Adoption and Children (Scotland) Bill: Stage 3
Resumed debate.
We resume stage 3 consideration of the Adoption and Children (Scotland) Bill. Members should have the bill as amended at stage 2, which is SP Bill 61A; the marshalled list, which contains all the amendments that I have selected for debate; a supplement to the marshalled list, which contains one manuscript amendment; and the groupings, which I have agreed.
The division bell will sound and proceedings will be suspended for five minutes for the first division on an amendment. The period of voting for the first division will be 30 seconds. Thereafter, I will allow a voting period of one minute for the first division after a debate. All other divisions will last 30 seconds.
I invite the Minister for Parliamentary Business to move a motion under rule 9.8.5A of the standing orders to extend the next time limit by 30 minutes, which will have the knock-on effect of extending all remaining time limits by 30 minutes.
Motion moved,
That, under Rule 9.8.5A, the time-limits for groups 8 to 10 be extended by 30 minutes.—[Ms Margaret Curran.]
Motion agreed to.
I therefore expect the debate on whether the bill should be passed to begin shortly before 4.30 pm and decision time to be around 5.30 pm, although it might be just a little earlier.
Group 8 is on permanence orders. Amendment 104, in the name of the minister, is grouped with amendments 105, 34 to 36, 115 to 117, 37, 38, 42, 44 to 46, 129, 131, 56, 60, 63, 66, 148, 67, 68 and 71 to 74.
We begin round 2 of the debate.
Amendment 104 is simply a technical amendment that will replace a reference to a permanence order to provide consistency of expression with the rest of the bill.
Amendment 105 was lodged to define the term "parent" in sections 33(2) and 33(2A). It will bring the definition of "parent" in those sections into line with the definition that will be used in the section that sets out the conditions for a permanence order with authority to adopt. Amendment 115 is also relevant in that context.
Essentially, amendments 34 to 38 and amendment 115 will divide up the provisions that were originally contained in section 84. This is another restructuring issue. Members of the committee thought that that section was too long; the amendments address their concerns.
I do not think that Lord James Douglas-Hamilton will press amendment 116, but I will resist it if he does so. He lodged a similar amendment at stage 2, when the clarity of the provisions was its attraction. However, I hope that we have now addressed the problems in a satisfactory manner in amendments 34 to 38 and amendment 115. At stage 2, I set out my policy concerns about his amendment, so we do not need to rehearse them again.
Lord James Douglas-Hamilton's amendment 117 would not add anything new to the bill—all the provisions that the amendment proposes are already contained in the bill. Under section 37(2), the making of an adoption order will extinguish the parental responsibilities and rights that were previously held and will therefore bring a permanence order to an end. Under subsection (2) of the new section to be inserted by amendment 35, the duration of a permanence order is otherwise clearly provided for. That provision is not new—it will replace section 84(9).
Amendments 42, 44 to 46, 129, 131 56, 60, 63, 66, 148, 67, 68 and 71 to 74 are technical, consequential amendments that arise from the redrafting of section 84. Amendments 42, 44 and 45 will replace references to subsection (4) of section 84 with subsection (1) of the new section that will set out provisions with regard to the ancillary provisions of a permanence order. Amendment 46 will replace the reference in section 90 to subsection 84(6) with a reference to the new section that contains the conditions that must be met before a permanence order that grants authority for a child to be adopted may be made.
Amendments 129 and 131 will replace the references to section 84(5) with references to the new section that contains the conditions that must be met before a permanence order that grants authority for a child to be adopted may be made. Amendments 56, 60, 63, 66, 148, 67, 68 and 71 to 74 are consequential.
I move amendment 104.
My amendments in the group were drafted by Janys Scott, who is an advocate, part-time sheriff and one of the foremost experts in Scotland on the subject. I am grateful to the minister for agreeing to see me with her and Michael Clancy of the Law Society of Scotland.
I will not enter into a debate on whose drafting is better, and I cannot claim that every detail of what I have proposed has been accepted. Nevertheless, I thank the minister for accepting a great deal of the spirit of my amendments through the expert wording of his own draftsman. It was kind of him to give us an hour and a quarter of his valuable time. I feel a little like the man who abstained from taking any alcohol but who was presented with a bottle of cherry brandy. Not wishing to appear ungrateful, he replied, "Thank you for the gift and the spirit in which it is given." Because I am grateful to the minister for lodging amendment 104 and the associated amendments, I will not move my amendments in this group or the associated amendments in subsequent groups. I will support the Executive's amendments.
The credit for the minister's substantial movement should go not just to him, but to the Law Society of Scotland and to Janys Scott of the Faculty of Advocates.
I welcome the Executive's amendments and congratulate Lord James Douglas-Hamilton on his diligence and persistence in pursuing his concerns in the matter of permanence order provisions.
I was grateful for the input of members of all parties and their expert advisers, and for the meeting with the Law Society, which Lord James Douglas-Hamilton mentioned. That input has focused minds on the technicalities of a difficult and complex bill, and the bill has benefited from it. I am also grateful to both Adam Ingram and Lord James Douglas-Hamilton.
Amendment 104 agreed to.
Amendment 105 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 51—Adoption support plans
Amendments 106 and 107 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 52—Duration
Group 9 is on assessment of an adopted person's requirements beyond the age of 18. Amendment 108, in the name of Adam Ingram, is the only amendment in the group.
The minister will be familiar with the debate that we had in the Education Committee on the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004, concerning the importance of making provision for the transition periods in young people's lives, such as that which occurs when they move from school to college. The principle behind amendment 108 is similar.
Members will be aware that adopted children nowadays have often been traumatised by early life experiences and that the damage that has been done can have a lifelong impact. It is, therefore, important that their access to services, such as those that are provided by child and adolescent mental health teams, is not cut off at the age of 18. Access to appropriate services needs to be planned for, so that there is a seamless transition in the provision of services to meet the needs of young people in that situation. However, according to agencies in the field, such as Adoption UK, seamless transitions are, unfortunately, the exception rather than the rule.
When the law changed in England, that difficulty was not picked up down there and has developed into a serious problem. We have an opportunity to address the issue now. I therefore commend amendment 108 to the chamber.
I move amendment 108.
I am minded to support amendment 108 because, as Adam Ingram has said, it would permit a smooth transition from children's services to comparable adult services for people who still very much need that support after the age of 18. Without the amendment, there is a danger of necessary services either being withdrawn or not being replaced. I feel that the amendment would provide an important safeguard.
I am grateful to Adam Ingram for lodging the amendment, which hits on the head an important area that, as he rightly says, we have all had experience of in other fields—not least during our consideration of the Education (Additional Support for Learning) (Scotland) Act 2004.
I accept entirely the central point. However, under the bill, adopted children will have access to adoption support services under an adoption support plan, which will detail the services that the local authority provides to a child to meet any needs that have been identified and assessed. Adoption support plans will cease to have effect when a child reaches 18. Amendment 108 would require a local authority to consider whether a child needed adult services, although it would not require the local authority to take any steps in that connection.
The amendment is unnecessary, because under the more coherent approach that we now have to adoption services, the bill provides for people to be able to access adoption services throughout life. Even though that will not be provided for in an adoption support plan, it ought to happen as a matter of course. I say to Adam Ingram—this is the important point—that I am happy to progress the issue in the development of good practice and subsidiary stuff, such as the consideration of guidance, as we try to move towards having high-quality services that are spread evenly throughout Scotland and to fill in the gaps that have been identified during the passage of the bill. I hope that he will accept that assurance as genuine and will therefore ask to withdraw the amendment, which would not advance the situation.
I appreciate what the minister said about the focus of amendment 108. I also appreciate that we can deal with some issues in regulations. On the basis of the commitment that he has given, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 108, by agreement, withdrawn.
Section 55—Reassessment of needs for adoption support services
Amendment 109 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 61—Connections between the register and birth records
Amendments 110 and 111 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 65—Preliminary order where child to be adopted abroad
Amendment 112 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 66—Restriction on removal of children for adoption outwith Great Britain
Group 10 is on the meaning of "protected child". Amendment 113, in Hugh Henry's name, is the only amendment in the group.
Amendment 113 will replace part of section 66(9), which defines a protected child for the purposes of restrictions on removing a child from Great Britain with a view to adoption outwith the British isles. A person who takes or sends a protected child out of Great Britain for the purposes of adoption commits an offence. The amendment will make a protected child one who is habitually resident in the United Kingdom or a Commonwealth citizen, rather than a British subject or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, as the bill currently says—that reflects previous legislation.
The original definition was taken from the Adoption (Scotland) Act 1978 and is outdated. I am told that citizens of the Republic of Ireland were previously included because of former intercountry adoption connections with that country that are no longer directly relevant. The amendment is in line with the updated definition that is used in the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which is appropriate for a unified approach. In practical terms, the amendment will make a technical update.
I move amendment 113.
Amendment 113 agreed to.
Section 12—Adoption societies which are not registered adoption services
Amendment 114 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Before section 84
Amendments 34 to 36 and 115 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 84—Permanence orders
Amendments 116 and 117 not moved.
Amendment 37 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 85—Conditions and considerations applicable to making of order
Group 11 is on conditions and considerations applicable to making of permanence order. Amendment 119, in the name of Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, is grouped with amendment 120. I understand that Lord James does not intend to move amendment 119.
I will not move amendment 119 for the reason that I gave during the debate on an earlier group: I am content with the technical amendments lodged by the minister.
Amendment 119 not moved.
