Justice 1 Committee, 05 Dec 2001

Meeting date: Wednesday, December 5, 2001

Official Report 299KB pdf

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Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill: Stage 1

Item 4 on the agenda is the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill. I see that Mr Jim Wallace is waiting in the wings. I welcome the minister to the meeting. With him are Geoff Owenson of the constitution and parliamentary secretariat of the Scottish Executive, and Keith Connal, who is head of the freedom of information unit. Thank you for attending, gentlemen. I believe that Mr Wallace wishes to make a short opening statement.

It will be very short, convener. Thank you for this invitation to give evidence on the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill in support of the committee's stage 1 scrutiny of the general principles of the bill. You have already mentioned Keith Connal and Geoff Owenson; I am also joined by Robbie Kent, who is also from the Scottish Executive justice department. All the officials have been very involved in the detailed preparation of the bill and might be familiar to committee members.

I understand that previous evidence sessions have been stimulating. A number of important issues have been focused on in particular, such as class exemptions, the absence of a purpose section, and ministerial overrides. I hope that my answers to members' questions will be helpful.

Thank you minister—that was short and sweet.

I would like to talk about the purpose section—or the lack of it. We have heard evidence to the effect that having a purpose section could play an important role in setting the tone of the legislation and in making its spirit clear, which would ensure that the proposed freedom of information regime was supported by a culture of openness. There is a fear that, although the bill might be passed, nothing much will change because people will not have signed up to the idea, which will mean that the culture will stay the same. How will you ensure that not including a purpose section does not defeat the aims of the bill? Do not you feel that a purpose section is necessary?

I had an open mind on whether to include a purpose section and I gave careful consideration to the idea. It was only in the final stages of putting the bill together that I concluded that a purpose section was unnecessary and, as I will explain, perhaps even inappropriate.

Section 1(1) of the bill states:

"A person who requests information from a Scottish public authority which holds it is entitled to be given it by the authority."

That is a very simple statement of the principal right that is established by the bill. It is a statement of purpose—so, in that respect, the bill does have a purpose section. I accept Maureen Macmillan's point about culture. We were not sure about the effect that inclusion of a purpose section might have and we wondered how it would affect the balance between the right of access, exemptions, harm tests and—in particular—the functions and powers of the commissioner.

I have made it clear that the bill takes us only so far. The culture is important and a change to that culture will not necessarily be achieved by words in a bill because such a change must be driven from the top. We have made clear the Executive's objective of encouraging openness and accountability.

A key part of the process will be the work of the commissioner, whose role will not simply be that of arbiter in cases in which applicants are dissatisfied with a refusal from a public authority. Much of the day-to-day work of the commissioner will be to foster and nurture a much more open regime. As time passes, that will allow the culture of openness to be refreshed and it will allow us to take account of changing circumstances. The alternative is the danger that, in future, words that are set in statute might be interpreted by courts in such a way that we would be, in effect, stuck in one time.

Those are warm words, but how will you put those ideas into effect? You say that the commissioner will foster a culture of openness, but how will that happen? Will there be training for public bodies?

Yes—very much so. A working group was established in February this year, which includes representatives of various Scottish Executive departments and other public bodies that will be involved with the proposed legislation. That group has met on a number of occasions and one of its main tasks is to prepare the ground for training to ensure that the culture is right when the resultant act comes into force. The group includes the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, the health trusts, the Scottish Environment Protection Agency and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland.

When I went to Ireland and met the commissioner and the minister who have responsibility for freedom of information there, the message that was clearer than any other was about the importance of training public officials. That is something that we have put in train and that will continue to develop with—no doubt—increasing pace the closer we get to the legislation's being implemented. Training is an important aspect of the process for the Executive and the public authorities.

Members should also note the references to the Scottish information commissioner in sections 42 to 46 of the bill, which make it clear that the commissioner will ensure that good practice is disseminated. Indeed, the commissioner's work will encourage a culture of openness that I hope we all want to see.

It was interesting that the minister referred to discussing freedom of information with the commissioner in Ireland. Last year, the Canadian commissioner who is responsible for freedom of information through the Canadian Access to Information Act 1985 was in Scotland and he stated that, after some 15 years, the greatest challenge that they faced was changing the culture of secrecy. Like Maureen Macmillan, I think that there have been lots of warm words in the minister's evidence, but I am not convinced that they will provide us with a way to change that culture of secrecy and to ensure that the bill is effectively implemented.

