Antisocial Behaviour etc (Scotland) Bill: Stage 2
This is day 2 of our consideration at stage 2 of the Antisocial Behaviour etc (Scotland) Bill. I remind members that they should have with them a copy of the groupings of amendments and the marshalled list; a copy of the bill would probably help, too. I reinforce the point that was made last week: when we are taking votes, members should indicate clearly which way they are voting so that the result can be recorded accurately for the Official Report.
Section 4—Antisocial behaviour orders
Amendment 149, in the name of Donald Gorrie, is grouped with amendments 149A and 132 to 143.
The objective of my amendment 149 and, I think, of Stewart Stevenson's amendment 149A is to try to take account of the strongly and sincerely held views of a number of people in organisations that try to help people with medical problems or disabilities. People in those organisations are afraid that the behaviour of a young person with, for example, autistic behaviour problems might appear disruptive to the neighbours. Those people are very worried that some councils, registered social landlords and sheriffs might pursue an antisocial behaviour order against someone with such a problem in ignorance of the real causes of the problem. There has to be something in the bill or in guidance that reassures those people that although such behaviour might be difficult for neighbours, it will not be dealt with through an antisocial behaviour order but in a different way.
I have had some helpful discussions and I accept the argument that my amendment 149 might be drawn too widely, so I will not live or die by the wording of the amendment. However, it is important that the bill contain reassurances. If it does not, such reassurances should be in the guidance, which would give comfort to those people who are genuinely concerned.
I move amendment 149.
Donald Gorrie spotted at once that I was seeking simply to ensure that we include autism in his amendment, as it is a condition that is worthy of such protection.
Turning to Elaine Smith's amendments in the group, I am conscious that under section 4(3), sheriffs are able to
"disregard any act or conduct of the specified person which that person shows was reasonable in the circumstances."
Donald Gorrie's and Elaine Smith's amendments touch on that area. Amendment 149 would prevent people from entering into a process that would lead to the sheriff having to judge whether behaviour was reasonable. If the Executive is to rebuff amendment 149, I want to hear a vigorous and well-stated defence of that rejection. It is important that people with medical and developmental conditions do not enter the legal system.
Similarly, Elaine Smith's amendments focus on the definitions—I use the plural because there are several—of antisocial behaviour in the bill. In amendments 132 and 135, Elaine Smith uses the term "wilfully or recklessly". That test might be too high, but I want to hear what Elaine Smith has to say.
Elaine Smith also seeks to include in the main interpretation section the expression—I paraphrase because the amendments are worded differently—that "the person knows" that they are committing an act of antisocial behaviour. I have considerable sympathy with that idea. This group of amendments is key to the way in which antisocial behaviour orders will work and how they will control the way in which people enter the system.
Along with other members of the committee, I am quite anxious to ensure that people who are not aware of the antisocial impact of their behaviour do not enter the legal system through an antisocial behaviour order but are helped in a way that will ensure that the person who is affected by their antisocial behaviour is relieved of the burden of that behaviour.
You should now move the amendment to the amendment.
You are quite correct, convener. I move amendment 149A.
I have a technical question. What happens if, after I have moved an amendment, I am comforted by what the minister has to say?
If the amendment was the first in the group, or if it was an amendment to an amendment, you would be asked to move it. Once moved, the amendment would become the property of the committee as a whole. I would then ask whether you wished to press or withdraw the amendment. If you wished to withdraw it because you were comforted by what the minister had said, you would seek leave to withdraw and the committee would have to give its consent before you could withdraw it. However, if one member indicated, simply by saying no, that they did not wish the amendment to be withdrawn, we would move not to a discussion on whether you should be allowed to withdraw, but simply to a vote on the substance of the amendment.
If you were promoting one of the other amendments in the group that was not first in the group or an amendment to an amendment, you would be asked simply to speak to the amendment. Then you would be asked either to move it or not to move it. In those circumstances, you would not seek leave from anybody but would simply indicate whether you wanted to move the amendment or not to move it. If you did not want to move the amendment, it would be within the power of any other member of the committee to indicate that they wanted the amendment to be moved. Again, we would then move to a vote on the substance of the amendment and would vote for or against it. Is that helpful?
Very helpful. Thank you.
That is the bit that I enjoy, sad person that I am.
I now ask Elaine Smith to speak to amendment 132 and to the other amendments in the group.
I lodged the amendments to address specific concerns raised by the National Autistic Society Scotland. The term "wilfully or recklessly" refers to the intention to do the act, and the phrase "the person knows" refers to awareness of the act's consequences. Someone with an autistic spectrum disorder may do or say something that might be perceived as antisocial but they might not have the necessary knowledge or understanding of the effects of their actions on other people, as Donald Gorrie said.
At present, research is somewhat lacking on the number of adults with autistic spectrum disorder in our prisons, although there continue to be concerns about that. We discussed the issue at stage 1 and the minister took our concerns seriously. As I recall, she gave a commitment to provide guidance to help to address those concerns. I have no doubt that the Executive is committed to equal opportunities; however, there remain concerns that the definition of antisocial behaviour in the bill might inadvertently result in discrimination against people such as those with an autistic spectrum disorder.
I shall listen carefully to the minister's comments. I hope that she will comment specifically on how guidance might be used to help to allay those fears. I would also be interested in her thoughts on the arrangements for post-legislative monitoring to ensure that the bill does not inadvertently discriminate when it is put into practice.
Finally, touching on what Stewart Stevenson said, I recognise that there might be some problems with the bill with regard to definitions. Given the nature of the reasons behind the amendments, those problems might not have been anticipated. I would like to hear the minister's comments on that matter, too.
I am sure that members will agree that this group of amendments has major significance for the bill as a whole. Elaine Smith's amendments, in particular, could change fundamentally the interpretation of "antisocial behaviour" throughout the bill.
I would like to deal first of all with Donald Gorrie's amendment 149, which is the subject of an amendment lodged by Stewart Stevenson. I know that amendment 149 has arisen largely as a consequence of concerns raised at stage 1 by the National Autistic Society Scotland. Quite simply, I suggest that inserting such a condition into the bill is not needed. Sheriffs take account of the full facts and circumstances of the cases before them in determining whether an antisocial behaviour order is necessary. Where such factors are significant, they will be considered and balanced with the need to protect the community. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to put an explicit condition in the statute to require sheriffs, in assessing whether conduct amounts to antisocial behaviour, to take account of any medical or developmental condition that may have caused or contributed significantly to that behaviour.