Section 85 already sets out the conditions and considerations applicable to making a permanence order, which include the condition in section 85(5)(c) that the court must be satisfied before making a permanence order that no person has the right to have the child living with them or otherwise to regulate the child's residence. That was the issue that bothered Lord James. I will say nothing further on the subject because of his change of position.
Amendment 120 makes it clear that the paramount consideration of the court in granting a permanence order is the welfare of the child throughout his or her childhood. That reflects the fact that, apart from including responsibility to provide guidance as far as the age of 18, a permanence order lasts only until the child is 16. That differs from section 9(4)(c), under which the welfare consideration with regard to the making of an adoption order is to be the effect on the child throughout their life, as is appropriate.
Amendment 120 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
After section 85
Amendment 38 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 86A—Effect of order on existing parental right
Group 12 is on definition of "relevant child". Amendment 39, in the name of the minister, is grouped with amendments 40, 41 and 43.
Amendments 39 and 40 are consequential on the removal of the term "relevant child" from the sections replacing section 84. The amendments replace the reference to "relevant child" with a reference to
"the child in respect of whom a permanence order is made".
Wonderful are the ways of the drafters in such matters.
Amendments 41 and 43 are also drafting amendments that are consequential on the removal of references to "relevant child". The reference to the section that will replace the pertinent part of current section 84 in section 88A(1)(b) makes it clear that section 88A deals with a child
"in respect of whom a permanence order has been made".
The label and definition are therefore unnecessary.
I move amendment 39.
Amendment 39 agreed to.
Amendment 40 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
After section 87
Group 13 is on parental responsibilities and rights subsisting after making of permanence order. Amendment 121, in the name of Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, is the only amendment in the group.
As I explained earlier, amendment 121 is associated with amendments 116 and 117, in relation to which the Executive has already made concessions. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to move amendment 121 at this stage.
Amendment 121 not moved.
Section 88A—Exercise of parental right under order
Amendments 41 to 43 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 89—Variation of ancillary provisions in order
Amendments 44 and 45 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 90—Amendment of order to grant authority for child to be adopted
Amendment 46 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 91—Proceedings
Group 14 is on variation of permanence order: proceedings. Amendment 122, in the name of the minister, is grouped with amendment 123.
Amendment 122 is essentially an amendment for the sake of consistency in the bill. Section 91 already lists those persons who are entitled to make representations to the court in any proceedings relating to variation of a permanence order. Those include the local authority; the child; any person with parental responsibilities or rights in relation to the child; any person who has had a duty conferred on him or her by the order; any person who had parental responsibilities or rights in relation to the child immediately prior to the making of the order; and anyone who had parental responsibilities or rights in relation to the child immediately prior to a previous variation of the order. It also includes any other person who, in the opinion of the court, is able to "demonstrate an interest".
We lodged an amendment to section 86 at stage 2 to allow anyone who simply claims an interest to make representations to the court in proceedings for an application for a permanence order, rather than first having to demonstrate an interest in the opinion of the court. Amendment 122 ensures that the same criteria apply in proceedings for a variation of an order. There is no change in the substance of the matter. Any person who simply claims an interest will be able to make representations. The court will take those representations into account in its deliberations if it considers that they are valid.
Amendment 123 is a technical amendment that seeks to clarify the relationship between the two provisions in section 91(5) by inserting an "or" between paragraphs (a) and (b), as the "other" in paragraph (b) means that the two provisions have to be mutually exclusive.
I move amendment 122.
I am grateful that the minister has lodged amendment 122, which removes the burden of having first to demonstrate an interest before being allowed to make representations to the court. It is very unlikely that those who claim to have an interest will not be genuine, and the court should be allowed to weigh up the various views.
Amendment 122 agreed to.
Amendments 123 and 47 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
After section 91
Group 15 is on the interface between permanence orders and supervision requirements. Amendment 124, in the name of the minister, is grouped with amendments 125, 49, 126, 51, 52, 153, 53 and 54.
The interface between permanence orders and the children's hearings system is a complex but important area that has given rise to a great deal of comment and, indeed, has been the subject of some discussion with Lord James Douglas-Hamilton, Adam Ingram and other members. I repeat my thanks to those who have contributed to the discussions on the bill's provisions in this area and I hope that we have listened carefully to all that has been said. Although what we have come up with is not our original proposal, we think that it provides the best practical way forward for the child and the process.
Amendment 124 seeks to place a duty on the children's hearing to prepare a report for the court if it proposes to make or to modify a supervision requirement, when there is a live application for a permanence order or when such an order is subject to variation or amendment. If the court is content with the proposal, it can remit the child's case back to the hearing under section 91A(3), which allows the hearing to make or to modify the requirement. Without such a remittal, the wider terms of section 91A would prevent the children's hearing from doing that.
Two principles apply to the period when the permanence order is live. First, if there is a conflict between the permanence order, which is a court order that has been made by a higher authority, and the supervision requirement, which is a broader, longer-term provision, the permanence order should prevail. Secondly, as the children's hearings system is usually responsible for providing for the welfare of children, the people who are involved in the system are, given their previous involvement in such matters, perhaps the best equipped to hold the detailed discussions that are sometimes necessary. Amendment 124 seeks to make that link in that regard.
Amendment 125 seeks to delete section 91A(2), which says that
"No supervision requirement in respect of the child may be made or varied",
and to replace it with wording that takes account of the fact that, in addition to being varied, the supervision requirement might require to be modified under section 73(9)(d) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 to insert in the requirement any requirement that could have been imposed under section 70(3) of the 1995 act.
Amendment 49 is a tidying-up amendment that seeks to clarify the provision in section 91A.
Amendment 126 is linked to amendment 124, which seeks to introduce the new section on the duty of the children's hearing to prepare a report for the court. It seeks to make it clear that the court's power to remit cases to the children's hearing is not limited to cases in which it receives such a report. For example, proceedings during a permanence order application might bring up a matter that is best handled by the children's hearings system. Under section 91A(3), the court has the power to remit a child's case to the children's hearing on its own initiative, as well as when it receives a report from the children's hearing.
On amendment 51, in the name of Adam Ingram, the question is whether, in the period between the making of an application for and the granting of a permanence order, the court should deal with all matters relating to any existing supervision requirement to which the child may be subject. Amendment 51 suggests that, with a few specific exceptions, that should be the case. We do not agree, because we think that the expertise and experience of the hearing and the court are different. We do not think that a sheriff is the best person to decide how best to conduct a routine review of a supervision requirement or handle minor truancy or petty offending incidents. Discussions on such matters properly belong with the hearing; it would probably be of no advantage to the child or the process to have them dealt with by a court.
We accept that there is a risk that, in some cases, a children's hearing might make supervision requirements—particularly in relation to contact, which is potentially the most contentious area—that send the child in a different direction from that in which he or she will ultimately go after a permanence order is made. To remedy that, we have given the court an ability to make interim orders. Amendment 153 will ensure that if there is any conflict or inconsistency, interim orders will prevail over any supervision requirement. In that way, we hope that matters will come together in the end.
Amendment 52 will ensure that the wording of section 91B(1) mirrors that of section 91A(1); it has no substantive effect. The purpose of amendment 53 is to ensure that in section 91B, as in other parts of the bill, the phrase
"variation of a permanence order"
includes amendment of the order to give permission for the child to be adopted.
Amendment 153 makes it clear that if a child in respect of whom an interim order is made is subject to a supervision requirement and the provisions of the order conflict or are otherwise inconsistent, the provisions of the order prevail. If I remember rightly, that issue was dealt with in a manuscript amendment at stage 2, as a result of an accidental omission at an earlier stage. I may be wrong about that because I have lost track of which amendment is which. Amendment 153 is an important amendment, at any rate.
Amendment 54, in the name of Adam Ingram, seeks to deal with the situation in which the permanence order has been made and the children's hearing proposes to vary an existing supervision requirement or to make a fresh one. We are clear that, once a permanence order has been made in respect of a child, the child should be treated in the same way as any other child, which includes preserving their right to have any relevant issues that affect them dealt with by the children's hearing rather than by the court. As I said at stage 2, that will avoid legal aid and a panoply of other matters coming into play when that is not necessary. We do children no service if a case of minor truancy or an offending issue that arises some years after the permanence order was made leads to the involvement of a court as well as a children's hearing. We receive complaints about the difficulty that children have in following all the events that swirl round them as important decisions about their lives are made.
We acknowledge that, in a few cases, after a permanence order has been granted, a birth parent who has some remaining parental responsibilities and rights might seek to trigger a review of a supervision requirement, perhaps with a view to obtaining greater contact than is allowed for under the permanence order. Such cases will be rare because birth parents will often be left with no responsibilities or rights. The supervision requirement will usually be revoked when the permanence order is made, so there will be no requirement to review. That is what we anticipate will happen in most cases.
If there is a review, the hearing is likely to be wary of making a supervision requirement that would conflict with the permanence order. However, if the hearing took a decision that the local authority or the reporter thought was misguided, remedies would be available. The local authority can appeal a procedurally flawed or clearly unreasonable decision to the sheriff and can seek to vary the permanence order, which would bring in the arrangements to do with the permanence order being live and would allow interim orders to be made that superseded the supervision requirement, if the court agreed. In addition, the local authority can seek to vary the order to remove the birth parents' remaining parental responsibilities and rights, if they are being abused to trigger vexatious reviews. There are plenty of remedies to deal with those relatively unusual circumstances.
