Education, Culture and Sport Committee, 06 Mar 2001

Meeting date: Tuesday, March 6, 2001

Official Report 182KB pdf

---

National Stadium Inquiry

The Minister for Environment, Sport and Culture will stay with us for this item and we are joined by John Gilmour, who is head of the sport policy unit at the Scottish Executive, and Patrick Andrews from Shepherd & Wedderburn, who were the solicitors to the co-funders. I ask the minister to make a short statement.

The committee has taken a lot of evidence and knows most of the facts involved in the matter and I have provided you with a wind-up letter on the subject but I would like to make a short opening statement.

I have made it clear in the numerous statements that I have made to the Scottish Parliament that the Scottish Office was always a minor funder of phase 2 redevelopment at Hampden. The project was not run by the Scottish Office; the Millennium Commission was the major funder and we are grateful for the substantial work that it has put into the project and into the development of the rescue package. It is fair to say that, without that input, Scotland and Scottish football would not have had the asset that is Hampden.

The Executive first learned of the financial problems encountered by the project in late July 1999, only weeks after the Executive assumed its full powers. We could have let it fail but decided, in the national interest, to try to save it. We have been happy to play a major and constructive part in resolving the problems which, as I say, were not of our making.

Much has been said about the financial pressures relating to the project. The position of the co-funders was simple: we were not prepared to contribute further funding without knowing the final outturn costs of the project and the size of the residual funding gap. Our consultants had access to the books of National Stadium and Queen's Park Football Club, but the information that was available to us was insufficient for us to get the answers we wanted.

It has been said that the project was underfunded from the outset. The arrangement was set up by the Millennium Commission and a previous Administration. It is important to understand that when it entered the management contract with McAlpine, Queen's Park FC was not required to have a full funding package in place; it was required to be satisfied that a full funding package could be put in place. Everyone involved was aware that the project would require further funding from sponsorship deals, the debenture scheme and other sources.

The decision of the directors of Queen's Park FC to seek the appointment of administrators came as something of a surprise to the co-funders. We were not aware of any creditor pressure—in fact, we believed that an informal arrangement with McAlpine gave Queen's Park FC the funds to continue trading over the festive period. It is important to note that the directors of Queen's Park FC were at sportscotland offices signing papers relating to the new lottery awards some time after the court had appointed administrators ad interim.

The co-funders—particularly the Millennium Commission and the Scottish Executive—put in considerable effort over many months to help resolve the problems and put the management of Hampden on a more secure long-term footing.

My officials and the commission attended many lengthy meetings—often arranged at short notice—with representatives of Queen's Park FC, the National Stadium plc, the Royal Bank of Scotland, the Scottish Football Association and other parties. It was quite an exhaustive process. The outcome is that we now have an excellent stadium that has a five-star rating from the Union of European Football Associations and some excellent ancillary facilities.

When all the offices are occupied and the museum and sports injury clinic are open, Hampden will have a life about it and a place in the community that it never really had before. It is now time to put Hampden's past behind us and to help the SFA in its efforts to restore confidence, stability and a certain pride in the Hampden stadium and to attract many more visitors, sponsors and paying customers to it.

Thank you, minister, for your statement.

The committee has received a great deal of evidence so far in what was meant to be a short, sharp inquiry and is now a lengthy inquiry. Patrick Andrews has now been here twice to give evidence. The inquiry is in danger of boiling down to whether one believes the consortium or Queen's Park FC. That is not a criticism; it is just where we are getting to, unfortunately.

The part that is hardest to understand is referred to on page 11 of the memorandum that was submitted to us. That is the period between 21 December and 10 January, when you and others believed that an agreement was in place and in which Queen's Park FC, according to the document, was, frankly, coming it. Basically, the report says that Queen's Park FC did not tell you the truth and did not give you the proper information. There is an astonishing remark on page 10, at paragraph 3.4:

"By early December, if not before, the co-funders and the Consultants had no confidence in the financial position as disclosed for both QPFC/TNS and the co-funders doubted whether further due diligence on the figures would give the comfort required."

