Common Fisheries Policy (Reform)
I welcome members to the 12th meeting this year of the European Committee. I have received apologies from Ben Wallace, who is at the Conservative party conference, and I understand that John Home Robertson will be a little late.
I am pleased to welcome Ross Finnie, who is the Minister for Environment and Rural Development. It is the first time that the committee has used its new procedures to invite a minister to attend a European Committee meeting in advance of a meeting of the Council of Ministers. I am sure that members will welcome that development. I understand that the agriculture and fisheries council will meet next week and that some items of great importance to the committee and to the Scottish Parliament will be on the agenda. The minister's presence today will allow us to follow up on the questioning that the Rural Development Committee undertook.
Before we begin, I will remind everyone who is present of the committee's previous comments on the general principles of the common fisheries policy and of our report on the CFP. I hope that the minister will regard our work on the CFP as an endorsement and that he will do his utmost to ensure that the outcome of the debate on the CFP addresses the principles that the European Committee and the Rural Development Committee have agreed.
I invite the minister to make a short statement on the state of play as we approach the agriculture and fisheries council meeting. We will then move to formal questioning.
The review of the CFP is more than welcome. Although there are disagreements about some of the initial proposals that have been published, there is no doubt that member states have given a general welcome to the review. The majority of member states agree that change is needed.
It is self-evident to the European Committee that the review does not represent a blind foray into an obscure part of the world that is called Europe. We are already in Europe. Fisheries management is mainstream activity and we are recognised players on that stage. My officials attend the weekly Council working group meetings in Brussels and Executive officials attend ad hoc European Union meetings on such issues as discards and multi-annual management. We are a part of everything that is going on in the CFP review process.
Without a shadow of a doubt, Scottish views form an integral part of the UK line that my colleagues and I develop. Scottish ministers have attended a substantial number of Council meetings since devolution. I have been at 13 of them—lucky for some, one might say. The Executive is involved at all stages of the negotiation process, including those at the ministerial level. I will continue to be centrally involved in protecting and promoting Scottish interests.
Achieving sustainable fish stocks is one of the most important elements of our present negotiating stance. That view is shared by leaders in the industry. We cannot allow the decline to continue; if we do, we will have no fish and therefore no industry. Some member states have a tendency to bury their heads in the sand and find it difficult to face up to grave realities and to rethink old priorities. To provide the tools to solve the problems that we face, we need a revised CFP with a framework within which sustainability must be promoted.
Difficult decisions will have to be made if we are to stabilise our stocks. We must consider fishing effort and find realistic ways in which to adjust our fleet's capacity. The CFP proposals contain some suggestions on that. We must also be alive to technological gain, by which I mean the increase in fishing efficiency that comes with new vessels and improved technology. That gain is difficult to measure and can be variable. However, it has an undeniably significant effect on the fleet and needs to be considered when we talk about the sustainability of fish stocks.
There is no option of the CFP standing still. The status quo would result in an inevitable drift towards increased fishing pressure. The key point is how to address effectively the imbalances while taking into account fishermen's needs. Therefore, in addition to addressing the fundamental issue of relative stability and looking for CFP reform that addresses the broader picture of sustainability, we will continue to press on what are the major items from a Scottish perspective. Those include linking relative stability with our existing rights under the Hague preference, prosecuting our interests in maintaining the Shetland box and preserving the 6-mile and 12-mile limits.
We are clear about our priorities in the negotiations and we will continue to prosecute them vigorously at every opportunity, in the Council and through my officials' regular attendance at Council working group meetings in Europe.
I will be happy to answer any questions.
I do not think that the committee would disagree with anything in your introductory remarks. You will be aware of our report on the common fisheries policy. Do you take issue with anything in that report or do you feel able to argue vociferously on the basis of the committee's recommendations?
I have been encouraged by the fact that the European Committee's report and the Rural Development Committee's recommendations by and large articulate the same principles to which the committees believe Scottish ministers should direct their attention as part of the CFP reform discussions.
There are minor matters of detail, but on the essential principles, such as the need for management committees to be an effective instrument, there are no major differences between us. The devil is always in the detail. The real differences are not between the committees of the Parliament and the Executive. The potential differences will emerge in reaching the final written regulation and in how closely that represents the real interests of Scotland and Scotland's fishermen.