Group 15 is a complex but important group of amendments. We take the view that during the period of activity of an application for a permanence order—or of an application to change it—the permanence order will prevail, but incidental matters will be dealt with in the usual way by the children's hearing. Once the permanence order is in place, the children's hearing comes into its own in the usual way, as it would if the children were living with their own parents. That provides a logical, philosophically acceptable and—I hope—practical framework for such matters to be dealt with.
I move amendment 124.
As Robert Brown rightly said, the amendments in group 15 address a complex area of the law and practice. The adoption policy review group was exercised by the issues with which the group deals. The key problem stems from an overlap between the children's hearings system and the courts that deal with adoption. The adoption process can be derailed if the two bodies cannot be aligned and end up making contradictory or differing decisions.
To solve that problem, the adoption policy review group made two recommendations. The first of those would govern what happens when a permanence order application is made for a child who is subject to a supervision requirement. The recommendation was that, during the period when the permanence order is being determined, any existing supervision requirement should continue in force but any changes should be made by the court rather than by the children's hearing that made the supervision requirement. In addition, any interim orders that are made by the court should supersede inconsistent conditions of the supervision requirement.
The point at issue is that the Executive's attempts to implement that recommendation in sections 91A and 91B appear not to be fit for purpose, even with the adjustment that is proposed in amendment 153. BAAF Scotland has provided a detailed technical analysis, which is informed by not just legal expertise but practical professional experience, as to the reasons why that is so. I hope that the minister and other members have received a copy of that analysis.
The upshot is that there is a fear in professional circles that, because the interface between the court and the children's hearing is not set out in line with the APRG recommendation, local authorities will not use permanence orders. If that is so, the bill's key reform mechanism will be dead in the water. That is a situation that none of us would wish to see. Amendment 51 is offered as a solution to the problem of implementing the APRG recommendation.
We are in a very unhappy predicament here. Serious questions are being asked about, essentially, the competence of the bill's draftsmanship. Last minute manuscript amendments were made to critical provisions in the bill. I do not see how the minister can convincingly rebut the detailed criticisms that are made in the BAAF briefing. Members present should be aware that the briefing and amendment 51 were prepared by the independent legal adviser to Sheriff Principal Graham Cox's adoption policy review group and that BAAF has the support of the Association of Directors of Social Work in its concerns. I urge the minister to accept amendment 51 and thereby dispel the fears of a fundamental flaw in the bill.
Amendment 54 would reinstate the APRG's second recommendation, which the Executive has decided not to implement, on the interface between the court and the children's hearing. The provisions in amendment 54 would govern what happens after a permanence order has been granted and the hearings system is still involved, or wants to become involved, with the child. The amendment would again give the court primacy for any variation of the conditions of the permanence order. The fact that such children would be treated differently in the hearings system would be offset by the consideration that there must be some limit to what a hearing may do about the residence, contact and basic welfare aspects of the life of a child who is already subject to a court order. If a permanence order is to work, it must provide a significant level of security for the child.
I intend to move amendments 51 and 54.
It is crucial that we get the interface between the court system and the children's hearings system right if we are to move forward with permanence orders. As members may or may not be aware, tensions have always existed since the Boarding Out and Fostering of Children (Scotland) Regulations 1985 (SSI 1985/1799) made it difficult to talk about adoption when, under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, the children's hearings system was being used to place a child. Things got very confusing because the word "adoption" was not allowed to be mentioned at the children's hearing, as the law did not allow for that, even though everyone knew that that was the reason why the child was being placed under a supervision requirement.
We need to be careful that we get the interface between the children's hearings system and the court system right. If we fail to do that, the concern among some people is that the permanence order will not be used. There are too many good ideas in child care legislation that have never been properly implemented—although the idea was sound, the legal framework in which it was to be enshrined became too difficult and people shied away from it. Today, we have to ensure that we have that right and that we have a piece of legislation that is fit for purpose.
Our difficulty is with the different roles and responsibilities of the two systems. We have to be careful to ensure that a supervision requirement from a children's hearing can in no way impede the process of the permanence order. That goes to the crux of the matter that we are discussing. When the court is considering making an interim or full permanence order, there should be nothing in any supervision requirement that might still be in place that could be used to subvert the order. Because of the way in which reviews can be called—albeit that it might be the annual review—several people, including the young person, can request a review under the 1995 act. That means that several people have the opportunity to interfere with the process.
I listened carefully to the minister and he seemed to be quite clear that that would not be allowed to happen. However, I would be interested if he could expand on that during his summing up; it strikes at the heart of what we are discussing. If the supervision requirement that a children's hearing makes on a child and the court are going in slightly different directions, and the two do not properly interface, we could end up with a piece of legislation that does not just confuse but acts in a contradictory way for the young person. I want to hear from the minister a very clear exposition of how, when the court is deciding on the interim order and granting the permanence order, we can be sure that supervision requirements that are made by a children's hearing will not interfere with that in any way.
It is important that we have a proper debate on this issue today and that members should not forget that the bill is about considerably more than what we debated this morning. The point about the interface between the children's hearings system and permanence orders and the courts has exercised the Education Committee since the start of our consideration of the bill.
In our stage 1 report, we said:
"Concerns were expressed about the lack of detail over how permanence orders and the Children's Hearings system will interact. Despite the fact that both systems put the interests of children first, the two systems serve very different functions. The adoption system (of which permanence orders will form part) creates a permanent new family for a child within a legal framework of rights and responsibilities. The Children's Hearings system addresses temporary problems that can be handled within the existing family and involves lay members of the community."
In our recommendation, we welcomed the minister's commitment to address the need for clarity about the interaction between permanence orders and the children's hearings system, and the fact that he stressed the need for guidance to be issued on the subject. We also considered the matter at stage 2 and here we are talking about it again at stage 3.
It concerns me that this is a complex area and stage 3 is not the best time to try to sort out such issues. I am concerned about the system that we end up with, whatever Parliament approves. There are two approaches: Adam Ingram's approach, which comes from BAAF Scotland, and the one that the minister presented. Neither the committee nor the Parliament has had the opportunity to interrogate the two systems to find out which is the right one to adopt.
I agree with the member's comments. Given that the ADSW, which will have ultimate responsibility for so many of these children, supports the amendments in the name of Adam Ingram, does he not think that we should pause for reflection and go with the ADSW? It will have to apply the legislation and it is telling us that it wants the amendments in the name of Adam Ingram.
That is part of the debate that we are having. It is difficult to consider these issues at stage 3, especially when there is such a divergence of views on such a crucial matter. It is very difficult for members who have not been involved in this process. Robert Brown talked about the Deputy Presiding Officer's eyes glazing over this morning, but I think that everyone's eyes will glaze over. I should say that Mr Brown was not talking about the Deputy Presiding Officer who is in the chair just now—I just want to make that clear. It is understandable when we are dealing with a complex technical issue. No one can know how the interfaces will work until they are applied. It worries me slightly that if the professionals have decided that the interfaces will not work, they will not even try to apply them in order to find out whether they do. That cannot be allowed to happen.
I am not saying that the Executive's amendments are wrong or that the amendments from BAAF are wrong. I am saying that, whatever approach we adopt today, we must try to ensure that it works and that everyone buckles down to that task. I am not a legal expert and have never been involved in the children's hearings system. The comments of Scott Barrie, who has been involved in child social work, were valuable, but it is difficult for us to make decisions on the issue today.
I want the minister in his response to provide a clear indication of why the Executive has decided to take a different route from the one that was proposed in the APRG's report. What is the best response that it can give at this stage to the BAAF briefing that has been issued to members? I accept that it has had a short time to respond to that briefing, just as BAAF had a short time to respond to the Executive's amendments. I want to get a clear indication of why the Executive is proposing to take the route that it has chosen and how it will ensure that the system functions, if it is put in place.
As has been said, permanence orders are a crucial part of the bill. They are about changing the lives of young people who go into local authority care and about moving from the very uncertain system that we have had until now to a system that, by definition, gives young people a degree of permanence in their lives. It is important that we get the system right and that practitioners do not say that they will not use it because they think that the courts or the children's hearings system will muck it up. Let us get clarity on this important issue from the minister in his response.
Although I am a non-practising Queen's counsel, it is most unlikely that I will be involved in court proceedings on this subject. I am glad to support the amendments in the name of Adam Ingram, which would enable the court to handle all matters relating to a child during and after the application for a permanence order. It is very much in the interests of children that there is clarity and consistency of decision making about their welfare. Scott Barrie echoed that point.
The current legal structure, which allows the court and the children's hearing to make conflicting decisions, causes distress and uncertainty. Executive amendments at stage 2 alleviated the problem considerably, but not entirely, when an application for a permanence order is pending before the court. The problem has not been tackled at all in situations where a permanence order is in place, which gives rise to the particular need for amendment 54.
I understand that the minister is reluctant for cases to be referred back to court when no application is pending but, under sections 90 and 91, the court already has a role, particularly where the welfare of the child in respect of whom the permanence order was made is affected by a material change in circumstances or where there are changes to the circumstances of the child's parents, the child's guardian or a number of other specified persons. As well as the Association of Directors of Social Work, the Law Society of Scotland, from which I have received representations on the issue, is strongly of the view that the court is the most appropriate forum for variation of the central aspects of a permanence order. It believes that the children's hearing should not make orders that further redistribute parental responsibilities and rights after a permanence order has been made.
This is very much a matter of balance and judgment. I believe that the two amendments in the name of Adam Ingram resolve the problem and I am happy to support them.
