Level Crossings (Fatal Accident Inquiries)
The final item of business today is a members' business debate on motion S3M-4986, in the name of Willie Coffey, on conduct of inquiries into fatalities at level crossings. The debate will be concluded without any question being put.
Motion debated,
That the Parliament regrets the continuing loss of life at railway level crossings, most recently at Halkirk in Caithness and, in January 2009, at Gatehead in Kilmarnock and Loudoun; notes the large number of organisations involved in the investigation of rail accidents and incidents in Scotland, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, the British Transport Police, Scotland's eight police forces and the Office of Rail Regulation, and considers that, following the Review of Fatal Accident Inquiry Legislation being conducted by Lord Cullen, a modernised system of fatal accident inquiries can contribute to greater coordination and scrutiny of any inquiries, including the implementation of any recommendations, by whichever agency, following such tragic incidents.
I thank the Parliamentary Bureau and my colleagues for giving me the opportunity to bring this matter before the Parliament.
As background to today's debate, I note that Lord Cullen has published his report on the review of fatal accident inquiry legislation. I do not know whether the impending debate hastened the report's completion, but it is helpful that the report has emerged while attention is focused on the issue, following the most recent deaths at Halkirk level crossing, which I am sure will feature in the debate.
My focus on the issue was prompted by the death in January this year of local teenager Boab Milloy at the Gatehead level crossing in my constituency. That level crossing has half barriers that block vehicular traffic from proceeding across the crossing but do not fully cover the road and footpaths. Before moving on to the general topic, I advise members that the procurator fiscal has advised me that Mr Milloy's death is not to be the subject of a fatal accident inquiry. As Lord Cullen's report makes clear, current practice in such cases is not to provide written reasons for decisions; those inquiring about the outcome are simply advised that, in arriving at the decision, all evidence was carefully considered. I am pleased that Lord Cullen recommends an end to that practice and that relatives and other parties with an interest in the matter will be advised of the reason for the Lord Advocate's decision not to apply for a fatal accident inquiry.
When I learned of Mr Milloy's death, I asked to be kept informed of the outcome of any inquiry that was conducted. That proved to be very difficult, mainly due to the number of agencies dealing with the matter. Members will see how difficult it must be for the public to know whom to pursue for such information.
I was, of course, aware of the fatal accident inquiry system and of its good reputation for drawing valuable lessons from sudden deaths in a wide variety of circumstances. I therefore submitted questions on previous inquiries into the deaths of pedestrians at level crossings. Having received confirmation of four pedestrian deaths at level crossings between 1999 and 2007, I was disappointed to receive this follow-up comment:
"Procurator Fiscal records are not structured in a manner that makes it possible to confirm if any of these four pedestrian deaths were followed up by a fatal accident inquiry."
When I then asked the local procurator fiscal whether an inquiry had ever been held into a death at a level crossing similar to the one at Gatehead, I was advised that the type of information requested
"is not recorded in a way which would permit it to be readily identifiable".
Members might begin to see the problems that we are facing on the issue. However, I am pleased to see that Lord Cullen has recommended that, in future, FAI determinations should be available on the Scottish Court Service website. That will provide access to a body of information that will be of value to many people.
Although Lord Cullen's report has just become available, having reviewed it in preparation for this debate I believe that it addresses a number of deficiencies in the FAI system and I am sure that it will be widely welcomed. One point in particular—it may surprise members that this is not done already—is that, in future, recommendations from FAls will be monitored to ensure that they are implemented.
However, I must say that, specifically in relation to deaths on the rail system, I found the report very disappointing. The report rehearses, in one paragraph, the complexity of the arrangements around the rail system, in which the FAI system has an interface with rail safety arrangements, which are a reserved matter. If anyone has waded through the memorandum of understanding between the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service and the rail safety agencies, they will appreciate the complexity of the arrangements. In light of that, I was disappointed to see how little evidence was submitted to Lord Cullen's inquiry by bodies responsible for safety in the rail industry.
Although the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland made a submission, it did not offer any comments on rail safety issues. The British Transport Police did not make a submission and the rail accident investigation branch made a single-paragraph submission, which focused solely on managing conflicting recommendations from one of its investigations and a fatal accident inquiry.