As the minister knows, our committee supports delegated powers for regional advisory councils.
I was pleased that your party's fisheries spokesperson, Mr Andrew George MP, recently said that
"reforms must take power away from landlocked Brussels and give it to fishermen and scientists in the fishing regions."
However, Mr George's view seems to contrast with that of the Commission's John Farnell, who seemed to indicate that he would like the regional committees or councils to be purely advisory or consultative. What is your position? Do you want those committees to have real decision-making powers, or do you envisage that they will be purely advisory or consultative?
The way in which the committees are described in the draft regulations is unsatisfactory and I do not think that they have anything like sufficient powers. You and I know that the committees might have regard to this issue or that, but, equally, they might not. I am fully signed up to the principle, but I am not at all happy that the committees will have sufficient power or status to deliver what we want. The matter is slightly complicated by the fact that, at the outset of the consultative process on the review of the CFP, member states ruled out a complete revision of the treaty. That restricts the extent to which powers can be transferred to those regional committees and is a disappointment to me.
Let me take off my minister's hat for a minute and advise members that, politically, Andrew George and I are as one. The first document on advisory committees that was circulated was produced before I started to attend Council meetings, although I was well aware of it. However, the Council voted against making a treaty revision, which means that, although we can beef up those committees and give them a more important role than is currently envisaged for them, I am not sure that we will get as far as some people might wish.
What about the view of the UK Government? I note in a recent report by the House of Commons European Scrutiny Select Committee, that the UK fisheries minister referred to the proposed regional advisory councils as
"a positive step towards greater stakeholder involvement".
In particular, he referred to
"the ‘significant' power that they would have to inform Commission decisions and comment on regulations."
That is a bit ambiguous, to say the least, because the power to inform and comment is not the same as the power to decide.
I recall that comment, although I do not recall the context. I will not get into an argument about that.
I am not aware of any substantive difference between Elliot Morley's approach and understanding and mine. The proposals as drafted are insufficient and need to be beefed up—the regional advisory committees must become the serious instruments of change management that they should be. We have often been critical of fishermen's principles and how they have acted. However, if we take power away from them and try to dictate from the centre, we will not get the right answer. In my view, the right answer is to give responsibility to those who have to manage the stocks. Fishing is their livelihood, and if they get it wrong, the consequences will be severe.
What about the views of other Governments or devolved Administrations in the EU? Do any of them support the devolution of real power to the regional advisory committees? What efforts are you making to try to persuade them of your point of view?
Our difficulties are slightly more fundamental than that at present. You ask about an important aspect of the debate but, to be honest, in the two Council meetings that have taken place since the proposals were published, there has been a dramatic divergence of opinion between the northern and southern states. That divergence revolves around the Commission's proposals to restrict the granting of funding for new vessels.
The Commission has put a huge amount of effort towards finding ways of bridging what at first sight appeared to be an enormous gap in views. There appeared to be some movement from the so-called friends of fishing at the meeting that I attended four weeks ago. They began to realise that their position was untenable, given the lack of any sustainable approach to addressing the matter.
The point is that although we will come to a more substantial discussion about the regional advisory councils, we are not there yet. That matter may become clear after next week. I hope so, because it is a very important element in our proposals.
You mentioned the difficulties of treaty revision. We might consider that the whole future of Europe debate is about decentralising power and making Europe more open and more transparent. As that debate develops in the European convention over the next year or so, might that present opportunities for treaty revision, which could open up the way to making regional advisory councils more relevant to local stakeholders in the future?
It might do in theory. I would welcome that—although I am not an expert in the precise details of the European legislation concerned. The disappointment in this case was that it was about giving more power not just to a regional Government, but to a specific interest group with a clear and demonstrable interest in the management of its own future. I will not disagree with what you suggest, as it is self-evident. If the debate opens up the opportunities that you mention, that would be enormously helpful. That would be two or three years down the line, however. Some time in the next three to five months, we must bring together a common fisheries policy. Otherwise, we will get into one or two quite serious regulatory problems.