The minister mentioned Ireland. Given that there are other countries that have considerable experience in the matter, what lessons have you learned from Ireland about changing a culture of secrecy?

I was impressed by how training in Ireland generally tries to change the culture of secrecy. Ireland has a strong freedom of information act and it also has a strong commissioner. The combination of those two factors has helped.

New Zealand is the other country with which I have had discussions and which I have considered in more detail. I was impressed by the work of New Zealand's ombudsman—as they call him, rather than commissioner—who deals with freedom of information.

The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill will generate its own commissioner case law, which will help because public authorities will need to have regard to what emerges from case law. Returning to Ireland for a moment, I think that I am right in saying that the Irish commissioner took the view in the early stages that it was better to take time in determining some of the cases that were referred to him—even allowing a backlog to build up—because he knew that his decisions on those cases would be influential in how the Irish act operated. Public authorities could use his decisions as guidance, which would mean that he would not get the same request time and again because it would be clear to public authorities that the commissioner would rule in a particular way. A strong commissioner is important.

In New Zealand, it was drawn to my attention that the worldwide web was being used by government departments proactively to put information into the public domain. In fact, those departments and their ministers—it was often the minister who took most responsibility for the matter—which sought proactively to put most information into the public domain were usually the departments about which there were the fewest complaints or referrals to the ombudsman. I hope that ministers in Scotland and other public bodies in Scotland will note that by being proactive they can reduce the number of times that they will be subject to challenge.

Members will also be aware that there will be publication scheme provisions for our bill that will place an onus on public authorities to publish what they are doing to promote openness and accessibility to information.

In linking our discussion to the culture of openness programme, I want the committee to move on to two matters that appear from the evidence that we have heard to mitigate against that culture. Those are class exemptions—which seem substantial—and ministerial certificates.

Donald Gorrie wanted to ask questions on ministerial certificates. That ties in with my question. We have a letter from the freedom of information unit that refers to the minister's experience in New Zealand and Ireland with regard to ministerial certificates. We are all very much in favour of a robust freedom of information bill, but class exemptions and ministerial certificates are, I am sure that the committee would agree, matters for concern. The letter says that, in Ireland, three certificates

"have been issued since the Act came into force in 1998".

In your initial submission you said that such certificates were used very rarely and that you could think of no examples. I am taken aback to learn that three certificates have been issued in Ireland in that time.

Secondly, I am concerned that you have not been able to obtain information on the use of ministerial certificates in New Zealand. The letter states:

"There is a particular difficulty in obtaining information on the use of Ministerial certificates in New Zealand because these relate to events between 1982 and 1987."

The letter is dated 30 November. Are you any further forward on that? Have we got any information from other countries that have freedom of information regimes and which use ministerial certificates?

The two regimes to which the convener refers are relevant because the ministerial certificate is a feature of both cases. It is important not to isolate the ministerial certificate—it is part of a package and the overall package is balanced in terms of openness. The fact that the harm test specifies "substantial harm" decisively favours those who seek information. The fact that the commissioner has the power to order disclosure, rather than simply to make a recommendation, is an important part of the overall scheme. It is against that background that one should consider the ministerial certificate.

In Ireland, the ministerial certificate precludes consideration of an appeal by the commissioner. In other words, the commissioner would never get the opportunity to consider whether the public interest test has been met. In Scotland, the commissioner would be able to determine that. It should be kept in mind that the ministerial certificate applies after a determination by the commissioner in only six classes out of 17.

I recall that I claimed that it was in New Zealand, rather than in Ireland, where the ministerial certificate override had never been used since the change in 1987. In Ireland, there have been three ministerial certificates, each of which has been signed by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. The first certificate was issued in respect of a freedom of information request for records relating to a joint Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Garda Siochana implementation and strategy group, which was considering enhanced co-operation between the Garda and the police authorities in Northern Ireland. The second certificate concerned requests for records relating to a review on the continuing need for a special criminal court. The third concerned records relating to telephone intercepts. They all fell within the category of justice and security matters.

I understand those points. I am talking not about the earlier use of the ministerial certificates, but about the final veto—the equivalent of the First Minister's certificate. That is the contentious matter.

I know. I was trying to put the matter into context. Ireland is often held up as an example of a country that has a robust freedom of information regime—you referred to that in your question, convener—but there, there is an option for ministerial intervention even before the commissioner can make a judgment. I argue that our system will be stronger in its openness, because such matters would go through the commissioner and would become the subject of a ministerial certificate only subsequent to that consideration.