Of course, steps should be taken to raise awareness and understanding of the implications of medical and developmental conditions that might relate to antisocial behaviour. I can confirm that statutory guidance will address those issues. In doing so, I give the committee the reassurance that it was seeking at paragraph 48 of its stage 1 report. For those reasons, I invite Donald Gorrie to withdraw amendment 149.
I turn to amendments on the interpretation of the term "antisocial behaviour". Section 110 provides the interpretation of antisocial behaviour for the bill as a whole. We have provided that a person engages in antisocial behaviour if he or she
"(a) acts in a manner that causes or is likely to cause alarm or distress; or
(b) pursues a course of conduct that causes or is likely to cause alarm or distress,
to at least one person who is not of the same household".
Amendment 141 would amend section 110 by adding "wilfully or recklessly" to the requirements that need to be satisfied in interpreting what constitutes antisocial behaviour. Amendments 142 and 143 would also amend the interpretation of antisocial behaviour in section 100. The remaining amendments in the group would have the same effect with respect to interpretation in other parts of the bill.
The amendments would undermine the operational effectiveness of the bill's measures. In doing so, they could seriously prejudice our ability to protect those who suffer from antisocial behaviour. The proposed changes might initially appear to be an additional check to protect vulnerable people who might not understand the implications of their conduct. I am sure that that was members' intention. However, the fundamental point is that the amendments would lessen protection for people whose quality of life is undermined by antisocial behaviour.
We are taking action to deal with behaviour from which people are not always adequately protected through existing measures. The introduction of a requirement to prove that an individual behaved "wilfully or recklessly" and that they did not know that their behaviour was likely to cause alarm or distress would greatly undermine the effectiveness of the bill. The amendments would greatly increase the evidential requirement placed on local authorities, the police and other agencies that work to deal with antisocial behaviour. That would make the measures in the bill unworkable, and people whose behaviour is persistently antisocial would have the means to obstruct action being taken.
I know that the committee expended a great deal of energy on this issue at stage 1. You will know that the definition of antisocial behaviour is the same as the existing definition in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. That definition, as the police and local authorities confirmed to you in evidence at stage 1, works well. They also confirmed that the introduction of a concept of intent would cause difficulties and that vulnerable groups would not suffer if the definition remained as it was. It is important to remember that, even when antisocial behaviour has taken place, an antisocial behaviour order will be made only if it is necessary to protect people against future antisocial behaviour.
In saying that, I do not underestimate in any way Elaine Smith's genuine concerns on the issue. We carefully considered the evidence given at stage 1 by organisations such as the National Autistic Society Scotland, which argued for the need to include an explicit concept of intent in the interpretation section so as to ensure that powers were not used inappropriately against people with autism. I met representatives of the society twice to discuss those issues, and I recognise the genuine concerns that people have. We made a commitment at stage 1 to ensure that guidance on the implementation of the bill's provisions would address concerns about the potential for inappropriate use of powers against children and young people with autism and other special needs. I can reiterate our commitment to doing that.
I agree with the conclusions in the stage 1 report on the definition of antisocial behaviour. The definition used in the bill is the right one. It is wide enough to encompass what all the witnesses regard as antisocial behaviour. It already works in practice through the use of ASBO powers under the 1998 act, and it is not used indiscriminately. I therefore invite Elaine Smith not to move amendments132 to 143.
Could the minister confirm that the guidance will be available for us to look at before we have to vote at stage 3?
We will try our best to make it available. That is our intention.
On that basis and as the minister has responded reasonably to the point that I was trying to make, with the leave of the committee, I will withdraw—
I will ask you to do that slightly later because first we have to deal with amendment 149A. You may comment on the debate and then I will come back to you.
Stewart Stevenson can now wind up the debate on amendment 149A and indicate whether he intends to press or withdraw the amendment.
I will be brief. I wish to press amendment 149A on the basis that I do not know whether amendment 149 will be moved and, if it is to be moved, I want it to reflect my amendment. I suspect that amendment 149 will be withdrawn, but procedurally it would be appropriate to amend amendment 149 with my amendment 149A.
The question is, that amendment 149A be agreed to. Are we agreed?
No.
There will be a division.
For
Scanlon, Mary (Highlands and Islands) (Con)
Stevenson, Stewart (Banff and Buchan) (SNP)
White, Ms Sandra (Glasgow) (SNP)
Against
Barrie, Scott (Dunfermline West) (Lab)
Craigie, Cathie (Cumbernauld and Kilsyth) (Lab)
Lamont, Johann (Glasgow Pollok) (Lab)
Smith, Elaine (Coatbridge and Chryston) (Lab)
Abstentions
Gorrie, Donald (Central Scotland) (LD)
The result of the division is: For 3, Against 4, Abstentions 1.
Amendment 149A disagreed to.
Amendment 149, by agreement, withdrawn.
Amendment 150 is grouped with amendment 169.
These two amendments make the same point. I am not a lawyer but it does not seem to be good law to say, as the bill does at the top of page 4, that
"an antisocial behaviour order is an order which prohibits, indefinitely or for such period as may be specified".
I query including in the bill a provision that deals with something "indefinitely". I would like the minister to clarify whether that is common in legislation of this sort. Is it not reasonable that the duration of an antisocial behaviour order should be specified? The order could always be extended, rather than being left open. To impose indefinitely what can be a quite draconian set of conditions on a person through an antisocial behaviour order seems unreasonable to me. I will listen with interest to what the minister has to say.
I move amendment 150.
It would be reasonable for a sheriff to state that a person was indefinitely to stop behaving in a manner that was severely annoying the people who live in their area. I am confident that under the bill the decision would be taken by the sheriff, who would consider the type of behaviour and set the period of time for which the ASBO would be in force. When she responds perhaps the minister will confirm that or correct me if I am wrong.
I share Donald Gorrie's concerns about the inclusion of the word "indefinitely". Let us consider a scenario. An indefinite prohibition is issued by the sheriff and, 10 years later, that person, who has not breached in any sense the terms of the antisocial behaviour order, applies for a sensitive position, perhaps in the public services. At that point the existence of that antisocial behaviour order, which was successful in its objectives, could become a barrier to employment. Amendment 150 would remove the word "indefinitely" and would not replace it with any specific limitation on the duration of an order. That is an important point to bear in mind, along with the fact that the orders can be renewed upon expiry. A provision that the order would apply indefinitely—which, on the face of it, means for the rest of one's life—could be an affront to civil liberties. The removal of "indefinitely" would not damage the policy intention of the bill.
