Official Report 413KB pdf
Agenda item 2 is our final evidence session on the Regulatory Reform (Scotland) Bill. I welcome the Minister for Environment and Climate Change, Paul Wheelhouse; he can introduce his staff. If you wish to make an opening statement, minister, that will be fine.
Thank you very much, convener. Good morning, committee.
Thank you, minister. We will kick off with some questions about the term “sustainable economic growth”. Where did it originate? Does it mean economically sustainable growth, or economic growth within the limits of ecological and social sustainability?
We have a definition of sustainable economic growth, which the Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Employment and Sustainable Growth highlighted in a written answer on 20 November last year:
Although there might not be a need for a definition in part 1, we might need to have some clarity later on. We have to tease out a little further your intention in using the term. Does it give extra weight towards economic growth in policy decisions, or is it a subset of sustainable development?
As I said earlier, one of the key things that we want to achieve with the bill is greater transparency. As I stated in my opening statement, regulators such as SEPA already have to take economic issues into consideration to a degree when making decisions.
Okay. Claudia Beamish wants to come in on that point.
Good morning, minister. I would like to pursue that issue a little further. Would the purpose and effect of the bill change significantly if it included a duty to contribute to achieving sustainable development rather than a duty to contribute to achieving sustainable economic growth?
That is a fair point. The point that I would make—this also deals with an aspect of the convener’s question that I did not answer—is that although sustainable development and sustainable economic growth are clearly related principles, they are distinct concepts. I take the point about the social and environmental aspects of sustainable development being less explicit in the definition of sustainable economic growth that I read out earlier.
It might help to look specifically at section 38 of the bill and the new general purpose for SEPA, because that brings together the various concepts. When we gave evidence to the committee two weeks ago, we had a look at section 38, which provides that SEPA’s primary purpose is
As well as providing guidance, we will improve the tools that are available to make decisions about the link between economic and environmental matters with the welcome introduction, albeit that it is early days, of the natural capital index and evolving an approach in terms of ecosystem services. We are gaining an understanding of what environmental investments can deliver in terms of economic gain, and vice versa in terms of what economic investment can deliver for the environment. That will help not only those who promote projects but regulators to understand better the links between the economy and environmental issues.
I am still puzzled, so I wonder whether you can help me to understand why, if sustainable development will be defined in guidance, it is not included in the bill. I think that understanding that might help to reassure a number of stakeholders who have made comments.
I take the point that perhaps an explicit link is lacking, although George Burgess has explained that we feel that some aspects of the bill already collectively deliver the outcome that Claudia Beamish seeks. I do not want to lose sight of the importance of having consistency and line-of-sight issues delivered by explicitly bringing into the bill the purpose of sustainable economic growth. There has been a focus on sustainable economic growth because it is one of the Government’s overarching purposes. There is a clear link between the Government’s economic strategy and the regulators that interact with the economic community.
The reference to sustainable development is already in the Environment Act 1995. We do not need to refer to it in the bill, because it is already in the statute.
Is it in section 20 of the 1995 act?
I think that it is in a section that is up in the 30s.
You could remind us in writing of what section it is in.
We will get back to you on that point, convener.
I have a point on George Burgess’s comment about section 38 and the duty for SEPA, and the helpful hierarchy that puts the environment first, with the other two aspects being subordinate to that. I put it to the minister that it might help us—and, perhaps, many of those from whom we have already heard—if the general duties in the bill took a similar hierarchical approach. One of the points about sustainable economic growth is that we are not sure whether the environment or the economy comes first. My impression is that you feel that the environment comes first. If that position, which is explicitly stated in section 38, was stated as the general tenor of all the other duties for the other regulators, that would to an extent overcome our problem with what the words mean. I do not think that the problem is actually in the words; the problem is in knowing what they mean and what the hierarchy of duties is.
That is a reasonable point, but as I am not the lead minister for the bill, I can only take that back to Fergus Ewing to see whether there is an approach that he can find to accommodate that concern. However, it is worth stating that, in terms of the environmental regulators, the hierarchy is in place, in that the environment will remain the overarching responsibility and economic interest will come second.
To answer the convener’s question, the reference to sustainable development and the guidance power is in section 31 of the Environment Act 1995.
How will the code of practice define sustainable economic growth so that it is readily understood and applied to the functions of the 10 listed regulators? Given the diverse nature of their remits, is one code of practice sufficient, or should each regulator receive detailed and specific guidance?
