Chamber and committees

Work will be done through the hearings system working group, which is considering the issue. As Pauline McNeill said, I have laid out that our desire is to return to a situation in which we have that balance. As Pauline McNeill also said, it is true that, for a number of years, we have had difficulties in getting male members. One or two males in my local area were successfully encouraged to join, but Clackmannanshire has a very small pool of people to draw from.

The national convener of the children’s hearings system remains committed to diversity in the recruitment of panel members and in relation to the composition of individual hearings, as does the Government. We think that it is optimal to have that balance for obvious reasons.

Sheriff Mackie, who some members will be aware of—he happens to come from my local area, just by sheer coincidence—is leading the review to consider the future of the system. It might be that the issue is considered further against a backdrop of change in the system more generally. However, that is a matter for the independent hearings system working group. We have asked that data on the gender composition of children’s hearings panels continues to be collected, and we will continue to monitor how and when that measure is used.

As is mentioned in the bill, the measure will be temporary, as things stand.

The committee considered issues around virtual hearings carefully at stage 1. It is clear that, although some stakeholders are extremely supportive and would like the use of virtual hearings to be extended further, others have concerns. We need to explore those concerns with them before we make decisions on any permanent measures in future bills, and we are committed to doing that. Indeed, we have already begun, including through the consultation on improving victims’ experiences of the justice system that we launched just last month.

I mention in passing that Ken Dalling, the president of the Law Society of Scotland, in evidence to the committee last September, said:

“I am a relative convert to virtual custodies ... that approach seems to be well received by the accused who are appearing, because they do not have to be bussed around.”—[Official Report, Criminal Justice Committee, 8 September 2021; c 31.]

On the points that Pauline McNeill raised, I accept that we are all working with the best of intentions to try to get the best justice system possible, but the bill deals with measures that we believe to be necessary in order to respond to the pandemic. It may be argued, of course, that larger elements of the pandemic have receded in recent months, but we cannot take that as meaning that the threat from Covid is over. In addition, Covid is likely to be more prevalent in the justice system, in prisons or even among juries, where people are obliged to be in certain spaces at certain times.

In the meantime, the temporary provisions in the bill will enable the use of virtual hearings, which, in the Government’s view, remain a vital part of supporting the recovery of our courts. Virtual hearings give courts the crucial flexibility to help them to address the backlog, and they enable the continued use of remote jury centres, which remain part of the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service’s contingency planning.

Virtual hearings have been used extensively for civil procedural business in particular, and the civil courts will continue to rely on the provisions in the bill until new court rules, which are currently being developed by the Scottish Civil Justice Council, come into effect. The continuation of these provisions will also enable partners across the sector to continue to build an evidence base that will allow us to take longer-term decisions on how and when virtual hearings should be used for criminal cases. I am aware from previous discussions with the committee that there are different views, and it is right that we take time to explore those further, certainly with regard to any future permanent changes.

In its stage 1 report, the committee recommended

“that more virtual trials need to take place in the criminal courts”,

including through an extension of the virtual summary trials pilot, led by Sheriff Principal Pyle. Again, that relies on the implementation of the provisions in the bill.

For those reasons, I cannot support Pauline McNeill’s amendment 1035, which would remove the crucial flexibility on which the criminal justice system has relied, and continues to rely, in its response to mitigating the impact of the pandemic on court users, including victims and witnesses. It would lead to increased delays and undermine the development of an evidence base to inform long-term decisions on the role of virtual proceedings. Even if some people think that the pandemic is largely over, we have always known that the backlog is far from over.

Amendment 1036 focuses specifically on hearings where the accused person is in custody, and would require those hearings to be held in person by default. Pauline McNeill has voiced concerns about the operation of virtual custody hearings, and I know that Police Scotland has previously written to the committee about the issue.

In its letter, it highlighted recent improvements to the technology that supports virtual custody hearings and underlined its commitment to ensuring that custody hearings run as efficiently as possible so that people are not detained in custody for longer than is necessary. Listening to the experience that Pauline McNeill passed on, it strikes me that the Parliament has had its own issues with the transmission of virtual proceedings.