I assume that the word "indefinitely" would not apply to a condition in an order that prevented someone from walking down a particular street, because I can see the point that Stewart Stevenson makes in that regard. However, if the condition covered a specific act of harassing elderly people in sheltered housing, it would seem reasonable to say that someone ought not to do that—full stop. It would be useful to have clarification of what the word "indefinitely" is attached to, as that might provide reassurance.
It might be helpful if we consider the context of the provision. An antisocial behaviour order is intended to protect the public from further antisocial behaviour, as Cathie Craigie and others have said. An order will be granted only when necessary; it is not a punishment. It is for the sheriff to decide the proportionality of the terms of an order, including, if appropriate, the length of time for which a condition should apply. It is appropriate that the sheriff has the option of making an indefinite order if the facts and circumstances of an individual case are such that that is necessary to protect others from the antisocial behaviour that has been exhibited. Of course, we should also remember that it is open to an individual to appeal against an order or apply for the order to be varied or revoked, which should provide sufficient safeguards.
I will not support amendment 150 and I ask Donald Gorrie not to move amendment 169, which is consequential on amendment 150 and which relates to section 14(2)(c), on how the duration of an antisocial behaviour order is included in the register of orders. Donald Gorrie asked whether the term "indefinite" was usual in legislation. It has been used in legislation since the introduction of antisocial behaviour orders in 1998, so there is a precedent. I should say in response to a point that Stewart Stevenson made that an antisocial behaviour order is not generally a declarable resolution and therefore should not prohibit employment.
Given that one of the people who may draw information from the register of antisocial behaviour orders is the chief constable, could disclosure to a chief constable of an antisocial behaviour order that is in force affect the employment prospects of someone who might have led an entirely blameless life for a considerable period of time in the police force?
If the minister wishes to invite an official to respond on her behalf, I am happy to allow that.
David Doris (Scottish Executive Development Department):
The example given by Stewart Stevenson is relevant only in relation to enhanced disclosures. An ASBO is not a conviction in itself, so it would be for the chief constable to decide whether it was relevant to include such information in the enhanced certificate. As far as I know, the same would apply to police recruitment. A previous ASBO could be included as relevant in that way—it would depend on whether the information was relevant to the position. As the minister has said, an ASBO order should not continue on an on-going basis if it is no longer relevant. If so much time had elapsed that it was clearly not relevant, individuals should appeal to ensure that it is revoked.
Do you wish to say anything, minister?
I have completed my comments. Are there any other questions?
Do not encourage them.
I ask Donald Gorrie to wind up.
I am not totally reassured. I am indebted to Stewart Stevenson for explaining the angle from which he is coming at the amendment, which I think is a constructive one. I am not sure whether the minister will have an opportunity to respond further. Her argument that the person concerned may apply to have the ASBO terminated at some future stage helps a bit, but there should be an automatic sweeping away of ASBOs that have served their purpose, that are no longer relevant and that could be put in the bin. I would have thought that such a provision would be helpful, in that most people are not bureaucratic animals: the thought of applying to have some ASBO from two or three years ago revoked might not occur to a lot of people in that situation.
If there was an opportunity to consider some sort of sunset clause—if that is the right term—on ASBOs that have become irrelevant, that would be helpful. If the minister shows me that the word "indefinitely" occurs in the 1998 act, I will have to accept that, but I think that Stewart Stevenson and I have a point. I wonder whether the minister might wish to interrupt me and say that the Executive might consider including such a sunset provision. I would find that helpful before I decide what to do with my amendments.
I recognise Donald Gorrie's concern about provisions being everlasting but, given that we would want the action in question to stop, that might not be a bad thing. I would be more than happy to review how many of the antisocial behaviour orders that have already been made have been indefinite, which would show whether that is an issue. As the information is not required to be disclosed, I should be able to reassure Stewart Stevenson that there would not be a difficulty with accessing employment. We would be prepared to write to the committee to explain the issues around disclosure and to clarify that an antisocial behaviour order should not be an impediment to people getting on with their lives, as long as they refrain from involving themselves in the actions on the grounds of which the order was sought in the first place.
Following that very long interruption, I ask Donald Gorrie whether he intends to press amendment 150.
In the light of those very helpful remarks from the minister, it is clear that there may be further discussion on the issue so as to address our concerns. On that basis, and with the consent of the committee, I am willing to withdraw amendment 150.
Donald Gorrie wishes to withdraw amendment 150. Is that agreed?
No.
Therefore, the question is, that amendment 150 be agreed to. Are we all agreed?
No.
There will be a division.
For
Harvie, Patrick (Glasgow) (Green)
Scanlon, Mary (Highlands and Islands) (Con)
Stevenson, Stewart (Banff and Buchan) (SNP)
White, Ms Sandra (Glasgow) (SNP)
Against
Barrie, Scott (Dunfermline West) (Lab)
Craigie, Cathie (Cumbernauld and Kilsyth) (Lab)
Lamont, Johann (Glasgow Pollok) (Lab)
Smith, Elaine (Coatbridge and Chryston) (Lab)
Abstention
Gorrie, Donald (Central Scotland) (LD)
The result of the division is: For 4, Against 4, Abstentions 1. As convener, I have the casting vote, and I cast it for the status quo, which means resisting the amendment. Therefore, the amendment falls.
Amendment 150 disagreed to.
Amendment 44 is grouped with amendments 50 and 71.
This grouping introduces amendments to improve clarity and consistency in the provisions on ASBOs, interim ASBOs and ASBOs on conviction. In the interests of fairness and to make the orders consistent with what we have already provided for parenting orders, we are introducing a requirement to explain in plain language the effect of the order and the consequences of failing to comply.
Amendment 44 provides that requirement for full ASBOs in the civil court and amendment 50 makes the same requirement for interim orders, while amendment 71 introduces the requirement to explain the order in plain language when ASBOs are made in the criminal court.
I move amendment 44.
Amendment 44 agreed to.
Amendment 114 not moved.
Amendments 151 to 154 not moved.
Amendment 262 is grouped with amendments 170 and 263.
Amendments 262 and 263 concern issues that the Scottish Retail Consortium asked me to bring to the stage 2 deliberations, and I am happy to do so. In essence, the consortium's argument is that adding the chief constable to the list of people who may seek antisocial behaviour orders will increase their effectiveness and directly engage the police in the process, and that that might lead to a more rapid response to an antisocial behaviour situation.
The Scottish Retail Consortium clearly has a particular interest in the disorder that occurs outside shops from time to time. However, the amendment would be more generally applicable and my probing amendment gives the Executive the opportunity to put on record its resistance to the idea, which I understand that it has expressed during meetings with the Scottish Retail Consortium, or it could tell the committee that it is now minded to consider the measure further now or at stage 3.
