Culture, Tourism, Europe and External Relations Committee

Meeting date: Thursday, June 7, 2018

Official Report 779KB pdf

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Presidency of the Council of the European Union

The second item on the agenda is an evidence session with the ambassador of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United Kingdom. Bulgaria holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union. I welcome His Excellency Konstantin Dimitrov. I understand that he would like to make an opening statement.

Thank you very much, madam convener.

I am privileged to address honourable members of the committee today as we enter the final phase of the Bulgarian presidency of the important political, economic and civilisational project that we call the European Union. Assuming the presidency has been a historic opportunity for Bulgaria, which is a former communist bloc country.

My introductory statement will be brief so that we will have more opportunities for questions and answers that address more directly areas of interest or concern of members as representatives of the Scottish people.

Our first priority—although it is not necessarily the most pleasant one from Bulgaria’s viewpoint—is the on-going negotiation process for the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union. We are entering an important phase for the completion of the withdrawal agreement. It is hoped that progress will be made if not this month, by October, so that a withdrawal agreement that includes a full detailed description of the expected transition period plus a declaration of a political nature that lays down the framework for the future legally binding arrangements for the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union after the United Kingdom leaves—in the legal sense of that word—the European Union can be signed.

An important element of both the withdrawal agreement and the future agreement will be EU citizens’ rights on the territory of the United Kingdom and, reciprocally, UK nationals’ rights on the territories of EU members. The progress in that particular area has been very satisfactory. At this point in time, we do not see any major impediments to reaching a mutually satisfactory set of rights and obligations that will address the expectations of EU and UK citizens. The same holds true at this point in time in respect of the financial arrangements that are related to the United Kingdom’s obligations as it departs the European Union. Other aspects have yet to be clarified. If members have an interest in discussing them, I will be ready to engage in a dialogue on them in the context of the Brexit negotiations.

Our agenda is not confined to the issue of Brexit. Another important task of ours is the focusing of the initial debate on the multi-annual financial framework for the next six or seven-year period of the functioning of the European Union. We are satisfied with the start and our capacity to moderate that difficult debate. We hope that the budget will retain the centrality of cohesion policy, which is important for the catching-up potential of countries of eastern Europe in particular, but also that of other parts of the European Union so that the European Union is not only civilisationally cohesive but economically and socially cohesive. We aspire to achieve the same centrality in respect of preserving the European Union’s regional development programmes. Therefore, we are looking forward to the opportunity for the United Kingdom to continue to selectively participate in specific regional development programmes of its own choosing in co-ordination with the plans and opportunities that are presented by the European Union’s budget, even after the UK leaves the European Union.

The future of the common agricultural policy is no less important in our agenda. That is another area in which consensus is sometimes very hard to achieve, as member states have differing views on the common agricultural policy’s future and centrality.

A workable budget is needed for the digital agenda. We have to work very hard as we lay down the grounds for the digital single market, the protection of personal data, and the common efforts to fight cybersecurity challenges.

An important priority for Bulgaria’s presidency is the reaffirmation of the European perspective for the western Balkans, by which we mean the countries in south-eastern Europe that have not yet started or have just started their negotiations for acceding to membership of the European Union. We are rewarded by the fact that the United Kingdom continues to take a very active interest in the future Europeanisation of the western Balkans. On 17 May 2018, Bulgaria hosted an important European Union summit that was devoted to the western Balkans, and we are looking forward to a meeting at the highest level in London that will be hosted by Prime Minister Theresa May and which will continue to develop the momentum that there has been in focusing on and underpinning the perspective for the western Balkans with concrete projects in transport, digitalisation, energy, connectivity and institutional integration.

Last but not least, the management of migration policy is an important element of our prioritisation in the presidency. It is an open secret that that is a very difficult area. Member states have differing views on whether the European Union should be open to more managed migration into it or whether there should be further reductions in the flows of migrants into it, whether they are legal or illegal.

An important aspect of the problem is the voluntary or compulsory relocation of migrants in accordance with a possibly amended text of the Dublin convention. I am sad to say that progress on that is very limited—if there has been progress at all—but we still hope to push the agenda for progress on amending the existing acquis communautaire of the European Union so that the expectations of all the nationals of the member states and the international community as a whole are better met and we combine the principles of solidarity, our commitments to the international documents on refugees, and concerns that are related to the influx of a large number of migrants in something that reflects a balanced account of the individual interests of the member states.