I was also very disappointed to note that the Office of Rail Regulation made no submission to Lord Cullen's inquiry. I asked whether it had made representations by other means and was advised that it had not. Given the importance of the FAI system, the minister or cabinet secretary may wish to take up with the Office of Rail Regulation its failure to submit a response. I note also that, although it is its rail network that is the subject of this complex system of regulation and inquiry, Network Rail made no submission to Lord Cullen.
The lack of input from the multitude of agencies that have a responsibility for rail safety may explain why the report makes no recommendations that bear directly on it. I think that that is a weakness in the report that would benefit from further consideration, either by Lord Cullen or by the relevant committee of this Parliament.
In order to provide the clearest possible system it should be clear that, whichever agency is investigating the cause of death, any sudden death in Scotland is subject to decision by the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service. All the arrangements entered into between agencies should reflect that.
The improvements in the FAI process should help us better assess whether level crossings in Scotland are currently as safe as they could be, but we are not helped by the fact that too many agencies are involved. Ultimately, there must be a clearer path to improving safety, which will reduce the numbers of deaths occurring at level crossings.
I am not yet satisfied that crossings such as Gatehead in my constituency are as safe as they could be. "Working properly" might be an acceptable assessment of safety by the industry, but people are still losing their lives. We need reassurance that every effort is being made to prevent further loss of life.
I congratulate Willie Coffey on securing the debate. I will talk in particular about the facts surrounding the tragic crash at Halkirk. I pay tribute to the Minister for Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change, Stewart Stevenson, who responded to it swiftly and sensitively. Other Highland MSPs and I were grateful for the opportunity to meet him to discuss the issues that we feel are important.
I want to lay out the case, as I see it, for why there should be barriers at the 23 crossings in question. The key point is that ungated crossings are intrinsically dangerous and inadequate for the task at hand. The argument is simple: if ungated crossings are safe, why bother with gated crossings at all? Think of the money that could have been saved over the years.
We should not be diverted by Network Rail's emphasis that, in the case in question, all elements of the crossing were in working order and the train was properly driven. To me, those points are irrelevant. Ungated crossings are inappropriate and inadequate, even when all their elements are working perfectly.
The company has decided to rely on ungated crossings while being aware of their dangers. It seems to me that, in its calculations, it deems the risks to be acceptable. The number of casualties and fatalities might be sufficiently low for Network Rail not to take action but, by refusing to gate the crossings, it proves that it considers deaths—past deaths at any rate—to be acceptable.
However, I believe that the events of 29 September, when Angus—Gus—MacKay, his wife Margaret and his younger brother Donnie were killed, change the whole scenario.
I believe that there will be future deaths as long as there are no gates. We have to be careful about some of the suggestions that have been made. It has been suggested that double traffic lights should be put in place. However, although that might be a move in the right direction, that is not the same as gating crossings.
It is true that a number of people have been chancing the red lights and it is good that the police and the rail authorities are cracking down on such behaviour. However, let no one imply that that is what happened in our crash. Gus MacKay had been a telephone engineer and had used these roads most of his life. He knew better than almost anyone else of the dangers of these crossings and he would never have gambled with those lives.
There is also an unfortunate implication that the accident might have happened because the people involved were elderly. These were very fit elderly people who had many good years ahead of them. Their deaths leave a huge chasm for their surviving relatives.
It is a fact—I have argued this before—that low, brilliant sunlight will dazzle drivers who are proceeding south on the road in question. I have argued that the same is true of the Delny crossing. I believe that Network Rail conceded that point after the September crash at Halkirk, because it is putting bigger hoods on the lights. However, I have to say that that is just tinkering and that only gates will do.
Let me put the argument, which I think is a clinching argument, another way: Network Rail made a profit of £1.2 billion last year. Even if the cost of gating the 23 crossings is £23 million—£1 million each—which I doubt, that is only 2 per cent of the £1.2 billion, which I would have thought was absolutely affordable.
I stick to the argument that we need gated crossings in future. If, while still denying that that is necessary, Network Rail at least started to gate the crossings where the accidents have happened, that would be a move in the right direction.
I thank the minister for his considered approach and I look forward to hearing what he has to say but, as far as I, the local member, am concerned, the bottom line is that these crossings cannot be left ungated or there will be future fatalities, which we as a Parliament cannot tolerate.