It is important to remember that, although there have been challenges with the implementation of virtual custody hearings, as there are with any technological innovation, the provision remains a valuable tool to support safe appearances from custody. For example, if an accused person has, or is suspected of having, Covid, maintaining the provision ensures that the custody hearing can take place safely by video link. Of course, there remains an option for individuals to request an in-person appearance if that is preferred. For those reasons, I do not support amendment 1036. I invite Pauline McNeill not to press or move her amendments.

Amendments 1005, 1006 and 1007 in my name would make it the default position that appearances on undertaking take place in person rather than virtually. An appearance on undertaking means that the police have charged a person with an offence but, rather than keep the person in custody and bring them before a court, the police release the person on an undertaking, which is agreed to and signed by that person, that they will come to court on a particular day. The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service has brought to our attention that there has been some uncertainty about how the current arrangements for virtual attendance in the Coronavirus (Scotland) Act 2020—the first Scottish coronavirus act—should operate in relation to undertaking hearings. In practice, those hearings have continued to have been held in person, and the amendments would put the matter beyond doubt to reflect operational practice.

We will continue to consult justice partners on the operation of the first Scottish coronavirus act provisions as they relate to undertaking hearings and on whether it would be beneficial to move other types of hearing to being in person by default to reflect operational need and practice. If so, we may lodge further amendments at stage 3.

On amendment 1010, in the name of Jamie Greene, I am supportive of gathering and publishing data on virtual trials as part of building up an evidence base that can inform decisions on a permanent approach. However, it is essential that any requirements that we create for the publication of data from the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service are workable and not unduly onerous for a system that is, as I mentioned, seeking to tackle the backlogs efficiently and effectively.

It is also important that any data that is published is robust, meaningful and focused. As currently drafted, amendment 1010 would capture a sweeping range of cases, including many that we might not think of as virtual trials. For example, it would capture all cases in which a vulnerable or child witness gave evidence by video link as part of standard permitted special measures, which have been in operation for many years and have nothing to do with the Covid legislation or the provisions in the bill. The amendment would also require the courts service to publish information that it does not normally hold, and the courts service has advised us that it would not be possible to deliver the amendment in its current form.

If Jamie Greene is willing to not move his amendment, I will ask my officials to work with the courts service to agree a workable and focused approach to publishing data to improve the evidence base on virtual trials on a non-statutory basis. With that in mind, I ask Jamie Greene not to move amendment 1010.

Finally, I come to Katy Clark’s amendment 1034, which would require ministers to “prepare and lay” regular reports

“setting out the progress that is being made in the implementation of virtual courts.”

It is important to remember that, as Pauline McNeill has made clear, there is not a consensus on what the future of virtual courts should look like, such that we can progress towards it in a linear way. The committee’s stage 1 report recommended that more evidence be built up on the impact of virtual court and tribunal business before any decisions are made on permanent arrangements. We agree with that approach. Our response to the committee’s report sets out work that is already under way to gather more evidence on virtual court proceedings. The findings of consultations and research will be published in due course, and they will inform our decisions on next steps.

We do not want to pre-empt the results of that work, nor do we want to cut across the work of the Scottish Civil Justice Council, which has already consulted on proposed new court rules concerning the mode of attendance in civil proceedings and is developing plans to implement changes. Drawing on the evidence and our engagement with partners, if we decide to legislate to put virtual criminal courts on a permanent footing, Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise any proposed legislation that we introduce. In addition, members can use parliamentary questions or the committee system to seek information from the Government on its progress in developing policy on virtual courts.

Therefore, I do not support amendment 1034, and I invite Katy Clark not to move it.

Is the member’s position that he is opposed to the ability of ministers to intervene in sentencing in relation to release? Does that apply only to the Scottish ministers, or does he object to the same power being used by UK ministers?

Without those provisions, we would be required to introduce emergency legislation if the impact of coronavirus placed the security of prisons at risk. Emergency legislation would take time that our experience of the pandemic shows that we could not afford.

For those reasons, I cannot support amendments 1049 and 1057, which would remove the ability for the Scottish ministers to release groups of prisoners in response to the impact that coronavirus was having, or was likely to have, on the security and good order of prisons and the health and safety of prisoners and prison staff. I therefore invite Russell Findlay not to move those amendments.

