very behaviour for which they were put in prison. Therefore, I very much welcome the LCM as an attempt to reduce and, eventually, eliminate the illicit use of mobile phones in prison. Can you indicate the extent of the problem in the whole prison estate? Is it possible to assess how effective the pilot has been so far?
Certainly. I will give you some figures. There remains a challenge because the existing provisions have not fully dealt with the problem. In 2011, 959 mobile telephone handsets were found in Scottish prisons and more than 800 component parts of mobile phones—SIM cards and the like—were found. Phones are sometimes broken up, distributed and then reassembled for the purpose of making a call. In the six-month period to October 2014, after the implementation of the existing regulations relating to the previous measures that the committee oversaw, 135 mobile telephone handsets were found in Scottish prisons along with more than 170 component parts of mobile phones. If those figures are grossed up to annual figures, they show that there has been a substantial reduction in the number of phones and components that are being found.
The existing provisions are having some impact but—Margaret Mitchell is quite right—we need to keep up with and stay ahead of, where we can, the entrepreneurial activity of some prisoners in the custodial setting. With the advent of new mobile phone bandwidths, 4G and potentially, in the future, 5G and other generations of phones, we need to be alive to the innovation that is going into the devices and the more generic phones that are being brought into prisons.
We are realistic, in that other devices will have escaped detection. The Scottish Prison Service takes the issue extremely seriously, but I hope that I have given you a sense of scale regarding what the numbers were before the regulations came into force and what they are now. We need to keep ahead of where the prison community is going in terms of technology.
I have a practical question. When an issue has been identified and a court order is required to compel the communications provider to take action, how long is that likely to take?
Margaret Mitchell is quite right to ask about that. We will need to do some further work in that area. We need to speak to the Scottish Court Service to see what potential there is—particularly if there is concern about a serious crime that might be getting furthered through the use of a phone, or if there is a risk to public safety or to witnesses outside the prison system—to move very quickly. We will need to explore with the Scottish Court Service whether there is potential for expedited procedures to be used to ensure that, when necessary, we can take the first available opportunity to go through court and get that delivered.
I am happy to come back to the committee, in a private setting or through correspondence, to discuss how that might be taken forward.
That would be helpful.
I return to questions relating to the rights of communities living around prisons. Before you action the setting up of the 10,000-point perimeter check, would the public be the priority, or would security and governance be the priority?
It goes without saying—Gil Paterson and Mr Finnie are quite right to raise such issues—that we must take the protection of civil liberties extremely seriously and treat that as a very high priority. I would hope that that is a key consideration in implementing the technology.
Under our proposals, the ability to have more mobile technology that can be used within the prison, rather than potentially impacting on people outside the prison, will be helpful to us, and will perhaps minimise the risks of that happening.
I ask Jim O’Neill to explain the processes that we go through to ensure that we protect local communities, and to go beyond the original answer to Mr Finnie.
The minister is correct: the public are the priority. That is the key interest of Ofcom, which is responsible for regulating the wireless network.
Briefly, I return to Mr Finnie’s point about telecare and other services. The technology has no impact on those whatever. The technology operates only on the frequencies of mobile phones; it does not operate on or block any other frequencies.
Do you know that that is future proofed? The technologies could develop.
They could. However, Ofcom has oversight of the whole wireless spectrum, and it is aware of who is transmitting on the whole spectrum. Ofcom, as the principal regulator, needs to be satisfied that we are not interfering with parts of the wireless spectrum where we are not authorised to do so. The technology interferes only with those wireless signals that mobile phones use. That is key when it comes to public protection. Furthermore, the testing is to the satisfaction of the regulator of the wireless spectrum technology and to that of mobile network operators. They have the public interest at the core of their business.
I will add something for Mr Paterson’s benefit. The directions to prison governors are designed to limit interference outside prison. More importantly and pertinently, with reference to your concerns, Mr Paterson, and indeed yours, Mr Finnie, the technology must be switched off should it be proved that it is disproportionately causing interference outside the prison boundary.