We are still seeking detail from New Zealand on the number of ministerial certificates that it issued between 1982—when the legislation came into force—and 1987. During that period, certificates could be issued by individual ministers. After 1987 a veto, or ministerial certificate, could be issued only with the collective agreement of the Cabinet. There has been no use of ministerial certificates since they became a collective responsibility. That was the case when I was in New Zealand last December and I am not aware of any case of their use since. In the five years prior to 1987, there were a number of cases in which individual ministers issued veto certificates. We are still trying to get details of those cases.

The scheme that we have chosen involves collective responsibility; it would not be a matter for a justice minister or an environment minister to issue a certificate.

There is no collective responsibility. Section 52(2) uses the phrase "after consulting", which is not the same thing as collective responsibility.

The intention is that collective decisions will be made by ministers. When I appeared before the committee during consultation on the bill, I remember explaining that, if we were to use the phrase "Scottish ministers", the structure of the Scotland Act 1998 would lead to the very situation that we want to avoid—namely, that of individual ministers making decisions. We have tried to take account of concerns and to find a form of words that will mean that collective decisions will be made by ministers. That was our policy intent, but the committee might wish to say in its report that it does not believe that we have achieved that policy intent. If that is the case, we will reconsider the matter. However, I assure the committee that much thought was given to finding the best way of reducing to words in statute the policy intent that the issuing of certificates should be a collective decision of the Cabinet and not simply a decision of either the First Minister alone or of other individual ministers.

The minister will recall the Scott inquiry into arms to Iraq, during which it was alleged that the use of ministerial certificates had been abused. Will the Deputy First Minister confirm that he has no intention of using ministerial certificates in that way?

I think that you are asking about public interest immunity certificates, which I believe arose during the Scott inquiry. PII certificates deal only with withholding documents from courts, for which there is a higher test. I do not think that anyone would ever expect ministers to give a blanket denial that would affect for all time the discretion of other ministers. However, such considerations have nothing to do with the bill; we are talking about something totally different. In two and a half years, there has never been a suggestion of our coming anywhere near a PII certificate.

We took evidence from journalists and from David Shayler, who believed that ministerial certificates should not be used under any circumstances. During emergencies or very important criminal investigations, or if intelligence emerged that led you to understand that a very serious crime was about to be committed, could ministerial certificates be used?

I am not sure that we are talking about the same thing. If we are talking about someone applying for information that, if released, could assist in dealing with a crime that our intelligence told us was about to be committed, I would rather hope that the commissioner would take that into account. Initially, that information would be refused as being exempt if it were about to prejudice a continuing investigation. If the information found its way to the commissioner, who then said that the information should be disclosed—for whatever reason—and ministers took the view that that disclosure would prejudice a crime operation that might be about to take place, that might be a circumstance in which the minister might override the commissioner's decision.

Although national security is a reserved matter, since 11 September ministers have been involved in the civil contingencies committee at Whitehall, which has been putting emergency planning procedures into operation. Therefore we have sensitive information, albeit that national security is a reserved matter.

Would it be correct to say that ministerial certificates operate as a safeguard for the public interest? If they were removed altogether, would that safeguard be removed?

That is one of the reasons why we have that override power. Ultimately, in the six exemption categories, the question of public interest would be determined by ministers. It is unlikely to happen, but the safeguard exists. Of course, ministers would be accountable to the Parliament for exercise of such an override power.

We will appoint a worthy commissioner who is distinct and separate from all the public authorities and in whom everyone must have trust. However, as the bill stands, there is a problem with section 52 in that only one public body—Scottish ministers—will be able to say that it does not care what the commissioner says. Ministers will use the power of veto under section 52, and will issue a certificate and say that information cannot be disclosed. It is difficult to understand why we will have an independent commissioner operating with all the information before him, but with ministers telling the commissioner why information should not be disclosed. If the commissioner took the view that information should be disclosed, the First Minister could then use his veto. That detracts from the idea of freedom of information. It also introduces to a situation the politics and political views of the First Minister and his cabinet colleagues, which could place further pressure on the operation of the veto. That is why I am concerned about section 52.

I understand and acknowledge that concern. I argue strongly that the scheme and the provisions of the bill are consistent with an approach that is considered to be appropriate and necessary in other countries that have freedom of information regimes, which are widely recognised as being strong and progressive.