I will stop there so that I can give honourable members of the committee the chance to make comments and ask questions.

Thank you very much, your excellency. You talked about Brexit and the progress that has been made on citizens’ rights, which is, of course, welcome. Can you say a little more about the EU27’s other priority issues, such as the island of Ireland and, in particular, whether the Bulgarian presidency of the EU is hopeful that the Brexit talks might make significant progress at the June European Council?

Indeed, the issue of the so-called Irish border, which means how the European Union and the United Kingdom could square the circle of the following points is critical: how to retain the constitutional integrity of the United Kingdom, how to fully translate the provisions of the Good Friday agreement into a post-Brexit reality without violating the spirit or the substance of that agreement, and how at the same time we respect the international legal norm of the fact that the UK will be a non-member of the EU whereas the Republic of Ireland will continue to be a member of the EU. These three elements constitute the problematic need of squaring the circle.

In practical terms, the EU27 expects a more detailed proposal by the United Kingdom Government—hopefully very soon, whatever that means—on a detailed description of the backstop arrangements on that particular point, which could be applicable in case innovative solutions contemplated by the United Kingdom Government take longer than the transition period post-March 2019; that is, post the date of 31 December 2020. I think that that is the most concrete description of our expectation that I am allowed to mention now, and which I think is well understood by the United Kingdom Government. We hope to receive that clearer and more detailed description of its idea of how to tackle the issue so that one of the impediments to the smoother continuation of the finalisation of the withdrawal agreement can be removed.

I think that it is fair to say that we are with you in anticipating that particular document. I hand over to Claire Baker.

09:15  

You talked about the multi-annual financial framework that is being worked on, the policies that are coming out of that and the expectation that the UK would participate selectively in on-going programmes.

After the UK withdraws, yes.

Do you see the UK’s influence in the current discussions around the financial framework and the future of the CAP policy and the future of horizon 2020 funding? Do you see the UK’s influence on those policies in the current situation?

My understanding—with the qualification, of course, that I am not working in Brussels—is that the United Kingdom is very cautious not to overstep the mark between what it gets involved in for the period up to the withdrawal from the European Union and issues that will primarily concern the work and functioning of the union after its withdrawal. However, we have a clear political declaration on the part of the UK Government that there is an interest in participation, on a case-by-case basis, in regional development programmes that reflect the UK’s interest in and traditional strategic commitment to such programmes that enhance the capacity of east European nations, including Bulgaria, to catch up in their socioeconomic development. We welcome that firm political declaration as another testimony to the UK Government’s strategic commitment to the future of Europe, especially to that part that belonged to the former communist bloc.

I was interested in your comments around migration policy and the recognition that it is difficult for the EU to deal with that issue.

That is true, sadly. Yes.

You will be aware that migration was a significant issue within the debate that we had in the UK around Brexit and the referendum. In the role of the presidency, how do you try to keep the 27 countries united around that issue? Are you concerned that other countries are considering their membership of the EU? Does that issue have traction in other countries, in terms of presenting a threat to the stability of the EU?

My observation—I think that it is not only my observation—is that unlike the situation in certain quarters of the United Kingdom, the migration issue is not a reason for people to give up on their aspirations to join the European Union. The desire by aspirant countries to join the European Union has been retained at a very high level, irrespective of the challenges that are faced by those countries in areas of migration or certain instabilities in the eurozone and so on.

I would like to contrast the problems that we have, especially at 27, on rearranging the management of migration flows with the excellent climate of co-operation that we have, especially as ambassadors in London, with your Home Office and other institutions on the practicalities of regulating the status of EU nationals. I refer to EU nationals who had arrived in the UK and had been permanently staying in the UK before the date of the referendum; who will have already been here by the date of your withdrawal; and who will have been here by the date of the expiry of the transition period. The only area of relative obscurity remains the status of EU citizens who will arrive in the United Kingdom for the first time after the end of the transition period, but it is very natural that we have not covered all aspects of the future relationship. We are yet to adopt a political declaration. We are yet to begin working on the concrete legally binding text.

Overall, to sum up the problem of migration flow management that concerns primarily the 27 nations, excepting the UK, I would say that the on-going dialogue with the British authorities on the status of EU citizens in the UK is generally considered to be satisfactory. That is very good news for my compatriots, for example.

