Subordinate Legislation Committee, 11 Jun 2002

Meeting date: Tuesday, June 11, 2002

Official Report 204KB pdf

---

Instruments Subject to Annulment

---

Instruments Subject <br />to Annulment

---

TSE (Scotland) Regulations 2002 <br />(SSI 2002/255)

We had better get the witnesses in now. I hope that some of you lawyers know what you are doing on this.

I was going to leave at this point, because I have glazed over.

No, no, no, you cannot glaze over for TSE. And you thought that criminal justice was bad. We will get through it, do not worry. We are talking mainly about the difference between the regulations south of the border and the regulations here. Given that there are EHCR implications—not EHCR, EC whatever it is—no, I mean European Community law—[Laughter.] Do not laugh, Brian. That was a simple slip of the tongue. Anyone can make those.

I was just thinking about—no, it does not matter.

There might be ECHR implications as well, because there are differences in the regulations about who can go into whose house and whether we can kill beasts in our house.

That is putting it mildly. Is the paper that we have a summary?

Yes. We have to ask the witnesses about this, because it is important. Does anybody want to say anything before the witnesses come in? [Members: "No."] You cannot say goodbye.

Just remember that we are on public record.

I welcome the witnesses to the Subordinate Legislation Committee. We will try to get through the session quickly and efficiently. As you will be aware, our main interests and concerns lie with the fact that the regulations that came into play on 19 April south of the border appear to be different in some cases from the Scottish regulations. We think that the differences in the Scottish regulations might be significant. Therefore, most of our questions will be about that.

Are the differences in the Scottish regulations intentional?

Yes. The English statutory instrument was made and laid to a rapid timetable because—well, we were all late, but we were hosting a mission from the European Commission authorities. We made a conscious decision to take a more considered approach in Scotland. The instrument was drafted jointly with our colleagues from the Food Standards Agency Scotland. The underlying intention was to pursue the same policy.

Right. I understand. Are you satisfied that the differences that have been created by your decision—we are not taking issue with it—will not upset anyone in the Commission?

Well, if they are upset I hope that they will be upset not with the Scottish approach but with the English one.

Do you mean that the English one is deficient in some respect?

As I said, the English statutory instrument was introduced to a rapid timetable indeed. When we saw the finished article, as it were, we noted a number of inconsistencies, spelling errors and basic mistakes. That is understandable in the context of what they were trying to achieve, but we did not want to duplicate those errors in our approach.

Obviously, we are glad about that. We hope that the Commission agrees with you.

We move on to regulation 3 in which the definition of cutting premises is different from the English regulations. Is there a different policy?

I ask our colleagues from the Food Standards Agency Scotland to answer that, as it was their approach that suggested this way ahead.

There is no different policy. The intention is for the Scottish regulations to produce the same result as the English ones. The difference that you pointed out is that the Scottish regulations define cutting premises as being licensed under other regulations. Our understanding is that the effect in England would be exactly the same, notwithstanding that they are not making specific reference to their cutting premises being licensed.

Slaughterhouses, which were also mentioned by the committee, and cutting premises require to be licensed under the Fresh Meat (Hygiene and Inspection) Regulations (SI 1995/539) in order to deal with meat for human consumption. The expectation is that those regulations relate to the bulk of what is covered by the TSE regulations and therefore that the practical outcome will be the same in that the cutting premises and slaughterhouses referred to in England and Wales will also be licensed under the fresh meat regulations.

Is there another form of licensing that covers unlicensed premises or is it just those that are outwith any licence?

There is a licensing requirement if one is cutting meat for human consumption, but no such requirement if the meat is not for human consumption.

I was thinking of illegal or unauthorised places.

Obviously, unauthorised premises will not have a licence and are not supposed to produce meat for human consumption. We understand that, in accordance with the law, no meat for human consumption would go through unlicensed plants.

However, if the English regulations are wider and cover unlicensed premises, I presume that they cover places where meat is not supposed to be cut.