I move amendment 262.
The Law Society of Scotland, or some other organisation, raised with me the point about the difference between the local authority and a landlord pursuing an issue. Amendment 170 seeks to protect a child and the family concerned from unreasonable action against them. The argument is clearly set out if members read the amendment with the appropriate section in the bill.
I am also aware that the Scottish Retail Consortium was keen to explore how the police can be positively engaged in the promotion of ASBOs. I am aware of the police view, however, that they do not wish to be involved in civil actions. The police regard their role in the criminal courts and in criminal actions as sufficient for them in terms of the pursuit of an ASBO.
It strikes me that the police might be the first people to detect a pattern of behaviour. The first contact that a member of the public makes could be with the police and a picture could be built up over a period of time that would show the clear problems at a particular area, address or location. If we are not to give the police the direct responsibility of initiating an ASBO, how do we encourage the police to assist in the process? Is there a way in which, through dialogue, the police can be proactive in pursuing with other agencies the serving of an ASBO?
What seems to be happening at the moment is that the information is being gathered in lots of different places. The police have as clear a picture as anyone of the situation. I would have thought that it would be entirely reasonable for them to say, "Because of what has happened on X number of occasions, this will trigger a dialogue with another agency in a local community about what we can do to take forward an ASBO." If the police are not to be given direct responsibility for pursuing the application for an ASBO, what can be done for that proactive reading of a situation to be translated into a discussion with those who might apply for an ASBO?
In relation to Stewart Stevenson's amendment 263, he will be aware that it is local authorities and registered social landlords, in consultation with the police, who can apply for antisocial behaviour orders in Scotland. In England and Wales, the police have the power to apply for an ASBO and we know that that power has been used.
We have given consideration to whether the police in Scotland should be able to apply directly to the civil court for an ASBO, both in the context of the bill and in our discussions on earlier legislation. The issue was raised last year during the consultation on the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill. I know that it was also considered when ASBOs were being introduced under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.
However, we maintain our view that the police should not have the power to apply for an ASBO. We are by no means alone in taking that view. We consulted on our recommendation that the power to apply for an ASBO should not be widened beyond local authorities and registered social landlords and the overwhelming majority of respondents agreed with that approach.
Neither the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, the Scottish Police Federation nor the Association of Scottish Police Superintendents are looking for the power to apply for ASBOs. They consider that it is more appropriate for the police to be consulted on ASBO applications rather than for them to apply directly for an order to be made.
Only six responses to the consultation on "Putting our communities first: A Strategy for tackling Anti-social Behaviour" believed that the power to apply for ASBOs should be given to the police. I recognise that one of those responses was from the Scottish Retail Consortium. Joint working between the police and local authorities is vital in tackling antisocial behaviour effectively. This should include consideration of requests for ASBOs. The police will be consulted on all applications and local authorities are expected to consider requests in a strategic capacity. Extending to the police the power to apply for an ASBO could make the process more complex than is intended and lead to less protection for those who are affected by antisocial behaviour. It is important to avoid confusion over who should take the lead in making applications.
As far as possible, the Executive wants to maintain the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings. The police have a wide range of duties, and their focus has to be on enforcing the criminal law, which includes dealing with breaches of ASBOs. ASBOs are applied for, however, through the civil courts.
As members will be aware, section 88 of the bill introduces ASBOs on conviction, which will prove useful in preventing further antisocial behaviour in situations were the police have referred matters to the procurator fiscal. The sheriff will have power to make an ASBO as part of the sentence when an offence involves antisocial behaviour and when an order is necessary to protect the public from further antisocial acts.
It is essential—especially given the examples that we have heard of antisocial behaviour in the vicinity of retail premises—that the police, in recognising the problem as having become a persistent one, work with the local authority, consider alternatives and, if necessary, consider making an antisocial behaviour order. We can provide guidance on recognising where there might be an issue and on ensuring that that is addressed, either directly by the police or as part of the delivery of the antisocial behaviour order.
Amendment 262 is effectively a consequential amendment arising from amendment 263, as it provides the interpretation of "relevant person" in respect of an application from a chief constable. I hope that Stewart Stevenson feels able to withdraw amendment 262 and not to move amendment 263.
I turn to Donald Gorrie's amendment 170, which seeks to limit the power of registered social landlords to apply for ASBOs to cases involving persons aged 16 or over. RSLs obtained the power to apply for ASBOs just last year, through the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003. There are further issues to consider with respect to applications involving under-16s, and it is appropriate that we consider whether RSLs should have that power in relation to under-16s before the age threshold is lowered.
We consulted on that last summer, and we have taken steps to ensure that the wider circumstances of the child are considered, while allowing RSLs to apply. The RSL would have to consult the local authority and the principal reporter before any application for an order was made. We would not expect an application to be granted if it was not supported by those bodies. We will issue guidance on applications involving registered social landlords, and we will make it clear that an ASBO should not be the first option to be considered. The majority of children would continue to be dealt with through the children's hearings system.
It is important and reasonable that registered social landlords, who increasingly have a strategic role to play in dealing with antisocial behaviour, should have the power to apply for ASBOs in cases involving 12 to 15-year-olds. It is important to note that the power for RSLs to apply for ASBOs is limited to cases in and around their premises. Bearing that in mind, and reassuring him that we are taking steps to ensure that powers are not used inappropriately, I hope that Donald Gorrie feels able to not move amendment 170.
To return to Stewart Stevenson's amendments, I am aware of examples, particularly in South Lanarkshire, of the police, retail establishments and the local authority working closely together to establish a relationship that responds to antisocial behaviour issues, particularly around retail establishments. There are good examples there of the sort of partnership working that would produce the results that we want without extending the power to the police.
I have listened with considerable interest to the minister's remarks, as ever. The minister advised against involving the chief constable and the police in taking civil action, which is what applying for an ASBO is, and spoke about the potential of that being at the expense of the police's responsibilities towards the criminal justice system. We should listen to that view carefully.
The minister referred to the situation in England and the fact that orders had been taken out by the police there, but it is slightly disappointing that she failed to explain to us why that situation is different. The minister will know that I am not by any means necessarily against our taking different viewpoints in Scotland, but it might have been useful if she had explained.
I note what she said about South Lanarkshire, which is interesting. However, I counsel the minister not to rely on the numerical weight of evidence on the matter unless she intends to make similar statements when we come to the dispersal powers, as the respondents in favour of the proposals on that subject in the Executive's bill are rather sparse in number. From memory, there were fewer than six of them—the number that appears to be being dismissed on this occasion. We will see when we reach that part of the bill.