I have taken an interest in this subject since I was a district councillor in Dingwall, where there are three open level crossings, where there have been accidents, which were investigated by the complex network to which Willie Coffey alluded. He is to be congratulated whole-heartedly on bringing this debate to Parliament in an attempt to simplify the means of finding a clear line of responsibility to meet Scottish conditions. It is obvious from his evidence that the regulatory bodies did not take seriously the Cullen inquiry and that FAIs in Scotland must be central to the way in which we address the matter. Transparent records and responses are needed. An FAI can provide those and may follow them up. I would like to know, for example, what effect Network Rail's placing of cameras at the Dingwall crossings has had on driver behaviour. I could ask many other questions, but that is important to know.
It is also necessary to ask questions of Network Rail. It provided us with a briefing that says that it spends more than £80 million improving the safety of level crossings each year. How much of that £80 million is spent on the most vulnerable crossings? In addition, we need to know how much of the millions of pounds that Network Rail claims it spends on maintenance and renewal programmes is spent on the most vulnerable crossings.
There are problems for drivers and rail passengers. In particular, train drivers are often traumatised because of an accident in which a car, bus or lorry hits a train. They take that with them throughout their lives, which is why ASLEF instituted a voluntary code for drivers to slow down over crossings such as the one at Halkirk. That raises the question of the length of the journey that rail passengers have to take. The journey between Wick and Inverness is already at least four hours long, and it is essential that the voluntary slow-down does not become permanent; it is an initial response to show that train drivers are trying to help. At the same time, rail passengers are further disadvantaged by such incidents. That needs to be considered carefully, because fewer passengers will use the rail service if it remains so slow.
We need to seek a safe environment for rail and road users alike. Network Rail must do much more than it has done. It says that it seeks to develop, in the plans that run alongside last year's media campaign,
"solutions which could lead to the replacement of some crossings".
It must start in the north of Scotland and it must start this year.
The case is strong and I welcome the debate. However, I wish to be excused from the debate, as I need to catch a train.
I congratulate Willie Coffey on securing the debate and extend my condolences to his constituent's family. There is a certain amount of truth in the notion that a great part of the issue that he raises is the complexity of the judicial arrangements. I do not want to stray into that area too much.
It is certainly true that the institutional landscape of the United Kingdom's rail industry is cluttered and complex, but the principles of operating on the railway are not dissimilar to those of operating on a road. The main principle is that signals and signs should be obeyed.
We have all seen Network Rail's briefing, which is an operational briefing. Members are right to say that the company has left a great deal unsaid. Jamie Stone was specific about what he considers to be an operational, technical solution to the problem and he feels that the sums of money involved in providing that solution are not necessarily unmanageable. It still remains to be seen whether, ultimately, the Scottish taxpayer would bear that burden or whether other arrangements would be made.
Does Charlie Gordon accept that Network Rail is making £1.2 billion profit and can afford to make improvements itself?
Yes, on the face of it, but I suspect that there is a bit more to it than that. Part of the further dialogue that we must have with Network Rail relates, among other things, to financial arrangements, although we must be careful not to give the impression that we care more about finance than about public safety. However, we are talking about a publicly owned company, so we also have to bear in mind that public resources are finite.
We must be careful not to apply a culture of double standards to the operations of the railway industry; I say that in the best of spirit, as a former operational railwayman. The point I am about to make is not just about level crossings. Over the years, whenever a train running through a red signal results in an accident, I have heard demands for investment to be made to make such an occurrence physically impossible. However, in the case of very serious road accidents that involve drivers going through a red traffic light, we just accept that the mess will be cleared up and the next day we are all driving through the same junction. The fundamental principle, as I said earlier, is that signals and signs are meant to be obeyed.
In recent years, I have seen a culture on the roads of more motorists running red lights. I suspect that there may be a similar cultural effect in some cases on an operational railway. I am not saying that more train drivers are running more red signals, but it may well be that more members of the public who interact with the railway have a pattern of behaviour at those times that is similar to their behaviour on the roads. The consequences of such behaviour on an operational railway are often fatal.
This debate is a welcome one that is only just getting under way. A great deal more has to be said and done about this important matter.
I, too, congratulate Willie Coffey on getting the debate. Jamie Stone has already talked about the Halkirk accident in Highland, which was tragic, as he said.