That is one interpretation. However, because any plants in England that produce meat for human consumption must be licensed by the 1995 fresh meat regulations—

Would such places be in breach of another set of regulations?

Yes, so the outcome would be the same.

The definitions of inspector are not always clear in the 2002 regulations. Are there two types of inspectors?

Regulation 2 on page 7 of the regulations provides a definition of inspector. In some circumstances, inspector means an inspector who has been appointed by Scottish ministers; in other circumstances, it means one who has been appointed on behalf of the Food Standards Agency; and in others, it means a local authority inspector. The structure is intended to work in such a way that that three-pronged definition of inspector is read along with regulation 99, which deals with enforcement, so as to indicate the purposes under which each type of inspector operates.

The enforcement provisions are fairly lengthy so I shall not read them out, but they state that parts II and IV of the regulations, which deal with licensed premises, shall be enforced by inspectors of the Food Standards Agency or of the Scottish ministers. For the purpose of other parts of the regulations, the enforcement authority is the local authority. By reading the definition of inspector together with regulation 99, you can see a structure whereby the various powers of inspectors can be identified for each purpose of the regulations.

Is that the only way in which the regulations could have been drafted?

You could have added narration every time the word "inspector" appears to make it manifest that the inspector is exercising a function on behalf of the Food Standards Agency or Scottish ministers or on behalf of the local authority. There are obvious benefits in dealing with the definitional matters collectively, so that inspector has those meanings for the various parts of the regulations.

Probably the most important thing in this context is the exercise of powers of entry. It is clear that neither a local authority inspector nor an inspector of the Scottish ministers can exercise those functions of entry unless they can produce a document to show that they are duly authorised to take entry. Obviously, that is extremely important for the person who is affected.

Any authorisation under the regulations will provide the inspectors with a physical authorisation that can be produced to show the occupier of the premises that the inspector is allowed to take such entry. In practical terms, the structure of the regulations should give adequate and effective control over the powers of entry, so that the right people take entry in the right circumstances—although I hope that the public officials would do that anyway.

We were simply concerned about how the right of entry was to be established when we discussed the regulations earlier.

The regulations are huge and cover a vast number of powers vested in different people, so that concern is understandable.

I want to touch on what premises can be entered. In the definition of premises, the English regulations specifically include premises that are used as a private dwelling, but the Scottish regulations do not. What do the Scottish regulations cover?

The definition of premises in the Scottish regulations includes buildings, which means that potentially private dwellings are included. However, the Scottish regulations do not contain the words that are contained in the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs regulations, which expressly state that private dwellings are included. That point was made in the letter on the notification of points.

Our view is that the question of uncertainty or lack of clarity arises only if comparisons are made with the English regulations. We make our comparisons with Scottish regulations. I make no apology for focusing on powers of entry. If members consider the Scottish regulations, references to powers of entry appear throughout the instrument. The first reference to a power of entry can be found under regulation 28, which relates to the powers of inspectors. On producing a "duly authenticated document", the power of entry is given to an inspector who shall

"have the right at all reasonable hours to enter any premises (excluding premises used only as a dwelling)".

Given that the ability to enter a dwelling is excluded, it must follow that the definition of premises includes a dwelling in respect of granting the power of entry. If that were not the case, the exclusion would not make sense. The definition of premises includes references to buildings. In my view, the Scottish regulations, when read together, are clear about what it is that they do. Any question of doubt can only arise if the Scottish regulations are compared with the DEFRA regulations. In my view, that is not the right approach when trying to work out what is meant by the Scottish regulations.

We take your intended rebuke.

It was not intended as such.

Thank you for the explanation. I think that you mean that the definition of slaughterhouse is different. That has been covered.

We move on to the definition of specified risk material. The definition appears to differ between the two sets of regulations and that appears to be important. It is difficult to see how there could be a difference between Scottish and English regulations in this respect.

The definition that we have used reflects Regulation (EC) No 999/2001, which is directly applicable in our law and which defines SRM. Our definition seeks to supplement the definition that appears in the Community regulation to ensure that things that come into contact with SRM are treated in the same way. The intention was to improve the administrative function.