Although I retain the right to consult further with the Scottish Retail Consortium and perhaps take action at stage 3, at this stage, in light of all that the minister has said, I seek the committee's permission to withdraw amendment 262.
Amendment 262, by agreement, withdrawn.
Section 4, as amended, agreed to.
Section 5—Antisocial behaviour orders: variation and revocation
Amendment 45 moved—[Mrs Mary Mulligan]—and agreed to.
Amendment 115 not moved.
Amendments 46 and 47 moved—[Mrs Mary Mulligan]—and agreed to.
Amendment 155 not moved.
Amendment 48 moved—[Mrs Mary Mulligan]—and agreed to.
Amendments 156 and 157 not moved.
Section 5, as amended, agreed to.
Section 6 agreed to.
Section 7—Interim antisocial behaviour orders
Amendment 158, in the name of Donald Gorrie, is grouped with amendment 49.
Amendment 158, which responds to a point that was made by the Law Society of Scotland, relates to interim ASBOs. The bill says that the sheriff must be satisfied about various things. Amendment 158 suggests that, before making a decision on an interim ASBO, the sheriff should first hear the parties who wish to say anything about it.
I know that the interim ASBO is meant to be a rapid system, but it seems reasonable that the people affected should have a chance to have a day in court to make their point to the sheriff before he or she decides to check whether the conditions that are mentioned in the bill have been satisfied. It is natural justice that people should be heard.
I move amendment 158.
I invite the minister to speak to amendment 49 and to the other amendment in the group.
I will speak to Donald Gorrie's amendment 158 first. The issue was considered, although not on exactly the same terms, in some detail during the course of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill last year, which introduced interim ASBOs. That bill originally had a requirement to consider representations that were made by or on behalf of the person defending the application. It was concluded that an explicit statement of that right in the bill was unhelpful and could undermine the effectiveness of interim orders. Donald Gorrie is right to remind us that interim orders were introduced to reduce delays in providing protection from antisocial behaviour, which is much needed in our communities.
Individuals have a right to challenge the granting of an interim order and intimation is received before a decision is made. An explicit requirement in the bill that parties had to be heard before an interim order could be granted would lead to regular delays and could be damaging. It would allow someone who is subject to an application to frustrate the process if they wanted to do so by simply not turning up for the hearing, which would seriously frustrate the protection that interim ASBOs can afford to those who suffer from antisocial behaviour. Therefore, I ask Donald Gorrie to seek to withdraw amendment 158.
Amendment 49 makes it explicit that an interim order may contain only the same prohibitions as may be contained in a full order. The amendment aims to tighten up the drafting and does not involve a change in policy. I hope that the committee will agree to amendment 49.
I share the minister's concerns about the impact of introducing the words "after hearing parties". After all, the differentiation between an interim ASBO and a full hearing for an ASBO is that it enables urgent situations to be addressed free from impediments. Similarly, in the civil law, an interim interdict can be granted in the absence of the person who is being interdicted for precisely that reason where there is a balance of advantage, and, of course, there is a process by which interim ASBOs, like interim interdicts, can be overturned quite rapidly. If we were to require for an interim ASBO the introduction of the full panoply of opportunities and a requirement for everybody to be present that is quite rightly associated with a full hearing, I do not know what an interim ASBO would end up being in respect of process. Therefore, I do not support Donald Gorrie's amendment 158.
The combined arguments of the minister and Stewart Stevenson are irresistible. The fact that the matter was discussed during the previous bill, which was dealt with by another committee, is also persuasive—I was not aware of all the details. Therefore, with the committee's leave, I seek to withdraw amendment 158.
Amendment 158, by agreement, withdrawn.
Amendments 159 and 160 not moved.
Amendments 49 and 50 moved—[Mrs Mary Mulligan]—and agreed to.
Amendments 161 to 163 not moved.
Section 7, as amended, agreed to.
Section 8—Notification of making etc of orders and interim orders
Amendment 164, in the name of Stewart Stevenson, is grouped with amendments 51, 165, 52, 53, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 72 and 73. I ask Stewart Stevenson to move amendment 164 and to speak to all the amendments in the group.
As we discussed in relation to some of my amendments in this area at last week's meeting, I seek through amendments 164 and 165 to bring the victim more closely into the system. The minister sought last week to highlight some of the difficulties with my use of the phrase "relevant person". She said:
"As a relevant person in relation to an application by a local authority is a person within the area of the authority, that would include any person residing in the area, or otherwise in the area. I am sure that members will accept that that is probably impractical."—[Official Report, Communities Committee, 21 April 2004; c 833.]
The minister is clearly correct in that regard; however, that opens up another issue that we cannot readily deal with through the amendments that have been lodged. To determine that antisocial behaviour is occurring, there has under the bill to be an identifiable person at the outset—leaving aside the legal definition of a person as a human being—who is being subjected to the antisocial behaviour. I seek to ensure that that person is properly involved in the process.
Elsewhere, the minister has made the point that that person will inevitably be involved in the consultation that must take place before an application for an antisocial behaviour order can be submitted and before such an order can be made. However, the bill does not provide that that person, who has been part of the process, will subsequently see, be aware of or have a copy of the antisocial behaviour order.
After I have moved amendment 164—as I will, to facilitate debate—I am likely to seek the permission of the committee to withdraw it in the light of the remarks that the minister made last week and of what I am sure that the minister is going to say now. Nevertheless, it would be useful if the minister were able to indicate that, because an antisocial behaviour order will be issued in open court—that is my understanding, but I seek confirmation of that—it would be proper that a copy of it be, by some means, given to the person who has been subjected to the antisocial behaviour that the order is supposed to suppress so that that person knows the terms of the order and can, therefore, take part in the process of alerting the necessary authorities to its being breached.
The committee took evidence from people in the real world out there, who stated that that shortcoming in the 1998 act led to people not knowing whether antisocial behaviour orders were being breached, although those orders had supposedly been made on their behalf. I seek the minister's indulgence and assistance in navigating me and other members of the committee to a position in which we are quite clear that the initial victim—the bill provides for the protection of others who are not initially victims but who might become so later—is part of the process and is aware of orders' being made. If the minister is able to do that, I will feel able to seek the committee's permission to withdraw amendment 164. However, to allow the debate to proceed, I move amendment 164.
Just as well for you.
I will comment first on amendments 51 to 53, 60 to 64, 66, 72 and 73, which are in my name.
