European and External Relations Committee, 14 Mar 2006

Meeting date: Tuesday, March 14, 2006

Official Report 253KB pdf

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Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill

Good afternoon and welcome to the fourth meeting in 2006 of the European and External Relations Committee. I have received apologies from Margaret Ewing.

Item 1 on the agenda is the legislative consent memorandum to the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill, which is currently passing through the Westminster Parliament. I welcome George Lyon, the Deputy Minister for Finance, Public Service Reform and Parliamentary Business, who is accompanied by Daniel Kleinberg from the Executive's Europe division and Laurence Sullivan from the office of the solicitor to the Scottish Executive.

Members will be aware from our briefing note that the committee has to report to the Parliament on the memorandum, and the timetable for the bill indicates that today's meeting will be our only opportunity to consider it—perhaps we can probe that point. The memorandum is necessary because the bill affects the powers of Scottish ministers to make subordinate legislation implementing European Union obligations. The details are in paragraph 5 of the memorandum and paragraph 2 of the supplementary memorandum. In the view of the Scottish Executive, the effect will be to widen ministers' powers to implement EU obligations and to give greater flexibility. Members will have seen that the Subordinate Legislation Committee reports to us that it is content with those provisions.

However, the Subordinate Legislation Committee discussed an issue that is not covered by the Executive memorandum, relating to clauses 2(4) and 8 of the bill. That committee considered that the issue was outside its remit, but it agreed to send us a copy of the Official Report of its discussion, which has been included in members' papers. The committee might therefore want to consider whether consent for clause 2(4) should be included in the motion that goes before the Parliament.

I invite the minister to address the committee, and then we shall ask questions.

The Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 11 January 2006. It runs to 33 clauses and is predominantly concerned with matters outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. Parts 1 and 2 of the bill deal with the operation of regulatory reform orders and with inspection and enforcement regimes that do not operate in devolved areas in Scotland.

However, there are four provisions in the bill that are subject to the consent of the Scottish Parliament by virtue of the Sewel convention, because they apply to Scotland and are for devolved purposes. Those clauses are found in part 3 of the bill and are aimed at streamlining the way in which European Community law is implemented in domestic legislation. Those matters are technical in nature and, I would expect, uncontroversial in themselves. The committee will have seen the report in which the Subordinate Legislation Committee states that it was content with the proposals.

The effect of the clauses is to confer a new power on Scottish ministers to make a wider range of secondary legislation under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. It is currently possible to make orders in council or regulations under section 2(2), but not any other form of secondary legislation. That has meant that multiple Scottish statutory instruments have previously been required where policies required the use of powers extended by other acts. Clause 26 allows ministers to make orders, schemes or rules under section 2(2) of the 1972 act in addition to orders in council and regulations, so it will be possible to implement an EU obligation by the use of a single Scottish statutory instrument. An amendment—the subject of the supplementary memorandum—allows for the combination of instruments requiring different parliamentary procedures, on the condition that the more onerous course of parliamentary scrutiny is taken.

The clauses will also confer a new power on Scottish ministers to allow for references in domestic legislation to EC instruments to be ambulatory. Ambulatory references would allow references to EC instruments in SSIs to be taken as a reference to an amended version of the EC instrument, so domestic implementing legislation will be able to pick up future amendments to the EC instrument without further subordinate legislation being required. That provision is aimed at situations in which an EC instrument is the subject of subsequent technical amendments. The clauses provide that references in domestic legislation to "Community instruments" will be taken as referring to the EC instrument as so amended, extended or applied. That applies only in relation to legislation made after the coming into force of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill. The current situation is that, when domestic legislation refers to a Community instrument that has been amended or applied by other Community instruments, it is necessary to specify all the instruments that have amended or applied it, which can produce very long references. The new provision is designed to make the drafting of SSIs simpler and therefore more transparent and accessible.

I am, of course, aware of the views that have been expressed about parts 1 and 2 of the bill, as recorded in the committee's briefing paper for today's meeting. Although the Executive does not generally comment on reserved matters, it is worth clarifying that it is a matter for the United Kingdom Parliament to determine what legislative powers it wishes to delegate to UK ministers and the nature of the procedures and level of scrutiny associated with the exercise of such powers.

Because there are circumstances in which the bill could have impacts in Scotland, we have considered the proposals. In principle, it is already the case that regulatory reform orders could amend the Scotland Act 1998—and any other reserved legislation—if prescribed conditions and tests were met. The same will be true for the new orders. Although the conditions and tests for those orders will be more flexible than before, there will be no blank cheque. However, the details of such procedures and scrutiny are not related to the parts of the bill that are the subject of the legislative consent motion and, as reserved matters, they are therefore rightly a matter for the UK Parliament.

I am happy to answer any questions from members, and my officials are here to assist on technical and legal issues.

I note what you said about clause 2(4) in part 1 of the bill, but there is an argument that that clause applies in Scotland and that consent for it should therefore be included in the Executive's motion on the legislative consent memorandum. Can you justify to us the Executive's view on why consent for that provision is not included in the motion?

The ability to make such provision at the margins is well precedented. It ensures that the operation of the law on reserved matters is not unworkable simply because devolved Scots law has not caught up with the changes. It does not open the door to anything more substantial. It mirrors the arrangements under the Sewel convention, and we believe that it restates the status quo; I hope that the committee will be reassured that the provisions only restate the current arrangements under the Sewel convention.

I am struck by the phrase in clause 2(4)

"as the Minister making it considers appropriate."