We have left out the first portion of the definition that appears in the English regulations because we believe that that portion is covered in the Community regulation. The Community regulation lists the things that amount to SRM and mentions things that come into contact with it. For that reason, we did not consider that it was necessary or proper to repeat the first portion of the definition that appears in the English regulations in the first part of our definition.

After that, our definition goes on to replicate the English definition. That is because the issues that are covered are supplementary. We then go a step further, by adding something that is not in the English regulations. In effect, we add a distinction to say that something that would otherwise have been SRM is not SRM when it comes from an animal from a specific country and when the animal is of a certain age. The Community regulation allows for derogation in relation to the elements that deal with the vertebral columns of animals raised in the UK—the bone-in-beef aspect, if you like.

The English regulations have not included the fact that that material should not be treated as SRM—the implication is that it will not be treated as SRM. The Community has allowed the UK that derogation. We thought that it would be more transparent if we included the derogation.

I think that is clear.

We hope that it is more transparent. We do not see any fundamental difference between the Scottish and English regulations. We are simply saying that the English regulations include something that is dealt with in the Community instrument. We think that it was unnecessary to—

On this committee, it is okay to say that you have done things better.

We always hope so.

We come to the definition of specified solid waste. It looks like there is a typographical error. You have used "collated" and we think you meant "collected".

Regulation 3(2) is not qualified in the same way as regulation 3(3). The provision in regulation 3(2) is not restricted to expressions that are not defined in regulation 3(1). Is there a question of conflict?

There is a possibility of conflict, because the wording that we chose was different from that in the DEFRA draft. I am not aware of any words that are used in regulation 3(1) that are also used in the Community legislation and intended to bear a different meaning. There is a possibility of conflict, but it does not arise in practice. If someone can think of a practical example of conflict arising, we will consider it. The wording of regulation 3(2) could, hypothetically, give rise to a conflict, but it does not do so in practice and that is why we drafted it in that way.

I am pretty certain that nobody in the committee can give you a practical example off the top of their head, but if we come up with any, we will let you know.

That would be helpful. If there is an example that we have missed, we need to sort out the problem because there could be a conflict.

Regulation 4 refers to TSE monitoring. Paragraph (2) omits sub paragraph (h) of the English equivalent, which confers a power of entry on an inspector for the purposes of issuing a movement licence. You have already explained your attitude.

I find myself talking about powers of entry for the third time. Sub paragraph (h) was omitted because of the context, which refers to a power of entry to go into someone's property forcibly. Someone could go into another person's property forcibly for the purpose of handing them a movement licence that they want, and it does not seem appropriate to award powers to make forced entry under those circumstances. If a person wants a movement licence—

They will answer the door.

What if they are not there?

I do not imagine that one would break in if they were not there.

I just wondered what would happen.

It would be a case of, "I am breaking into your house for your own good."

In short, that is the reason.

The regulations provide many ways of ensuring that the documents are delivered.

I am glad that we do not have to knock down the barn door.

The next points deal with similar issues, but are not particularly significant.

Regulation 10 deals with notifications. Let us consider regulations 10(2) and 10(3) together. The Scottish regulation does not deal with how the certification is made known. Is that correct?

The duty of publication exists anyway. Regulation 10(2) requires Scottish ministers to publish the fact that they have requested a monitoring notification and also whether the appointed agent requires them to publicise that, although the agent is not relevant to the case in hand. Regulation 10(3) has consequences for a person if they do not know that a monitoring notification has been requested because a minister has not published a request.

The DEFRA regulations go further than we do by saying that where certification and publication have taken place, the provisions of regulation 10(3) will apply. The duty of publication is imposed on Scottish ministers anyway. We felt that it was unnecessary to provide expressly for Scottish ministers failing to fulfil their duty to publish. That duty is imposed on Scottish ministers where a monitoring notification is required and it has been fulfilled in the past. The DEFRA regulations go further and stop regulation 10(3) being triggered unless publication has happened. We could not conceive of a situation in which someone would be prosecuted under regulation 10(3) in circumstances where Scottish ministers had failed in that statutory duty. That seemed to be one stage too far. It would not prevent cases from arising only where those two criteria are met, but it appeared unnecessary to make a provision just in case Scottish ministers were to fail to fulfil their duty.