That is a fair question. The code will apply to all the regulators that are listed in schedule 1, and will not be specific to any particular regulator. It will support regulators as they deliver on their economic duty, and is being developed by regulators and by business to capture and encourage best practice. It will very deliberately be the subject of substantial consultation, and will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny prior to its introduction. That process is important, and will give those who have an interest in delivery on the ground the opportunity to comment on the code of practice and guidance.
The code is being developed with the regulators, the purpose of which is to design the code to clarify the practicalities around how regulators’ roles will be delivered.
It must be challenging to come up with what will, by definition, be quite a broad code that will cover things as diverse as charities, housing, tourism and healthcare. How will you make it relevant to such a diverse group?
As the minister said, it is all about providing a line of sight to the Government’s purpose. We are moving from part 1 of the bill to part 2 of the bill—section 5—and talking about SEPA’s purpose before going back to part 1.
In previous evidence-taking sessions, we have touched on the possibility that we might end up with a pyramid structure, where there is a broad code sitting at the top, with specific policy guidance for the regulators underneath that. Is that what will happen in practice?
Graeme Dey has raised a fair point about interpretation. It will be difficult in practice to have specific guidance for every sector. I guess that it is about providing guidance about the approach that is to be taken and about the interpretation of guidance. I suppose that in some respects guidance on guidance is what is often needed—I am sure that you have experienced that.
I appreciate the difficulty that you have in that regard, minister.
Is there a concern about how section 5 might influence the FSA? Can you expand on that?
The FSA suggested that some clarity in that regard would be useful.
The new powers are intended to complement the duties on bodies such as the FSA, not to circumvent or prejudice—as Graeme Dey suggested—their other powers.
My point is in keeping with themes that we touched on earlier, such as the need for greater clarity on what the bill is about. There is an issue in that respect, is there not?
There are some fundamental principles, which I set out in my opening statement. We are trying—unlike under the deregulation agenda elsewhere in these islands—to improve the clarity and transparency of regulation, although it appears that that is not as easy as we expected.
That is reassuring.
The issues that the committee has heard in evidence and which we are discussing today were teased out in the consultation that was run by our better regulation colleagues, who are also appearing at the Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee.
Thank you. We note that.
Section 6(4)(b) states that ministers will consider whom it is “appropriate” to consult on the draft code of practice. What organisations do you consider to be “appropriate”?
Jim Hume has raised an important point, which others have also raised. Section 6(4)(b) guarantees that we will consult relevant regulators and “appropriate” stakeholders. We are committed to an inclusive and open approach in undertaking a consultation, and I hope that nothing in the bill suggests otherwise.
That would be useful. When stakeholders gave evidence, there appeared to be no dissent from the view that the consultation should go out to the broader public and wider society. Did you consider that?
The key thing is that we should make sure that those who have a direct relevant interest in particular measures are consulted. George Burgess will address the wider point about how to bring in the wider public for consultation on some of the measures.
That would be useful. You mentioned that a diverse range of people—anyone and everyone—could be affected directly or indirectly.
It would be fair to say that in the environmental sphere, we have a pretty good handle on who our stakeholders are. We interact with SEPA and SNH and our active stakeholder communities work very well with our regulators and with Government. I ask George Burgess to address the wider point.
I wonder whether requirements that there must be consultation of particular parties might be rather old-fashioned. They seem to come from an earlier day when only particular people were consulted, and not the wider public.
It is also fair to say that we are always conscious of the degree to which there is consultation overload for some stakeholders. The point that I was making earlier is that we need to be sure that those with whom interaction is absolutely critical are aware that the consultation is happening so that we get their views on board. As George Burgess said, it is not about closing off consultation to others; it is about making sure that those who need to know that the consultation is happening are aware of it so that they do not miss the opportunity to feed into it.
I just want to get pure clarity and get it on the record. You will engage with some stakeholders to make sure that they engage with the consultation, but it will also be open to the public.
As George Burgess said, that is the general practice. The consultation is available and it is an important principle of Parliament that such consultations are always open and transparent to the public.
I guess that we are stereotyped as sitting at our desks waiting for written consultation responses to come in. I look at consultation responses and it is not just about reading letters; we are encouraged to get out there and speak to people. I hope that we have managed to do that in the policy areas for which I am responsible. I would like nothing better than to get out of the office and do that. We are not just talking about the formal element of consultation, important as it is.
That has cleared it up quite well, thank you.
Good morning, minister. I welcome Neil Watt’s comment that he is going to be out talking to people.