I turn to amendment 1023 in the name of Jamie Greene. The amendment seeks to limit the application of the prisoner early release power, so that prisoners cannot be released any earlier than six months prior to their scheduled release date. I am happy to support the principle of the amendment and highlight that the regulations that allowed the use of that power in May 2020 restricted release to individuals within 90 days of their scheduled release date. However, there are some significant problems with the way that amendment 1023 is drafted. For that reason, I cannot support it today, but I would like to work with Jamie Greene, if he is willing, to lodge amendments at stage 3 that will achieve what is intended. I therefore invite Jamie Greene not to move amendment 1023.

Amendment 1050, in the name of Russell Findlay, would prevent individuals who have tested positive for coronavirus from being released under the emergency release mechanism. I know that Mr Findlay raised that issue during stage 1.

It should be noted that testing is not mandatory in the community and I am of the view that we should not make it mandatory as a condition of release. SPS worked hard during the pandemic to ensure that the Covid-related restrictions placed on prisoners were proportionate and, as far as possible and as a number of committee members have said, reflected the restrictions placed on the wider community. That was certainly the view of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons for Scotland. That helped to protect the good order of prisons and the health and wellbeing of prisoners and prison staff.

I assume that the amendment is intended to protect public health. That is an intention that I support. However, if members of the general public are not required to undertake Covid testing for the purposes of protecting public health, it is not proportionate to require prisoners to do so. If it were the case that a prisoner had tested positive, or, in the absence of a test, was nevertheless reasonably believed by the SPS to be infectious with Covid, the release power would be used to delay their release until they ceased to be infectious. That approach was taken in 2020 and is the approach that we would intend to take in future.

Also, as currently drafted, amendment 1050 could prevent any prisoner who has ever tested positive for coronavirus being released under that power, which I am not sure is the effect that Mr Findlay intended.

For those reasons, I do not support amendment 1050 and I invite Mr Findlay not to move the amendment.

The remaining amendments in the group, all in the name of Russell Findlay, would exclude various categories of prisoner from emergency release by regulations. I cannot support any of those amendments today, because they all suffer from the same drafting error and would have the effect of preventing someone from being released in an emergency if, at any point in their lives, they had been convicted of an offence of one of the kinds that his amendments mention, even if the conviction had been spent decades ago. That would be a completely unreasonable position to take—it might even be an unlawful one—and I do not think that it is what Mr Findlay intended. I assume that he means only to stop the release of people who are actually serving sentences for the offences that his amendments mention.

I would be pleased to work with Mr Findlay to produce, for stage 3, properly drafted versions of his amendments 1052 and 1053, which would exclude from the emergency release mechanism anyone serving a sentence for a domestic abuse offence. Indeed, I would like to go further and also exclude anyone convicted of an offence aggravated by domestic abuse. That is exactly what we did in the one set of regulations made under the power in the emergency act. I therefore ask Mr Findlay not to move amendments 1052 and 1053 so that we can work to bring them back, in better shape, at stage 3.

I cannot support amendments 1051, 1054 and 1055 at all.

Amendment 1051 would exclude from the emergency release mechanism anyone who has been convicted on indictment. The thought behind that seems to be that the crime of a person who was prosecuted on indictment is inherently more serious than that of someone who was prosecuted summarily. That is too simplistic. It is, of course, right that a prosecutor’s decision about whether to prosecute someone summarily or on indictment will be based on their assessment of the seriousness of the crime. However, such an assessment, which is made before a trial has begun, might not reflect what comes out in court. It is wrong to assume that everyone who has been convicted on indictment has committed a crime that is worse than that of anyone convicted summarily, or that those who have been convicted on indictment are inherently more prone to recidivism than anyone convicted summarily. Using the administrative choice that was made about which procedure to prosecute someone under is simply too blunt an instrument for deciding which prisoners should be released early in the face of a deadly virus. I therefore urge members to reject amendment 1051.

Amendments 1054 and 1055 would exclude from early release people who have been convicted of crimes of violence and sexual crimes. The amendments do not define those terms, which do not have any generally accepted legal meaning. Agreeing to them would therefore introduce considerable uncertainty into the law. It would be a dereliction of the Parliament’s responsibilities to pass such ambiguous legislation.