There is a statutory duty and therefore, theoretically, Scottish ministers cannot fail to discharge it. What recourse to correction is there?

It is not recourse in that sense. In that scenario, somebody who failed to comply with regulation 10(3) would have done so in ignorance of the certification by Scottish ministers because the Scottish ministers had failed to publish it. If the person found themselves subject to prosecution, that would clearly be wrong. We cannot conceive that a fiscal would take such a case. If someone said that they did not know about the certification because Scottish ministers had not published it, and on investigation it was discovered that Scottish ministers had not published it, the accused person would be right.

So you consider that the farmer or whoever would be protected?

It is a matter for the Crown to decide what cases to take. We did not perceive it likely that the Crown would pursue a case in which someone had committed an offence without being in a position to know about it because Scottish ministers had failed to fulfil their statutory duty of publication.

You could have been generous—you could have given people as much protection as DEFRA has given them.

That would have been another way of doing it.

Thank you for your explanation. The committee will talk about it afterwards.

The provision is a rollover of previous provisions under the BSE monitoring regulations. There were separate English and Scottish versions of that instrument, too. Monitoring, notification, writing to farmers and adverts in The Scottish Farmer and so on have all been done previously and it is not DEFRA's intention to repeat that process—I checked. Although the provision is included in the English TSE regulations, DEFRA will not be going through that process again. That is another reason for us deciding to take our own approach.

Farmers are sometimes not aware of regulations. Ministers publish regulations, but there is always the possibility that they might stick them in a wee corner of one newspaper. Technically, that would be publication, but there is a duty on ministers to ensure that people know and that information has been issued properly. I would want to ensure that people did not suffer as a result of inadequate publication.

Regulation 13 relates to mammalian meat and bone meal for use in fertilisers. There is a big difference between the English and Scottish regulations, which might be important.

I am afraid that my memory fails me on this one, although I recall the amendment. I believe that at the time it was felt that the practical effect of what we were doing was the same as the effect of what DEFRA had done, but I cannot remember the reason for the change. I will have to consult my papers and come back to the committee on that question.

We found the change puzzling and would welcome further information on it.

We have dealt with regulation 28, on the powers of inspectors.

Part IV of the regulations relates to specified risk material. Here again there is a big difference between the Scottish regulations and their English equivalents. Did you intend there to be such a big difference?

We did not mean there to be a difference. Our intention was simply to meet the requirements of the Community regulation, which refers to "placing on the market" and provides a detailed definition of that expression. Because that definition is directly applicable, we thought that the proper way for us to proceed was to use the language of the Community regulation.

That is very communautaire.

For practical purposes, I am not sure what difference exists between the English and Scottish regulations. The English have taken a different route by using the definition of sale that derives from the Food Safety Act 1990. That term is used frequently in English subordinate legislation. We suspect that exactly the same people and actions will be caught north and south of the border. We have used different language, so it is possible that there will be a different result, but we are not aware of anything that will lead to one. We believe that we have proceeded correctly.

Thank you for your explanation.

Our comments on regulation 61 are more straightforward. The regulation refers first to "the occupier" and then to

"the person to whom the notice is given".

Does that mean that someone other than the occupier may appeal, or may only the occupier appeal because they are the person who is licensed under the regulations?

Only the occupier may appeal. The wording of regulation 61 may suggest a slightly wider meaning, but that is not intended. It would have been better for the regulations to refer only to an occupier. In the preceding set of regulations, the only person who had a relevant interest was the occupier.

Regulation 68(1)(b) omits weight. Why?

I do not have the specific reference, but weight is included elsewhere under people's duty to keep records. There is a reference to keeping records of volumes, which we regard as having the same effect as keeping records of weight.

