Welfare Reform Committee

Meeting date: Tuesday, May 28, 2013

Official Report 421KB pdf

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Scottish Human Rights Commission

Our next item of business is evidence from the Scottish Human Rights Commission, which is represented here today by its chairman, Professor Alan Miller. I thank you very much for coming along this morning. Professor Miller will make some opening remarks, after which committee members will ask questions.

Thanks very much, convener. I commend the committee for the work that it has been doing. It might assist if I briefly set the scene with three questions for further discussion. What does human rights add to the committee’s work? Where have we reached? What can be done?

First, I will deal with what human rights brings to the table that adds a necessary dimension to your considerations. International human rights law provides for the right to social security as part of the right to an adequate standard of living. That very language is useful in broadening the terms of the debate, which hitherto has been on welfare reform. With so much stigmatisation being attached to the UK debate on welfare reform, it is helpful and will lead to better scrutiny of the welfare reform measures if they are seen in the context of the broader international human rights legal framework right to social security.

The framework that is provided by international human rights law is not about just giving out big rights without filling in much detail about what they mean and what states are supposed to do. It suggests how, in times of austerity, decisions and policies should impact on the right to social security. It would have been helpful if some of those principles had been followed before now; nevertheless, they should be followed now.

All United Nations member states—including the United Kingdom, which has accepted all the international human rights treaties—accept that they should progressively realise the right to social security and an adequate standard of living through committing the maximum available resources to realising that right. When, in times of austerity, there may have to be cuts in public spending, those cuts, as they impact on the right to social security, should be demonstrated to be necessary: that is, evidence should be given of what alternatives were considered and why they were rejected, what the legal measures that were introduced were based on, and what the likely impact is understood to be by those who are introducing the measures.

The measures should be temporary and should not be built into the system on any other basis. They should prioritise the most vulnerable people and should not create unjustifiable discrimination against them. Even in times of austerity, measures must ensure that there is the core provision that is essential for a dignified human existence, and that the right to social security is not so impacted that people are left in a state of destitution.

Secondly, where are we? Because the United Kingdom—unlike many other countries and despite continual requests to do so from the United Nations—has refused to incorporate the international human rights treaties that it has ratified, and to give them legal status in the UK, the UK Parliament has been able to pass legislation that is not within the international human rights legal framework. The consequence of that today is that no human rights impact assessment whatever was done by the UK Government before it introduced its legislative measures. A box was ticked to say that there would be no impact on human rights.

When the UK Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights asked what reference was made to the UK’s international legal human rights obligations, it was told that the Government did not consider that there were any implications, and therefore no detailed analysis was done; that committee received literally a one-sentence reply. More important is that the public have been left with inadequate legal protection. Although the UK has signed up to the international human rights treaties and has a legal obligation to apply them domestically, the public have no rights to enforce them through tribunals or courts in the UK, which leaves the public largely unprotected from the measures that have been introduced.

Thirdly, what can be done? Individuals will use whatever legal means they can to challenge the impact of some of the measures on their right to social security. They will use the Human Rights Act 1998, which will provide some form of protection. It does not give the right to social security, but it gives certain other protections in relation to a person’s private family life and home, as well as non-discrimination. Challenges are already being brought to court—some successfully—in relation to the bedroom tax.

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Local authorities in Scotland will do the best that they can in what are very difficult circumstances. They are being left to implement a discretionary housing payment fund in relation to the bedroom tax. They should use a human rights approach, using the broader principles to determine how they use that discretionary fund. The fund is inadequate, however, when it comes to meeting the needs and ensuring the rights of the population.

As for the Department for Work and Pensions, there should be an urgent review of some of the measures. It is already beginning to be demonstrated that they have not been properly considered. Evidence should be examined and a review done to determine what alternative steps should be taken—in particular, to the bedroom tax, which is now in force.

The bigger lesson, for the UK and for Scotland, is to incorporate the international human rights legal treaties, which would lead to better governance and better policies. It would enable Parliament better to hold the Government to account and to exercise more scrutiny. It would give the public protection. Incorporation of those international treaties, which provide the right to social security, an adequate standard of living and adequate housing, has to be the next step, whether that is at UK or Scotland level.