Do you mean regulators generally or SEPA specifically?
I mean regulators generally.
There is a good understanding of the Government’s purpose and we have already had a discussion about the definition of the terms that we have used. I would like to think that when the duty is picked up specifically in the code of practice, the discussion will be specifically about practical implementation. We are talking about the principles of better regulation and how we can ensure transparency and consistency across regulators; that is the purpose of having the duty, and that is the kind of discussion I will be having.
Imagine that I am a regulator and I do not know what sustainable economic growth means. What does it mean to you?
It might be easier to look at the question as if, for the purpose of the argument, Mr Lyle was SEPA. I am sure that he would enjoy that role.
I am glad to hear that. Thank you.
If I picked you up correctly in your answer to the very first question, you said that Scottish Environment LINK has a very clear understanding of the definition of sustainable economic growth.
I said sustainable development.
Thank you for putting me right on that.
That is an important point that I should have raised earlier; thank you for the opportunity to address it.
It is good news that the short-life working group will be established. Will it also be able to look at what enforcement procedures might be used if a regulator is found not to be upholding its duty?
Consultation on enforcement will be key. After all, we must ensure that all regulators and actors understand the relationship between the public duty and the regulator, the interpretation of those public duties and the linkages with enforcement where harm is being caused to the regulator’s objectives, so that people understand where these things come in.
Huge new reporting requirements would not be in line with the principles of better regulation, and the new requirement will fit into well-established governance structures that regulators and public bodies use to report on their performance and contribution to the Government’s purpose. This is not about radical change, creating something new or adding an extra burden—we do not want to take resources away from front-line delivery—but about creating transparency and consistency.
I entirely accept that, but if you put a duty on a regulator to achieve a certain aim and it fails to do so, you must have some mechanism for drawing that to its attention and seeking other actions that will assure everyone that the duty is being upheld. Is that not what should happen with a duty?
As regulators such as SEPA and SNH in my portfolio are accountable to ministers in delivering on those outcomes, there would already be interaction with them on what they could do to improve their performance; they already report to me. For example, I recently received reports from them on their outcomes in relation to the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 and the steps that they are taking to reduce their own damaging greenhouse gas emissions. Good progress is being made, but occasionally there are bumps along the way and they will write to me to explain the reason for their failure to deliver on a particular area and the steps that they are taking to address that in the forthcoming year. A mechanism already exists, but I am happy to take the committee’s view on whether there are any other measures that we could consider.
Thank you. That was helpful.
Good morning, minister. Your previous answer strayed a wee bit into the territory that I was going to cover, but I will still ask my question to ensure that we have an understanding on the record. Is it likely or possible that the lack of understanding of the concept of sustainable economic growth will lead to a paralysis of indecision? If that were to happen, would you intervene to move things forward?
It is a fair question, but I hope that the short-life working group will provide much greater clarity on the code and how the concepts should be interpreted. I would certainly have on-going engagement with the regulators that I regularly engage with and the chief executives and chairs of those organisations if they found it difficult to interpret any aspect of our policy. That would be a vehicle for dialogue and interaction in which I would ask, “Okay, what in relation to your specific functions as a regulator are the challenges in delivering this approach?” We would provide better guidance either through a formal letter setting out supplementary guidance on interpretation or through a revision of the code. I do not know whether that has come up in discussion with Mr Ewing, but it is certainly the approach that I would be keen to take. Instead of standing alone and aloof, I would want to have on-going engagement with SEPA and SNH to ensure that, if they were uncomfortable with anything, we would have a chance to interact and improve the situation if necessary.
That is good to know.
Good morning, minister. Following on from the points that have been raised by Alex Fergusson and Jayne Baxter, I wonder how, in the event of a legal challenge in the courts with regard to the concept of sustainable economic growth and the possibility of a paralysis of indecision that has been mentioned and which was raised at the round-table session by Scottish Environment LINK, you will ensure that the courts interpret the spirit of the law in the absence of national and international guidelines or definitions.
That is an important point. Obviously, in recent times there have been cases in which accusations have been made that SNH or SEPA has slowed down the process of supporting an investment in a particular area or industry. It is always a challenge for regulators to protect the environment while supporting legitimate and good economic investments.
In looking at the requirements, the courts would no doubt look at the provisions of the bill—by then an act—and at, for instance, the code of practice. To take a hypothetical example, if there was a case about whether a regulator had complied with the code of practice, the court would obviously look at the code of practice.