Regulation 69(1) relates to cleansing and inspection. The English regulations impose a time limit. Should not the Scottish regulations also include such a limit? I should have thought that that would be central to the policy.

Paragraph (3) of the equivalent English regulation is not included in our regulations, as the same provision is contained in regulation 73(2). A number of provisions on compliance with notices and time limits are pulled together.

The lack of a reference to time limits in the Scottish regulations is an important point—perhaps it is a simple omission. Regulation 69(2) says that a notice may

"prohibit the movement of specified risk material into the vehicle … until such time as the required cleansing and disinfection has been satisfactorily completed."

A time limit should be included in that provision.

I am sorry, but I do not believe that a time limit should be included. The vehicle would have to be cleaned, whether within one hour, 10 hours or whatever, as a matter of good practice and bio-security, before it could be used again for that purpose.

Are you saying that the time limit is unimportant?

Yes. We believe that the time limit is unimportant. The cleansing and disinfecting operation must be done. It would be an operational decision of the person in charge of a vehicle to leave it for longer than we had specified.

Regulation 70(1) of the English regulations says:

"If an inspector suspects that any vehicle"—

doodah, doodah—

"he may serve a notice on the person in charge of the vehicle … or on the occupier … requiring that person to cleanse and disinfect, at his own expense and in such a manner and within such period as may be specified in the notice".

Would you like to think about that?

We shall reconsider the regulation.

Thank you.

Could you explain the differences between the English regulations and the Scottish regulations and why regulation 70(1) of the English regulations is omitted from the Scottish regulations?

The Scottish regulations should have an equivalent paragraph. I hope that that answers your question.

So you will include it. Thank you very much. I am glad, because that was mind nipping.

A reference to reasonable assistance is missing from regulation 70(4)(a). That is not material to the workings of the regulations, but—

The same matter was raised in an earlier question about the powers of inspectors, which appear at various points throughout the regulations. The wording of the obligations on persons to assist inspectors is different from the wording that is used in the DEFRA draft—our wording is foreshortened. We do not feel that anything is missing from the obligations in our regulations compared with those from DEFRA. It is a matter of achieving the same end through different means.

I presume that we will find that out as the regulations are applied.

Regulation 79 is on movement restrictions. Can you explain the thinking behind the difference between the English and Scottish regulations?

The DEFRA regulations refer to powers in relation to inspectors and veterinary inspectors, whereas we refer simply to inspectors because the definition of an inspector includes a veterinary inspector. A veterinary inspector is a sub-class of inspector, and is included already, because

"'inspector' means … including a veterinary inspector".

The replication of "veterinary inspector" seemed to us to be unnecessary.

Regulations 86(4) and 95(1) refer to powers of entry. We are quibbling with your use of the word "apprehended" rather than "expected". For the life of me—I must be honest—I do not know why. Does anybody else know?

Could you explain regulation 90(5), which refers to moneys being recoverable as a debt?

The regulations are not consistent, and I am grateful that that has been pointed out. In drafting regulations—and I realise that this is an issue that the committee has raised before—it is my preference to refer to sums being recoverable as a debt, because of my experience many years ago of debt recovery. I found that if the provision that moneys are recoverable as a debt is express rather than implied, it has a practical consequence for debt recovery. One can point out the provision and say, "You can see that it says it is recoverable as a debt." My experience is that that is more efficient in persuading persons who owe money that the money is due. The regulation states the sums that are due and that they are recoverable as a debt.

Nice try, but.

I do not wish to drag this out unduly because it is not a material point, but legally, the words "as a debt" are of no consequence whatever.

I do not dispute that.

But that is hardly a material point.

Regulation 97 refers to offences and penalties. Why do the Scottish regulations have no time limit?

Rather than looking at comparisons with the English regulations, we went our own way. One point that arose from that was the combining of the various offence provisions. Part IV of the DEFRA regulations has a self-contained offences provision in relation to that part, and there is a collective provision as well. We felt that it was better to pull all the offence provisions together. By doing so, we divorced ourselves from what the DEFRA regulations had done.