Good morning, ambassador. I am fascinated to hear your comments. Following on from your previous remarks on the reciprocal arrangements for EU nationals—those who are here now and those who may arrive during the transition—I would like to focus on seasonal workers. That is an important issue for the rural economy in Scotland and, indeed, the UK.

Given your confidence that satisfactory arrangements are in place around the status quo, and notwithstanding any changes that may happen in the future, which are the unknowns, why do you think that there has been a reduction in the flow of seasonal migratory workers? I refer to workers specifically from eastern Europe, many of whom are from your own country. A lot of Scottish farms that rely quite heavily on seasonal workers have seen drastic reductions, to the extent that farmers have been flying over to Bulgaria and other countries to try to recruit and to cover people’s costs in coming here. Farmers in one Scottish co-operative were quoted recently as saying that they believed that the eastern European tabloid media had painted a very bleak picture of the current situation. Given that there are no legal restrictions on people coming here, what do you think are the social issues that are stopping people coming here even today?

A number of factors are behind the relative decline—I would not call it a dramatic decline—in the interest of east European seasonal workers in coming to the United Kingdom. One element is that those who have already arrived and have begun working legally as seasonal workers have been able to adapt themselves on a more permanent basis in the United Kingdom and to change the type of profession that they would like to exercise while residing in the United Kingdom.

Secondly, contrary to public perceptions, in part—those perceptions are fuelled by some of your wide circulation newspapers, if I may put it that way—that the United Kingdom is a great magnet for the low-skilled labour force, there is an element that concerns the standard of living in the United Kingdom. It is relatively expensive for east Europeans to live in the United Kingdom, compared with opportunities in other, less-expensive EU countries, especially bearing in mind that some of those countries have overcome the most acute phases of the economic crisis that they had been living through after the problems with the eurozone and the financial crisis of 2008-09.

The third element is perhaps the element of insecurity about people’s long-term status in the United Kingdom, especially if they are yet to arrive. Although we are, technically speaking, at the end of your full membership, we have not yet entered your transition period. Still, in the perception of the average national, the question always lingers—if I commit myself to the United Kingdom and I am not given the same status that my compatriots have who are there already, it is worthwhile taking the risk? On top of that, the work is seasonal, without guarantees for any long-term employment.

Those may be the factors that combine, in a specific way, in the minds of those who show greater reticence to commit themselves to repetitive seasonal work in the United Kingdom. At least, that is my explanation.

May I ask a supplementary question on Jamie Greene’s theme? I expect that many of your nationals seek official advice from your Government. What official advice is being given to nationals who ask about their status in the UK and whether they should come to the UK to do seasonal work or whatever?

The procedures that are to be adopted by your Government in dialogue, as I said, with us, the member states, and the representation of the European Union in London, and probably also in Edinburgh, Belfast and Wales, have not yet been finalised. At this point, therefore, we are not embarking on an active information campaign on the way in which people could revalidate their legal status from a permanent status, as it is called now, into a settled status, which it may be called after the UK’s withdraw from the European Union. We need to avoid confusion or the creation of false impressions about the actual rights, starting from the content of the questionnaire that should have to be filled in and going on to issues such as family reunification, pension benefits and social benefits

By the end of the summer, perhaps we will have greater clarity on the total plan of the United Kingdom Government and thereafter we are ready to engage in an explanatory campaign, both digitally and through other sources of the Bulgarian embassy and inside Bulgaria. That seems to be the expected plan of action of other countries whose nationals are among the economic migrants into the United Kingdom. At this point, it is a bit premature to engage in an information campaign because such a campaign might be a bit misleading before the plans of the UK Government in co-ordination with the European Union have been finalised.

Given some of the identified priorities that you have for the presidency, and in relation to some of your comments in your opening statement about the multi-annual financial framework, I would like to hear your views on where the main opportunities lie within the new framework. I think that one of your priorities is on the future of Europe and young people and I believe that the budget for Erasmus is due to double. The committee has done a report on the Erasmus+ programme, which Scotland wants very much to continue to be part of.

I would like to hear about some of the opportunities that you think will exist in the new financial framework and, for example, other areas that we can take part in. I know that there are areas of concern within the new budget as well, particularly around cuts to rural development funding. I wanted to get your views on that, too.