How would you know?
Just a minute, John. I know that you are excited about this, and you are quite right, but let the minister continue.
As I think that Mr O’Neill has indicated, there is a memorandum of understanding between the Scottish ministers, UK ministers, Ofcom and communications providers, which guarantees that we continue to work constructively with them. The operators have at heart the interests of the wider community using their phones.
Clearly, the Government is also concerned to ensure that we do not impact on people where we can avoid doing so and that the powers are exercised effectively, proportionately and responsibly. It is not something that is done lightly—I want to put that on record—but we are talking about situations in which there may be a serious threat to public safety, so difficult decisions may have to be made. That is why it is important to have the ability to redress the situation should a phone prove to be incorrectly switched off, and to allow compensation for the impact that that has had on an individual.
12:15
My next question is about what right an individual has in the process. If this was approved and the scheme was in operation, could an individual make a complaint, have it investigated and get the phone brought back into use? Do people have a right to do that? Is that implicit?
The memorandum of understanding has that right within it now, and any member of the public can raise any concerns with their mobile network operator. The mobile network operators have agreed to work with us to explore whether that is a problem with their technology or with ours. The memorandum of understanding already provides that opportunity for people to raise concerns and make complaints, but we would be equally delighted if they approached us and we would be happy to investigate.
In those circumstances, how do you let people know that? People do not always read leaflets that are put through their doors; I presume that you do that if you are implementing the procedure in a community in the vicinity of a prison. How do you engage with people and explain how they can get in contact if something funny happens with their mobile phone? Stuff comes through the door all the time, but people might not read your leaflet because they might think that it is for a furniture sale or something. How do you give people a simple list? They may think that they have run out of money or that somebody has blocked their phone.
That is an important point and I will ask Jim O’Neill to explain what we already do. If the committee has any concerns about communication with local communities around prisons, I am happy to look sympathetically at how we engage with people and ensure that they are aware of their rights and know how to go about fixing any problems that arise. As Mr Finnie pointed out, the procedures for contacting a communications provider are set out in paragraph 12(f) of the paper on the legislative consent motion.
Yes, but how do you tell people in advance?
I certainly agree that that would be a sensible thing to do to ensure that local communities are aware that there might be a problem.
I was going to say that you could send them a text, but that is no good to someone if their phone is not working.
Jim O’Neill will explain what we currently do and what was done in advance of the problems at Shotts and Glenochil.
That is an important point. The key thing that the SPS did, contrary to the approach that was taken down south, was to make that public. Indeed, the former Cabinet Secretary for Justice visited one of the sites where we were piloting the technology, so information about where the technology was being deployed was already in the public domain. It received some fairly significant coverage in the local press in the area and in the national press. One key way in which we made the public aware that it was happening was to take a different approach to that taken down south by actually publicising the fact that we were deploying the technology.
Did you also put something through people’s doors? Not everybody gets the local papers.
No, we did not. We said quite openly, “We’re going to do this here in this place.”
People do not all read the papers or watch television. I have a neighbour who does not have a television. Can you not simply go door to door saying, “Here is a note telling you that if problems are happening it may be because of this”?
That would be entirely fair. We can come back to the committee on that.
It is belt and braces, but it could be useful.
I agree that we need to consider what to do if there is a concern. Mr Finnie has identified a prison where there might be a concern of that nature, and it is not unreasonable to let people know how they can go about identifying whether deployment of the technology has had an impact on their signal, and that they should communicate with their service provider, who will know whether that signal has been switched off—it will be specific to a phone and to a SIM card—and can take steps to restore the service to anybody who is not an inmate.
There could be no complaint if you did that, because you would be taking reasonable steps.
It is important to ensure that people are comfortable with what we are doing.
That is fine. Thank you very much. That concludes the evidence session, and I thank the minister and his officials. We shall consider our draft report on the LCM at our next meeting. I thank Nigel Don for coming to explain why we have that committee whose new name I can never remember.
12:20 Meeting continued in private until 12:49.