If, at that stage, you had no confidence in the people with whom you were negotiating, were there any other actions that you could have taken, apart from walking away from the deal?

I do not think so. We could have walked away. That option was open to us all the time. The first decision that we had to make when we were presented with the financial deficit was whether to walk away. Remember that the stadium was completed by that stage and was being used—there was a cup final in it. Should we have walked away from the stadium and let it and Queen's Park Football Club, our oldest amateur club, go bust? Should we have let a stadium that had been funded by a lot of public money go at a knock-down price and lose all the public conditions that were associated with it? I took the view that we had to save it.

Once we were in to save it, I was intent on trying to see that through. We were always faced with the possibility of walking away. That came up numerous times, as yet another problem would arise. There was no other way we could get better information. We made our judgments based on the best information that we had. The only alternative was to walk away.

When Christmas came and the negotiations were still going on, you expected them to start again on 6 January. When, as the report says, they did not start again on 6 January, what alarm bells rang and what actions did you take? You say that representatives of Queen's Park FC were signing documentation after the administration order had been signed. If that is true—I have no reason to doubt it—it raises legal questions. There is also a question as to whether they were preparing for liquidation while you were still trying to negotiate in good faith. Do you believe that that was the case?

I will have to ask you too to make that judgment. We were acting in good faith. There were lots of telephone calls because we could not understand what the hold up was, but things still seemed to be okay. We felt that we had acted in good faith. Our view is that Queen's Park FC had acted in bad faith. We had no inkling that it was going into administration, particularly as it signed a document with sportscotland after it had been to the courts.

Let us move on.

That was the most difficult moment. A recovery was possible. Paragraph 4.2 of the document gives a number of reasons for why the rescue package was even more expensive than expected. I would like to ask about those reasons, because it is important to put this on the record and to understand what is involved here.

What was the "provision for professional fees"? The document says "an astonishing provision". Can you put that in context? Will you tell us what the provision was and what it might have been expected to be?

It was £450,000.

What period does that cover?

The period of administration.

For that short period?

Yes.

The sum of £450,000?

Yes.

I do not know whether you or Patrick Andrews are in a position to comment on this, minister, but how far is that in excess of what would have been expected?

That is completely beyond my scope of knowledge. I was staggered when I saw the figure—I thought "My golly, these people do well."

As I put it to the interim administrator and to Dundas & Wilson, I can say only that I thought that it was an astonishing provision for fees, given the amount of work that had already been undertaken during the work-out period. That work should have made Dundas & Wilson fully apprised of the position of Queen's Park FC and TNS.

I am not asking you to tell me what the estimate would have been if you had done the work, but as you were close to this what would be a fair estimate for the amount of work that was done in that period?

It is difficult to say. All I can do is compare it with my fees for the same period.

What would they be?

I cannot say what my fees would be for the same period, but I can tell you that from 16 August, when I was first instructed, up to completion, my firm's fees were in the region of £120,000.

That speaks for itself.

Paragraph 4.2 goes on:

"A deterioration in the settlement terms agreed with AR Limited/Austin Reilly".

Precisely what does that mean?

When we first agreed the settlement term, before the move to administration, it was agreed that the package was just over £4 million, of which just over £3 million was to deal with McAlpine. The other £1 million was to reduce the borrowing requirement from the bank. Other than that, there was no provision for settlements with creditors. Once the administrators were in, we agreed a funding package to pay off all the creditors, but not what would go into it. The deal that was being done with Mr Reilly deteriorated and proved to his benefit.

How much is involved financially in that package?

I think that the figure is £100,000.

How much extra did this cost McAlpine?

I do not know. You would have to ask McAlpine that.

But it was a significant increase?

I would like the committee to recognise the contribution that McAlpine has made to the settlement of this deal, which was considerable. You will have to get the figure from McAlpine, but we are talking millions.