We consider it appropriate that the bill contains limited provision—it applies only to six categories of information out of seventeen—that allows ministers to take a final decision on whether sensitive exempt information should be disclosed in the public interest. Ministers will be accountable to Parliament for such decisions. It is not a political reality that we would just toss aside the commissioner's view. Were such a situation to arise, it is inevitable that ministers would use the power only after giving their utmost consideration to the gravity of the information involved. For that, we would be accountable to members of the Parliament. Whether sensitive information should be disclosed in the public interest should be determined by ministers.

You mentioned being accountable to Parliament. Section 52(3) states that you will lay a copy of the certificate before Parliament and give notice of the reasons for the opinion that has been formed. However, in giving those reasons, the section states:

"except that the First Minister is not obliged to provide information under paragraph (b) if, or to the extent that, compliance with that paragraph would necessitate the disclosure of exempt information."

I suspect that we are not going to be told very much.

If you think about it for a moment, you will realise that we could not disclose the exempt information.

Of course not. That makes sense.

You are therefore saying that ministers will be able to lay a certificate before Parliament that says that information will not be disclosed because disclosure is not in the public interest. That is what we will be told and we will just have to believe it.

I know the convener's parliamentary skills well enough that I do not think for one minute that she would let such a certificate lie. The convener would not just put her hands up and say, "You must be right." A considerable amount of probing and challenging of such certificates would come, not only from the Opposition, but from—

The media.

It would come from the media, but it would also come from the back benches of the Executive parties. For that reason, ministers would not undertake lightly such a course of action. It might well be for those reasons that ministers in New Zealand have never taken that action.

I caution the minister, because he appears to be at one with the Conservative party over the need for a ministerial veto. When the Conservatives were in Government, they were not forthcoming in providing information to the public. I do not know whether that comes as a comfort to him.

It should come as a comfort that I want to protect the police's criminal investigations.

Let me take the issue further. It is easy to use the example of criminal investigations—I am sure that the public interest test would apply in such cases. You referred to Ireland and New Zealand. How many countries that have freedom of information legislation in place have a ministerial veto?

I cannot give an answer off the top of my head. However, countries that do not have ministerial vetoes might have other checks and balances in the system, which remove the need for a ministerial veto.

We are getting bogged down in a debate about the systems in New Zealand and Ireland. Although those two systems have a ministerial veto, they are exceptions. However, the Executive wants to introduce a system that has a ministerial veto. The American and Canadian systems, for example, do not have ministerial vetoes. Why have you chosen to take the route of the exception rather than the norm?

There is no need for a veto in the United States system because there is no commissioner to be overruled.

There is a good public interest test system.

Freedom of information cases in the United States are pursued through the courts, which is expensive and time consuming. In many respects, our system will be more accessible to the public than is that of the United States. Every country puts together its own scheme and we looked around and borrowed ideas when we thought it useful. We have what is widely acknowledged to be a robust scheme. It includes a substantial harm test and gives the commissioner the right to make decisions—not recommendations—that can be implemented. Furthermore, the commissioner will be independent and appointed by the Parliament, not by the Executive.

Those are key parts of a robust freedom of information system. In a limited number of cases that involve very sensitive information, we have reserved the power for ministers collectively to present a certificate to override the system. That is one of the checks and balances. Whatever scheme one considers, one finds checks and balances throughout it. I believe that our system—taken as a whole and including the ministerial override certificate—is decisively tilted in favour of openness and the applicant. The circumstances in which the ministerial override certificate will apply are limited. In the ultimate analysis, consideration of what is in the public interest in relation to sensitive information should be for ministers, who are accountable to Parliament.

I do not believe that you have achieved the correct balance. On the one hand, there is the public harm test, which is predicated on a requirement for good evidence that shows that the publication of the information might cause the public harm—

Substantial harm.

Yes, substantial harm.

You were being loose with your words, Mr Matheson.

The public harm test requires substantial harm, but it is predicated on a requirement for information to be provided. On the other hand, there are the class exemptions and the ministerial veto. Given that the bill includes the substantial prejudice measure and the public harm test, why do you need what appears to be the sledgehammer approach of the ministerial veto and the wide-ranging class exemptions? There is no balance.