It is good to have Professor Miller with us today. In your paper you set out how

“the Chairperson of the UN Committee on ESC rights”—

that is, economic, social and cultural rights—

“has advised all States’ Parties that they should ‘avoid at all times taking decisions which might lead to the denial or infringement of economic, social and cultural rights’.

How is the UK faring by that barometer?

I do not think that the UK is faring well. As I said in my opening remarks, the UK Government has said in one sentence that it thinks that international human rights treaty obligations have no relevance to the Welfare Reform Act 2012. I do not know about all of them, but a lot of bodies have given the committee evidence—whatever one’s view of what weight to attach to things, and irrespective of whether it is premature for us to say that we understand the impact—that there are clear implications for the rights to enjoyment of private and family life and of the home. In that light, welfare reform does not serve governance, policy making or the public well, at all.

Did the UK Government respond to the call by the chairperson of the United Nations committee on economic, social and cultural rights?

The UK was subjected to UN scrutiny late last year. Its response was that, by and large, it is continuing to refuse to incorporate international human rights treaty obligations on the basis that it feels that such obligations are best left to the UK Parliament through domestic legislation. That is a statable position—it is up to the United Kingdom. However, it increases the necessity for the UK Parliament to be able to hold the Government to account when it introduces laws, and to satisfy itself that those laws implement international human rights treaty obligations and do not breach them. Otherwise, the UK’s international position becomes unsustainable, if Parliament is unable to hold the Government to account and if there is no human rights impact assessment that would enable Parliament to know whether measures that are introduced are consistent with international law.

Still on economic, social and cultural rights, you suggest in your submission:

“Germany and Latvia provide good examples of where states have integrated ESC rights into their domestic or constitutional law.”

You give the example that, in Latvia, pensioners were able to take a reduction in state pensions to their constitutional court. What are the parameters within which the legislatures and Executives in those two states—you perhaps have other examples—operate, which do not exist in the United Kingdom?

About 60 countries have constitutionalised their international human rights obligations; Germany and Latvia are just my examples. Such a framework means that, when laws are brought to a Parliament, the Government should be able to satisfy that Parliament that those laws are consistent with its international obligations, which were entered into for the benefit of the public. The experience of humanity and of other countries is that basic human rights must be part of governance. It is left to countries to decide how they will best achieve that, but everyone agrees that that is the destination.

If there is no human rights framework in the constitutional framework, it means that if the Government of the day seeks not to comply with international human rights legal obligations, Parliament will not be able to hold it to account properly and the public will not be able to enforce their rights through the tribunals and courts in their country.

Let us look at welfare reform more widely. As we know and as you say in your submission, under the Scotland Act 1998,

“the Scottish Parliament may not pass laws which are incompatible with the rights in the”

Human Rights Act 1998. You go on to say:

“Under the Scotland Act both the Scottish Government and Parliament must also take into account the whole range of international human rights obligations by observing and implementing them.”

This will be theoretical. Let us put to one side the reservation in schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998 that means that the Scottish Parliament does not have control over social security, and instead say that it has that control, and there is an attempt to take forward the welfare reforms through the Scottish Parliament under the provisions that are set out in the Human Rights Act 1998 and with the Parliament’s responsibility to refer to international human rights obligations. As the chair of the Scottish Human Rights Commission, what would you say about the Scottish Parliament attempting to take forward the welfare reforms if we had responsibility for them?

I do not think that the Scottish Parliament would do that; I do not think that it would be able to do that, and I would not expect there to be the political will to do that.

We have just finished a mapping of where human rights are in Scotland. One of the findings from that exercise is that, because of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Scotland Act 1998, which create a sort of constitution and constitutionalise certain human rights, lawmaking in Scotland by and large attracts a green light and has been consistent with the European convention on human rights, although things get weaker when we get to outcomes. The good intentions are not always turned into good practice. However, we can see the benefit of devolution to date. Because of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Scotland Act 1998, the legislative process in Scotland is sounder and better and resonates more with international best practice. Indeed, some of the laws that have come out of the Scottish Parliament have been recognised internationally as best practice.

We have already seen the public benefit of constitutionalising some of our internationally recognised human rights in Scotland, but we need to go further and to constitutionalise economic, social and cultural rights, as the UK should. That has been a repeated call of the United Nations for decades.

That is interesting. Essentially, because of our institutional practice and perhaps even our cultural practice through devolution, you do not think that the welfare reform process would even get off the ground here.