As has been said, this is a complex and difficult area of the law. I find it difficult to understand why, after two years of deliberation, the APRG's recommendations should be set aside. It would be helpful if the minister would explain that further. I appreciate that the recommendations were made on a majority basis, but they followed very detailed and careful consideration of the issue.
I am particularly concerned about the situation after the permanence order is made, which was the subject of the second recommendation of the APRG. There is obviously an important role for the children's hearings system but, once an order has been made and variation to that order is sought, I am not at all clear that the children's hearing is the appropriate forum for alterations to be put in place.
The detailed briefing from BAAF, particularly on amendment 54, gives cause for concern. The Executive has come forward with a ranking system, but that system appears to be dependent on an interim order. If an interim order is to be sought on the basis of a dispute, or potential dispute, how can we be clear that a court will grant that order? If, for example, an order is sought to head off a potential dispute, there may be no cause shown, so the court will not be minded to grant the interim order. Also, if local authorities are in some way deterred from seeking interim orders, because the court will not grant them, the purposes of the bill relating to permanence orders will be undermined.
It would be helpful to hear from the minister precisely why the APRG's recommendations have not been followed, and to have a clear indication from him as to why the court is not the appropriate forum for alteration after a permanence order has been made.
I thought that I had set out as clearly as I could in my introductory comments the basic outline, as well as some of the detail, of the way in which we were trying to approach the matter. To summate, because it is important that members have it in mind, we took the view that there is a difference between the period when the permanence order is live and the period when the permanence order has been granted and is in place, at which stage the function of the court is defunct. The policy has been developed on that basis.
I entirely accept that, having said initially that we were going to accept the recommendation of the majority of the adoption policy review group, we moved away from that position as we worked through the implications of that recommendation in detail. I apologise to members for that but, as I have said, it is a complex area of the law and it was important to get the bill right as the policy developed. I stand by my position that the arrangements that we have in place are both philosophically right and practical. After the bill goes through, we will certainly examine the detailed arrangements that are put in place, to consider whether there is a need for guidance or for other arrangements to reinforce that position.
I take seriously Iain Smith's point about the fact that practitioners must be confident about using the new arrangements that will be in place. At the moment, we are in the middle of a debate about that. The proposition before us is the one that the Executive is making about how that should be done, and I have explained the different functions that I envisage the children's hearing and the court having in that regard.
At stage 2, if I recall correctly, I talked about what I saw as the disadvantage to the process and to children of having to go to court for all sorts of routine issues. There will be situations in which legal aid applications must be made, there will be delays and there will be the involvement of the higher authority, which might not be necessary for many of the detailed issues that come before a children's hearing, particularly if the issue arises a number of years down the line after the permanence order has been granted, as it could be to do with something entirely different, such as offending when the child gets into the teenage years.
I want to separate out two issues. The minister is talking about a situation that arises after the granting of a permanence order, but the major concern is about a situation in which a permanence order is pending. That is when the court should have paramouncy. As I understood it, the Executive accepted the APRG's recommendation and the amendments that the minister lodged were designed to implement it. However, because it was thought that the Executive amendments would not implement the recommendation, I lodged amendment 51. Can the minister focus on that issue and guarantee categorically that the Executive amendments are fit for purpose?
In fairness, a number of points have been made in relation to both the provenance of the permanence order and what happens once it is in place. I will deal with both those situations.
We have considered the practical implications on the ground of having to work these things through. We can visualise a number of situations that may arise. A permanence order may be applied for while a supervision order is in existence. Obviously, there is a potential for conflict, but we try to deal with that issue in the amendments. The court is able to make interim orders to bring that conflict to an immediate end if it sees fit. It has been suggested that the court might not have all the information, might not see fit to do that and might not take the matter forward but, as I understand it, interim orders are available at various stages and can be brought back if necessary at a later stage. Therefore, that is not an overriding concern. When, during that period, there is a conflict between a children's hearing order and a permanence order, the permanence order will rule, as we have already said in—I think—section 91. That is an important overarching principle, regardless of the practical details of how it works its way through.
There might be no supervision order. In that case the situation is more straightforward and there is not the same complexity.
I refer also to the powers that the children's hearing has in this situation. As we indicated previously, while a permanence order is pending—while it is live before the court—the children's hearing can go through the routine processes to continue a supervision order or it can get rid of the supervision order. However, it cannot vary the supervision order, impose new conditions on it or do things of that sort that might cause conflict with the permanence order. I do not see that there is practical conflict between the potential of the supervision order, the actions of the children's hearing and the reality of the permanence order in the way that some members have made out. In any event, such a situation will arise in only a limited number of cases.
I must deal with the situation after the permanence order is granted. At that point, in the vast bulk of cases—90 per cent of cases or whatever—the permanence order will get rid of the supervision order. The supervision order will no longer be necessary and will be finished with. However, in some cases, the court will decide to continue the supervision order. In that small minority of cases, there will be a live supervision order to be considered.
In that situation, a new supervision order issue might come forward; something new might come before the children's hearing for determination. In that event, the children's hearing can take matters forward as if it were coming to the matter afresh, but remedies are available. If various people think that the hearing has gone off the rails, the court can be brought in on the matter, either by an appeal against the determination of the hearing or by bringing back the permanence order, varying it or applying to vary it and thus bringing on board all the other arrangements in relation to interim orders and so on.
To cut a long story short, I think that the procedure is understandable and workable and that it is better than one in which everything must go to the court, which is the alternative proposal. I say that because, as we have discussed and determined already, the children's hearing and the court have different functions. Children's hearings are better equipped to deal with the shorter-term issues that arise and are potentially more expeditious than the court, as there is no need to apply for legal aid or to deal with the complexities that go with that.
To summarise, we must satisfy people that the permanence orders should be used, are worth while and do not bring complications. I do not think that they do and I think that that will become clear when the legislation goes through and is seen as a whole. We will certainly take on board the comments that have been made and I am more than happy to consider other arrangements that we can make to encourage good practice, explain the outcome of the legislation to people and ensure that practitioners are comfortable with and confident about the ways of taking matters forward. In the light of observations from members, the Executive will have to take that on board, perhaps with greater urgency than I had anticipated when I proposed the arrangements.
I hope that that has dealt with all the issues that have arisen on the matter. I would propose that the Executive's basic approach in this regard is correct, as is the way forward for the arrangements. The Executive's approach avoids that of amendments 51 and 54, which would clutter up matters and cause all sorts of other confusions. This is a complex matter. I am sorry to have to explain it at stage 3. The basic framework was there at stage 2, and what we are doing, after discussion with the various interests and further consideration of the detail, is tidying up one or two loose ends, which, hopefully, will make the arrangements foolproof.
Amendment 124 agreed to.
Amendments 48, 125, 49, 126 and 50 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Amendment 51 moved—[Mr Adam Ingram].
The question is, that amendment 51 be agreed to. Are we agreed?
No.
There will be a division. We will have a suspension while the division bell is rung and members return to the chamber.
Meeting suspended.
On resuming—
We will now proceed with the division.