On whether we had misunderstood the English provision, we made our provisions without any reference to the English ones. We did not have regard to what had been done in England.

On whether it would have been a good idea to have followed DEFRA in putting a time limit on prosecutions, my feeling and my understanding is that the standard position—if there is such a thing—for such offences is that there is no time limit. A time limit was imposed in the DEFRA regulations, but the norm is that such offences do not have a time limit.

The choice is between bringing down the shutters at the end of three years, for example, beyond which no prosecutions can take place, and—the situation that we have chosen—having no such limitation, so that the decision whether to take a prosecution lies in the hands of the fiscal. It seems more appropriate that it is left to the fiscal to decide in the public interest whether, even though more than three years have passed, a case is serious enough that it should be taken in the public interest. In making the decision, the fiscal will have to have regard to whether it is fair that a prosecution is taken three, four or five years after the event. It seems better to leave the decision to the fiscal, who will have regard to all the circumstances, than to have a provision whereby the shutters come down after three years.

I am inclined to agree with you on that, although it is probably at odds with everything else that we have decided on criminal justice practice.

I do not have a problem with it.

I accept it.

Okay.

The next point, on regulation 101, is the difference between schedule 8 to the Scottish regulations and schedule 8 to the English regulations.

I am not aware of a difference that matters. Some of the English consequential amendments are replicated in our regulations. We do not have one of the amendments because a set of regulations is revoked in its entirety. We picked up additional amendments because we thought them helpful and sensible. I am not aware of anything that differs in effect. We took a different approach to schedule 8 in trying to ensure that we picked up all the consequential amendments. That has resulted in additional amendments over and above those in the DEFRA regulations, which reflects a different approach and an attempt to be tidier in the statute book.

I confess that I do not feel that I have any expertise in the area. I am inclined to take you at your word. We will come back to you on that.

On part 1 of schedule 1, we thought that there might be a European dimension. We noted that the English regulations specifically provide for the cost of a valuer to be paid by the secretary of state. If the Scottish regulations do not do so, does that put the Scots at a disadvantage? Should the situation not be exactly the same under European regulations?

The issue of compensation should perhaps be dealt with collectively. It is the issue on which we were most mindful to examine what we had done and what DEFRA had done, so that we did not find ourselves in a situation in which a Scottish farmer ended up with more or less compensation than an equivalent farmer in England. That need for consistency is probably more important in relation to compensation than in any other respect. There are differences between the various provisions. We have endeavoured to ensure and are satisfied that the difference will not have the effect that people get a different level of compensation.

We had regard to the model that DEFRA had adopted. The differences in the Scottish regulations are rooted in the experience of dealing with compensation payments in relation to foot-and-mouth. Rather than looking too closely at the practical operation of arbiters, valuers and who does what, we considered the model that was used in dealing with foot-and-mouth; the regulations replicate that fairly closely. For example, subparagraph (c) in paragraph 15 of part III is included because that provision was in place during the foot-and-mouth outbreak and reflects practical experience of how well the compensation arrangements worked.

I do not know whether there is a significant risk of arbiters' costs being dealt with differently. Our provisions allow for the arbiter to determine their costs, rather than for the secretary of state to do so, as in the DEFRA regulations. That will not automatically lead to a different conclusion; it simply means that the arbiter will decide when he or she resolves the compensation question.

Paragraph 15(c) says:

"liability for the costs of the arbiter shall be determined by the arbiter."

Yes.

I am interested in that, because an arbiter and a valuer are not the same—an arbitration and a valuation can have substantially different outcomes. What guidance does the EU legislation give on how sums are arrived at? The English interpretation is that the valuer makes such determinations, whereas the Executive's interpretation is that that is done by an arbiter.

The approach of following the appointment of an arbiter was rooted in the foot-and-mouth experience. I accept that valuers and arbiters may approach things in different ways and that that could give rise to different results. We will have discussions about whether that is sufficiently significant that we should bring the regulations in line with the English ones. We are trying to avoid a situation in which people are treated differently north and south in relation to important issues such as compensation. If there is a concern that the difference in wording will lead to difficulties, we will reconsider the issue.