It is encouraging that it is acknowledged that the code of practice should be robust enough for the courts to follow. Thank you for the feedback on that.
On that point, without wanting for one moment to disagree with what Mr Burgess said, I put it to him and to the minister that the last thing that anyone wants to do is to produce an act of Parliament that requires to be interpreted by the courts. The courts will interpret statutes when they are forced to do so, but surely we all recognise that it is much better to have statute that is so well drafted and clear that the courts never get involved.
Nigel Don raises an important point. I suppose that there is greater scope for misinterpretation with the difficult concepts that formed the initial part of our discussions on sustainable development and sustainable economic growth. Those concepts are, if you like, outwith the comfort zone of most courts, so I think that it will be helpful to provide guidance on how they should be interpreted and delivered by regulators. That will assist the courts with the intent behind the concepts of sustainable development and sustainable economic growth.
That is my point entirely.
However, your fundamental point that the legislation should be as clear as possible is also fair.
I cannot resist the temptation to point out that much of the committee’s time is currently being taken up with the Crofting (Amendment) (Scotland) Bill, which is required because of the way in which provisions in the Crofting Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 were interpreted very soon after the act was passed. I know that there are many reasons for that, but I am anxious that we do not find ourselves in a similar scenario with this legislation in two or three years’ time. Let us avoid any confusions of interpretation if we can possibly do so.
I can assure you that, as a recent student of crofting law, I am in 100 per cent agreement with you on that point.
Of course, crofting legislation has a court all of its own to deal with such things.
As another recent student of crofting law, I could not agree with the minister more.
I should be clear, and I am sorry if I have confused matters.
I am not saying that—
I may have confused you by the way in which I expressed the point, rather than its being your fault. There are existing definitions, and I read out the definition of sustainable economic growth. People might disagree with it, but that is the definition that is there to give guidance on interpretation, which is the key.
We are clear, just to wrap up, that sustainable development is defined in the Environment Act 1995.
Not in the act itself, as I understand it. Perhaps George Burgess can explain the situation with regard to that act. There is a reference to “sustainable development” in the act—
Yes, I know.
But there is a definition of sustainable development in planning policy; Scottish Environment LINK particularly respects that definition and has used it elsewhere.
Can we have that cited, please, so that we have it for our report?
You can indeed. We can give that to you.
The term “sustainable development” is quite commonly used in statute. To my knowledge, there is no statutory definition anywhere in the United Kingdom of what that term means. There are, of course, commonly understood and accepted definitions, particularly going back to the Brundtland commission in the early 1990s, so there is a common understanding of the term, but you would not find a statutory definition of what it means.
Maybe we need one in Scotland—a world-beating one. I think that we could do with that, if you can help us, because we will try to find a way in our report, drawing on the views that are expressed around this table, to clarify those terms. Sustainable economic growth has been defined to a degree by the Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Employment and Sustainable Growth, John Swinney, but we need a definition of sustainable development. The Cabinet Secretary for Rural Affairs and the Environment might like to turn his attention to that.
We have several European and international obligations, such as those relating to Natura sites, sites of special scientific interest and European protected species. Could the duty to
I understand Mr Hume’s point. I refer to our discussion about the hierarchy. The duty does not prioritise sustainable economic growth over the other regulatory purposes. It is important to recognise that, so I thank Mr Hume for raising the issue, as it gives me an opportunity to put the matter on the record. Regulators need to determine an appropriate balance, which is legitimate; however, as the committee has probably heard in evidence, the regulators make balancing judgments every day and are comfortable with that approach.
I want to explore the issue slightly more deeply, putting protected sites to one side. You said that SNH and SEPA will have the environment as the top priority, but the duty to contribute to sustainable economic growth will surely still apply to them to an extent. Will you explore a bit further the extent to which it will apply?
We could look at what already happens. It is generally acknowledged that, in recent years, SEPA and SNH have taken a much more constructive approach and have tried to work with the developers of projects. There are good examples from across Scotland of SEPA and SNH working with promoters of local projects to ensure that development takes place in a way that delivers economic benefit and employment opportunities but does not harm the environment, when that can be avoided.
We have explored that issue in considerable detail, so we will move on to questions from Claudia Beamish.
How will the code of practice ensure that SNH, SEPA and the FSA will be able to prioritise between the multiple statutory duties? Is the provision likely to change the way in which regulators operate on a daily basis?