There is a current proposal for the Commission to become responsible for managing the multi-annual management plans, once they are agreed by the Council of Ministers. In effect, that would consist of a transfer of power away from the Council of Ministers to the Commission. You stated in evidence to the Rural Development Committee:
"I do not believe that there is a case for the Council's devolving its powers elsewhere. We would lose essential accountability through that. The aim of introducing more predictability and stability to the management plans is laudable, but I am not sure that the way of doing that is to give the Commission more powers. It seems to me that that would be an inappropriate devolution or delegation of power and I am not comfortable with that proposal."—[Official Report, Rural Development Committee, 17 September 2002; c 3448.]
Will that be the UK's negotiating line on that aspect of the proposals? Will the UK oppose such a change in decision making?
Yes. The UK has already indicated severe reservations and caution over those proposals. There are two aspects to that. The first is a point that I have already made, about which there is no disagreement. It is terribly important that there should be some democratic accountability for such important decisions. The second element that needs to be fleshed out is the basis on which all the decisions are to be made. The Commission has progressively moved towards basing its decision on scientific evidence, but we all know that there have been exceptions to that. I think that I, and everyone else, would feel much more comfortable if we were absolutely clear as to the criteria to be applied. We do not have that certainty, however, and some democratic accountability would seem to be necessary when we are making such important decisions on multi-annual management rules.
The opposite stream of thought is that, when management plans are planned, and the Council agrees to them, giving control over them to the Commission actually removes political interference. I fully appreciate and understand your commitment to accountability, but when the accountability issue is considered in real terms—with regard to the UK Government and other major Governments—it is in fact a smokescreen for the retention of power. In reality, the creation of management structures to be administered by the Commission, as agreed by the Council, would represent no loss of accountability. Further to that, what level of support is there for the UK's position among other member states?
Unless we were absolutely able to demonstrate that the Commission would be driven solely by scientific advice—I do not want to impugn the integrity of the commissioners, but the notion that the Commission is not subject to political pressure does not bear close examination—it would be difficult to see how the control over the multi-annual management plans might be delegated, particularly in the intervening period, when a stock might either dramatically recover or collapse and require major decisions rather than minor tinkering around the edges. That said, there is no question but that, if we had multi-annual management plans, it would be hugely beneficial. Therefore, I will be interested in what other member states have to say in the coming negotiations.
Listening to the round-table talks at the previous two fisheries council meetings, I became aware that a large number of people, particularly in the northern states, were interested in multi-annual management plans but have also expressed reservations about the mechanism and whether it would be possible simply to delegate that to the European Commission. That will be a matter for negotiation.
We have discussed the issues of accountability and the opposite view. I accept that political pressure can be applied on the Commission, but the key point is that you are saying that you would support the position if there were clarity in the mechanism.
I would have to see the situation. My limited experience has caused me to have difficulty reposing total confidence in the Commission because of its actions over the past 14 or 15 months. That might be unfair, but I have to work in the real world and protect the interests of Scottish fishermen. I am not about to agree to a delegation process unless there are a lot of other elements. The matter rests not only on the basis of science but on other elements that will protect our fishermen in the event of a manifestly obtuse decision being made as a result of that consideration. I need to think that through. While I am, obviously, attracted to multi-annual agreements, it is not clear that the Commission is prepared to give us the comfort that we seek.
What if there were a change in the European Commission and a proper definition of the mechanisms and structures?
That would be helpful, especially if it were accompanied by transparency about how the decision would be arrived at.
Thank you. My second question—
Can you be brief, Lloyd? We have a number of questions still to ask.
If you do not want the question asked, that is fine.
John Home Robertson, did you want to ask a question?
Yes. From my hazy recollection of the way in which the fisheries council works, I would be reluctant to describe it as being terribly democratically accountable. I take the point that the Commission is not necessarily any better, as the minister has said, but what would be the best way in which we could achieve scientifically sustainable management of fisheries without sacrificing important political interests?
I believe that Lloyd Quinan's follow-up question got us closer to where we want to be. Earlier, Dennis Canavan talked about John Farnell making ex cathedra remarks that seemed to be at odds with what the Commission had said and were also slightly provocative on the issue of the ultimate powers. That is profoundly unhelpful. If that is how the Commission conducts its business, it makes it difficult to repose confidence in it as a body that has set a set of rules that we can see.