Amendment 51 seeks to introduce a requirement to notify the person who is subject to the antisocial behaviour order if the order is revoked or if an interim order is recalled. There was no requirement to notify revocation in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, but it is in our view only fair that a person is made aware if a court order no longer applies to them. Amendments 52 and 53 will provide the means of delivery and the test of sufficient evidence to satisfy the requirement to notify of revocation or recall.
Amendment 72 will require the court to serve a copy of an antisocial behaviour order that is made or varied by the criminal court on the offender and the local authority that it considers most relevant. The court will have discretion over which local authority to copy the order to in order to take account of where the antisocial behaviour occurred and the residence of the offender. The court shall also notify the local authority if the order is revoked. Amendment 72 also provides the means by which a copy of the order is served, and the test of sufficient evidence that the order was served.
Stewart Stevenson's comments on amendments 164 and 165 were helpful. I acknowledge the concern that he is trying to address by establishing that the victims of antisocial behaviour should be kept fully informed and aware of the process, but I commented last week on how many people could be involved. He implied that it would be a single person, but it might not be—perhaps he did not imply it, but there was a suspicion that it was one person.
For clarification, I seek simply to inform the identifiable people who were part of the initial taking out of an order. I recognise that I have not addressed that in amendments 164 and 165, but that is the relatively limited number of people that I am talking about.
I am a bit concerned that I am being accused of losing control of this meeting. This had better be a productive response, or it will not happen again.
I will not let him in again.
I acknowledge that there is an issue. My one concern is about who we make aware when the antisocial behaviour order relates to a person under 16. We need to be careful how we make the notice available. However, we can under statutory guidance provide for that to be taken forward, to ensure that the people concerned—I do not want to use the word "relevant", because it has other connotations, as the committee will understand—should be given the information where necessary. We share Stewart Stevenson's objective, but his amendments will not achieve it. However, I hope that he is reassured by the fact that we share that objective, and feels that we will achieve the result through statutory guidance.
Executive amendments 60 to 64, 66 and 73 will ensure that records of antisocial behaviour orders and interim orders that are kept by local authorities are complete and comprehensive. Amendment 60 clarifies the requirement on registered social landlords to copy to relevant local authorities antisocial behaviour orders and interim orders that they obtain. The registered social landlord must also notify the authorities of any revocation or recall of an order.
Amendment 61 is a minor drafting amendment. Amendment 62 will make it clear that the record of orders will include interim orders as well as full ASBOs. Amendment 63 is a minor drafting amendment. Amendment 64 will improve the drafting of section 14(2). Amendment 66 will add the principal reporter to the list of persons to whom a local authority shall disclose information in the record keeping.
Amendment 73 will ensure that local authorities maintain records of antisocial behaviour orders that are made on conviction. Although section 14 makes separate provision for orders that are granted in the civil court, local authorities will in practice be able to keep one set of records to cover both civil and criminal orders. The requirements that are placed on local authorities are equivalent to those in section 14. A separate requirement to have regard to guidance on the record of ASBOs on conviction is included in the statutory guidance on ASBOs, which we will introduce via amendment 67 and which will include guidance on records of ASBOs that are granted in the civil courts. That relates only to part 2 of the bill.
I invite the committee to approve the Executive's amendments.
I have a comment about Stewart Stevenson's amendment 164. The committee has concerns that while a local authority is dealing with a problem, victims are often left out and do not know what final arrangements have been made. We heard good evidence on that from people who are involved in successful projects in the Edinburgh area. One failing that they mentioned was that it is often some time until victims find out what has happened. We look forward to the minister providing more detail on the matter, although we recognise that it is a sensitive one, particularly when under-16s are involved. However, we must ensure that victims see what action has been taken.
I support the principle of giving information to victims or people who feel that they have been affected by a case. However, as well as talk about who should get access to information, we need to think about how people will get access. The idea of providing physical copies of orders gives me the horrible image of photocopies being distributed round neighbourhoods or published in local newspapers. Such naming and shaming would not help to change the behaviour of the person who is subject to the order. If I am not assured on that point, I will not support Stewart Stevenson's amendment 164 if he decides to press it. If he does not press it, I hope that the minister will be aware of the issue when she considers the guidance.
The debate has been useful, although the committee has some unresolved issues. The minister rightly pointed to the issue of young people and Patrick Harvie made a perfectly reasonable point. The minister is on notice to produce something that will address the concerns of the people from Edinburgh and elsewhere to whom we spoke. I am not minded to press amendment 164 and therefore seek the committee's leave to withdraw it.
Amendment 164, by agreement, withdrawn.
Amendment 51 moved—[Mrs Mary Mulligan]—and agreed to.
Amendment 165 not moved.
Amendments 52 and 53 moved—[Mrs Mary Mulligan]—and agreed to.
Section 8, as amended, agreed to.
Section 9—Breach of orders
Amendment 166, in the name of Donald Gorrie, is grouped with amendments 54, 167 and 55. If amendment 54 is agreed to, amendment 167 will be pre-empted.
The issue in this group is what penalties it is reasonable for a young person to face if he or she breaches an antisocial behaviour order. Amendment 54 will remove the possibility of the young person's going to prison, which is welcome. Under unamended section 9, there exists the possibility of prison or a fine for a breach. My amendments 166 and 167 try to deal with the matter differently by removing both possibilities and spelling out the sort of penalties that would be possible, such as
"a community reparation order or supervision requirement and … any additional non-custodial sentence imposed by the court".
If we agree to amendment 54, which I think most people would agree to, the issue is whether fining is a reasonable proposition in dealing with a young person. As I understand the matter, technically the young person would pay the fine, but obviously it might be the parents who actually do so. It is possible to argue that it is reasonable for the parent of a young tearaway from a reasonably well-off household to cough up a fine on the child's behalf and that that might be a useful deterrent. On the other hand, there is evidence from elsewhere that the use of inappropriate fines can lead to people going to prison. We discovered on visits to Cornton Vale prison that many women are in there as a result of their having not paid fines for not having television licences or for prostitution. It would be bad if not paying fines for the breach of ASBOs led to prison.
It is important that the minister clarify for us what the procedure would be if a fine were to be imposed. Her conversion to the cause of not sending young people who breach ASBOs to prison is welcome, so I support amendment 54, but the bill must address what sentences are suitable for the breach of ASBOs. Perhaps there should be a two-tier approach: reasonable or early offenders could be dealt with in the way that is specified in amendment 166, but there could be fines as a deterrent for more habitual offenders. It is important that we be clear about what the outcome of fining might be.
I move amendment 166 and await the minister's response with interest.