Provisions in the bill will place a duty on regulators to exercise their functions in a way that contributes to sustainable economic growth, but only to the extent that that is consistent with the exercise of their other regulatory functions. We are not asking them to do anything that would subvert their existing regulatory functions, such as protecting the environment, which is obviously at the top of the hierarchy—that addresses the point that Jim Hume made, as well.
Do you have any specific comments about that with regard to the FSA?
The FSA is outwith my day-to-day duties. I will refer to Neil Watt. Have you had any discussion or interaction with the FSA on that?
The FSA and SNH gave evidence last week about how the duty might work in practice. I do not think that I could explain it better.
I seek clarification of a point about the duty of SNH and SEPA to
It applies only to their regulatory functions.
Okay.
As the minister with portfolio responsibility for SNH and SEPA, I know that those agencies sometimes come under a lot of pressure regarding important economic projects. However, they are fulfilling their statutory duties to protect the environment, and people need to recognise that important function.
That is very useful. We will move on to part 2, chapter 1, on environmental regulation.
Part 2 largely covers SEPA and talks about control activities one way or another. In her written evidence, Dr Sarah Hendry made a point about the four sorts of control that appear to be in it: permit, registration, notification and general binding rules. I understand her point that although permits and general binding rules are things that we know about historically, the difference between a registration and a notification is not entirely clear.
I take the point. As you have identified, schedule 2 provides for a four-tier system of authorisation, should that be required. The permit and registration have a similar legal effect. Notification is intended to be used as a means for an operator simply to tell SEPA that they are carrying out an activity in a particular location. Most likely, it would be combined with a general binding rule, so that there is a requirement on an operator to follow the rules set out in legislation or guidance and to notify SEPA that they are carrying out the activity. The Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003 provides for four similar tiers, so a similar approach is already being deployed. However, I take the point that we could perhaps do a little more to make it clear why that is necessary.
I have a couple of points on that. First, we should remember that what we are providing here is simply an enabling power. How many tiers are used in an individual bit of regulation would be a matter for the regulations. I certainly take the point that four tiers of control is probably too many. We discussed quite a lot among ourselves and with the lawyers whether three tiers of control would be sufficient—the permit, registration and general binding rules. We thought that it was best to retain the flexibility that is already in the WEWS act. In practice, though, down the line and in consultation with regulated parties, the regulations that are produced might only actually make use of a subset of the flexibility that is available there.
Okay. I think that I now understand that. Notification might be an add-on to a general binding rule process and registration might be a subset of a permit.
If those already exist elsewhere and they will be mixed and matched, I suspect that that is fine.
We move on to chapter 2 and powers of enforcement, mainly related to SEPA.
Minister, I was pleased to hear you say in your introductory remarks that environmental workshops with stakeholders will begin to be held next week. I am sure that those workshops will look at powers of enforcement.
In short, yes. We are confident that adequate safeguards are in place to protect those being accused of offences and ensure that there is a proportionate approach. Bridget Marshall has given evidence on the reasons for applying a balance of probabilities test to the evidence that SEPA must gather. There may be some interest in the relationship between criminal and civil actions and where the boundary falls. There is a role for the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service in determining whether, on the balance of probabilities, something criminal has taken place—in other words, something quite malicious and deliberate rather than simply non-compliance as a result of ignorance of the requirements.
But you are confident that SEPA’s powers of enforcement will be proportionate.
Proportionality is, along with transparency and other issues, a key part of the bill as far as enforcement is concerned. Even in the short time that I have been in this role, I have come to see that there is quite a difference between accidental non-compliers and, for example, the serious organised crime elements that as we know and as I have previously mentioned to the committee exist in some aspects of the waste sector—I make it clear that I am not making any link with the member’s constituency, but there are certainly issues in relation to other sites. For example, I recently visited a site near Ikea that had been left in a horrendous state by a waste contractor who had clearly and significantly breached the regulations and had effectively left others to meet the huge cost of clearing things up. We need the powers to tackle such sites, but at the moment SEPA has one arm tied behind its back with its limited powers and the very modest fines and fixed penalties that it can apply. We need a more proportionate system, which reflects the fact that, in certain cases, there is a serious intention to ignore regulations or do something criminal and, in other cases, things happen because people are ignorant of the regulations that they have to work within.
If I recall correctly, the possibility of putting bonds in place for new waste management developments has been raised with the committee and I think that that would certainly help to deal with people who do not follow the rules. What discussions have taken place with SEPA on the general issue of extra enforcement powers?