I have been interested in this subject for some time. A crossing quite close to Inverness, at Bunchrew, has given us problems over the past few years. It took an awful lot of time to convince Network Rail that there was a problem with that crossing. More than once we had to get the Office of the Rail Regulator involved, along with various other bodies. Eventually, it was conceded that a battery was faulty and that the lights were, in fact, faulty. In such situations, Network Rail normally denies that there is any problem with its equipment. However, it was clear that that was not the case in this case.
There are 7,674 level crossings in the UK. If it helps Charlie Gordon, I can say that I am certainly not calling for all of them to be dealt with in a physical sense. I just want the 23 crossings in Scotland that are automatic open crossings to be dealt with. Of course, 21 of those are in Highland, while the other two are in Ardrossan. Like Jamie Stone, I have been pressing the case for gating those crossings.
Those crossings constitute only 2 per cent of the total number of crossings, but 31 per cent of collisions take place on them. Northern Ireland got rid of all its automatic open crossings in the 1980s for safety reasons. In Highland, we have two such crossings on the Fort William to Mallaig line, seven on the Dingwall to Kyle line and 12 on the Inverness to Wick and Thurso line. Although there are not many trains a day, because there are so many crossings on those lines, we end up with a train crossing an open crossing in Highland every 10 minutes or so. That is a significant fact, which perhaps gives members an indication of why we end up with so many accidents: it is because open crossings are crossed so many times in a day.
I would like to see a five-year programme of gating open crossings. Like Jamie Stone, I do not think that it is unreasonable to ask for that to be funded. If it costs £1 million a crossing and £23 million over five years, we are talking about a cost that is less than £5 million a year. Such a programme would solve the problem. The fewer accidents that we have at such crossings, the fewer fatal accident inquiries will be needed.
I apologise for my absence at the start of the debate. I congratulate Willie Coffey on securing a members' business debate, and I am pleased to have this opportunity to speak on a subject that is of paramount importance to my Highlands and Islands region.
The need for a proper discussion on safety at level crossings was highlighted by the awful deaths last month of Angus and Margaret MacKay and Mr MacKay's younger brother. All three of them died when their car was struck by a train at the Halkirk level crossing. The incident has shown more specifically that we need to consider whether it is appropriate for ungated level crossings to continue. There have been other accidents and many near misses at level crossings in places such as—to name but a few—Invergordon, Garve, Bunchrew and Forsinard. Almost a third of level crossing accidents happen where there is no gate in place, even though such crossings make up only 2 per cent of crossings in the UK. Such evidence speaks for itself. As Mr Thompson mentioned, the fact that 21 out of the 23 open crossings in Scotland are located in the Highlands means that the region is especially vulnerable. Therefore, I feel that I have a duty to my constituents to emphasise the importance of the problem. We must remember that the most recent incident was not an isolated case. Cost should not be an issue where valuable life is at stake.
I am told that it is not uncommon for the warning lights at level crossings in the Highlands to flash incorrectly due to, for instance, an animal such as a red deer or a cattle beast walking on the line further down the track. That can breed frustration for drivers, because no train appears when the lights are flashing. It can also breed complacency, because people might think that the lights are faulty so they can cross without danger. It is obviously imperative to bring in a system that negates problems of that kind. However, a thorough investigation is needed into why the most recent and other crashes have occurred. That will enable the Government to work out precisely what measures need to be taken to increase safety at all road-rail junctions in Scotland.
When I met the Minister for Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change recently following the dreadful tragedy—a meeting for which I am grateful—I welcomed his suggestion that the Government look into the possibility of installing barriers at such junctions. However, my constituents and I would appreciate more concrete assurances that the issue will be dealt with adequately. I also agreed with his suggestion that there should be more warning notices to tell drivers what is ahead of them.
Of course it is crucial that the inquiry system be modernised, but we must also work out how the crossings can be improved. The Government should take swift and positive action to prevent similar accidents from happening in future. I hope that the minister will do that.
Like others, I thank Willie Coffey for lodging the motion that has given us the opportunity to debate the issue. I should also highlight the substantial quality of the research and engagement that he demonstrated in his speech. No one who is here tonight or who reads the debate afterwards will fail to learn something that was not in the ministerial brief or in their own research. In the way that he has dealt with the issue, Willie Coffey has set an example that others should follow.