I believe that the balance exists. Many objective commentators have said that the proposed scheme ranks highly in terms of its openness and robustness in promoting freedom of information. You mentioned class exemptions, but the public interest can override them. That is a matter for the commissioner to determine in every case. For six of the 17 categories of information, ministers have a residual power to present a certificate to overrule requests. That power is very limited and in your description of it, you omitted to say that the public interest could override the class exemptions. That should not be overlooked. There will be an independent commissioner who will not be appointed by ministers. All those things stack up.

In order to try to get the balance right, we are saying that in the ultimate analysis—in those areas that, as Lord James suggested, might relate to intelligence that could be useful to criminals—ministers should make decisions in the public interest. That process should, of course, be subject to parliamentary accountability.

It is interesting that you make reference to information that might have an impact on security, because the evidence that we received from the police did not indicate that that was their primary concern. They felt that the checks in the system would provide sufficient protection for any live investigations.

I agree entirely with that.

The police were referring not to the ministerial veto, but to substantial prejudice.

With respect, you have become so obsessed by the ministerial veto—

I do not think that we need it.

You ignore the fact that most matters would never get anywhere near the ministerial veto, because of the scheme that we have adopted.

That is exactly why we should not have the veto.

The veto is only for exceptional cases—such as have never arisen in New Zealand in 14 years—in which ministers might take the view that the public interest would not be served by releasing particular information into the public domain. I think that Michael Matheson can rest in his bed at night, safe in the knowledge that the scheme is well balanced. As he rightly said, the police indicated in their evidence that they were content with the general scheme. We are talking about some very exceptional circumstances, so it might well be proper to apply the ministerial veto in those circumstances.

I bring in Donald Gorrie to pursue the ministerial veto and—as we have touched on it—class exemptions. Paul Martin will follow.

Most of the people who have spoken to us accept that the bill is a huge step forward, that it is well intentioned and that there is good will among those who are promoting it. However, many of the bodies that seek information have lived with an atmosphere of civil service secrecy for many years, so they retain residual suspicions.

One witness gave evidence to us of a recent analogous case in London. Although the Home Secretary promised in a debate that there was no reason to use an exemption certificate to prevent the release of factual and background information, the Westminster Government overruled the parliamentary ombudsman and refused to give out factual information, because it thought that the information would be embarrassing to ministers. Many people fear that when the Government makes mistakes—mistakes that would be revealed by information—the law will be used to reduce its embarrassment.

On factual information for ministers, I understand that in Ireland exemptions cannot be used to withhold factual and statistical information or its analysis; to withhold scientific or technical expert advice or opinion; to withhold the reasons for a decision that was taken by an authority; or to withhold a study into an authority's effectiveness. Would it be possible to remove some of the class exemptions or to broaden the provision that allows merely for the release of statistical information? Can you comfort us by improving the bill so that it is not merely a vehicle for avoiding ministerial embarrassment?

Mr Gorrie has asked a question with many parts. I hope that I have remembered them all. I do not doubt that he will let me know if I omit to answer any parts.

I acknowledge the underlying premise of the question. We have said during the meeting that for far too long a culture of secrecy has pervaded most of the public service. Like an oil tanker, the situation cannot be turned round immediately. Changes have been made; I have seen them myself. Mr Gorrie can be assured that every encouragement will be given for that to continue. I have mentioned some of the things that we are doing to promote change.

Many of the problems that have been identified require, to some extent, an act of faith. I had a meeting yesterday morning with Friends of the Earth Scotland to discuss some of its specific concerns. We found that we often agreed on the end point that we wanted to achieve, but the words "act of faith" came up several times. It will be difficult for many people to have such faith for some time until the change in culture manifests itself. That is the background. I assure the committee again that efforts are being made to try to ensure that we change that culture of secrecy.

The Robathan case in Westminster is distinct from what we are discussing here on one or two important fronts. In that case there was a recommendation on a code of practice, which was not part of the statutory regime. It was not a ruling or a determination, but a recommendation by the ombudsman. Distinctions can be made.

I can readily understand why the suspicion that the veto would be used to cover Government embarrassment exists, but there are in the scheme as it stands enough checks and balances to make it difficult for a Government that was seeking merely to hide embarrassment to get away with that. The class exemptions, other than the technical measures, are subject to a public interest test. I would not consider saving a minister from embarrassment as being in the public interest and I hope that a robust independent commissioner would take the same view.

Mr Gorrie asked about statistics. Section 29(2) of the bill uses the words:

"Once a decision as to policy has been taken".