I will ask Neil Watt and Bridget Marshall to talk about on-going engagement as they are actively involved in discussions with SEPA not only on the content of the bill but on wider enforcement issues.
We are having very active discussions with SEPA; indeed, I have been seconded to the Scottish Government partly to ensure that that link is as strong as possible. The other important partner in all of this is the Crown Office and the Lord Advocate, and the minister and the Lord Advocate have discussed how these enforcement tools will work in practice and have explored the territory between the role of the procurator fiscal and the role of SEPA. Very active discussions are going on with all the parties involved about what will be for SEPA a quite novel use of such tools.
I also point out that next week’s event will be jointly hosted by SEPA, the Scottish Government and the Crown Office to ensure that questions are answered from all angles and that, if required, we explain how things will work in practice, the impacts on people and of course the intention behind all this.
I am conscious that time is passing but, on intent and following on from Bridget Marshall’s reference to the Lord Advocate, I should say that the whole system will operate within the framework of the Lord Advocate’s guidelines, which will set out in terms of proportionality and public interest the cases referred to the procurator fiscal for prosecution and the cases that SEPA will enforce directly. There will be clarity on where the boundary lies and I hope that next week’s workshop will inform the debate.
Following on from Angus MacDonald’s well made point about people who dump or cause such problems, I have to say that for my whole political life I have abhorred people who leave sites in a state, who dump or whatever; I have always wanted the issue to be taken up.
The £40,000 cap was chosen after detailed consideration. It is the maximum amount that can be imposed by a criminal court in summary proceedings for most environmental offences. The policy intention is not to create an imbalance between the criminal courts, and £40,000 seemed an appropriate upper limit. Were the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service to determine that there had been a really serious crime and serious criminal intent, the case would not necessarily go through summary procedure; it would be heard in full in the criminal courts and evidence would be taken. In such situations, the courts could apply more severe penalties. We are not saying that £40,000 is the absolute maximum limit, but it is the maximum limit that can be set in summary proceedings. That acknowledges that there might be a public interest in getting things tackled quickly, rather than having a huge delay before ending up with the same conclusion about the level of fine. I do not know whether Bridget Marshall wants to add anything about the approach that would be taken in the criminal court and what the penalties might be in that scenario.
The £40,000 relates to the variable monetary penalty, which is something that SEPA will be able to impose directly. That is why the cap is at £40,000. As the minister rightly said, that is the maximum for most environmental offences in summary proceedings, which are for the less serious crimes. A serious crime will be taken to a jury trial under solemn proceedings, where unlimited fines and imprisonment are available. It is important to have in mind the fact that £40,000 is the maximum that SEPA can impose directly. Any more significant offences will be referred, as currently, to the fiscals for prosecution in the criminal courts, either under summary procedure or, if they are more serious, under solemn procedure.
I am certainly glad to hear that. Criminals beware!
In oral evidence, the Law Society of Scotland and the UK Environmental Law Association raised concerns about the implications of enforcement measures being imposed by SEPA based on the balance of probabilities, as against following court procedures where the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. They raised the issue of what could be viewed as the lower level of evidence, if I can put it as bluntly as that. What approach do you see SEPA adopting in deciding whether to go for the fixed or variable fine, based on the balance of probabilities, or to pass a case on to the procurator fiscal, which would require a greater burden of proof? Will you expand on that for us?
You raise a number of issues. I recognise that there will always be concerns in this area. I know that there has been substantial feedback from the consultation and the evidence that you heard last week on these sort of matters. You referred to the procurator fiscal being satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the person has committed a relevant offence. A number of safeguards are built into the system, including the Lord Advocate’s guidelines, which were referred to earlier, which will set the framework for the new enforcement measures, and SEPA will revise its enforcement policy to include the new enforcement measures, so there will be a linkage between the two.
It has to a certain degree. It is incredibly important to get this bit right because, if there is room for doubt, SEPA could be open to accusations of saying, “Well, we haven’t got enough proof to get it through the courts, but we’ll do them through the powers we have ourselves.” Obviously, one does not want that to happen.
The important point is that the quality of evidence is not what will determine whether the case goes through the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service or is dealt with by SEPA. The question is more whether, on the balance of probabilities, it is likely that criminal intent was involved. As I understand it, if that is the case, regardless of the quality of the evidence, the matter will go to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service under the Lord Advocate’s guidelines. However, if it is just a matter of regulatory non-compliance due to accident or incompetence in some respect, there would be no criminal intent and it would be more likely for SEPA to take direct enforcement action.