For
Adam, Brian (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
Byrne, Ms Rosemary (South of Scotland) (Sol)
Crawford, Bruce (Mid Scotland and Fife) (SNP)
Cunningham, Roseanna (Perth) (SNP)
Curran, Frances (West of Scotland) (SSP)
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James (Lothians) (Con)
Fabiani, Linda (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Fox, Colin (Lothians) (SSP)
Gallie, Phil (South of Scotland) (Con)
Gibson, Rob (Highlands and Islands) (SNP)
Grahame, Christine (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Hyslop, Fiona (Lothians) (SNP)
Ingram, Mr Adam (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Lochhead, Richard (Moray) (SNP)
MacAskill, Mr Kenny (Lothians) (SNP)
Marwick, Tricia (Mid Scotland and Fife) (SNP)
Mather, Jim (Highlands and Islands) (SNP)
Matheson, Michael (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Maxwell, Mr Stewart (West of Scotland) (SNP)
McLetchie, David (Edinburgh Pentlands) (Con)
Milne, Mrs Nanette (North East Scotland) (Con)
Mitchell, Margaret (Central Scotland) (Con)
Morgan, Alasdair (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Neil, Alex (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Petrie, Dave (Highlands and Islands) (Con)
Scott, John (Ayr) (Con)
Sheridan, Tommy (Glasgow) (Sol)
Stevenson, Stewart (Banff and Buchan) (SNP)
Sturgeon, Nicola (Glasgow) (SNP)
Swinney, Mr John (North Tayside) (SNP)
Tosh, Murray (West of Scotland) (Con)
Turner, Dr Jean (Strathkelvin and Bearsden) (Ind)
Watt, Ms Maureen (North East Scotland) (SNP)
Welsh, Mr Andrew (Angus) (SNP)
White, Ms Sandra (Glasgow) (SNP)
Against
Alexander, Ms Wendy (Paisley North) (Lab)
Arbuckle, Mr Andrew (Mid Scotland and Fife) (LD)
Baillie, Jackie (Dumbarton) (Lab)
Baker, Richard (North East Scotland) (Lab)
Barrie, Scott (Dunfermline West) (Lab)
Boyack, Sarah (Edinburgh Central) (Lab)
Brankin, Rhona (Midlothian) (Lab)
Brown, Robert (Glasgow) (LD)
Butler, Bill (Glasgow Anniesland) (Lab)
Canavan, Dennis (Falkirk West) (Ind)
Chisholm, Malcolm (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab)
Craigie, Cathie (Cumbernauld and Kilsyth) (Lab)
Curran, Ms Margaret (Glasgow Baillieston) (Lab)
Deacon, Susan (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)
Eadie, Helen (Dunfermline East) (Lab)
Ferguson, Patricia (Glasgow Maryhill) (Lab)
Finnie, Ross (West of Scotland) (LD)
Gillon, Karen (Clydesdale) (Lab)
Glen, Marlyn (North East Scotland) (Lab)
Gordon, Mr Charlie (Glasgow Cathcart) (Lab)
Gorrie, Donald (Central Scotland) (LD)
Henry, Hugh (Paisley South) (Lab)
Home Robertson, John (East Lothian) (Lab)
Hughes, Janis (Glasgow Rutherglen) (Lab)
Jackson, Dr Sylvia (Stirling) (Lab)
Jackson, Gordon (Glasgow Govan) (Lab)
Jamieson, Cathy (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley) (Lab)
Jamieson, Margaret (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (Lab)
Kerr, Mr Andy (East Kilbride) (Lab)
Lamont, Johann (Glasgow Pollok) (Lab)
Livingstone, Marilyn (Kirkcaldy) (Lab)
Lyon, George (Argyll and Bute) (LD)
Macdonald, Lewis (Aberdeen Central) (Lab)
Macintosh, Mr Kenneth (Eastwood) (Lab)
Maclean, Kate (Dundee West) (Lab)
Macmillan, Maureen (Highlands and Islands) (Lab)
Martin, Paul (Glasgow Springburn) (Lab)
May, Christine (Central Fife) (Lab)
McAveety, Mr Frank (Glasgow Shettleston) (Lab)
McCabe, Mr Tom (Hamilton South) (Lab)
McMahon, Michael (Hamilton North and Bellshill) (Lab)
McNeil, Mr Duncan (Greenock and Inverclyde) (Lab)
McNeill, Pauline (Glasgow Kelvin) (Lab)
McNulty, Des (Clydebank and Milngavie) (Lab)
Morrison, Mr Alasdair (Western Isles) (Lab)
Muldoon, Bristow (Livingston) (Lab)
Mulligan, Mrs Mary (Linlithgow) (Lab)
Munro, John Farquhar (Ross, Skye and Inverness West) (LD)
Murray, Dr Elaine (Dumfries) (Lab)
Oldfather, Irene (Cunninghame South) (Lab)
Peattie, Cathy (Falkirk East) (Lab)
Pringle, Mike (Edinburgh South) (LD)
Purvis, Jeremy (Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale) (LD)
Radcliffe, Nora (Gordon) (LD)
Robson, Euan (Roxburgh and Berwickshire) (LD)
Rumbles, Mike (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD)
Scott, Tavish (Shetland) (LD)
Smith, Elaine (Coatbridge and Chryston) (Lab)
Smith, Iain (North East Fife) (LD)
Smith, Margaret (Edinburgh West) (LD)
Stephen, Nicol (Aberdeen South) (LD)
Stone, Mr Jamie (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)
Wallace, Mr Jim (Orkney) (LD)
Whitefield, Karen (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab)
Wilson, Allan (Cunninghame North) (Lab)
Abstentions
Baird, Shiona (North East Scotland) (Green)
Ballance, Chris (South of Scotland) (Green)
Ballard, Mark (Lothians) (Green)
Harper, Robin (Lothians) (Green)
Harvie, Patrick (Glasgow) (Green)
Ruskell, Mr Mark (Mid Scotland and Fife) (Green)
Scott, Eleanor (Highlands and Islands) (Green)
The result of the division is: For 35, Against 65, Abstentions 7.
Amendment 51 disagreed to.
Section 91B—Interim orders and revocation of supervision requirement
Amendments 52, 153 and 53 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
After section 91B
Amendment 54 moved—[Mr Adam Ingram].
The question is, that amendment 54 be agreed to. Are we agreed?
No.
There will be a division.
For
Adam, Brian (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
Byrne, Ms Rosemary (South of Scotland) (Sol)
Crawford, Bruce (Mid Scotland and Fife) (SNP)
Cunningham, Roseanna (Perth) (SNP)
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James (Lothians) (Con)
Fabiani, Linda (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Fox, Colin (Lothians) (SSP)
Gallie, Phil (South of Scotland) (Con)
Gibson, Rob (Highlands and Islands) (SNP)
Grahame, Christine (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Hyslop, Fiona (Lothians) (SNP)
Ingram, Mr Adam (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Lochhead, Richard (Moray) (SNP)
MacAskill, Mr Kenny (Lothians) (SNP)
Marwick, Tricia (Mid Scotland and Fife) (SNP)
Mather, Jim (Highlands and Islands) (SNP)
Matheson, Michael (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Maxwell, Mr Stewart (West of Scotland) (SNP)
McLetchie, David (Edinburgh Pentlands) (Con)
Milne, Mrs Nanette (North East Scotland) (Con)
Mitchell, Margaret (Central Scotland) (Con)
Morgan, Alasdair (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Neil, Alex (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Petrie, Dave (Highlands and Islands) (Con)
Scott, John (Ayr) (Con)
Sheridan, Tommy (Glasgow) (Sol)
Stevenson, Stewart (Banff and Buchan) (SNP)
Sturgeon, Nicola (Glasgow) (SNP)
Swinney, Mr John (North Tayside) (SNP)
Tosh, Murray (West of Scotland) (Con)
Turner, Dr Jean (Strathkelvin and Bearsden) (Ind)
Watt, Ms Maureen (North East Scotland) (SNP)
Welsh, Mr Andrew (Angus) (SNP)
White, Ms Sandra (Glasgow) (SNP)
Against
Alexander, Ms Wendy (Paisley North) (Lab)
Arbuckle, Mr Andrew (Mid Scotland and Fife) (LD)
Baillie, Jackie (Dumbarton) (Lab)
Baker, Richard (North East Scotland) (Lab)
Barrie, Scott (Dunfermline West) (Lab)
Boyack, Sarah (Edinburgh Central) (Lab)
Brankin, Rhona (Midlothian) (Lab)
Brown, Robert (Glasgow) (LD)
Butler, Bill (Glasgow Anniesland) (Lab)
Canavan, Dennis (Falkirk West) (Ind)
Chisholm, Malcolm (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab)
Craigie, Cathie (Cumbernauld and Kilsyth) (Lab)
Curran, Ms Margaret (Glasgow Baillieston) (Lab)
Deacon, Susan (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)
Eadie, Helen (Dunfermline East) (Lab)
Ferguson, Patricia (Glasgow Maryhill) (Lab)
Finnie, Ross (West of Scotland) (LD)
Gillon, Karen (Clydesdale) (Lab)
Glen, Marlyn (North East Scotland) (Lab)
Gordon, Mr Charlie (Glasgow Cathcart) (Lab)
Gorrie, Donald (Central Scotland) (LD)
Henry, Hugh (Paisley South) (Lab)
Home Robertson, John (East Lothian) (Lab)
Hughes, Janis (Glasgow Rutherglen) (Lab)
Jackson, Dr Sylvia (Stirling) (Lab)
Jackson, Gordon (Glasgow Govan) (Lab)
Jamieson, Cathy (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley) (Lab)
Jamieson, Margaret (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (Lab)
Kerr, Mr Andy (East Kilbride) (Lab)
Lamont, Johann (Glasgow Pollok) (Lab)
Livingstone, Marilyn (Kirkcaldy) (Lab)
Lyon, George (Argyll and Bute) (LD)
Macdonald, Lewis (Aberdeen Central) (Lab)
Macintosh, Mr Kenneth (Eastwood) (Lab)
Maclean, Kate (Dundee West) (Lab)
Macmillan, Maureen (Highlands and Islands) (Lab)
Martin, Paul (Glasgow Springburn) (Lab)
May, Christine (Central Fife) (Lab)
McAveety, Mr Frank (Glasgow Shettleston) (Lab)
McCabe, Mr Tom (Hamilton South) (Lab)
McMahon, Michael (Hamilton North and Bellshill) (Lab)
McNeil, Mr Duncan (Greenock and Inverclyde) (Lab)
McNeill, Pauline (Glasgow Kelvin) (Lab)
McNulty, Des (Clydebank and Milngavie) (Lab)
Morrison, Mr Alasdair (Western Isles) (Lab)
Muldoon, Bristow (Livingston) (Lab)
Mulligan, Mrs Mary (Linlithgow) (Lab)
Munro, John Farquhar (Ross, Skye and Inverness West) (LD)
Murray, Dr Elaine (Dumfries) (Lab)
Oldfather, Irene (Cunninghame South) (Lab)
Peattie, Cathy (Falkirk East) (Lab)
Pringle, Mike (Edinburgh South) (LD)
Purvis, Jeremy (Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale) (LD)
Radcliffe, Nora (Gordon) (LD)
Rumbles, Mike (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD)
Scott, Tavish (Shetland) (LD)
Smith, Elaine (Coatbridge and Chryston) (Lab)
Smith, Iain (North East Fife) (LD)
Smith, Margaret (Edinburgh West) (LD)
Stephen, Nicol (Aberdeen South) (LD)
Stone, Mr Jamie (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)
Wallace, Mr Jim (Orkney) (LD)
Whitefield, Karen (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab)
Wilson, Allan (Cunninghame North) (Lab)
Abstentions
Baird, Shiona (North East Scotland) (Green)
Ballance, Chris (South of Scotland) (Green)
Ballard, Mark (Lothians) (Green)
Curran, Frances (West of Scotland) (SSP)
Harper, Robin (Lothians) (Green)
Harvie, Patrick (Glasgow) (Green)
Robson, Euan (Roxburgh and Berwickshire) (LD)
Ruskell, Mr Mark (Mid Scotland and Fife) (Green)
Scott, Eleanor (Highlands and Islands) (Green)
The result of the division is: For 34, Against 64, Abstentions 9.