Will you remind us of the additional taxpayers' contribution, through the Scottish Executive and Glasgow City Council?

As a result of its going over?

Yes.

The city council and the Scottish Executive each put in £600,000.

Going for administration on 10 January was a substantial increased cost, which was borne to a great extent by the taxpayer and the council tax payer, and to some extent by McAlpine and so on. It was a significant increased cost. Will you estimate the total increased cost?

No. I do not know how much McAlpine's contribution was—you would have to ask McAlpine.

Would the only beneficiary of that—in terms of this document—have been the marginal improvement in QPFC's position?

Yes. It was a fairly minor improvement, relating to how much Queen's Park FC was going to get in terms of the leasing arrangement. It was not huge.

Can I ask a question that I asked Austin Reilly and Queen's Park FC? I have some information that we received from Queen's Park FC today. One of the things that concerns me is the bottom paragraph of page 10, in which you say:

"On 16 December 1999 we sought to broker a deal amongst McAlpines, the Scottish Executive and the Royal Bank of Scotland to bridge the residual funding gap".

I was concerned that

"on the evening of 21 December 1999 a further Schedule of Figures was"

submitted, which indicated

"an additional deficit in excess of £500,000."

From what I could pick up from a quick reading of this report and the Queen's Park FC papers, Queen's Park FC indicates that no agreement was made on 16 December. Do you accept that? If you do not, where did the additional £500,000 come from between 16 and 21 December 1999?

I cannot remember the exact answer to that question. My experience of all these negotiations was that every time we thought we had closed the funding gap, another £0.5 million suddenly popped out from somewhere. We faced that virtually week in, week out. Every time we thought we had it nailed down, we did not. I cannot remember what that £500,000 that popped up was. I wonder whether Patrick Andrews can remember.

I cannot speak to the detail, but in general terms it was £500,000 for a mix of things. It was partly a product of the negotiations with the SFA and the Royal Bank of Scotland on the funding arrangements and partly the way certain revenue receipts had been accounted for in the spreadsheet of figures. Some of the income that had been received from debentures that had been sold in the run-up to the Scotland-England match should have been attributed to the bank but had been credited to funds available to Queen's Park FC and TNS. It was also partly a product of other funding within TNS and Queen's Park FC. That made up the deficit.

The conclusion that we reached on that particular date was that the schedule of figures, which showed a deficit of £541,000, could not be reconciled. Effectively, we stopped negotiations at about 10 o'clock that evening. Each party went back to their own camp to try to identify a way forward, which is what happened the following day.

I have a supplementary, which takes us back to the evidence that Patrick Andrews gave when he was here with the Millennium Commission. We were all concerned about the state of the National Stadium plc's accounts. A lot has been made of that, not made of that and disagreed with by TNS and Queen's Park FC. In your view, as the solicitor for the co-funders, do you believe that the accounting process was appropriate and gave you the right figures to work out a solution to the problems?

There are two elements to that. At the outset, we were asked to go into Hampden stadium and in a short period of time identify the full extent of the outturn cost for the project and the extent of the then funding gap. Those were the first questions that had to be answered before we knew how much money we were looking to put toward the project to effect a rescue. We had substantial difficulty, on the basis of the information that was made available to Deloitte & Touche and the other consultants, answering that question. Indeed, the question of the outturn project cost was not finally resolved until the end of September.

The second element that gave rise to the change in the position as it emerged during the work-out period is slightly more complicated because there are two parts to it. First, there were the changes in the finances of both Queen's Park FC and TNS that arose out of their trading activities during that period; secondly, there were the consequences of the deal for the rescue package that we were negotiating. That involved consideration of the terms of the lease with the Scottish Football Association and consideration of the funding package with the Royal Bank of Scotland.

As will be obvious to the committee, if the rental and lease go up, that has a knock-on effect; on the other side, if the cost of the funding from the bank changes, that also has a knock-on effect. There were a number of dynamics in the figures in the period from September to December 1999. Our problem was that those were never buttoned down.