Starting from your final point, madam, I mentioned the common agricultural policy because there are problems there. The retention of the level and the categorisation of the funding in the common agricultural policy is an area in which the fight is yet to enter its acute phase. We are at the initial phase of the debate on the multi-annual financial framework, but we would like to retain the levels of agricultural support while at the same time agreeing to the needs of reforming the principles of financing agricultural farmers, especially when we talk about support for smaller-scale farmers versus the obvious advantage that larger-scale farmers have enjoyed throughout the years as a result of the current CAP architecture.

Erasmus is an important priority, and we support its centrality in the multi-annual financial framework. We are happy that the United Kingdom and the devolved Administration in Scotland are very much interested in continuing an active participation in the programmes of Erasmus post-Brexit. We will continue to treasure the academic and scientific excellence of the United Kingdom institutions and, as far as Bulgaria is concerned, guaranteed access by UK institutions or non-governmental bodies, research centres, universities, laboratories and so on to the Erasmus programme projects and vice versa will be most welcome, along with helping your research and technological capacity to develop as a result of the co-operation with the European Union. We think that the retention of the United Kingdom’s cutting-edge role in specific scientific areas is also important to retaining your stature as one of the leading forces inside the G7 and the P5, the permanent members of the European Union, with a determined interest in retaining the strength, cohesion and geopolitical weight of Europe—I mean not necessarily only the European Union, but Europe as a civilisational identity—in difficult and competitive times.

09:30  

Good morning, ambassador. Under the Bulgarian presidency, has any activity been undertaken to deal with the rise of populist movements in the European Union countries in order to try to safeguard the existence of the European Union?

That is an extremely important question. The question seems to be related to domestic politics or international party politics, but the European Union can actually do a lot from one particular angle, in my view. It can manage—without unlawfully controlling it—the digital space against attempts at waging hybrid warfare through propagation of fake news, and through manipulation of public opinion by distribution of non-facts and mixtures of facts and lies. All those elements of information warfare have to do with the capacity of populist movements to build up support for their doctrines based on a lack of proper solid knowledge about the truth and reality in the minds of many of their potential voters.

That is where the European Union, through its organised institutions and programme to strengthen cybersecurity, can combat fake news and enter into a far more simplified, in language terms, but more detailed debate about why the European Union with its current set of values is more conducive to the prosperity and security of the individual. That is where the European Union has a role to play and how it can, on top of national efforts, combat the dangerous extremeness of some populist movements in Europe.

Certainly, when the UK leaves the European Union, it will be important that there is that strength in an organisation, and that there is a grouping of nations that genuinely want to work together beside this country, so that we have better security and understandable trading arrangements. There are also issues such as the Erasmus scheme, which Mairi Gougeon spoke about. It is important that the European Union survives for many years to come.

I totally share that view. We expect that the future agreement, if it is one agreement, should contain a trade pillar, a security pillar—which could be subdivided into justice and home affairs—and a common foreign, security and defence pillar. A comprehensive agreement—a sui generis agreement—that is not a routine third-country agreement, but is a special case of privilege and deep partnership, would be the kind of outcome from this Brexit situation that would reflect the interests of the majority of UK nationals and I would say, the majority of not only Bulgarian nationals, but the people of most countries of the European Union.

That is, however, the next step. I stress once again that the UK Government and especially some supporters of the majority in the United Kingdom Parliament should understand that it is difficult to move officially to step 2 before we have finished step 1. We should concentrate on finalisation of the withdrawal agreement and of the characteristics of the transition period, including its de jure or de facto length.

Following on from that, what is your view on what selective participation might be, going forward? What will be the challenges and barriers to ensuring that there will still be United Kingdom participation? Although we will no longer be in the EU, will we still have the opportunity for our expertise and the expertise in the EU be tapped into and assessed and processed across the participating countries? How would that succeed?

How the United Kingdom participates organisationally and financially in programmes that are instituted by the European Union for the period after your withdrawal will be part of the arrangement. The obvious areas in that respect are regional development programmes, projects on cohesion and on strengthening the less-advanced regions and countries within the European Union, and participation in the common security and defence policies of the European Union. Of course, you must keep it in mind that the UK will not be part of the decision-making process, but might somehow be incorporated into the decision-shaping consultative phase in conceptualisation and design of future operations.

The UK should also be involved in projects that are related to realisation of the common foreign and security policies of the European Union outside the geographical scope of the European Union. Of course, it should also be involved in areas related to scientific research and the ability of the European Union to give young people a chance to get, sooner rather than later, good job qualifications based on overall improvement in the level of accessible education.