I gave quite a lot of evidence to the committee two weeks ago about why we chose the burden of proof as civil. The minister referred to that. I acknowledged that Mr Fergusson’s point was a criticism that could be levied at the approach that we chose, but the minister has outlined in his answers some of the safeguards that mean that it is unlikely or virtually impossible that that will happen.
Will the Lord Advocate’s guidelines be made public? Will we have access to them? If it is possible to say, when will they be in place?
They will be made public. The workshop next week, which focuses on enforcement, is a joint workshop with the Scottish Government, SEPA and the Crown Office. The guidelines will be discussed at that workshop and will be made public subsequently.
That is useful to us. Thank you.
Is it possible that someone who is served with a notice of intent could decide to take their chances in, and ask to be referred to, the court because there is a need to demonstrate more proof there than the balance of probabilities? Is there any chance of the perpetrator being offered that choice?
I am certainly aware of comparable systems in which somebody can choose to take the punishment or go to court—for a parking or a speeding offence, for example. That approach applies elsewhere in the system, so I appreciate the point that you are making.
Would a successful appeal against a notice preclude SEPA from pursuing further action in the form of a second notice or prosecution?
My understanding is that, if a fixed penalty is withdrawn by the tribunal, SEPA cannot have another go. At the point at which the final notice is served for a fixed or variable penalty, no further sanction can be imposed by SEPA in relation to the facts that constituted the offence, and nor can the case be referred to the procurator fiscal for prosecution. That is it, in effect; there is no double jeopardy.
That is correct. If offences continue and the facts that related to the first notice arise again, SEPA may impose another variable penalty, which might be higher, or decide to refer the case to the procurator fiscal for report because there is a course of offending that is continuing.
It is worth saying that our general approach is to target our efforts on serious, regular offenders—in the criminal sense—and serial non-compliers, as part of the package of measures through which we will try to target SEPA’s resources more effectively. I think that the point has been raised with NFUS.
What about relatively trivial offences? I am thinking about a company that owns multiple sites and is guilty of a series of misdemeanours at a range of sites, albeit that the offences are genuinely small fry. Should we be looking at the cumulative situation and sending a message that a company that has a bad attitude to environmental regulation will be pursued?
I wholly endorse that approach. Up to now, we have probably been talking about serious breaches as opposed to an isolated and minor breach or a small number of breaches on one site. It is fair to suggest that there might be people who turn a blind eye to a series of fairly low-grade environmental breaches, such as littering, which can add up to a serious problem over their entire estate. It is right that SEPA engages with such a company, to ensure that it is aware that there is a problem across all its sites—it might not be aware that things are happening everywhere, just because of its management structure—and is given a chance to comply. If the company fails to comply, we will look to SEPA to take enforcement action.
The issue was raised with Calum MacDonald when he gave evidence to the committee. I think that he gave an assurance that we are beginning to look across not just sectors but corporate entities. In particular, we are thinking about how we organise our inspections and audits, which might be done on a corporate basis, rather than on the basis of individual companies in a corporation.
It is worth stressing that company executives who are responsible for a large chain of companies would be accountable for the actions of their subordinates across the network. It is a matter of making them aware that they are in breach and encouraging them as accountable officers to ensure that they bring the company within the regulations.
You are right. We were given that assurance by SEPA, but it is good to get the minister’s enthusiasm for tackling the issue on the record.
Minister, I am impressed that you and SEPA will take a commonsense approach to people who unintentionally break the law. It is true that, at the end of the day, they will have broken the law, but I want you to go after the people who continually break the law, turn a blind eye and think that they get away with it.
That is a fair point. Appeals against the technical decisions that SEPA makes are usually heard by the Scottish ministers. I am aware that concern was expressed about that in the consultation. It is a good example of our having listened to the consultation responses because we have taken an approach that, at least in the interim until we know the outcome of other discussions about tribunals in Scotland, ensures that appeals will be made to a body that is wholly independent of the Scottish ministers.
Regarding the commonsense approach that has been mentioned, the NFUS has welcomed at the committee on more than one occasion the more collaborative approach that SEPA is taking towards Scotland’s farmers. That certainly must be welcomed.
I will try to give a bit of clarity.
I agree that any intimidation of SEPA officers is completely out of order; the sooner we have powers to address that, the better.
If I may, at this point I will steal the cabinet secretary’s thunder and confirm that shortly there will be a Scottish Government consultation on national litter strategy that will address exactly what the member has asked about. The consultation will look at issues to do with fixed penalty notices in the future and is likely to take place over the summer, so we do not have long to wait.