As is clear from the memorandum that the Scottish Executive submitted, by November we lacked confidence in the figures that were being presented to us. For that very reason, we structured the deal that was struck on 16 December to leave a deficit to be resolved by TNS and Queen's Park FC.

I might want to return to that point.

In the minister's statement to the Parliament on 16 December, he said:

"Our monitoring arrangements were very strict, with scrutiny of monthly financial returns and regular visits to the area to see what was happening."—[Official Report, 16 December 1999; Vol 3, c 1679.]

The evidence that we have had so far seems to indicate a conflict among all the main players about how the information was shared. If that information was robust and monthly returns were being received, why was the deficit not detected earlier?

sportscotland has given you a submission on its monitoring arrangements. It did the monitoring for us. We put only £2 million into a project worth £51 million. It was correct and proper that sportscotland did that on our behalf. It has laid out all the regular monitoring arrangements. It has reviewed its internal monitoring and, although it found it to be good, it is having an independent review of that monitoring.

The stadium was built and we thought that we had got a good deal for our £2 million. As regards how we did not pick up the fact that deficits were developing, sportscotland, as far as I understand from its information, was getting projected and actual costs and receipts, which all seemed to tally at the time, and there was no evidence from what it could detect of any developing funding crisis. If there was a method by which sportscotland could have detected that, I hope that its external assessors can decide on that. It has looked at its internal systems and has found nothing to be at fault.

In the paper that we received from Queen's Park FC today, a bold statement is made on page 5, in the summary.

"QPFC consider the allegation that a ‘funding gap' of £500,000 arose over a 5 day period in December 1999 to be absurd. QPFC's view is supported by our Auditors. The unverified assessments carried out for the co-funders and for TNS plc since July 1999 had not been robust and lacked certified and agreed schedules of income and expenditure for each of the above 5 activities".

The document identified five reasons why a deficit emerged. It is very difficult for the committee to get behind that information, because we are hearing such diametrically opposed views of how that information is arrived at. Can you shed any light on that?

No, I cannot. Has the committee just received that report?

Yes.

I have not seen it at all. If you want to send us a copy, I can try to answer those questions and give you my comments in a follow-up memorandum.

That would be helpful.

Could you speculate a wee bit about why QPFC went into administration? It says that it had no alternative trading. What were the tactics? You stated that it would have been a terrible thing to let the stadium go. Was QPFC holding a gun to your head until its own time ran out? What were the tactics? What was the point of going into administration if it did not need to?

I do not know. That is for representatives of Queen's Park Football Club to tell you. I would not like to speculate. Our understanding was that McAlpine had allowed the club money to continue trading over the holiday period, that there were no problems and that the deal was about to be settled. We had absolutely no inkling that Queen's Park FC would go into administration and we were absolutely staggered when it happened. We were particularly staggered by the fact that we ended up with exactly the same package in place, except that it cost us at least £1.2 million extra in public money plus McAlpine's costs. Three months down the line, we could have had it. We do not know to this day just why the club went into administration, and I would not want to speculate.

The only people who gained from that were Queen's Park Football Club, marginally, and Austin Reilly's consultancy.

I think that QPFC's gain was marginal. I do not honestly think that it really gained any benefit from that.

Did the consultants and financial advisers again?

Yes.

You expressed surprise about Queen's Park Football Club going into administration. From evidence that we have received, it would appear that Queen's Park FC and TNS had set up a trust fund back in August 1999 to ensure that payments could be made and to protect them from accusations of wrongful trading. Were you aware that they had set up such a fund to avoid accusations of wrongful trading?

Yes. That was the trust fund that the Millennium Commission and the Royal Bank of Scotland put money into to fund the work-out.

So you were aware of that fund and that its purpose was to avoid accusations of wrongful trading against Queen's Park Football Club? Is that right?

To fund the work-out, yes.