Like others, I utterly regret that fatal accidents occur. I echo the statements of other members in expressing the sympathies of myself and my colleagues—and of Parliament generally—for the friends and families of those who lost their lives in the fatal accidents at Halkirk recently and at Gatehead in Kilmarnock and Loudoun earlier this year. Of course we note that the emergency services responded to those accidents in the professional manner that one would expect.
Willie Coffey mentioned the welcome report of Lord Cullen, who has a track record of producing substantial reports on matters of concern involving safety. It is certainly of interest that such modest submissions were made to Lord Cullen's deliberations from a range of bodies that might be thought to be substantially engaged in such issues.
I am sure that my colleague Kenny MacAskill will examine carefully the issue of FAIs and that action will be taken. The paucity of information that was available to Willie Coffey when he was researching the subject suggests that there is a case for action.
Jamie Stone talked about the recent accident at Halkirk. There was also an accident there in 2002 but, as it is the subject of court action, I will say no more about it. Other court issues may yet be associated with the accidents that have occurred. Jamie Stone asked the fundamental question why there should be barriers and exemplified the problem in saying that. The £1.2 billion profit is, in a sense, merely the public's money coming back round the system. Network Rail is a not-for-profit company, therefore it is difficult to talk about profit in the context of that company, although the balance sheet and the annual reports show it.
Rob Gibson highlighted the issues in Dingwall and asked about speed cameras. I will seek to follow up that question. He also highlighted the trauma that is experienced not just by the families of those who are killed or injured at crossings, but by the people who are employed on the railway. ASLEF has, I think, suggested that there should be a slowdown, which would result in the slowing down of people's journeys. That is an important issue, as one of the key things that we want to see is the speeding up of rail journeys. Anything that slows down journeys is something that I regret.
Charlie Gordon, who is an old railwayman—perhaps I should say a railwayman of long standing—made the clear point that signs and signals should be adhered to. Of course, no one disputes that. However, as part of my modest personal research, I asked my wife, who has been driving for 35 years, whether she had ever driven across a level crossing. She said that she had not. It is not that she has avoided them; she just happens not to have done that. I wonder whether the unfamiliarity with level crossings that some drivers experience contributes to near misses or accidents. The flashing red light is unfamiliar, whereas the steady red light is something with which people are familiar. A range of issues around the psychology of how level crossings are controlled should be considered further.
Charlie Gordon made the particular point that safety should trump finance. I think that we all agree on that. In the Government, "spads" means special advisers, but signals passed at danger are part of railway folklore. I think that I am correct in saying that, following some focus on the issue, the number of signals passed at danger is on the decline, therefore I do not think that train drivers should really come within our sights as contributors to the difficulty. I do not think that there is a culture of train drivers crossing lights perniciously.
Dave Thompson talked about Bunchrew. It was particularly interesting to hear that it took some time to persuade Network Rail that the fault existed. That leads us neatly to the complex mixture of people who are involved. The procurators fiscal, British Transport Police officers, the Office of Rail Regulation and the rail accident investigation branch all have a memorandum of understanding. However, the number of communications that are required in a quadripartite memorandum of understanding is great, with 18 different communication paths between the four organisations, and the complexity increases every time that someone is added to it. There is a high degree of co-ordination, but there is clearly difficulty involved in that.
I very much welcome the review that is currently being undertaken by the rail accident investigation branch, which has a special set of skills in relation to the safety of automatic open level crossings. We will wait and see what it has to say. It will certainly be time to consider then whether there are opportunities for further reviews.
Perhaps we could consider some of the things that happen in the marine and aviation environments. There is an intense focus on safety in aviation. In my flying career, I had to make an emergency landing in a light aircraft because of an equipment failure. It is interesting that, although that was the first failure in that aircraft type around the world—many tens of thousands of that aircraft type were produced—it nonetheless led to a mandatory change in all 20,000 of those aircraft in every country of the world. That was based on a single incident in an aircraft that had not had an incident in 30 years of operation. We should commend to ourselves that approach to safety.
I thank Willie Coffey for lodging the motion. I will continue to engage with members as matters develop. The issue is not subject to party dispute or debate. Railways are the safest part of our transport network, but they are still capable of improvement. We all agree that safety on our railways is vital.
Meeting closed at 17:46.