Amendments 1054 and 1055 are not only problematically unclear; they are unnecessary. The bill already excludes from emergency release the most serious sexual and violent offenders. It provides that the power cannot be used to release those serving extended sentences for sexual or violent offences, nor can it be used to release anyone subject to a supervised release order, nor anyone subject to notification requirements under the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009. As Mr Findlay himself said, on top of those restrictions it gives prison governors the power to deny emergency release to any prisoner who is considered a risk to an identified person.

There is no need for amendments 1054 and 1055, and they do not work technically. I therefore invite Mr Findlay not to move them.

It slightly predates my time as cabinet secretary, but I understand that these were asked for and welcomed by the profession. However, I ask Mr Haccius whether he can confirm that.

I have one thing to say. Although the bill includes a number of temporary changes, this would be a permanent change. However, as I have been trying to explain, the whole situation is under review through the hearings system working group that I have mentioned.

Amendment 1003 agreed to.

Section 38 agreed to.

Schedule—Temporary justice measures

When we first proposed the bill, it went further than John Scott’s committee had recommended in a number of respects—and, at this stage, we are going further than this committee suggested in a number of respects. I have taken into account the committee’s view, but I think that limits have to be set, as we could start to devalue the impact of the pardon.

I hope that the committee recognises in my amendments 2 and 3 a genuine attempt to broaden eligibility in a way that is relatively easy for people to understand and which does not dilute the value of the pardon. That might sound fairly abstract, but I do not think that it is fairly abstract to miners or the families of miners who will get the pardon. I think that they will want to know that it has a value that they can identify.

I have tried to address the issues that the committee is concerned about. Amendment 5 recognises that the offence of theft—for which, as I understand it, there were only three convictions—was an act of desperation for people who were very hard pressed during the strike. We have changed our view on that. I cannot say for certain, but I think that three women, all in Ayrshire, were involved. I cannot say, because the records are not there, but it is not hard to imagine that it happened as a result of economic hardship and having to look after families. That is why we have changed our view on that.

As I have said, I cannot support amendment 3A in its current format, because I believe that it would introduce uncertainty. Amendment 3 in my name makes clear the context of the purpose of the activity that a person

“was engaged or participating in”

or responding to during the miners’ strike, with personal matters expressly excluded. I note Pam Duncan-Glancy’s point about the bill covering only those in support of the strike, but we have discussed that issue with the National Union of Mineworkers and others, and they are perfectly comfortable with what we have proposed. Somebody who was against the strike has to be covered for the same behaviours as those who were for it. That is what we need if we are to have any real attempt at reconciliation—which, as I think Pam Duncan-Glancy has said, is a hard thing to do. As I have said, the NUM is perfectly comfortable with that approach. I have listened to Pam Duncan-Glancy’s explanation and I think that there is merit in giving it further consideration; however, it requires further work ahead of stage 3, so I ask her not to move amendment 3A at this time.

For the reasons that were set out previously, I ask Alexander Stewart not to move his amendments 9, 10, 11 and 12 if my amendment 3 is agreed to. In any event, they will, as the convener has said, be pre-empted. For similar reasons, I ask Pam Gosal not to move amendment 15, but I think that she has conceded the point that that amendment would be superseded, too.

I continue to have concerns about Richard Leonard’s amendment 17, given the aspects pertaining to the use of violence and intimidation that are mentioned in the 1875 act. I suppose that I am less concerned about whether it was Benjamin Disraeli who brought in that act than I am about what happened at the time.

To give a little bit of comfort to Alexander Stewart, I suggest that the maximum fine of £50 gives some indication of the level of offence, especially when we compare it with breaches of the peace and breaches of bail conditions. It seems to suggest that the offences were not as serious as might be construed under the act, but a bit of further work is required on the matter.

Richard Leonard and I are not too far apart on this, and I do not think that there will be too much difficulty in coming to agreement. I therefore ask him to accept at face value my offer to discuss it in good faith and not to move amendment 17.

Amendment 2 agreed to.

Amendment 3 moved—[Keith Brown].