A couple of minutes ago, you used the words "absolutely staggered" to describe your reaction when Queen's Park FC moved into administration. From evidence that we have received, it would appear that on 22 December 1999, Queen's Park FC's advisers, Dundas & Wilson, had returned to Burness, acting for the SFA, the final draft of the proposed agreement with the SFA. That draft agreement was received back by Dundas & Wilson on 7 January 2000, but it was received back with further changes being requested from Queen's Park FC which would mean further liabilities. The legal advice to Queen's Park FC was that the directors had no option but to seek the protection of the court by petitioning for the appointment of joint administrators.

Were you made aware at any stage, by Burness or by the SFA, that they were requesting further concessions from Queen's Park FC in the period between 22 December 1999 and 7 January 2000?

The position that Brian Monteith has described is correct in so far as I understand it, but I would add two things to what you have said. First, that was only one part of the negotiation. The other key part of the negotiation was the funding from the Royal Bank of Scotland. When we broke at Christmas time, the SFA delegation and Burness had made it absolutely clear to everybody who was involved in the negotiations that we could not close the SFA leasing arrangements without having sight of the Royal Bank of Scotland funding documentation, which was absolutely critical in establishing the level of rental payments and the other financial elements in the package.

In the SFA negotiation at the time to which Brian Monteith refers, elements were not resolved between the parties, because the discussion had not reached a conclusion. One example of such an element was the treatment of some vehicles that were leased and made available to employees of TNS; the SFA had not decided whether it would take those vehicles on. My recollection is that it had not seen the leasing arrangements and therefore had not said that it would take the vehicles on.

Another key issue was the treatment of the BT telephone exchange in the stadium. There was some debate about whether the SFA was prepared to take that over from BT. The debate revolved round two key elements—first, how much it would cost the SFA to do that, and secondly, whether the telephone system was fit for the purpose that the SFA intended that it should be used for.

I took the pragmatic view that all those issues and others could be resolved. For example, one cannot run a stadium without a telephone system. When first we met the interim administrator and the SFA on 13 January, I reviewed all the outstanding issues. I sought to explore and explain to the administrator how each outstanding issue was resolvable. The only caveat that I left with him was that which I had discussed with Queen's Park's advisers and the bank. The co-funders could not assess whether Queen's Park could afford the deal that was on the table, because we did not have confidence in the financial information that had been made available. However, I was confident that we could make the package work and that an agreement could be reached. What happened subsequently, within a relatively short period during March, shows that I was correct.

Thank you for that extensive answer.

The injection of additional funding helped to settle the matter and concluded the deal to everybody's general satisfaction, although we must have an inquiry to discover what went wrong. However, it has been argued to the committee that, by negotiating directly as principals with the SFA and other co-funders, Queen's Park Football Club avoided what have been described as the fractious relationships that existed among the professional advisers of all the parties. Dealing directly helped to bring the matter to a successful conclusion. Do ministers or officials wish to comment on that?

What point are you trying to make?

Do you agree with Queen's Park Football Club's point that dealing direct with the Executive and the SFA, rather than through advisers, helped to bring the matter to a conclusion?

As members have probably worked out by now, the package was extremely complex and problems arose daily. I learned more about finance during that period than I had ever learned or will learn in future. It would not have been within our competence to conduct the negotiations without professional advisers—that is why they were involved. We could never have avoided that.

The minister issued a press release in February 2000 that intimated that any rescue package was contingent on three conditions, one of which was that the SFA must be involved in any new management arrangement. Did the Executive propose that requirement? If not, whose suggestion was it, and why was it non-negotiable?

Three conditions were required: we had to try to identify the funding gap; we needed a viable business plan; and we needed good, sound management in a system that we knew about.

The reason for the involvement of the SFA was that it was putting in over £1.5 million of the running costs, which were reckoned to be just over £2 million. Any management arrangements, package or business plan had to involve the SFA or it was not a viable business plan. The SFA was involved for that reason and for that reason only. We did not choose the SFA to manage the stadium: that was the only proposition that was ever put to us. If the three conditions were fulfilled, it would have been acceptable for anyone else to put propositions to us.