Certain aspects of it certainly would not get off the ground.

Good morning, Professor Miller.

I have been interested in following in general terms the progress—or, sadly, otherwise—of cases that have been brought to challenge some of the provisions. I seem to recall—although I may be recalling incorrectly—that, during the passage of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, there was an attempted challenge that came to naught. In any event, let us leave to one side the international treaty provisions, which are not always easy to invoke for the reasons that you have stated.

I presume that there may be grounds in the UK Equality Act 2010 on which to challenge some of the legislation, which might be an easier route for various groups. What are your views on that?

I think that the challenges, which have begun to come forward, will be based on the Equality Act 2010, particularly in relation to discrimination against disabled people and the lack of a proper impact assessment; on the Human Rights Act 1998, with regard to what is called the right to a possession—in this case, a social security entitlement—and discriminatory interference with that right in terms of, for example, the impact on the disabled; and on the European convention on human rights article 8, which covers the right to a private life, a family life and a home. The bedroom tax might well be on the radar for challenges under that article, because it might be argued that such interference is disproportionate and that the potential savings and stated public purpose do not outweigh the impact on individuals or families of having to uproot themselves from the life that they have led and look for alternative accommodation.

Those are the areas where the challenges will be raised; they might be more restricted than broader international human rights challenges, but might be more effective because the UK has given those aspects legal protection.

Are you aware of further challenges in the pipeline to other aspects of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and its statutory instruments?

No. The equality angle, the right to private life and the right to social security as a possession that should not be disproportionately interfered with seem to be the areas on which challenges to the bedroom tax, for example, are being based.

I imagine that as the welfare reforms, particularly the personal independence payment, are rolled out there might be further challenges down the line.

There is protection under ECHR against being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. If, in the worst cases, individuals are left destitute as a result of the cumulative impact of cuts, challenges will also be raised under article 3 that the state has failed to take measures to protect those people from falling into such a state. The threshold will have to be quite high, but there is European Court case law in which failure to take steps to protect someone, and their not having adequate food, clothing or housing, has taken things to that threshold. I have to say that for a country like the UK that is intolerable.

Thank you very much.

You have kind of answered this question, but I want to make things really clear. Are you, as chair of the Scottish Human Rights Commission, saying that, in your opinion, the way in which the welfare reform measures have been introduced is—at least in part—not compliant with the Government’s human rights obligations, and that they are, in part, likely to breach the human rights of some of the people who are affected?

Yes.

The paragraph in your submission about the position in Scotland, which Jamie Hepburn quoted in part, points out that the Human Rights Act 1998 has been embedded in the Scotland Act 1998. You have talked a bit about that, but I note that the paragraph goes to say:

“Under the HRA, public authorities too are prohibited from acting in a manner incompatible with the rights of the European Convention on Human Rights ... which are included within the HRA.”

You have also referred to the position of Scottish local authorities, which are, of course, public bodies. Does the constitutional embedding of the Human Rights Act 1998 in Scotland place Scottish local authorities in a more difficult position in that by implementing UK Government legislation they might find themselves breaching ECHR and therefore open to legal challenge?

It puts them in a very difficult position. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, they can argue as a defence that because of primary Westminster legislation they had no alternative—I have no doubt that they will seek to rely on that defence.

Case law from the Court of Appeal in England to date seems to indicate that if a local authority is challenged on the basis that its discretionary fund from the DWP is being allocated in such a way that someone can argue, “I should have had a discretionary payment”, the courts might well take the view that that discretionary fund is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 and that therefore the local authority should not be legally liable.

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When the DWP has argued that there is not a discretionary housing payment for any exceptional cases of real hardship that might arise, the courts have said that that is not good enough. For a start, the fund is discretionary—it might be here this year and gone the next—and because it is capped it is unlikely to capture all the deserving cases. Indeed, the UK National Audit Office has said the same thing and has asked for evidence that the £30 million is sufficient. As the courts’ view seems to be that the discretionary housing fund is inadequate to meet the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998, the legal challenge of an individual in Scotland would primarily be against the DWP.

Further on in your submission, you refer to article 8 of the ECHR, which is the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence, and point out that the European Court of Human Rights

“has consistently found that ‘the loss of one’s home is the most extreme form of interference with the right for respect for the home.’”