Transparency is certainly not a feature of the Commission—one reason why John Home Robertson may have a hazy recollection is that it is not always possible to see how the fisheries council or the Commission works. It is desirable to have a structure within the Commission that is demonstrably more transparent. Every aspect of the process should lead to the evidence that has been received; it should indicate how the evidence has been adjudged and how the conclusion has been arrived at that results in the mid-year adjustment as part of the two-year settlement. If we got closer to that, most member states would be more attracted to such a structure. That is not currently on the table. We will have to push in that direction.
Thanks for that clarification. We will now move on to decommissioning.
I will bring us back to the impact of decommissioning within Scotland. In our committee report, we stated that we thought that it was likely that there would be large-scale fleet decommissioning as part of the reform of the CFP. We recognised that that would have an impact on communities in Scotland. We recommended that the Executive should form a task force to develop alternative industries and training opportunities in advance of any adverse impact that decommissioning might have. Has anything been done along the lines of setting up such a task force?
A number of complications exist. First, the report from the Commission—both the route map and the draft proposals—is extremely ambiguous. It refers to levels of effort that might be consistent with a more sustainable fishery. Many people read the report and drew the conclusion that that was therefore pointing each member state to an inevitable and probably mandatory reduction in effort, by decommissioning or through other effort management. That having been the case for about 48 hours, the commissioner opined that the tables contained towards the back of the proposals were merely included for illustrative purposes and that the Commission had no intention of setting effort targets for each member state. That threw the proposal into confusion.
Running parallel to the current discussions on the reform of the CFP and germane to the Scottish fleet are the discussions on the cod and hake recovery plans, which are of particular importance to us because our white fish fleet operates a mixed fishery and the question of haddock is therefore drawn in. Again, there has been much discussion about the possible need for effort limitation and control.
Against that rather confused background, my position is that one of the key questions is what will be proposed for those fishing areas. Is it the North sea or the north North sea? All of us must recognise that under the common fisheries policy all member states have an obligation to address the scientific evidence that may emerge. None of us can duck that. Therefore, not having seen all the scientific evidence even for this year, I cannot rule out the need for further effort control or any one of the proposed measures.
However, I will make two points about that. First, I am absolutely clear that if any such proposals emerge, the steps that have already been taken by the Scottish fishing fleet must be taken into account in any calculation. We cannot draw a date today and ignore the facts that we have decommissioned 18 per cent of our white fish fleet and that we have operated technical measures such as square-mesh panels.
Secondly, although I have not established a commission, I have asked economists in my department and elsewhere in the Executive—unfortunately, they are not the two officials who are accompanying me—to start considering the matter seriously. If such proposals emerge, we may have a slightly better handle on the social and economic impact of any further reduction in effort and its consequences for fishing communities and fish processors. The economic multiplier of such action would affect a range of people.
I am not complacent about that, but one CFP issue is that all the member states that face stocks that are not sustainable at their present level should be able to come together and take collective action for the common good.
In effect, you have taken preliminary action to be ready in case of need.
I have.
We welcome your comments, but in practical terms, what are the job opportunities for fishermen who must decommission? How will we provide alternative employment for them?
If—I stress the word "if"—a further phase of decommissioning took place, it would present a different problem. The first phase coincided with an emerging shortage of fishermen. I understand that a substantial number of people who sought employment in the fishing fleet were accommodated by people who had a shortage. A further phase would produce difficulty on a different scale. That is why I have asked economists to consider the matter.
Fishing accounts for only about 0.3 per cent of gross domestic product in the whole Scottish economy, but it accounts for 13, 14 or 15 per cent in the communities where it takes place, so it is an extraordinarily important activity. I have asked my department to examine not only the impact on fishing communities but the mechanisms that will be required to retrain or reskill people and enable them to seek alternative employment opportunities. The exercise will not only be theoretical. It is at a preliminary stage. I do not wish to expect a disaster, but I will not be complacent about the prospect that is on the horizon.
I call Sarah Boyack.
I am not due to ask the next question.