Running a national stadium is a considerable responsibility. Was any consideration given to anybody else for taking on that role?

If anyone else had come forward, we would have given them consideration, but no one came forward with another plan for running the stadium.

Looking at it now, does the minister think that that was a good decision? Since the SFA took over, has the management outcome been successful?

Yes, I think that it has been. The SFA has been professional, in that it has set up a company that is separate from its committee structure, and it has appointed a manager. The SFA's input, including the use of office space and use of Hampden, accounts for more than half the business plan. I think it is also useful that the National Stadium is embedded in the governing body. So far, the decision has proved to be successful.

Given that there is a considerable amount of public money invested in the National Stadium, is there any scope to allow more public influence over future decision making about and management of Hampden?

Irene McGugan should remember that the stadium is owned by Queen's Park Football Club, which is a private company; that is the way that the Millennium Commission set it up. Short of legislation, we do not have any powers of enforcement in relation to private companies. However, as the member knows, when Queen's Park accepted funding from the Millennium Commission, one of the undertakings that the club made was that there should be public use of and involvement in the stadium. That includes the stadium's use for non-sport events, including political party meetings and so on. We were able to preserve those other uses as a result of that arrangement; they might otherwise have been lost.

Glasgow City Council also attached community use conditions to its funding package. I hope that that is something that the SFA—as the stadium manager—will also seek to get involved in, as one of its aims is to make the stadium a community facility. Members should not forget that the SFA plans also to make the stadium a visitor attraction that has a museum, lecture theatres, function rooms and a sports injury clinic. More and more, members will find that the public will be involved with the stadium.

My final comment, which is based on a visit that I made at the weekend, is that the stadium is extremely difficult to find. An investment in new signposts pointing people to the stadium would be very well received by visitors.

I have been going to Hampden Park since I was a boy, and I still do not know how to get there.

Exactly.

I find the crowd and I follow it, but if you asked me how to get there, I would have no idea.

The minister should go sober.

I did not catch what Mr McAveety said. We always went on the train from Greenock to Mount Florida.

People can also get there by bus.

We now know why there are so few people at SNP conferences. [Laughter.]

I could not possibly comment on that.

Ian Jenkins's comment was rich, coming from a Liberal Democrat.

I am glad about the minister's solicitude for our conferences. I must say that the national stadium is in danger of being too small for our conferences. [Laughter.]

Dream on.

I want to return to the crucial issue of administration; the two crucial issues in this inquiry are the monitoring that took place at the beginning, and administration.

In his evidence to the committee on 13 February 2001, Austin Reilly said that he did not believe that the Executive was told that the project was going into administration. He said:

"From being a party to events as they unfolded, and having taken advice from our legal advisers prior to attending this inquiry, I have no doubt whatever that the co-funders should have been advised by their professional advisers that Queen's Park was about to move into administration."—[Official Report, Education, Culture and Sport Committee 13 February 2001; c 2059.]

I presume that the minister would deny categorically that that happened.

Yes, absolutely categorically.

Absolutely categorically?

Yes.

That is useful. My second question relates to the level of advice that Queen's Park was given, although I understand that the minister cannot comment specifically on that. However, were the administrators during the period of administration that began on 10 January the same people who provided legal advice to the club before administration? In other words, were they the club's solicitors?

Yes.

They were the same people.

Therefore—I am not asking the minister to comment on this—I presume that they would be the same people who are referred to in column 2058 of the Official Report of the committee's meeting on 13 February as the advisers who advised the company that it could not continue to trade at that stage and that the directors would be personally liable in circumstances of insolvency. I presume that that was the case.

Yes.

Thank you.

In your introduction, you said that we need to put the past behind us and to move forward. Do you think that we can do that, or might funding issues and other issues emerge?