If the consultation is to be announced over the summer, circulation to the committee at the same time would be helpful.
I am sure that that will happen as a matter of course, but I will make sure that it is noted.
We now move on to questions on chapter 3, which is on court powers.
Minister, what considerations would a court be required to take into account in deciding whether it was appropriate to issue a publicity order? For example, would the fact that the offence was accidental be a consideration? As the Federation of Small Businesses suggested, a small business might lack understanding of its responsibilities. Would publicity orders be confined only to very serious offences in which the perpetrator had deliberately played fast and loose with the environment, or would past misdemeanours be considered, so that a company that is guilty of a series of relatively minor breaches is eventually made subject to an order on the basis that enough is enough?
That is a very good question and I am grateful for the chance to clarify. The policy intent is that publicity orders will be used only for the most serious and deliberate breaches of environmental legislation; they are an additional sentencing power to be given to the criminal courts.
Clearly, although the damage will have been done when they are used, publicity orders have a role as a deterrent to the individuals concerned and to other companies, who see what happens if they are guilty of such misdemeanours.
There is huge potential for a company to suffer reputational damage. The measure is already being used elsewhere—including, I believe, Australia—and it has apparently already had an impact.
Finally, will the courts receive guidance on what is deemed to be a serious offence?
That is a reasonable point. Ultimately, such a decision will be at the courts’ discretion but I imagine that clear guidelines on the intent will be produced.
The Government would never seek to guide the courts on such a matter. The procurator fiscal or the advocate depute would have an opportunity to draw the publicity order provisions to the court’s attention, but sentencing is a matter for the courts and the Government would never seek provide guidance to the courts on how to use their powers.
With regard to the deputy convener’s point, we will need to be clear about the policy intent and to set out our understanding of the policy and where it would apply. Ultimately, as George Burgess has made clear, it is up to the discretion of the court as to when such a measure would be applied.
Nigel Don will now ask a few questions about the miscellaneous provisions in chapter 4.
I will address a number of miscellaneous things in what might be a fairly random order. First, minister, do you have anything more to say about possible amendments relating to contaminated land?
Do you have any particular concern in mind?
I understand from the letter that you sent the committee that you propose to lodge amendments at stage 2.
We recognise that the contaminated land provisions contained in part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 are extremely technical. We think that we have got the provisions on contaminated land sites right, but we will need to make a few amendments and adjustments to the provisions on special sites to reflect the role of SEPA and local authorities. I must apologise; I appreciate that the area is hugely technical, but we hope that we can keep the amendments to the minimum necessary.
We can look forward to seeing those amendments at stage 2.
Indeed.
That is fine. I just wondered whether there was anything to add.
You raise an important point. The vicarious liability provisions in the bill apply to non-natural legal persons such as a company or partnership, not individuals or sole traders. The intention is that they will cover any legal person—to use the vernacular—other than an individual, and they might therefore extend to unincorporated associations, bodies or persons, including trusts. If the committee has concerns that such matters need to be clarified, we will happily take them on board.
I am not surprised by your reference to trusts, but I think that the mention of unincorporated associations will raise a few eyebrows. By definition, such things tend to simply appear and people do not realise that they are a part of what is going on. Has that issue been considered?
I ask George Burgess to respond.
As the minister has said, the provisions apply to anything that the law recognises as a legal personality; as a result, if an unincorporated association has a legal personality, it will be caught. However, if it is a looser association that is not a legal person in law, the provisions will not apply. The key point is that only a legal person can hold a licence or permit from SEPA. In short, if the thing exists as a legal entity, the vicarious liability provisions will apply.
On the offences, environmental harm is defined and understood elsewhere in statute, but it is not clear whether significant environmental harm is also understood in law.
There are a number of existing regulatory offences under the Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011, the Environmental Protection Act 1990, the Pollution Prevention and Control (Scotland) Regulations 2012 and the Radioactive Substances Act 1993. The intention is to repeal those offence provisions and provide a single set of regulatory offences under the new, integrated regulatory framework. That is a good example of where we seek to simplify and improve the read-across of regulation.
On whether significant environmental harm is a clearly understood concept, section 31 sets out when environmental harm becomes significant environmental harm. That is defined as being when
That takes us to the end of the series of questions. The minister and his officials have given us a lot of material to think about for our report. I thank them very much for that highly detailed and interesting evidence.
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Annual Report