I endorse some of the comments that have been made, not least those made by Pam Duncan-Glancy, on the strike. For my part, I was not on the picket line but I supported the strike when I was a student—in the various ways that students support such things. Those that have done that will understand what I mean.

I represent a constituency in which there is a substantial number of ex-miners. Some of them have only recently become ex-miners, because Longannet, where many people who live in my constituency were employed, is just outside the constituency boundary. It is also true that I was on strike in the 1980s, in a different context. I valued the solidarity of the other trade unions and different people at that time. I am very alive to that, and I am sure that there is no intention on Pam Duncan-Glancy’s part to dilute the provisions, although that would be the effect of her amendments.

I have always believed that it was the miners themselves who were the most disproportionately affected by the stigma and often unforeseen consequences of being convicted. Therefore, it is appropriate that it should be the miners who are pardoned if they consider that the eligibility criteria have been met. In my view, that also applies to the loved ones of those miners who are sadly no longer with us—they should be pardoned posthumously.

As Maggie Chapman said, I have extended the categories of people, having listened to what the committee had to say. However, to extend that further in the way that is proposed would start to dilute the provisions, introduce ambiguity, and create uncertainty in the minds of those who are eligible for the pardon.

It has been mentioned on several occasions that there is a lack of records that survive, given the passage of time. There are contesting views and accounts of the events during the strike. The committee will know that, having heard the very powerful testimonies of those who provided oral and written evidence at stage 1.

The report of the independent review group recommended that there should be a pardon for the men who were convicted and there is no robust evidence to suggest that any women or young people were convicted. Therefore, I recognise that there will always be a degree of uncertainty about how many individuals living in the same household as a miner were convicted during the strike. My amendments would broaden eligibility to such individuals that consider that they meet the qualifying criteria for the pardon. In so doing, the amendments seek to address one of the concerns that the committee raised.

I trust that the committee recognises that the amendments in my name are a genuine attempt to broaden eligibility to those who lived in the same household as a miner, close enough to be directly impacted by the strike, and who were convicted for actions that they took as a result of that impact.

Amendments 4A and 13 highlight the challenge of drafting a definition of “family member” that works in the context of the strike. I am willing to consider the matter further but I cannot support amendments 4A and 13 in their current form. I ask the member not to move amendments 4A and 13 at this time.

Amendments 4B and 14 require further careful consideration. I undertake to give them that consideration, in particular to clarify and set boundaries on the relationships that are covered by the term “supporter”. However, I cannot support amendments 4B and 14 in their current format, and I ask the member not to move them at stage 2.

Amendment 1 agreed to.

Post-bill, I would be more than happy to meet Richard Leonard and any other members who are interested in discussing how we can better prosecute the case for compensation from the UK Government. In having that discussion, I hope that it will be possible for us to reach a consensus and unanimity. It is important to the former miners to whom I have spoken that the Parliament speaks with one voice on the matter, even if we appear to have a difference of opinion here today.

I will do what I can to explain my view. I recognise that many miners and their families suffered terrible hardship as a result of taking part in the strike. Even now, many of those who are still living have not recovered from the effects of the strike, and subsequent generations have not recovered from the effects on their families and their communities. I understand that point, and it is absolutely right that compensation is paid in relation to that; however, I will explain why I do not think that the bill is the right place to do that. It is not for some of the reasons that have been mentioned, which I do not think that I have advanced.

I agree that compensation should be paid, but the bill is not the place to provide for that. That is not only my view—it is the view of the committee and of John Scott’s review group. The group was in favour of a pardon in order to provide reconciliation, which would be automatic and as easy as possible. That approach would be complicated if we tried to graft in a compensation scheme at a late stage of the bill process. The issue is not so much the time that it would take to introduce legislation; it is the time that it would take to put together a proper compensation scheme, and also the effect that it would have on the people who receive the pardon to which they are entitled.

Amendment 16 provides that some form of compensation be paid by the Scottish ministers to miners who qualify for the pardon. Although the amendment is not being voted on today, I must speak to it, because it is in front of us. The amendment does not specify what would be compensated for, nor does it specify an amount to be paid or the basis for calculating such an amount. Therefore, I have concerns about the lack of specificity in the proposed provisions.