I pray not. Our experience was that every time we thought that we had nailed the situation down, something else emerged.

These things are pot luck, but we have a five-star stadium that will host the European cup final. I think—oh, gosh, I should never say this—that it is looking reasonable for the future. That was a fatal thing to say.

Would it be a hard question at this stage to ask what we have learned from the situation? The committee has had a fairly amazing experience, in relation to the catalogue of incidents that led up to the stadium being built. Given that we might want to build similar facilities in future, what has been learned and what procedures could be put in place to ensure that—

If large sums of money are being put into a project, the Scottish Executive will be careful to make a minor contribution in future. You can be sure that we will get the blame for any trouble.

Whoever is the major funder must examine the management arrangements closely. The Scottish Executive was not around when the project was established—that was way before our time, and before my time. We were funding the project, not managing it. We gave money to Queen's Park, which set up another company down the line.

Our job was not to manage or micromanage the project, but we will want to be sure that appropriate management arrangements are in place in future projects. We were determined during the work-out period to ensure that whatever was put in place would be a robust and solid management arrangement, rather than leaving the project to be run by a chairman and a chief executive, given the close links between them and the other board. Those are the two areas about which the committee should be clear.

My first question is for Patrick Andrews. Are you aware who the professional advisers to TNS plc were in the period between January 2000 and March 2000?

TNS continued to be represented legally by Dundas & Wilson. In the negotiations that unfolded, Dundas & Wilson represented both Queen's Park—in administration—and TNS.

Did Dundas & Wilson represent both parties?

Yes.

That company represented Queen's Park, which was in administration, and TNS, which was not in administration?

Correct.

They were represented by the same—

—by the same company and by the same individuals.

Correct.

Is not that unusual? Is it legal?

It is certainly legal. It is unusual, but the structure and the circumstances were unusual.

The rescue package could not be put in place without unravelling the contractual arrangements that were in place at the stadium and which involved TNS. To an extent, therefore, that would influence TNS and Queen's Park in the administration's choice of legal adviser.

Was that choice surprising?

It was not surprising in the circumstances. It may have given rise to the potential for conflict, in that the interim administrator would have an eye on the negotiations that unfolded during the period of the work-out. He would not have been in a position to assess the level of advice that Queen's Park received during that period.

In general, would such an arrangement be undesirable?

My view is that it would be undesirable.

I will ask a final question, because I know that there are time constraints on us.

Much has been made of a meeting that took place between the Earl of Dalkeith and Mr Austin Reilly. Obviously, the minister was not party to that meeting, but I have correspondence from the Millennium Commission, including copies of letters dated 12 February and 5 March 1999, that say that it was unable to provide additional funding. The exact wording of the letter of 5 March 1999 is that the Millennium Commission was unable to provide

"the ‘funding comfort' you needed".

The Millennium Commission suggested that Mr Reilly might approach other funding bodies. To your knowledge, did any correspondence come the way of the Scottish Executive?

No.

So you are aware of no approach for additional funding being made to the Scottish Executive, following the letters from the Millennium Commission that said that it could not provide the funding.

I am aware of no such approach.

That is helpful, thank you.

Finally, minister, did sportscotland make you aware of any bids that it received for additional funding, following the letters from the Millennium Commission that said that it could provide no additional funding?

No. I would be surprised if the project had approached sportscotland, rather than approaching the Executive directly.

Would you check that?

Yes.

That would be very helpful.

The Millennium Commission correspondence also mentions the Scottish Office. With whom would it be appropriate to take that up? Would anybody at the Scottish Executive be able to provide—

You will not be able to gain access to information about the previous Administration.

I am talking about 1999.

That would be before the 1999 election.

Are you saying that we would have no access to information from before the election in 1999?

Mr Galbraith indicated agreement.

As there are no further questions from committee members, I thank the minister for his time. If he has any further information, I ask him to provide it to the committee as soon as possible.

We will have a brief adjournment.

Meeting adjourned.

On resuming—