I am aware that we are running late. I hope that we can get through the rest of our points in the next few minutes. Let us push on.

Will you let us know the outcome of your deliberations on the issue of arbiters and valuers?

Yes. We will take that on board.

Is it correct that annexe 1 to part III of schedule 1 to the Scottish regulations refers to Great Britain but that the equivalent provision in the English regulations refers to England? I presume that that is correct.

That is interesting. We talked about compensation levels. The point about the difference is tricky. The reference relates to the identification of an indicative price, which ties in with compensation. DEFRA's regulations use as a basis a comparator with other animals in England. If we wanted to achieve the same effect, we would have to identify the indicative price by reference to English animals only. It would be wrong for Scottish farmers to be in that position.

We are in an odd position. DEFRA has made its regulations. We could have referred to England only, to Scotland only or to Great Britain. From the point of view of Scottish farmers, the unacceptable option was to replicate what DEFRA did. That gave us something of an irresolvable dilemma. The resolution that was adopted was to refer to Great Britain, because that seemed likely to give the result that was nearest to the median. That certainly is a difference.

We have partly covered part IV of schedule 1, where there is a difference in paragraph 2 of the compensation provisions.

Schedules 3 and 4 to the English regulations give precise values for temperatures and pH. Do we need to clarify why the Scottish regulations are different?

The reason for that might be beyond us, too. We have re-examined schedules 3 and 4 and compared them with the English versions. We thought that they were identical. They were certainly intended to be identical. If the committee wants to draw items to our attention, we will examine them.

We will let you know about that.

Schedule 5 refers to regulation 33(4), which deals only with SRM in the slaughterhouse and does not cover material that is removed from the slaughterhouse.

There is something odd not about the schedule 5 reference, but about regulation 33(4). I have not puzzled out what is not quite right, but we must re-examine that.

You will take that back and reconsider it.

Is there a difference between "rendered material" and "protein and tallow"?

No.

Oh, great.

Paragraph 4 of schedule 7 raises the compensation question that we have discussed and we have dealt with the fact that none of the amendments in schedule 8 to the English regulations has been reproduced in the Scottish regulations.

There are significant differences between schedule 9 to the English regulations and schedule 9 to the Scottish regulations. The Specified Risk Material Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/2965) were only partially revoked in England. Is there a reason for the difference?

DEFRA retained provisions, which are now largely redundant, concerning the export of whole sheep carcases to France. The French stopped that trade about two years ago, so those provisions are no longer necessary and we deleted them from the Scottish statutory instrument.

Have the French stopped that trade for all time?

Yes, in the circumstances that the amendments to the Specified Risk Material Regulations 1997 allowed.

Okay. We might need more clarification on the revocation of the Specified Risk Material (Inspection Charges) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/539).

The Specified Risk Material (Inspection Charges) Regulations 1999 gave a power to impose charges in respect of the inspections under the Specified Risk Material Regulations 1997. England has retained the hypothetical use of the 1997 regulations, so it has also retained the hypothetical part of charging in relation to it. We have completely revoked those regulations and consequently, given that the charges power in the 1999 regulations relied completely on what was done under the 1997 regulations, the 1999 regulations have been revoked completely as well.

It appears that there are different policies.

We do not think that there is a practical difference. We understand that colleagues in England take the view that the residual effect of the 1999 regulations is zero. They will simply be repealed by implication, because there are no statutory instruments for it to be attached to. As far as we are concerned, no charges have ever been levied under the 1999 regulations.

So you are just formalising what the practice has been.

Indeed. The power has never been used. There did not seem to be any intention ever to use it and so it has simply been taken away. The matter of charging needs to be revisited and it will be revisited in another instrument.

Great. I hope that we are all here to see that. Thank you very much indeed. I am really sorry that this has been such a slog, but this was our only chance to deal with the regulations. We have noted that you will consider a number of points; we have a point to find out about as well.

You all thought that that was the hard bit. The rest will be easy-peasy. They will get to the sandwiches before us.