Chamber and committees

One challenge that we have had in looking at that bit of our overall budget is that about 80 per cent of the budget is staffing costs. As staff costs increase, there is very little wriggle room, because of the substantial proportion that staffing costs make up.

If we were to fix that, that would, over time, be expected to result in a reduction in the number of staff carrying out the same number of duties. Unless there is a consequential change in the duties that office-holders are required to perform—some of which are in legislation—there would be significant challenges in that regard.

I am not sure that there is a shared corporate body view on that. It depends on how quickly we want to get to the point of looking at the architecture and structure within which the functions sit, as Jackson Carlaw has highlighted.

It is perhaps more difficult to deal with the commissioners that already exist; indeed, the 2009 review of SPCB-supported bodies found exactly that. Lots of work went into that, and it made very clear recommendations with well-justified rationales, but the Parliament decided not to go ahead with them. It would be strange if there were not the same resistance now.

As for new and proposed commissioners, there is an opportunity for us to have conversations with the individuals who might be proposing them, with members, with campaign groups and with the committees that would be responsible for the functional scrutiny of those roles. The questions that we need to ask are: are they the best option, and what is the problem that you are trying to fix?

I think that that would be helpful. It is also clear—indeed, you have referred to it—that the proposals that are coming forward in the rights and advocacy spaces might be closely linked.

Last year, the Scottish Human Rights Commission itself produced a report on the potential expansion of the commissioner landscape into rights spaces. I think that none of us would wish our national human rights institution to be hollowed out by siphoning off its roles and responsibilities, and powers, to other parts that do not sit within it.

One of the challenges relates to some of the proposals that we see in the advocacy and rights spaces. Some would give the commissioners more rights, and more powers, than the national human rights institute currently has. We should probably all be thinking about that: why does our national human rights body not have greater powers and authority to act in comparison with other bodies, whether they be commissioners, non-departmental public bodies or whatever?

There is also a question around independence. In addition to the systemic failures that we have addressed, one of the reasons for people considering that an advocacy and rights-based role is required is that it would be independent from Government and from the control of, and framework setting for, public services. There is a tension in that respect that perhaps comes from not only the failure to get the service, but a lack of trust that those services can deliver what is needed.

We have already discussed the range of commissioners’ roles. The regulatory commissioners have very particular roles, as do the complaints-handling commissioners. Many of us might have questions, such as whether we are getting value for money out of the Electoral Commission, for example, but the answers to those questions are not necessarily ours to give. The corporate body is tasked with ensuring that there is compliance around governance, employment, accountable officers and those kinds of things, and that we understand what the commissioners are trying to achieve and, therefore, what resources they require in order to do that. Without simply giving them what they want without question, we are trying, as best we can, to give them the resources to carry out those roles.

The question about outcomes and operational functionality would be a question for the scrutiny committees. Do they think that the office-holders and commissioners are delivering what they were intended to deliver? The corporate body and the committees have a clear joint responsibility to answer that question.

I will kick off, then David McGill can come in.

Michelle Thomson talked about siloing and how witnesses have spoken about their patch. There have been a couple of exceptions to that, and I refer again to the Scottish Human Rights Commission review report from last year, which looks at the landscape as a whole, from an external, non-Government, non-Parliament point of view, and says that it will cause a problem if it carries on. There are certainly areas of concern, maybe specifically within the rights and advocacy space, but there are concerns beyond this place about the proposals that we might have to consider in the coming months and years. I do not think that there is necessarily the antagonism to have those discussions on a broader holistic footing.

I think that it is about governance and accountability. Jackson Carlaw and I probably come at this issue from opposite sides—Jackson in his finance role and me in a more governance-focused role—but I think that there is a mutuality there. If we get a better structure of commissioners—or whatever those roles turn into, if they are not office-holders—will it deliver better for people? That is ultimately what we should be ensuring.

From my point of view, the financial aspect is a concern and a worry, but we need change, because at present we are not necessarily giving the commissioners the scrutiny that they require across Parliament, and they are not necessarily undertaking functions in a way that meets the hopes and wishes of the people who established them right at the start. There is an opportunity to restructure and amalgamate, and I would welcome the space in Parliament to have those discussions in a comprehensive way.

I will be brief. I thank the committee for inviting us to give evidence for its inquiry into Scotland’s commissioner landscape. As you are aware, the corporate body currently supports seven office-holders and funds the devolved Scottish activities of the Electoral Commission. We will also support the new patient safety commissioner for Scotland when they are appointed and their office is established.

As you know, we have previously raised concerns with the committee and with the Scottish ministers about the growing number of commissioners and the impact of that on the corporate body’s workload, overall budget and staff. A lot of our responsibilities are reactive and responsive to decisions that are made by the Parliament. We are therefore grateful to contribute to the inquiry and to your work, and we look forward to the discussion this morning.

For all commissioners, there are written agreements between ourselves and the relevant committees that clearly outline the different roles and responsibilities of the corporate body and the subject committees. Those agreements set out a robust governance role for the corporate body and support the effective scrutiny of committees in their respective functions. The corporate body has responsibility for funding the various office-holders, as you have already heard, as well as oversight of the governance arrangements, which includes ensuring that the office-holders follow the appropriate practices for employment and standards as employers. The corporate body sets those conditions.

Office-holders are accountable to the Parliament for the functions laid out in legislation, and they do so by providing annual reports. Committees will also call in office-holders on an annual basis for scrutiny sessions. The corporate body’s role is discrete: it looks at funding and at how the governance arrangements are set up. We appoint the accountable officer for each of the commissioners; we also receive the annual reports and discuss the budget asks, given our role with regard to funding. There is a separation between the funding and governance aspects, and the scrutiny and accountability of the commissioners’ functions—the corporate body scrutinises funding and governance while committees scrutinise their functions.

We can certainly ask for that information, but there is no power to compel committees to provide it. One of the reasons for establishing the agreement between the Conveners Group and the corporate body last year was to address some of these issues and to open a line of communication that had perhaps not been as effective as it might have been in the past. It was also about supporting committees in understanding where the different responsibilities—that is, the corporate body’s responsibilities and their own—lay.

As Jackson Carlaw said initially, it is probably the case that not many MSPs come into Parliament with a desire to scrutinise the work and functions of a commissioner or a commission, and when they understand that such scrutiny is among the responsibilities of a committee, I would not say that it comes as a shock or a surprise, but people just do not seem to be aware of such things. The agreement, therefore, was an attempt to try to strengthen that awareness.

I also point out that, as Jackson Carlaw outlined, we have changed the way that we call in commissioners and commissions; we now do so at least annually to hear about issues—that is separate from the budget scrutiny and the annual report stuff that we do. There are mechanisms in that respect.

Does the corporate body routinely get told when committees call in office-holders? No. Can we ask? Yes, but there is no obligation on committees to let the corporate body know what they have done in a particular year.