I have other concerns. The bill does not provide the means to compensate miners for the hardships that they endured in a financial sense. The whole point of the bill is to grant a symbolic, collective and automatic pardon, and it focuses on reconciliation rather than on compensation. That is not to say that compensation is wrong, but the bill is not the place for it. Such a provision would undermine the fact that the bill is symbolic and collective; as I will go on to explain, it would divide miner from miner according to who qualified and who did not. In addition, compensation would not be automatic.

A compensation scheme would not be consistent with the proposal to self-assess eligibility for the pardon, which is what we are asking people to do. We are asking people to look at the bill as passed and say, “I’m entitled to that pardon, and I should get it.” A compensation scheme would undermine that, and it would have the potential to create significant practical differences. As the committee highlighted in its stage 1 report, the scheme would be complex to administer. If anybody can point me to a compensation scheme that the Parliament has approved that is not complex to administer, does not require substantial bureaucracy and does not require an application process, I would be happy to listen.

Such a scheme would require qualified people to assess whether an applicant actually qualified for the pardon. We know that, under the circumstances that are prescribed in the bill, it would be difficult for applicants to find evidence of a conviction, given the passage of time. That is why the bill does not propose an application scheme for the pardon; instead, it is for the individual to self-assess.

Richard Leonard mentioned the NUM. I said that the NUM agreed with our proposal in relation to a previous amendment, but I made no mention of the compensation scheme. I have known Nicky Wilson for many years, and we had a very cordial and straightforward discussion about it, although we have different points of view. As the question has been asked, I point out that Nicky Wilson asked me why a pardon and compensation were not approved during 13 years of a Labour Government, and why the miners pension fund lost billions of pounds at the hands of successive Governments, which hoovered up the money that belonged to the fund. Those matters cannot be addressed in the bill, either.

If the committee supports Richard Leonard’s amendment, only miners who meet the qualifying criteria for the pardon would receive compensation, while others who lost their jobs—perhaps on the basis of an arrest rather than a conviction, or because they were convicted of an offence that is outwith the qualifying criteria, which I think we are getting close to agreeing—would not receive compensation. We would be setting one miner and their family against other miners and their families. The scheme could also be divisive in relation to those who could show that they qualified for the pardon and those who could not, perhaps because no remaining reference to a conviction could be found in any records.

I recognise that the intention behind amendment 16 is good, and I agree with the principle of compensation; however, such a scheme would be complex and divisive, and it would be viewed by many people as unfair.

Both employment law and industrial relations are reserved to Westminster. Pam Duncan-Glancy rightly mentioned the aspects of the miners strike that are devolved and for which the Scottish Parliament has responsibility, but there are very serious areas in which powers are reserved. Employment, industrial relations and pensions are reserved to Westminster, and any Scottish Government that tries to compensate or to provide financial redress to miners who were dismissed by the National Coal Board and lost out, for example, on redundancy payments and pension rights risks straying into that reservation and not being within competence.

An issue that is raised by people such as Richard Leonard and others who support his point of view is that there was political interference in the strike, which is a commonly held view. However, we do not have the ability to look at UK Government Cabinet papers or to call before us people who can speak on behalf of the National Coal Board, if there are still people who can do that. The reason for saying that we will continue to press the UK Government for a UK-wide public inquiry is that we must have regard for what miners in Wales and the north of England would want to seek. Any compensation system should be properly thought out, uniform and fair.

If the compensation is for miscarriage of justice—do not forget that we have agreed that we will not go back to second guess what the courts did; whatever our view on that, that is the basis of the review by John Scott QC—it would not be appropriate for the Scottish Government to make a payment that would, in effect, undermine past judicial decisions and possibly pre-empt future decisions. Those decisions are for the judiciary.

I have huge sympathy with miners who have lost at least thousands, and sometimes tens of thousands, of pounds in redundancy and pension payments that would have made a massive difference to them and their families, but it is not possible for me to support the amendment to create a compensation scheme, because the bill is simply not the place for that. It would be regrettable if we as a Parliament were to divide—it will not be today, because there will not be a vote on the amendment—on the issue when there is so much that we agree on.