There has been quite a lot of discussion in this committee and elsewhere about how local authorities deal with that and their willingness or capacity to avoid evicting their own tenants if they get into rent arrears as a result of the bedroom tax. I suppose that my next question is similar to my previous one. Are we saying that if local authorities were to find themselves with no option but to evict a tenant from their home they might be found in breach of article 8?

It is a very tough place for local authorities to find themselves. They would have to demonstrate that eviction was the last resort that was open to them and the courts would have to be satisfied that all other avenues had been explored before that step was taken. That is provided for in the existing law on rent arrears in general, of which arrears as a result of the bedroom tax would be part.

Would the same apply to other registered social landlords, such as housing associations?

Yes.

You will have noted that a new phrase—“food poverty”—has gained currency; indeed, you will also have heard that we are now feeding people using the Big Lottery Fund. Where does the lack of dignity in queuing at a food bank or the inability to feed one’s children stand in relation to human rights?

As you did, I listened to Jackie Killeen and got quite an insight. As I sat there, I was reminded of a famous remark by Eleanor Roosevelt, the architect of “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights” in 1948, who in asking the question, “Where do human rights begin?” said that they do not begin in far-off countries that you can see only on maps of the world—they begin in places “close to home”, in our neighbourhoods, communities, care homes and workplaces. Having been chair of the Scottish Human Rights Commission for five years now, I have to say that compared with many other countries in the world Scotland has a relatively good human rights record but—I hope that I am proved wrong—the bedroom tax has the potential to become one of the most compelling human rights issues in Scotland. It is not something that we should be having to sit around a table and talk about in this day and age.

What about food poverty?

Article 3—protection against inhuman and degrading treatment—is by and large used by the European Court of Human Rights in very bad situations of detention in prisons, police stations and so on. However, we are moving in a direction in which it is foreseeable that such cases could find their way from the UK to the European court. Someone who was on the street as a result of the cumulative impact of cuts to social security could well argue—perhaps successfully—that they have been left in such a state that it amounts to inhuman and degrading treatment. That would be intolerable in Scotland and in a country such as the UK.

Will you clarify a specific point that was brought to my attention? The Department for Work and Pensions produced the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013, the explanatory notes to which state:

“The Bill has been introduced to avoid the need to repay claimants who have been sanctioned for failure to comply with requirements under the ESE Regulations”.

That gives the Government power to overturn a court ruling using primary legislation. Is that legal?

You are all becoming much more expert than I am in some of the practicalities of all this. One consequence of the power that is given to decision makers in the DWP on sanctions could relate to cases when, although people genuinely cannot work, they have been classified as unwilling to work and have therefore been cut off from social security. If such a person ends up in a destitute state, it is quite possible that they will be able to claim successfully that they have been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. One hopes that such cases never happen, but there is a definite risk of them happening, because wide discretion appears to have been given to the decision makers in the DWP.

You mentioned the lack of an equality and human rights impact assessment—I think that everyone was aware of that lack. Are you aware of any human rights organisation or any other organisation that might be conducting its own impact assessment because of the absence of such an assessment from the Government?

In one form or another, that will be attempted—with whatever resources are available—by non-governmental organisations. If academics could get funding to do it, I am sure that they would attempt it, too. However, it is very difficult for any body other than a Government to have the resources, the data and the reach to do a robust, proper human rights impact assessment. I am sure that there will be all kinds of attempts to do so and that references will be made, and many of them will be very credible, but a comprehensive human rights impact assessment is what the state needs to do, should do and so far has failed to do.

Was the UK Government specifically challenged for not conducting an impact assessment?

Yes. The Joint Committee on Human Rights at Westminster asked why an assessment was not done. As I said, the one-line answer was that it was not thought that there was sufficient cause to do an assessment.

I will look at the issue from a broader perspective. Apart from the fairly horrific social connotations of a state direction that people could take in a lodger as a response on how to mitigate the effect of the bedroom tax, there is the legal perspective. The DWP told the committee the other week that taking in a lodger would be one solution. Now that we have the learned professor here, will he say what legal issues would arise from a state prescription to take in a lodger to reduce the negative effect of a social security measure or provision?

There will probably be no legal requirement. People will not have to take in a lodger—that will be one of the options that are presented. People could charge more to members of their family, get more hours at work, take in a lodger or move.