In the partnership agreement, the Executive made a commitment to ensuring that there would be no imprisonment of children for breach of ASBOs. That was the policy intention underlying section 9(7), but upon reflection we are of the view that that provision does not fully implement the policy and that amendments 54 and 55 are needed to make clear the relationship between the provisions in section 9 of the bill and sections 44 and 208 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which relate to detention of children.
Amendments 54 and 55 are technical amendments that will ensure that a child cannot be detained or imprisoned for breach of an ASBO. I invite the committee to agree to the amendments.
Donald Gorrie's amendment 166 would amend section 9(2) to the effect that the penalty for breach of an ASBO by any person, young or old, would be limited to a community reparation order, a supervision requirement or any other non-custodial disposal. I cannot support that. We have confirmed, through amendments 54 and 55, that a child who breaches an ASBO cannot be detained for that breach, whether the child is prosecuted through summary procedure or on indictment. However, amendment 166's effect would be that, no matter how serious the situation, an adult could not be imprisoned for breach of an ASBO. I am not sure whether that is Donald Gorrie's intention, but it is not acceptable and should be resisted.
Amendment 167 seeks to amend section 9(7) to the effect that, in respect of a breach of an ASBO by a child, the only sentence that would be available to the courts would be the imposition of a community reparation order. There is a problem, however, in that amendment 54 seeks to delete subsection (7) and replace it with the new section in amendment 55. For that reason alone the amendment cannot be accepted.
On the issue of substance, although I can see where Donald Gorrie is coming from, I ask him to think again. We all agree that a child should not be detained for breach of an ASBO; I think that my amendments will achieve that. However, that being the case, I believe strongly that a court dealing with such a breach should have all options apart from detention open to it.
Breach of an ASBO by an under-16 will be referred to the procurator fiscal, who will determine, in consultation with the children's reporter, what action is most appropriate. The case could be referred at that point to the children's hearings system. In situations in which the decision is to taken to prosecute, all options other than detention should be available. That would include the use of a community reparation order. Alternatively, it might be decided that probation, deferral for good behaviour or, perhaps, admonishment is appropriate for a child. The court could refer the case to the hearings system for disposal on conviction. Donald Gorrie's amendment 166 would rule those options out—even though his opening comments seemed to suggest that the amendment related only to the issue of fines—and for that reason I must resist it.
I know where the minister is coming from and I see the difficulties with Donald Gorrie's amendments—I, too, felt uncomfortable about the fact that they would stop us jailing adults.
I am concerned about the drafting approach that is being taken, however, particularly with regard to changing section 44(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, which currently reads:
"This section applies to any offence in respect of which it is competent to impose imprisonment on a person of the age of 21 years or more."
The minister wants to stick in some words to say that that is the case except in one specific instance. By deleting section 9(7) from the bill—incidentally, I point out that section 9(2) contains a reference to subsection (7) that would remain—amendment 54 would give us a bill that says absolutely nothing in its main part except for amending other legislation to the effect that we are not imprisoning children. I find that slightly odd. I am not quite clear about why we are seeking to transfer that provision from the Antisocial Behaviour etc (Scotland) Bill into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. That seems to do nothing but make the drafting more complicated. Of course, it might be that I am making something out of nothing, in which case, feel free to tell me so.
Stewart Stevenson has raised a point to which we will all want to hear the answer.
I support the minister's amendment and, unlike Donald Gorrie, who thinks that the minister has undergone a conversion, I know that it was never the intention to send young people to prison for breach of an ASBO. I am pleased that the Executive has lodged amendment 54.
It is worth saying a few words in favour of amendment 166, particularly when the Executive is coming under fire over slopping out and some of the other consequences of overcrowding and a rising prison population. Politicians of various parties say that we send too many people to prison. We have an opportunity to reverse that and to make it clear that a non-custodial sentence, such as a community reparation order, would be more appropriate in this case.
I support amendment 54, which would have been consequential on amendment 112, in my name, had it been carried. I am happy to support amendment 54 in any case given that it clarifies that children should not be liable to imprisonment.
Will the minister comment on what happens when ASBOs are breached? Could a restriction of liberty order be used? The minister also mentioned other measures, so will she clarify that point?
Yes, an RLO could be used for breach of an ASBO. It would be more appropriate for me to ask one of the drafters to respond to Stewart Stevenson's point.
Gillian Russell (Scottish Executive Legal and Parliamentary Services):
When the court is considering the sentencing options it has for a child who is before it, it will look to the options that are open to it under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. That is why amendments are to be made to that act rather than having a stand-alone provision in the bill.
I take it that we are saying that section 44(2) of the 1995 act would prevail, notwithstanding the fact that, if we do not change it, section 9(7) of the bill says that imprisonment does not apply. Is that the essence of the point?
The essence is that we do not think that section 9(7) of the bill on its own would be enough when it was considered alongside the provision in the 1995 act, so we have amended the 1995 act instead.
I am content.
I accept the point that amendment 166 would affect people aged over 16 as well as those under 16. I am still concerned that although young people who breach an ASBO will not be sent to prison, they could still end up in prison for the non-payment of a fine.
Generally, fines are imposed only when a person has the means to pay. Given that we are talking about young people who it could reasonably be said would not have the means to pay, regardless of what their families could afford, it would be unlikely that a sheriff would impose a fine for a breach of an ASBO.
That is certainly helpful. I hope that sheriffs will use community reparation orders and so on. On the basis of the discussion, I seek the approval of the committee to withdraw amendment 166.
Amendment 166, by agreement, withdrawn.
Amendment 54 moved—[Mrs Mary Mulligan]—and agreed to.
Section 9, as amended, agreed to.
After section 9
Amendment 55 moved—[Mrs Mary Mulligan]—and agreed to.
Section 10 agreed to.
Section 11—Sheriff's power to refer case to children's hearing
Amendment 56, in the name of the minister, is in a group on its own.
Amendment 56 amends the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 to make explicit that the principal reporter must set up a children's hearing when a sheriff makes an ASBO or interim ASBO in respect of a child and refers the case to a children's hearing under section 11(1). If the child is not already subject to a supervision requirement, the children's panel must consider whether to impose such a requirement and if the child is already subject to a supervision requirement, the panel must review that arrangement.
I move amendment 56.
Members will be aware from my comments on other amendments at last week's meeting that I am concerned that we might end up with parallel systems in the courts and the children's hearings system. Amendment 56 makes explicit the role of the principal reporter and the action that must be taken if a young person is subject to a supervision requirement or, indeed, not subject to such a requirement. That clarification is welcome and allays some of the fears that I expressed last week.
Amendment 56 agreed to.
Amendment 116 not moved.
Section 11, as amended, agreed to.
