Once again, we are doing a lot of heavy lifting in the committee this morning, are we not, convener?

There is a conversation to be had ahead of stage 3. I still believe that a restatement of the commitment to ban the supply of peat for horticulture is needed in legislation. Regardless of whether that restatement reflects a need to extend the readiness period or to deliver a transition, I think that the destination is quite clear—we are moving towards making horticulture peat free in Scotland. I think that everyone acknowledges that.

We should reflect on the fact that, in Northern Ireland, a date has been set. At the very least, we could get a consensus on that.

Both of the amendments in this group relate to delivering nature networks. As the Government rightly highlights, nature networks deliver multiple benefits beyond biodiversity: they store carbon; they mitigate floods; they regulate temperature in our towns, villages and cities; and they improve our mental and physical health. They are a keystone of the Scottish biodiversity strategy, because fragmentation of nature is a key driver of its decline.

Amendment 76 would introduce a requirement for ministers to report on progress towards the establishment of nature networks and on their effectiveness. Embedding a reporting requirement at ministerial level would ensure co-ordinated delivery that complements the bottom-up approach at council level. We are all aware of the excellent work that councils are doing on the ground to establish nature networks and to embed them in local planning. Without amendment 76, we risk nature networks being overlooked. The Government has set ambitious goals for the planning system to deliver positive effects for biodiversity and for private finance to support the ambitions of the biodiversity strategy, but, unless a strategically co-ordinated pipeline of projects is identified through nature networks, we risk missing those opportunities.

Amendment 77 would add a requirement for the forthcoming land use strategy to consider the ecological connectivity that is delivered through nature networks. The land use strategy provides the context for the major land use decisions that are needed to meet Scotland’s climate ambitions. Given that a key principle of the bill is the need to tackle climate and nature together, it makes sense to explicitly include ecological connectivity in the land use strategy. The strategy also underpins regional land use partnerships, which engage communities in shaping the land use changes that are required to meet climate targets. Elevating nature to the same level as climate in those discussions would ensure that communities are involved in the decisions, especially those on nature networks.

I move amendment 76.

I do not have an answer to that question, but we could certainly explore that in discussions with the minister.

I think that there is scope to reflect on the situation ahead of stage 3. Would you like to come back in, minister?

I appreciate that. I go back to my original question. Part of the argument that you make for creating an offence of ecocide is that it forces us to look from the top of that regulatory pyramid down at the regulatory framework, and there are questions that emerge from that. If we put a permitting defence into the bill, does that mean that we are totally okay with everything else in the regulatory framework that protects the environment and sits underneath that defence?

If we accept a permitting defence—there are a lot of other ifs in that regard, such as if the bill gets to stage 2—we are effectively creating a protection for regulators, consenting bodies and those who have permits. That leads to the question whether we are okay with that and whether we think that any potential ecocide events could happen under the current permitted regime. What I am getting from your answer is that the current regime is fine, but culpability and intention remain at the top of the pyramid and are not captured by the strict liability offence at its highest level. I will leave it there, but it is on the record.

Some of those functions could therefore be co-ordinated at the UK level, but the Scottish Government would seek to input into that process rather than leading on it.

I want to ask you about the stand-alone offence of ecocide. Is there something quite different if somebody is convicted under the heading of ecocide? Leaving aside the penalties, which are obviously a lot higher, is there something quite different between that and a conviction under section 40 of the RRA? Is there a sense that a corporation might be fined or get a heavy penalty under section 40 of the act whereas, to a certain extent, individuals can hide behind that within a corporation? The committee is still trying to wheedle out the real strength of the stand-alone offence, so it would be good to get any reflections that you have on that from your expert working group or from wider consideration, referring to the value of the ecocide offence as compared with what COPFS might pursue through section 40 of the act, if it were to make a choice between one and the other.

That sounds pretty concrete. If corporations are putting ecocide into their risk registers, that goes right to the top, to board level, and it cuts across their legal fiduciary duties as companies. I am interested in that. Is there any more evidence from the corporate world about how practice is changing as a result of the concept of ecocide?

Thank you.

I am picking up the point that there is now consensus on a permitting defence, which would potentially extend to consenting bodies. Everybody would covered by that. Can ecocide still occur, even within that regime? I am aware that there is a provision on overriding public interest in the habitats regulations, which are designed to protect species and habitats. A consenting body can effectively allow environmental damage to occur if it is seen to be in the wider public interest, whether because of climate change or some other issue. Have you considered that? We are considering the creation of a defence for consenting bodies, but a consenting body could intentionally and wilfully allow environmental damage to take place because it is in the wider public interest to do so.

It feels like the ground has shifted a little bit with respect to the bill, which I think is good, given the evidence that we have heard on the impact on consenting bodies and on those that have been granted permits. Within that space, however, I am now wondering whether that has been or needs to be considered.

I hope that that question is clear—it is probably not.

I think that that is clear.