That probably would not be legally contentious. However, the law is one thing; it is the backstop. If individuals have to take cases to court, they have to do that. If that happens, the system has failed.

Another element is human empathy. Even if the worst does not come to the worst for Mrs Smith in Bellshill, she does not know what will happen or what the consequences will be this year, next year or the year after. We are talking about anxiety, uncertainty and insecurity, as well as the legal challenges that can take place, although those will be much more restricted; some will win and some will not.

We should not be in this place. People should not be in a state of uncertainty and the onus should not be on them to contrive, within the inadequate human rights framework at a UK level, a legal argument to try to get some assurance that they can live a life that has some dignity.

When the Parliament started back in 1999, there was a general pride that we had incorporated ECHR. There was also great pride when we appointed the Scottish Human Rights Commission. I know that you were recently reappointed as chair of an international group of human rights organisations.

Yes.

In your position as chair of that group, you obviously have experience of the austerity measures that are being taken in a lot of countries. I am trying not to be subjective, but it must be quite depressing for you to see our human rights level in the UK dropping considerably.

The Scottish commission was re-elected unanimously as chair of the European network of national human rights institutions, of which there are 40 on the continent of Europe. It is very interesting that we can see different responses to austerity emerging in different parts of Europe, with different outcomes from other parts. The imposition of austerity measures in countries such as Ireland, Spain and Greece is having devastating impacts on the fabric of life and is leading to all kinds of social tensions, such as increases in suicide rates, HIV rates and mental health problems.

Different responses have been made by countries in northern Europe, where the responses to austerity have been much more balanced. Some countries have made decisions in accordance with the framework of international human rights law, which gives a fairer prioritisation of limited resources than the starker austerity cuts that have been imposed in the likes of Greece and Spain.

It looks as though the UK is voluntarily going down the road of imposing cuts in the context of austerity. That could lead to the outcomes that we see in southern European countries, which are not seen to the same extent in other northern European countries, which are responding in different ways. For example, northern countries are still investing in promoting access to employment and training, which mitigates some of the effects. The economic, health and equality or inequality outcomes are better. From that point of view, the UK seems to be going—unnecessarily—in the wrong direction.

In his introduction, Professor Miller talked about the duty that human rights legislation places on Governments to prioritise the most vulnerable. Is that your interpretation?

Yes.

Where does the principle of universality sit within that? I am thinking of the circumstance in which universality could conceivably be a casualty of the prioritisation of the most vulnerable.

International human rights law requires states to recognise the right to social security. The state is left considerable leeway to determine how it will progressively realise that right. That can mean universality, if it wants to promote that system, or it can mean means testing. Whatever system is adopted should not discriminate on unjustified grounds against particular sections of the population, such as children, women, disabled people, migrants or whatever, and it should prioritise those who are the most vulnerable and the least resilient.

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The principle of universality, as we discuss it in the UK context, tends to be about whether we should limit the entitlement to certain benefits of those who are in higher income brackets. Is it fair to say that human rights legislation is silent on that?

On whether particular benefits should be universal or means tested?

Yes.

Yes. There are red lines that human rights legislation puts down. As a result of whatever system is adopted, no one should receive inhuman or degrading treatment. There are amber lights that say that if a state is to interfere with an individual’s quality of life—for example, through means testing—it should ensure that that interference is not disproportionate.

So the position would depend on the outcomes rather than the principles.

Yes.

I will raise a couple of other issues that have come up in discussion. One of them is the judgment that was made in relation to those who were asked to work as part of the welfare reform arrangements, which has already established case law or is in the process of doing so. I understand where we are with the ruling but, in your view, does human rights legislation state that it is inappropriate for a Government to ask people to work in return for any part of their benefits?

The case to which you refer might find its way to the European Court of Human Rights; I do not know whether it is progressing there. The answer is similar to the answer to your question about universality. Generally, there is no blanket prohibition on what might be called conditionality of unemployment benefit, but the situation very much depends on the outcome and the detail of the process that is put in place. I would say that human rights legislation is silent on the principle in the same way as it is silent on universality.

Is it therefore reasonable to suggest that it is conceivable that legislation could be put in place that was consistent with human rights legislation and which, in certain circumstances, would allow us to ask individuals to participate in work experience, for example, as a condition of receiving unemployment benefit?