Amendment 54 disagreed to.
Section 92—Duty of local authority to apply for variation or revocation
Amendment 55 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 94—Revocation: order to be made under section 11 of 1995 Act
Group 16 is on the revocation and variation of permanence orders. Amendment 128, in the name of the minister, is the only amendment in the group.
I trust that amendment 128 will not cause as much excitement as the last group.
The amendment is designed to ensure that, on revoking a permanence order, the court should consider whether a section 11 order should be made. For example, revoking the permanence order may be appropriate, but only with some adjustment of the allocation of parental responsibilities and rights that pre-existed it. Although the court should consider whether an order should be made, it is under no obligation to make such an order. It is a tidying-up amendment in that respect.
I move amendment 128.
The point was raised by the Law Society, and I am grateful to the minister for having lodged the amendment as a result. I hope that it will be passed.
Amendment 128 agreed to.
Section 94A—Local authority to give notice of certain matters
Amendments 129 and 131 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 96—Restriction on making of orders under section 11 of 1995 Act
Amendment 56 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 97—Permanence orders: rules of procedure
Group 17 is on rules of procedure applying to fathers without parental responsibilities and rights. Amendment 57, in the name of the minister, is grouped with amendments 58, 59 and 138 to 140.
The rules of court should make provision for the situation when a child is to be adopted, by means of either an adoption order or a permanence order with authority to adopt, and the unmarried father cannot be found. However, the provisions sit more appropriately in sections 97(2)(b) and 106(2)(b) so that sections 97(3)(b) and 106(5) refer only to who the person is, rather than create a condition. The change is achieved by amendments 57 and 59 for sections 97 and 138 and by amendment 140 for section 106.
Amendment 58 is designed to ensure that the unmarried father is notified of the fact that application has been made for a permanence order with authority to adopt, as well as the date and place that the application will be heard. That will speed up the process by allowing him to prepare his case in time, should he wish to do so. Amendment 139 replicates that provision with regard to an adoption order.
If I am not mistaken, the amendments deal with an issue raised at stage 2.
I move amendment 57.
Amendment 57 agreed to.
Amendments 58 and 59 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 102—Proceedings to be in private
Amendment 60 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 103—Regulations about allowances in respect of looked after children
We move now to group 18. Amendment 133, in the name of Rosemary Byrne, is grouped with amendments 134 to 137 and 152.
I lodged an amendment at stage 2 on kinship care allowances. I listened to the committee's points, and I have tried to adjust the amendment accordingly.
My main thrust is to ensure that we recognise the role of kinship carers in our society and that there is equality across the country in payments for kinship care. At the moment, local authorities may or may not provide for kinship carers, and the criteria are different from one local authority to another. I have noted the amendments in the name of the minister, and I know that, when he heard the discussions at stage 2, he was keen to accommodate some of the points. I am interested in what he will say, but I am clear that my purpose in lodging the amendments was to make progress on developing a national strategy for kinship caring.
Many kinship carers are grandparents who are left to look after children due to many different circumstances in children's lives, but often because of drug or alcohol misuse. It seems that elderly people, retired people and people who have not prepared for caring are left to pick up the cost. It costs less to our communities for families to look after children than it does for them to be looked after under local authority care. It is also important to stress that children fare better in kinship care than in local authority care.
I welcome the minister's efforts to accommodate the matter in the bill and I will be interested to hear what he has to say. My main point is that we should make progress with kinship care allowances in our communities.
I move amendment 133.
I ask for two-minute speeches because quite a few members wish to speak. I call Fiona Hyslop, to be followed by Lord James Douglas-Hamilton.
These amendments represent an important development. When the bill was introduced, there was no reference to kinship care. At stage 1, the minister was criticised for not including fostering and we were told that progress was being made on that, but it was not until 26 October that he met a reference group on fostering care and kinship care and it was only yesterday—one day before the stage 3 debate—that we finally got the national fostering and kinship care strategy, which states:
"we have commissioned an independent survey of all the entitlements … to which kinship carers may be entitled."
I pay tribute to Rosemary Byrne, Paul Martin and the others who have raised the issue of the support that relatives can give children, but the ministers' amendments are Johnny-come-lately policymaking. His proposals have come at the very last minute.
I am pleased that the minister responded to members' requests for a kinship care strategy and for financial support for kinship carers, but I regret that the proposals are so late. The next session of Parliament can pursue the matter with far more vigour than is possible now.
The change is so drastic that the bill's long title will have to be amended. One of the minister's amendments seeks to remove the reference to fostering because, all of a sudden, the bill is being broadened to include kinship care. That is a good move, but it is happening at the last minute and only a day after the launch of the fostering and kinship care strategy.
I welcome Rosemary Byrne's comments and look forward to supporting her amendments.
I will change the process marginally because some of the amendments in the group are the minister's amendments. That is not reflected in my script, but I should ask the minister to speak to his amendments before anyone else is called to speak.
Thank you. I was slightly caught on the hop there, I am afraid.
I am bound to say that I object to the tone of Fiona Hyslop's comments. It is important to put the matter in context. The preparations for the bill, the arrangements for it to include provisions and powers on fostering allowances and the arrangements for the fostering strategy have all been in the public domain for a long time. They are not new things that have suddenly emerged, as Fiona Hyslop suggested, and there was no conspiracy.
Last night, Hugh Henry and I launched the consultation on the national fostering and kinship care strategy at a reception for foster carers and kinship carers at Edinburgh Castle. The strategy is an important development. I hope that there will be a generous response to it from members. I know that members will take a keen interest in how the consultation progresses. Incidentally, I enjoyed meeting the foster carers and kinship carers last night and hearing about their experiences. Hugh Henry and I are aware of the difficulties that they face.
The consultation and the strategy will play a key part in the development of our policy on kinship carers and foster carers. The consultation invites people to comment on how the current arrangements for the support of kinship carers can be improved. That includes not just financial support but other types of support as well. Depending on the outcome of the consultation, I intend to ask officials to develop guidance that builds on the existing guidance on the 1995 act. That approach recognises that local authorities already have powers under the 1995 act to make payments to carers to support children in their care.
The new guidance could also include the outcomes of the independent survey that we commissioned of the tax and benefit system and how it supports kinship carers in Scotland. One of the aims will be to ensure that kinship carers receive clear and helpful information about how they can receive financial support for children or young people in their care. The purpose of the regulations that might emerge will be to deal with the issues that affect children rather than to provide the basic benefits system that supports adult carers.
I pay tribute to Rosemary Byrne's longstanding interest in kinship care. When she lodged an amendment on it at stage 2, I told her that I was attracted to the principle behind it and was keen to ensure that the Executive had the powers to do whatever we needed to do when it came to developing the strategy. That is the background to why we lodged amendment 134, to which I will come in a second.
Rosemary Byrne's amendment 133 would have the benefit of making it easy to determine eligibility for allowance. Carers will either have parental responsibilities and rights or they will not, so the issue is relatively straightforward. However, as far as I can see, many kinship carers will not have that legal clarity, so the amendment is rather too narrow to do what Rosemary Byrne and I both wanted to do. Her amendment 135 would compel ministers to make regulations, which is unusual in this context—if not unprecedented—and I would not want to take that approach.
Executive amendment 134 follows on from our commitment at stage 2 to consider further the matter of allowances for kinship carers. It will catch more people and is therefore more encompassing than Rosemary Byrne's amendment 133. The criteria for eligibility under any regulations made would be able to be extended to those carers who have stepped in before the child has become formally looked after by the local authority and where the carers by that action have relieved the local authority of a duty that it would otherwise have had towards the child. That echoes the comments that Rosemary Byrne made in introducing this group of amendments. It would include those who have taken on the duty instead of the local authority, rather than on behalf of the local authority as foster carers do. I therefore do not see those particular allowances as equivalent to fostering allowances, because they have to be dealt with in a slightly different context.
There is an important distinction. Kinship care in this context does not include arrangements whereby a grandmother takes care of the children in order to enable the parents to go out to work, or where an uncle or aunt take the children to their home in the Western Isles for the school holidays, for example. It must refer specifically to children who would otherwise have gained the label "looked-after children". We have to have a division in that regard. One of the difficulties with Rosemary Byrne's amendment 133 is that a relative in such circumstances might seek to gain a contact order under section 11 of the 1995 act, which would then trigger the allowance. That would therefore not be a good way to proceed. We have to look to the substance of the situation.
Kinship care does not include care provided by a parent or legal guardian of the child. Amendment 136—and the fact that the parent is excluded from the definition of "relative" in section 111 of the bill—makes that clear.
Although I am seeking to extend the regulation-making power in the way that I have just described, I want to make it clear that our first port of call will be to develop the guidance to which I referred earlier. If it becomes clear that guidance alone is not effective in addressing the issues that I anticipate will be brought to the fore in the strategy consultation, the power will be there to be used.
Amendment 137 is to ensure that those relatives who take on a permanence order to clarify their legal relationship to a child would not lose their eligibility for allowances under any regulations under section 103. It also addresses the issue of those cases where relatives have gained parental responsibilities and rights by means of a section 11 order.