Such a compensation scheme was not proposed by John Scott’s review. The independent review group took the issue into account and made a carefully constructed set of proposals, which we have tried to take forward. We have expanded the proposals to include more people in the pardon. It is a fine balance, but it is the right balance, and it is for that reason that I would not support the amendment, if it were to be voted on at this stage—not that I would ever vote in this committee anyway.

The intention behind amendments 1, 4, 6, 7 and 8, when taken together, is to try to broaden eligibility for the pardon to a person who was convicted of a qualifying offence that is related to the strike and which meets the other conditions of eligibility, and who, at the time of the offence, was a miner or lived in the same household as a miner. The term “miner” is already defined in section 4.

I should say that, with these and other amendments, we have attempted to address and reconcile issues that the committee has raised and to stay true to the original spirit of reconciliation that the review, led by John Scott, spoke of. We have listened to what the review and this committee have said.

Amendment 1, which seeks to amend section 1 by replacing the reference to “miner” with “qualifying individual”, is linked to amendment 4, which seeks to introduce a definition of “qualifying individual”. Amendment 4, which is the principal amendment in the group, would broaden eligibility to those close enough to be directly affected by the strike and its impact on a mining household of which they were part. That would, of course, cover spouses, dependants and other family members.

Amendment 6 defines the term “household” as

“a group of people living together as a family or other unit (whether or not related) in a private dwelling, who ... share living accommodation and cooking facilities”

with a miner as currently defined in the bill, and whose dwelling was

“their only or main residence”.

Amendment 7 is a consequential amendment to the definition of “miner” in section 4, while amendment 8 makes a consequential change to the bill’s long title.

Ultimately, as I said, those amendments in my name are intended as a positive response to the committee’s recommendation in its stage 1 report that the Scottish Government consider extending the range of people who could qualify for the pardon, particularly to family members of miners.

I will address amendments 4A and 13. Amendment 4A, in the name of Pam Duncan-Glancy, seeks to amend my amendment 4 by replacing the words

“member of the same household as”

with the words “family member of”. It is linked to amendment 13, which seeks to define the term “family member”. I recognise the intention behind the member’s amendments, given the committee’s recommendation in its stage 1 report, and I look forward to the member’s explanation of why the definition that she has put forward is preferable to my definition of household member.

I have some concerns about the amendment. The proposed definition requires further consideration, given that it seeks to extend eligibility to a considerable number of family members of a miner. The risk is that the amendment could have the unintended consequence of diluting the effect of the pardon for miners and—if the committee were to agree to my amendment—the immediate members of their households, who are arguably the people most likely to have been directly affected by the impact of the strike on the household.

I also sound a note of caution with regard to the broader formulation of the family connection as suggested by the member. Amendment 13 is not consistent in its treatment of different family members. For example, should “sibling” include half-siblings and step-siblings? The term “step-parent” implies a legal marriage and would not cover the living partner of a parent. Should step-grandchildren be included? Does “cousin” also cover first and second cousins? Why is “cousin” included but not “uncle”, “aunt”, “niece” or “nephew”? The amendment also refers to

“an individual ... in a civil partnership with ... a miner”,

but such partnerships did not exist at the time of the strike. Moreover, the member’s definition of “family member” includes only that list, and it is not clear how much further the definition would extend. I will be interested to hear the member elaborate on that.

Amendment 4B also seeks to amend amendment 4 and I think that I have covered that point. I recognise the intention of the member’s amendments, given the committee’s recommendation, and I look forward to hearing the member’s reasoning as to why these amendments are considered to be more appropriate.

I note also that the definition of “supporter”, in amendment 14, includes only the categories of people listed. However, the definition is not limited to those groups, so, again, it could be very hard for an individual to determine just how far eligibility for the pardon would extend if the amendments were accepted. As I have said previously to the committee, there is a real need for clarity so that those who are eligible for the pardon know that they are eligible—that should be straightforward. It is also necessary that eligibility is not diluted such that it negates the impact of the pardon for miners. There is a risk—it could be argued that it is a greater risk—that amendment 4B could have the unintended consequence of diluting the effects of the pardon for miners and those closest to them. Again, I sound a note of caution.

I move amendment 1.