If the case in question goes to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, I hope that the judgment will answer your question. As the European convention on human rights is a living instrument—it constantly evolves as society’s expectations and values evolve—it is very dangerous to give a categorical yes or no answer to such a question.

So far, in principle, conditionality has not breached ECHR but, as I said, it is a living instrument, and a lot would depend on the case that came before the European court. If the case that we are talking about goes there, we can wait and see what the judgment is.

Another issue that I want to tackle is an extension of something that has been discussed. In a great deal of the evidence that the committee has taken, we have heard about the establishment of food banks in Scotland. It is disappointing, to say the least, that it has become necessary for food banks to exist, although some food banks existed before the welfare reform process was put in train. There is a reasonable degree of concern that, in many cases, one reason why food banks are needed is that many people who receive benefits find it extremely difficult to budget and to prioritise their expenditure.

Can you imagine circumstances in which, in an attempt to deal with that problem, it would be appropriate for the present UK Government or any subsequent Government to use the medium of food stamps, for want of a better expression, as an alternative to giving people the money to dispose of as they see fit?

That takes me back to my original point about the stigmatisation that is taking place—very unhelpfully—of many sections of our community. The description of people who are living day to day to make ends meet and of the Government introducing welfare reform to assist those people with their budgetary decision-making processes is unrealistic. If that is a concern, there should be support provided and capacity built, not a carrot-and-stick approach.

We have austerity because of financial mismanagement by those running the financial institutions in our country and not because of those who are trying to get to the end of the month on a pay cheque or on social security. On the evidence about why we are in the place that we are in and what steps must be taken, it is a bit rich for those in government to blame the mismanagement of finances by families, as opposed to the mismanagement by those who got us into the hole and who should be getting us out of it.

Are there any circumstances in which it might be the responsibility of anybody other than the benefit claimant to prioritise how their support is used?

I do not know what you are referring to in particular. Before I became chair of the Scottish Human Rights Commission, I ran a legal aid practice in Castlemilk for 15 years. I am not singling out Castlemilk, but there was a lot of unemployment there. My experience was that the overwhelming majority of people wanted a decent job.

When I saw young kids get a decent job, I was losing my practice, because they were no longer committing crimes and they were not in debt or facing evictions and all that. Just getting a job stabilised their lives, and the whole community—not least their families and their partners—benefited as a result. Therefore, the stigmatisation of those who are not in work is most unhelpful. However, asking how we improve or reform the social security system is legitimate, particularly in times of austerity because, no matter who got us into this mess, we have to get out of it.

We should call welfare benefits social security. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights says that people have the right—through sickness, age, becoming unemployed or family circumstances—to expect some form of protection. All civilised communities share that right. Welfare reform has a stigma attached to it that can be the political justification for all kinds of things that go against human dignity and the reality of life in the UK.

Iain Gray’s question reminded me of the conversation that I had at the weekend—I was talking not to a Mrs Smith from Bellshill but to a gentleman—about the powers that local authorities have under the welfare regime to protect people. Could a local authority not follow orders and challenge the Government’s legislation because it believed that enacting it would be in breach of someone’s human rights? Could a local authority say that it was not prepared to breach those rights? Could it make a challenge on those grounds?

A public authority could not issue a challenge under the Human Rights Act 1998; that would have to be done by individuals who were impacted by the cuts. In legal terms, a local authority could not be the victim.

I have no doubt that you have taken or will take evidence from local authorities. They will be audited by the DWP on how they implement the discretionary housing payment fund, for example, so they must be very careful. I advise them that they should follow their duties under the 1998 act, prioritise the most vulnerable and not discriminate in how they operate the discretionary fund. If they do that, that will be an answer if the DWP asks in its audit why a local authority gave funding to one category and not to another.

A challenge must come from the individuals who experience the hardships as a result of the cuts. They would have to take that challenge to the DWP on the ground that, for example, the action interferes disproportionately in their right to family life. Scottish local authorities are placed in a difficult position.

I think that local authorities have tried to make that clear to us. It is just that, when I discussed the issue with someone at the weekend, they wondered whether local authorities might be able to offer more protection than they do. That clarification is really helpful.

All the evidence this morning has been very useful. As I said to Jackie Killeen earlier, we will watch to see how the picture emerges. We might chat to you again to see how the legislation is progressing and what challenges are emerging.

Many thanks, convener.

11:40 Meeting suspended.

11:43 On resuming—