Amendment 152 amends the long title of the bill, which Fiona Hyslop mentioned, to reflect our discussion and provide that the allowances in the regulations will not cover only those children who are in foster care. For that reason, rather than the provisions on kinship care, the long title of the bill needs to be changed.
I ask members to support amendments 134, 136, 137, 152 and to resist amendments 133 and 135. I hope that, in the light of my explanation, Rosemary Byrne will accept that we are providing a more comprehensive basis for regulation, which will enable her to seek to withdraw amendment 133 and to not move amendment 135.
This is important. As members of Parliament we have all had representations from people and met people who have suffered considerable difficulties in this context. We want to make substantial progress in this area in a way that will bring relief to a number of people.
Rosemary Byrne should think twice before not moving amendment 135. I understand the minister's argument that ministers should have total discretion. Amendment 135, however, would ensure that regulations must include, rather than may include, certain provisions. Ministers do not always welcome having an obligation placed on them. Robert Brown will claim that he is a reasonable minister and will always act reasonably, but how can we be certain that future ministers will be as reasonable as he is? Is it really so unfair to place a requirement on ministers, rather than merely providing an enabling power?
Did Lord James Douglas-Hamilton ever claim that he was a reasonable minister in his lengthy and distinguished ministerial career?
I suspect that I did.
I defend Robert Brown from the outrageous suggestion that he is a reasonable minister.
I congratulate Rosemary Byrne on bringing kinship care to the fore. She consistently raised the subject during committee meetings at stage 1 and stage 2. If she had not done so, there is no question in my mind that the Executive's amendments would not have been lodged.
The issue is important. I am pleased to say that a document on the national fostering and kinship care strategy was published yesterday—Fiona Hyslop referred to it—because I think that there has been reference only to a national fostering strategy until now. The change is welcome because we must recognise the important role that relatives can play in bringing up children who have been affected by the problems of their natural parents. Children's development will benefit if they can be kept in their extended families. That Rosemary Byrne has raised the issue is therefore welcome. That said, I hope that she will not press her amendments because those in the name of the minister will give ministers greater discretion on how to progress matters in the future.
It is important to study the financial arrangements relating to kinship carers and to ensure that we do not encourage people to do unacceptable things, such as take children away from their natural parents in order to get their hands on money. It is also important to ensure that there will not be interaction with the benefits system in a way that will disadvantage people in the long term.
I welcome the amendments in the name of the minister.
I welcome the amendments. Issues relating to kinship carers have become more prominent in discussions on the bill. I am certainly not the only member who has received representations from constituents on the matter, which, as Rosemary Byrne said, seems to be becoming more pressing as more and more families—sadly—have alcohol and drug abuse problems that require relatives to take care of children. Relatives of children have said to me that if local authorities had to accommodate the children who are affected by such problems, they would be considerably out of pocket. It seems to be unfair that relatives should have to bear such financial burdens.
Fiona Hyslop was a little unfair to ministers when she complained about the consultation document. There is not a strategy yet—there is only a consultation document. Guidance or regulations will be produced as a result of that consultation.
On amendment 135, I say to Lord James Douglas-Hamilton that it would not necessarily be appropriate to say that regulations must be made before the results of the consultation are known. The bill's current phraseology is probably more appropriate.
Will the member take an intervention?
I have just finished. I am sorry.
I congratulate Rosemary Byrne on her amendments, which have obviously triggered a response.
I take a simplistic view. For 10 years or more, people have lobbied me about grandparents who are getting a raw deal from the system, financially or otherwise, and I have agitated on their behalf. I am sure that every member has been lobbied in the same way. Many of the rules that have been drawn up in the past have been hostile to grandparents and other relations. The idea seemed to be that some person plucked off a shelf somewhere would look after children better than their grandparents would, which is ridiculous. Financial arrangements have been strongly in favour of non-relations and against kinship carers and grandparents looking after children.
Some grandparents are greedy, not-very-good people, as some parents, members of the Scottish Parliament and other people are. We do not want carte-blanche for all grandparents, but we must give them a fair chance to contribute. The fact is that, on the whole, grandparents look after children better and give them better support and a better start in life than other people do. Therefore, it is important that we get the right result. If that result comes from a great new document, that is fine. However, I reserve my judgment. Robert Brown was, as usual, persuasive, but I was not persuaded.
I thank the minister for his attention to this issue; unfortunately, I am not wholly convinced by what he said. My problem is something that Donald Gorrie hit on—the length of time for which we have been going over and over the issue.
I was at a kinship care conference on Saturday. A lot of hopes have been raised, and people were describing their circumstances and telling their stories, which were heartbreaking to hear. It is time to move forward, and the only way to move forward is to support my amendments. They may be narrow in some ways, as the minister said, but they can be expanded on and nothing has to be too definitive as we move forward. That would be a positive start and would send a signal to those kinship carers who are struggling and who are looking to see what we are going to do in the bill.
I am pleased that the long title will be amended, and I will support amendment 152. The minister has moved some way, and I am happy to support one of his amendments. Nevertheless, I ask members to support both amendments in my name.
The question is, that amendment 133 be agreed to. Are we agreed?
No.
There will be a division.
For
Adam, Brian (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
Baird, Shiona (North East Scotland) (Green)
Ballance, Chris (South of Scotland) (Green)
Ballard, Mark (Lothians) (Green)
Byrne, Ms Rosemary (South of Scotland) (Sol)
Canavan, Dennis (Falkirk West) (Ind)
Crawford, Bruce (Mid Scotland and Fife) (SNP)
Cunningham, Roseanna (Perth) (SNP)
Curran, Frances (West of Scotland) (SSP)
Fabiani, Linda (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Fox, Colin (Lothians) (SSP)
Gallie, Phil (South of Scotland) (Con)
Gibson, Rob (Highlands and Islands) (SNP)
Gorrie, Donald (Central Scotland) (LD)
Grahame, Christine (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Harper, Robin (Lothians) (Green)
Harvie, Patrick (Glasgow) (Green)
Hyslop, Fiona (Lothians) (SNP)
Ingram, Mr Adam (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Lochhead, Richard (Moray) (SNP)
MacAskill, Mr Kenny (Lothians) (SNP)
Marwick, Tricia (Mid Scotland and Fife) (SNP)
Mather, Jim (Highlands and Islands) (SNP)
Matheson, Michael (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Maxwell, Mr Stewart (West of Scotland) (SNP)
McNeill, Pauline (Glasgow Kelvin) (Lab)
Morgan, Alasdair (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Neil, Alex (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Ruskell, Mr Mark (Mid Scotland and Fife) (Green)
Scott, Eleanor (Highlands and Islands) (Green)
Sheridan, Tommy (Glasgow) (Sol)
Stevenson, Stewart (Banff and Buchan) (SNP)
Sturgeon, Nicola (Glasgow) (SNP)
Swinney, Mr John (North Tayside) (SNP)
Turner, Dr Jean (Strathkelvin and Bearsden) (Ind)
Watt, Ms Maureen (North East Scotland) (SNP)
Welsh, Mr Andrew (Angus) (SNP)
White, Ms Sandra (Glasgow) (SNP)
Against
Alexander, Ms Wendy (Paisley North) (Lab)
Arbuckle, Mr Andrew (Mid Scotland and Fife) (LD)
Baillie, Jackie (Dumbarton) (Lab)
Baker, Richard (North East Scotland) (Lab)
Barrie, Scott (Dunfermline West) (Lab)
Boyack, Sarah (Edinburgh Central) (Lab)
Brankin, Rhona (Midlothian) (Lab)
Brown, Robert (Glasgow) (LD)
Brownlee, Derek (South of Scotland) (Con)
Butler, Bill (Glasgow Anniesland) (Lab)
Chisholm, Malcolm (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab)
Craigie, Cathie (Cumbernauld and Kilsyth) (Lab)
Curran, Ms Margaret (Glasgow Baillieston) (Lab)
Deacon, Susan (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James (Lothians) (Con)
Eadie, Helen (Dunfermline East) (Lab)
Ferguson, Patricia (Glasgow Maryhill) (Lab)
Finnie, Ross (West of Scotland) (LD)
Gillon, Karen (Clydesdale) (Lab)
Glen, Marlyn (North East Scotland) (Lab)
Godman, Trish (West Renfrewshire) (Lab)
Gordon, Mr Charlie (Glasgow Cathcart) (Lab)
Henry, Hugh (Paisley South) (Lab)
Home Robertson, John (East Lothian) (Lab)
Hughes, Janis (Glasgow Rutherglen) (Lab)
Jackson, Dr Sylvia (Stirling) (Lab)
Jackson, Gordon (Glasgow Govan) (Lab)
Jamieson, Cathy (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley) (Lab)
Jamieson, Margaret (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (Lab)
Kerr, Mr Andy (East Kilbride) (Lab)
Lamont, Johann (Glasgow Pollok) (Lab)
Livingstone, Marilyn (Kirkcaldy) (Lab)
Lyon, George (Argyll and Bute) (LD)
Macdonald, Lewis (Aberdeen Central) (Lab)
Macintosh, Mr Kenneth (Eastwood) (Lab)
Maclean, Kate (Dundee West) (Lab)
Macmillan, Maureen (Highlands and Islands) (Lab)
Martin, Paul (Glasgow Springburn) (Lab)
May, Christine (Central Fife) (Lab)
McAveety, Mr Frank (Glasgow Shettleston) (Lab)
McCabe, Mr Tom (Hamilton South) (Lab)
McLetchie, David (Edinburgh Pentlands) (Con)
McMahon, Michael (Hamilton North and Bellshill) (Lab)
McNeil, Mr Duncan (Greenock and Inverclyde) (Lab)
McNulty, Des (Clydebank and Milngavie) (Lab)
Milne, Mrs Nanette (North East Scotland) (Con)
Mitchell, Margaret (Central Scotland) (Con)
Morrison, Mr Alasdair (Western Isles) (Lab)
Muldoon, Bristow (Livingston) (Lab)
Mulligan, Mrs Mary (Linlithgow) (Lab)
Munro, John Farquhar (Ross, Skye and Inverness West) (LD)
Murray, Dr Elaine (Dumfries) (Lab)
Oldfather, Irene (Cunninghame South) (Lab)
Peattie, Cathy (Falkirk East) (Lab)
Petrie, Dave (Highlands and Islands) (Con)
Pringle, Mike (Edinburgh South) (LD)
Purvis, Jeremy (Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale) (LD)
Radcliffe, Nora (Gordon) (LD)
Robson, Euan (Roxburgh and Berwickshire) (LD)
Rumbles, Mike (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD)
Scott, John (Ayr) (Con)
Scott, Tavish (Shetland) (LD)
Smith, Elaine (Coatbridge and Chryston) (Lab)
Smith, Iain (North East Fife) (LD)
Smith, Margaret (Edinburgh West) (LD)
Stephen, Nicol (Aberdeen South) (LD)
Stone, Mr Jamie (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)
Whitefield, Karen (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab)
Wilson, Allan (Cunninghame North) (Lab)
The result of the division is: For 38, Against 69, Abstentions 0.