You mentioned in your opening remarks the challenges for Europe of the refugee crisis. Bulgaria has been involved in that on two main fronts. My understanding is that Bulgaria agreed to take in, through the emergency resettlement scheme, about 1,300 people who had arrived in Europe through Italy and Greece. It would be interesting to hear what progress has been made in that, and about how that has more directly affected Bulgaria in relation to Turkey, and the agreement between the European Union and Turkey. As a nation that borders Turkey, how does Bulgaria ensure that the human rights of refugees who arrive through Turkey are respected, given the concerns that the EU, through the presidency, has raised about the human rights situation in Turkey?

One has to be very precise in describing how we might deal successfully with that problem. We are bound, by applicable international and national law, to register every foreign national who legally crosses the borders of Bulgaria. In the process of registration, those individuals must say where they have come from and what their grounds are for requesting refuge or some other form of legal—probably permanent—stay in a country of the European Union. We are bound by current convention as a country of first entry to register all those people on the moment of entry: we are not allowed to wave them through for them to go to another country. That is something that we have never done and will never do, even though it adds to the burden of responsibility on Bulgaria.

There is, however, another element: we cannot force people to remain in Bulgaria contrary to their will. In other words, we register them and we are not allowed by any international treaty—including European Union acquis communautaire—to make them stay in Bulgaria. The only permissible sanction is for the person, having been registered in Bulgaria, to be returned to Bulgaria by another country that has established that the individual in question came to that country from Bulgaria.

The same logic continues: once that person is returned to Bulgaria, we do not put him or her into a camp. They continue to be relatively free, in their movement. If they then leave Bulgaria, they must return again to Bulgaria. That is not efficient. Therefore, we say the following: we have to reduce the incentives of migrants to come to the European Union and we have to crack down with greater determination on the international trafficking gangs. We have to keep the all-important agreement with Turkey on the control of refugee or migrant flows, especially along the route from Syria through Turkey to Europe. We have, of course, to appeal for greater solidarity from countries that have a very low migrant presence in their territories but are still very reluctant even to conceive of voluntary acceptance of a quota of migrants. That is the most problematic essence of the political debate, which continues as we speak.

You mentioned countries that have very low numbers of refugees arriving, which includes the United Kingdom because of our geographical reality, but also because of the policy intentions of the United Kingdom Government. What are your hopes regarding the UK’s participation in European responses to the refugee crisis after the UK has left the European Union?

It is very clear that the expertise of border management is something that we in Bulgaria value very much. That is also the case with Greece. It is also the case with Frontex, as an organisation of the European Union. The UK has expertise in border management. Former military personnel could, in times of crisis, be invited to control borders. They could be retrained in rules of engagement with non-combatants, because refugees—even the most aggressive ones who want to cross a border illegally—cannot be equated with, say, jihadist terrorists in Afghanistan. They are civilians and are in quite a different category, so we cannot employ rules of engagement that are applicable to a combat situation.

09:45  

The United Kingdom is a country that has very good training expertise for former or current military women and men, who could be retrained to perform functions that are more characteristic of border guards, in situations of extreme pressure on the borders of a country by migrants or refugees. These are areas where you—by which I mean the United Kingdom—could be very useful in terms of co-operation.

Thank you very much. We have very little time left, but one more member will come in. Questions and answers should be as brief as possible, please. Thank you very much.

Can I ask you about US trade policy on aluminium and steel? Will your presidency maintain the very strong line that the European Union has taken so far towards President Trump’s tariffs, which are seen as being clearly protectionist in terms of trade policy?

I will answer with a couple of sentences. That is something that we have left to be handled by the European Commission. We have advised the Commission to exhaust all possible channels of dialogue, but once dialogue has proved to be futile, we have to be ready to employ proportionate—that word—countermeasures that will not in themselves provoke further escalation of reciprocal trade sanctions. An all-out trade war would be totally detrimental to all sides in this unacceptable situation.

It has been a great pleasure to hear from you today, not only as an ambassador but as a former member of the Bulgarian National Assembly’s European Affairs Committee. Thank you very much for coming to give evidence today. It is very clear that the Bulgarian presidency has made progress and has faced significant challenges during your six months. Thank you for coming to speak to us today.

09:47 Meeting suspended.  

09:50 On resuming—