I want to make it clear—this has been raised in the past—that "a decision" means a decision to go ahead or not to go ahead. It could be a decision not to do something, which can be as relevant a decision as one to go ahead with a project. Section 29 (2) continues by saying that

"any statistical information used to provide an informed background to the taking of the decision is not to be regarded, for the purposes of"

that exemption

"as relating to the formulation or development of the policy in question; or … as relating to Ministerial communications."

I refer the committee to section 2(1)(b) on the effect of exemptions. It says:

"To information which is exempt information by virtue of any provision of Part 2, section 1 applies only to the extent that— …

(b) in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in disclosing the information is not outweighed by that in maintaining the exemption."

Section 29(3) states:

"the Scottish Administration must have regard to the public interest in the disclosure of factual information which has been used, or is intended to be used, to provide an informed background to the taking of a decision."

The exemption does not preclude disclosure of statistics or facts. Statistics are not exempt after the decision has been made and the factual background relating to Government policy can be withheld only if it is in the public interest to do so. If there were a refusal to disclose the information, it would be subject to an appeal to the commissioner. I also want to draw the committee's attention to section 23(3)(a)(ii), which relates to the publication schemes. It states:

"In adopting or reviewing its publication scheme the authority must have regard to the public interest in—

(a) allowing public access to information held by it and in particular to information which— ….

(ii) consists of facts, or analyses, on the basis of which decisions of importance to the public have been made by it".

In regard to an individual request and the general approach that a public authority must adopt when it brings forward its publication scheme, there is a decisive tilt in favour of the publication of facts and analyses.

On creating the right sort of climate, it has been pointed out to the committee that, although there is a measure for dealing with individual cases in which a public body does not give information—which would allow for that body to be taken to court—there is no general provision. One could imagine a situation in which some errant quango, council body or whatever was consistently as laggardly as possible in providing information and produced it only to stay out of court. Would it be possible to include in the bill a section that would give the commissioner some power over such bodies—for example, by allowing him to send in a member of his staff to see how the body operated? Life proceeds on a basis of whip and carrot—there should be some sort of general whip as well as whips for individual issues.

I do not think that we need a specific statutory provision for that, because the functions of the commissioner are both general and specific. They are specific in that the commissioner can deal with an appeal in relation to a specific application. Also, as the provisions in the bill relate to the general functions of the commissioner, the commissioner has considerable power to promote good practice. For instance, he or she has specific powers of entry and inspection under schedule 3. The commissioner also has quite wide powers to make recommendations concerning good practice. Section 44(1), for example, states:

"If it appears to the Commissioner that the practice of a Scottish public authority"—

which could be the recalcitrant quango—

"in relation to the exercise of its functions under this Act does not conform with the code of practice … the Commissioner may give the authority a recommendation".

There are provisions in section 44 for practice recommendations that will specify the steps that the commissioner thinks that

"the authority ought to take to conform."

I stress that the commissioner does not have to wait for a specific complaint from a member of the public, a public body or a dissatisfied applicant before initiating proceedings against an authority. If he or she is aware that there is a general malaise or that enforcement notices are being breached, the commissioner can step in and, if the prescribed steps are not taken, the commissioner can then ask the Court of Session to find the authority in contempt of court. I think that that is a pretty robust set of provisions.

We were concerned that there were no penalties. However, action would take the normal route of finding an authority in contempt of court.

Yes—the provisions allow the courts to hold a public body in contempt in certain circumstances.

The convener raised a point about the process that will be followed for the submission of exemption certificates that are laid before Parliament. One of the concerns that were expressed by the National Union of Journalists related to the "practicable" period that is mentioned in the bill. The bill states that a certificate will be laid before Parliament "as soon as practicable". Could that be made more specific in the bill? The NUJ's concern was that a story could be killed off during that "practicable" period. Why would we want to include that term in the bill?

It is a term that appears often in bills and is more pressing than "in due course". However, I am happy to consider whether that could be tightened up.

I would like to ask a very general question. What information does the bill make available that is not currently available?

The bill applies to certain groups that the code for access does not cover, such as the police, the national health service and schools. The simple answer is that the bill makes all information available. At the moment we have a code and recommendations; the bill will establish a statutory right.

It has been brought to the committee's attention that the codes of practice that will be issued will be important. I know that there must be consultation about the codes, but will the codes be available to the committee—even in draft form—when we reach stage 2?

I think that that is the intention. Mr Connal has indicated that the codes will be available during stage 2.

Thank you.