Amendment 133 disagreed to.
Amendment 134 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Amendment 135 moved—[Ms Rosemary Byrne].
The question is, that amendment 135 be agreed to. Are we agreed?
No.
There will be a division.
For
Adam, Brian (Aberdeen North) (SNP)
Baird, Shiona (North East Scotland) (Green)
Ballance, Chris (South of Scotland) (Green)
Ballard, Mark (Lothians) (Green)
Brownlee, Derek (South of Scotland) (Con)
Byrne, Ms Rosemary (South of Scotland) (Sol)
Canavan, Dennis (Falkirk West) (Ind)
Crawford, Bruce (Mid Scotland and Fife) (SNP)
Cunningham, Roseanna (Perth) (SNP)
Curran, Frances (West of Scotland) (SSP)
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James (Lothians) (Con)
Fabiani, Linda (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Fox, Colin (Lothians) (SSP)
Gallie, Phil (South of Scotland) (Con)
Gibson, Rob (Highlands and Islands) (SNP)
Gorrie, Donald (Central Scotland) (LD)
Grahame, Christine (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Harper, Robin (Lothians) (Green)
Harvie, Patrick (Glasgow) (Green)
Hyslop, Fiona (Lothians) (SNP)
Ingram, Mr Adam (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Lochhead, Richard (Moray) (SNP)
MacAskill, Mr Kenny (Lothians) (SNP)
Marwick, Tricia (Mid Scotland and Fife) (SNP)
Mather, Jim (Highlands and Islands) (SNP)
Matheson, Michael (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Maxwell, Mr Stewart (West of Scotland) (SNP)
McLetchie, David (Edinburgh Pentlands) (Con)
Milne, Mrs Nanette (North East Scotland) (Con)
Mitchell, Margaret (Central Scotland) (Con)
Morgan, Alasdair (South of Scotland) (SNP)
Neil, Alex (Central Scotland) (SNP)
Petrie, Dave (Highlands and Islands) (Con)
Ruskell, Mr Mark (Mid Scotland and Fife) (Green)
Scott, Eleanor (Highlands and Islands) (Green)
Scott, John (Ayr) (Con)
Sheridan, Tommy (Glasgow) (Sol)
Stevenson, Stewart (Banff and Buchan) (SNP)
Sturgeon, Nicola (Glasgow) (SNP)
Swinney, Mr John (North Tayside) (SNP)
Turner, Dr Jean (Strathkelvin and Bearsden) (Ind)
Watt, Ms Maureen (North East Scotland) (SNP)
Welsh, Mr Andrew (Angus) (SNP)
White, Ms Sandra (Glasgow) (SNP)
Against
Alexander, Ms Wendy (Paisley North) (Lab)
Arbuckle, Mr Andrew (Mid Scotland and Fife) (LD)
Baillie, Jackie (Dumbarton) (Lab)
Baker, Richard (North East Scotland) (Lab)
Barrie, Scott (Dunfermline West) (Lab)
Boyack, Sarah (Edinburgh Central) (Lab)
Brankin, Rhona (Midlothian) (Lab)
Brown, Robert (Glasgow) (LD)
Butler, Bill (Glasgow Anniesland) (Lab)
Chisholm, Malcolm (Edinburgh North and Leith) (Lab)
Craigie, Cathie (Cumbernauld and Kilsyth) (Lab)
Curran, Ms Margaret (Glasgow Baillieston) (Lab)
Deacon, Susan (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)
Eadie, Helen (Dunfermline East) (Lab)
Ferguson, Patricia (Glasgow Maryhill) (Lab)
Finnie, Ross (West of Scotland) (LD)
Gillon, Karen (Clydesdale) (Lab)
Glen, Marlyn (North East Scotland) (Lab)
Godman, Trish (West Renfrewshire) (Lab)
Gordon, Mr Charlie (Glasgow Cathcart) (Lab)
Henry, Hugh (Paisley South) (Lab)
Home Robertson, John (East Lothian) (Lab)
Hughes, Janis (Glasgow Rutherglen) (Lab)
Jackson, Dr Sylvia (Stirling) (Lab)
Jackson, Gordon (Glasgow Govan) (Lab)
Jamieson, Cathy (Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley) (Lab)
Jamieson, Margaret (Kilmarnock and Loudoun) (Lab)
Kerr, Mr Andy (East Kilbride) (Lab)
Lamont, Johann (Glasgow Pollok) (Lab)
Livingstone, Marilyn (Kirkcaldy) (Lab)
Lyon, George (Argyll and Bute) (LD)
Macdonald, Lewis (Aberdeen Central) (Lab)
Macintosh, Mr Kenneth (Eastwood) (Lab)
Maclean, Kate (Dundee West) (Lab)
Macmillan, Maureen (Highlands and Islands) (Lab)
Martin, Paul (Glasgow Springburn) (Lab)
May, Christine (Central Fife) (Lab)
McAveety, Mr Frank (Glasgow Shettleston) (Lab)
McCabe, Mr Tom (Hamilton South) (Lab)
McMahon, Michael (Hamilton North and Bellshill) (Lab)
McNeil, Mr Duncan (Greenock and Inverclyde) (Lab)
McNeill, Pauline (Glasgow Kelvin) (Lab)
McNulty, Des (Clydebank and Milngavie) (Lab)
Morrison, Mr Alasdair (Western Isles) (Lab)
Muldoon, Bristow (Livingston) (Lab)
Mulligan, Mrs Mary (Linlithgow) (Lab)
Munro, John Farquhar (Ross, Skye and Inverness West) (LD)
Murray, Dr Elaine (Dumfries) (Lab)
Oldfather, Irene (Cunninghame South) (Lab)
Peattie, Cathy (Falkirk East) (Lab)
Pringle, Mike (Edinburgh South) (LD)
Purvis, Jeremy (Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale) (LD)
Radcliffe, Nora (Gordon) (LD)
Robson, Euan (Roxburgh and Berwickshire) (LD)
Rumbles, Mike (West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine) (LD)
Scott, Tavish (Shetland) (LD)
Smith, Elaine (Coatbridge and Chryston) (Lab)
Smith, Iain (North East Fife) (LD)
Smith, Margaret (Edinburgh West) (LD)
Stephen, Nicol (Aberdeen South) (LD)
Stone, Mr Jamie (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)
Whitefield, Karen (Airdrie and Shotts) (Lab)
Wilson, Allan (Cunninghame North) (Lab)
The result of the division is: For 44, Against 63, Abstentions 0.
Amendment 135 disagreed to.
Amendments 136 and 137 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 106—Rules of procedure
Amendments 138 to 140 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 109—Orders and regulations
Amendment 61 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Section 111—Interpretation
Amendments 62, 141, 142, 63, 143, 144, 64 and 65 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Schedule 1
Registration of adoptions
Amendments 145 and 146 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Schedule 2
Minor and consequential amendments
Amendments 147, 66, 148, 149 and 67 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
That takes us to group 19, on the prohibition of the publication of material at children's hearings. Amendment 150, in the name of the minister, is the only amendment in the group.
Amendment 150 not moved.
Amendments 68 to 72, 154, 73 and 74 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Group 20 is on the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999. Amendment 151, in the name of the minister, is the only amendment in the group.
Members will be pleased to know that I have only one or two sentences to say about amendment 151. The amendment provides that references to enactments in section 1 of the Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 include acts of the Scottish Parliament. That is necessary so that regulations that give effect to adoptions under the Hague convention can apply provisions of the bill to such adoptions. I would be grateful if nobody questioned me on that.
I move amendment 151.
Amendment 151 agreed to.
Amendments 75 to 79 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
Long Title
Amendment 152 moved—[Robert Brown]—and agreed to.
That ends the consideration of amendments.