Chamber and committees

With respect, I have answered that. It is not uncommon for secondary legislation to flow from any piece of primary legislation. I have already given a commitment, in response to what I have heard not only from this committee but elsewhere, that there will be more detail in the bill.

As anyone who has been through the trauma of a sexual offence goes through the criminal justice system, they encounter decisions that are not in their gift or are outwith their control, such as which court the case goes to and what process is applied. We must be open to choice on some matters. You will have heard many examples that support the move towards prerecorded evidence, but some victims might want to have their day in court, and having that sense of control and choice can be imperative to recovery.

Your point about the single point of contact is well made, and I am cognisant of the difference between independent legal advice and independent legal representation. Do you want to add anything that might be useful to Ms McNeill, Jeff?

I am trying to seek as much consensus as possible on the bill. Through our consultation, the other working groups, the work that flowed from various research and other work that has underpinned the bill, such as Lady Dorrian’s work, we are trying, in the interest of our justice system and its standing in our society, as well as the interests of complainers and the accused, to build as much consensus as possible. We consider our position, as it stands, as doing our best to reach that consensus.

You are right in saying that we are currently an outlier on three fronts in the jury system. However, the way that corroboration features in our system also makes us different. We have taken on board the research and the views that were expressed through the consultation. The continued existence of corroboration, notwithstanding the Lord Advocate’s successful reference to the appeal court, means that our position just now is that we should have a qualified majority. Instead of the jury convicting on seven out of 12, it would convict on eight out of 12.

I did not address the question about majorities, which, to be fair, is a much more complex matter. There are black and white arguments in favour of the abolition of the not proven verdict, and there are long-standing concerns that support its abolition. However, there are very different considerations around the jury majority.

In all of this, at the forefront of our minds is how we not only improve the experience for complainers by overcoming barriers to access to justice, but protect the integrity and balance of the system and reduce any risk of miscarriages of justice. There are some fine judgments to be made on how we achieve those two things. I will explain why, on the basis of evidence, the Government proposes that we move from a simple majority to a qualified majority of two thirds and why we do not propose to move to near unanimity or unanimity, but it is a complex area.

In short, Scotland’s jury structure system is an outlier. No other system has three verdicts. No other comparable jurisdiction convicts on the basis of a simple majority and, as I intimated earlier, no other comparable system has a jury of 15.

There are three sources of evidence on this. There is the Scottish jury research; there is a recent meta-analysis; and there are other reports over the past 15 years that show that, if you move from three verdicts to two verdicts, you will increase conviction rates for all crimes. The Scottish jury research is not quite as unequivocal, but the evidence shows that moving from three verdicts to two will increase convictions across all crimes, not just sexual crimes. Therefore, we have opted to move away from a simple majority, but not to move to near unanimity, because of the other protections in the system that exist, which we may, at the convener’s discretion, get on to. I have opted for the two-thirds majority.

I will leave my remarks there, because I appreciate that there will be other questions.

But the evidence for the abolition of not proven goes way beyond that. It far exceeds the fact that we are an outlier—

That part of the bill is about neither increasing nor decreasing conviction rates.

You did not hear that from me.

We have built a bill that is based on the substantial research that exists, and I have no doubt that we will build into it that there will have to be on-going evaluation of its impact, whether that is a more collective impact or the impact of particular aspects of it.

It has not been through the specific door of my office up to this moment in time. I hope that that is not too much information for you, Mr Findlay—

I will pass the question to Alastair Bowden in a moment, but my understanding is that the limitations in the Contempt of Court Act 1981 place constraints on live, real-life research as deliberations happen.