Section 12—Sheriff's power to make parenting order
Amendment 57, in the name of the minister, is grouped with amendments 58, 58A, 59 and 176.
Amendments 57, 58 and 59 ensure that the tests for parenting orders that are in part 9 are made explicit in section 12. Section 12(1) gives the sheriff the power to make a parenting order in respect of a parent of a child when making an antisocial behaviour order in respect of the child. The sheriff must be
"satisfied that the making of the order is desirable in the interests of preventing the child from engaging in further antisocial behaviour".
In addition, the sheriff can make the parenting order only if
"the Scottish Ministers have notified the court that the local authority for the area in which the parent ordinarily resides has made arrangements that would enable the order to be complied with."
Amendment 57 is a consequential amendment and amendment 58 fulfils the Executive's intention on the matter.
Amendment 58A, in the name of Elaine Smith, would introduce a requirement for a sheriff to take into account relevant factors, such as a child's disability. However, the sheriff would have taken all the circumstances of a case into account before deciding to make the ASBO and any factors relevant to the decision to make a parenting order linked to the ASBO would be considered. Clearly, the sheriff would take into account any disability of the child, so there is no need to make that requirement explicit. If the bill were explicitly to specify one factor, we would open up the possibility that it should specify others, which is not necessary. I therefore invite Elaine Smith not to move amendment 58A.
Amendment 59 ensures that the interpretation of "parent" is the one that is in section 87, which sets out the general interpretation of part 9. I invite the committee to agree to amendments 57, 58 and 59.
Amendment 176, in the name of Elaine Smith, would insert a further condition with which the sheriff would have to comply before making a parenting order. The amendment would apply to any application for a parenting order, but we are debating it now because it relates to the provisions in section 12 for linking parenting orders to ASBOs. Amendment 176 would require a sheriff to have regard to any disability of the relevant child before granting a parenting order. As I said, there is no need to make such a requirement explicit in the bill. A sheriff will have regard to the full circumstances of a case and he must be satisfied that all the existing conditions are satisfied, while having regard to the equal opportunities provision in section 107.
Members should be aware that a parenting order is about the behaviour of a parent rather than that of a child. The child's circumstances should not determine whether a parent is being irresponsible in their approach to parenting and how they look after their children and keep them out of trouble. There is no need for concern about parenting orders being used inappropriately for parents of children with disabilities. Therefore, I invite Elaine Smith not to move amendment 176.
I move amendment 57.
As the minister will know, amendment 58A relates to concerns that the National Autistic Society Scotland raised. The society feels that using parenting orders to prevent a child from engaging in further antisocial behaviour when such behaviour is directly caused by a disability or autism is unlikely to work. The society feels that, to prevent the occurrence of certain behaviours, it would be more appropriate to give particular social skills training to a child with ASD. NASS surveyed its members about which service was important for the person with autism whom they cared for and social skills training came out top of the list. However, when NASS asked which services were being delivered to people with ASD, social skills training came fifth in the list.
NASS believes that sheriffs should take disability into account when deciding whether a parenting order should be made as part of a decision on an ASBO. I believe that the minister gave a reassurance on that issue earlier and perhaps she can reiterate it when she winds up. Scott Barrie raised concerns at last week's meeting about parenting orders being attached to ASBOs. If amendment 117 were to be moved and agreed to, that provision would be removed from the bill. I believe that that issue needs further discussion and I throw it into the pot at this stage.
On amendment 176, it is possible for parenting orders to be regarded as blaming parents for a child's behaviour that is caused by disability. In the education system, for example, NASS believes that parenting orders could assume that truancy and behavioural problems are the sole responsibility of a pupil and their parent. NASS points out that that would not take into account the responsibility of schools and education authorities to ensure that they have a coherent behaviour policy, good class management and the required strategies. Children with ASD have a social and communication disorder. Therefore, it would be unfair to expect their behaviour always to be socially appropriate, especially if staff training was lacking and not enough support was provided. It would also be unfair to take action against parents for the behaviour of their child when such behaviour is caused by a disability.
I was comforted at the report stage by the minister's commitment to include support for parents in the bill and the acknowledgement that parenting orders could not be made unless and until such support is available. That seems a much more positive step, which will help to tackle the underlying causes of ASD.
The minister also seemed clear at the report stage that parenting orders are not about children's behaviour but about parents' willingness or otherwise to seek or accept assistance for their own behaviour. I believe that the minister has just reiterated that position. However, can she comment on the specialist support that would need to be in place for parents of children with ASD?
I have a brief comment on a matter that Elaine Smith touched on and to which the minister referred in her introductory remarks. We must remember that parenting orders are about parents' behaviour—or, rather, their lack of appropriate behaviour. Parenting orders are not about children's behaviour, which is dealt with in another place in the bill. We should not get those two aspects mixed up because it is clear that parenting orders are about influencing the behaviour of a parent. Members will know my views on that from my evidence at stage 1.
I will try to be brief. I reiterate that parenting orders are about the behaviour of the parent and that they would be used to respond to the needs of the parent. I acknowledge the points that Elaine Smith has made about the availability of social skills training for those with ASD who may need support, and there is nothing in amendment 58 that would prevent that from happening. It is an important part of looking at the individual as a person and of considering their specific support requirements. Parenting orders should not be used, and will not be used, to chastise parents of disabled children for their behaviour. That would be unacceptable and is not the intention of the introduction of the parenting orders.
I acknowledge the point that Scott Barrie made about support for parents who are experiencing difficulties. The parenting orders are for those who are refusing the support to enable them to carry out their parenting duties. The orders are not for parents, in whatever circumstances, who find themselves having difficulty managing their teenagers, and I am sure that many people would have sympathy with them. The orders are for those who refuse to respond to the needs of their children and who therefore need additional compulsion to ensure that their children's welfare is put to the fore.
Amendment 57 agreed to.
Amendment 58 moved—[Mrs Mary Mulligan.]
Amendment 58A not moved.
Amendment 58 agreed to.
Amendment 59 moved—[Mrs Mary Mulligan]—and agreed to.
Amendment 117 not moved.
Section 12, as amended, agreed to.
That finishes day 2 of our consideration of the Antisocial Behaviour etc (Scotland) Bill. There will be a call for amendments up to the end of section 75—the end of part 8—for our next meeting.
I thank members for attending what has been a long session today. In particular, I thank the minister, who has had to deal with the budget process and with stage 2 consideration of the bill. I also thank the official reporters, who are here along with the rest of us, sometimes in difficult circumstances. Thank you very much.
Meeting closed at 13:08.