I am sorry. We will move to Colin Campbell.
That question was disappointing, Sarah.
You wanted a question from Sarah Boyack, but you can have mine.
I felt her poised like a coiled spring.
Here is a slightly less coiled spring. You are obviously committed to relative stability, but on 28 May, the Commission published a road map that outlines its intent. Section 3.8 of the road map—COM(2002) 181—refers to
"the elimination of such barriers to normal economic activity as … the principle of relative stability."
That seems to be the kiss of death for relative stability. Section 3.8 also says:
"If the Community takes action to address"
several problems,
"on the basis of the proposals now put forward, it will gradually create a climate that will be more favourable to the introduction of more normal economic conditions and the elimination of such barriers to normal economic activity as national allocations of fishing possibilities and the principle of relative stability."
On 10 June, Franz Fischler told UK fisheries associations:
"we propose to keep relative stability".
That shows a slight contradiction. I know the Executive's position. You have a war on your hands. Where are your friends? Where are your enemies? How does the Council of Ministers look?
You could have mentioned the hapless John Farnell, who also entered the debate in an unhelpful way.
At the Council meeting before last, France supported the friends of fishing and surprised us by adopting an ambivalent stance on the question of relative stability. However, when pressed at the most recent meeting, France declared very publicly its solid support for the principle of relative stability. That was extraordinarily helpful. The French made it clear that they would support northern member states on the issue of relative stability, but that they would support southern member states on all other matters. The declaration was important because it enabled us to assemble a qualified majority in favour of relative stability.
As part of the United Kingdom, Scotland is seeking—and has had—bilateral talks with some of the nordic states. I understand that at least one of those states is with us. Germany is also in favour of relative stability. We are never relaxed, because this is a big issue, but at the moment we are content that we have the pieces of the jigsaw that will allow us to construct a majority in support of relative stability. I am talking about a majority that supports relative stability defined in terms that Colin Campbell and I would understand—rather than in the ambiguous and contradictory terms in which it is defined in section 3.8 of the road map.
I understand that you had about 30 minutes to speak to us, but I ask you to indulge us by taking a final question from John Home Robertson.
Perhaps even two.
My first question follows on from Colin Campbell's question about relative stability, which is a crucial baseline. What about the Hague preference, which is of particular interest and importance to Scottish fishermen and others in coastal areas?
We want to link the Hague preference to the debate on relative stability, as that is where it belongs. I would prefer the Hague preference to be enshrined in the final settlement on relative stability. There is no doubt that there is considerable opposition to the Hague preference as currently constructed. If, after we have undertaken a methodical, patient and at times tortuous negotiation of annual allowable catches, the UK and Ireland invoke the Hague preference, the whole calculation is revisited and someone finds that their negotiating position has been altered materially, that would do nothing for international relations.
I will not give up fighting for the Hague preference, but the trick is to have a formula for it enshrined in the settlement on relative stability and to do away with the second trigger. That would do a lot for our relations with those member states with which we are generally on good terms as regards the North sea fisheries.
That is a very helpful answer.
My second question takes us into deeper waters. It concerns the need for better protection of deepwater species outside European Union waters. Has progress been made either within the European Union or with other countries on achieving better conservation measures for fish stocks in the north-east Atlantic?
At the moment the politest thing that I can say is that discussions on that issue are stalled, because of the serious disagreement that the United Kingdom had about the other element of the North sea deepwater fisheries. We continue to argue that one cannot take a pick-and-mix approach to total allowable catches and control. That does not work with deep-sea species. If we want to ensure sustainability of deepwater stocks, we must develop a different approach. The disagreement about the previous settlement in which the United Kingdom is still embroiled has diverted attention from the issue that John Home Robertson raises. I am not unhappy about that, but we are not making progress on the issue.
That is a worry.
I thank the minister for his attendance. We have had a constructive discussion. I know that we all wish the minister well in Brussels next week. We look forward to receiving a post-Council report, in line with our agreement with the Scottish Executive.
Thank you very much.
I understand that the witnesses from the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities have not yet arrived. We will take a five-minute break to allow a change of witnesses and to give people the chance to have a cup of tea or coffee.
Meeting suspended.
On resuming—