That sounds like something that, if it is not actually a blank cheque, is not too far away from being one. Where, under the existing arrangements, do we have phrases such as "as the Minister considers appropriate"? You are saying that that is just what we have now. I agree that the words "incidental" and "supplementary" suggest no more than tweaking at the margins, but the decision whether a provision is just supplementary is based on whether the minister considers that appropriate. That seems to create quite a wide power—there is, of course, an exemption under clause 8.

The Sewel convention refers to consequential and incidental provisions, although I will leave it to the lawyer accompanying me to explain his interpretation of your concerns on the width of the arrangement and the use of the words that you quoted.

Clause 2(4) indeed says:

"as the Minister making it considers appropriate."

However, that will be read along with the general prohibition in clause 8, which is on regulatory reform orders not making

"provision which would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament".

Clause 2(4), combined with clause 8, replicates the current position under the Sewel convention, as specified in devolution guidance note 10. That note makes it clear that, when Westminster is legislating in reserved areas, it can also legislate to

"make incidental or consequential changes to Scots law on non-reserved matters".

I should add that, in evidence to a Westminster committee, the relevant Cabinet minister—I think that it was Jim Murphy—confirmed that, if regulatory reform orders make minor, consequential changes to devolved Scots law, the Scottish ministers will be consulted beforehand. There will be engagement between the Scottish ministers and UK ministers before such orders are made.

I appreciate that the Scotland Act 1998 can simply be amended, done away with or revoked by the Westminster Parliament. There is now a perception that it is getting easier to do that—not that that is about to happen, but other Governments that turn up from time to time might do so. Would this be an opportunity to consider at least asking Westminster to exempt the Scotland Act 1998 from the sort of powers that ministers are taking? Does the Executive have any view on that? In other words, it would not just be a matter of having clause 8 and saying that devolved matters will not come into it, but of taking the Scotland Act 1998 out of the frame.

In general, we do not go into the detail of our discussions with the UK Government. However, I can say that there has been close dialogue on the bill, especially around some of the issues that the Scottish Parliament's Subordinate Legislation Committee has raised. Specifically, we have drawn the Government's attention to the view of the Subordinate Legislation Committee. We have been clear on the need for confidence in the security of the devolution settlement. There must be no scope for doubt about that. The UK Government understands that, and there are continuing discussions and correspondence in that regard. I can give the committee the assurance that we are engaged at the highest level to ensure that some of the concerns that have been raised can be addressed.

I appreciate what you are saying. I have a supplementary to Gordon Jackson's question. Obviously, ministers change and personalities change. Devolution will be equally valid 50 or 100 years from now, which is why we must have built-in safeguards in the legislation. While I appreciate what you are saying about good faith, good will and discussion, 50 years down the road there will be entirely different personalities—there might even be entirely different political parties. We have to be clear that what we are doing will serve us all well for all time. I want to know what safeguards exist.

I take your point. I was trying to make it clear that we are trying to engage with our counterparts at the UK level to ensure greater certainty. That is the purpose of such engagement. We are exploring that issue with UK ministers.

I know that Jim Murphy can be persuasive and charming, but hang on a minute—although the bill's long title is clear enough, in addition to the narrower points that come later, the bill starts off with a catch-all that says that it can reform legislation. Clause 1(1) says:

"A Minister of the Crown may by order make provision for either or both of the following purposes—

(a) reforming legislation".

Clause 1(3) says:

"In this Part ‘legislation' means a provision of—

(a) any public general Act or local Act".

Clause 2(4) says:

"An order under section 1 may make such consequential, supplementary, incidental or transitional provision (including provision amending, repealing or replacing any legislation or other provision) as the Minister making it considers appropriate."

I spent 23 years campaigning for a Scottish Parliament and I thought that we held a referendum that entrenched its powers. For a wee bill like this to go through, creating brand new powers whereby any minister of the Crown at Westminster can, whenever they see fit, amend anything and everything—well, I don't think so. We need to express quite strong concerns about this.

On the introduction of the new regulatory reform orders at Westminster, it is for the UK Parliament to discuss how widely those powers should be drawn and the concerns about parliamentary scrutiny. I cannot comment on that. The issue that has been raised at this committee and at the Subordinate Legislation Committee relates to the Scotland Act 1998. We are aware of those concerns, which is why we are engaging with UK counterparts to get greater certainty on that matter.

A secretary of state at Westminster will not have an untrammelled power to make a regulatory reform order. The power will have to be exercised in line with the preconditions in clause 3 of the bill. There are all kinds of circumstances in which a secretary of state would not be able to get over the barriers in clause 3 to make a regulatory reform order.

Clause 3(1) says:

"A Minister may not make an order under section 1 … unless he considers that the conditions in subsection (2), where relevant, are satisfied in relation to that provision."

That is pretty weak stuff. I am sure that none of us would have any hang-ups if the legislation were drafted to match the apparent intention behind it, which is that it is a mechanism that tidies up legislation and avoids wasting time on detailed scrutiny of little cross-references. However, all of us can see that the bill could go much, much further than that. We probably have a duty to stand up and insist that our colleagues at Westminster think about it again.

I seem to remember reading in the transcript of Standing Committee A that Jim Murphy said that the Executive in Scotland had not expressed any concern about the bill. What representations were made to Westminster by Scottish ministers?

Executive ministers have written to UK ministers with regard to the concerns that have been expressed about these matters. Our discussions are on-going, and we will have further discussions on how we might make progress. I hear what members of the committee are saying, which adds weight to the representations that we will be making.

What were the concerns that ministers put in writing?

The concerns were the same as those that have been raised by members today. We have made representations on the issue of regulatory reform orders.

It appears that the Executive is as worried as the committee.

That is indeed a conclusion that we might draw.

When Jim Murphy was being quizzed by Standing Committee A, he cited the renumbering of provisions as one example of an incidental change. Can the minister give us any other examples of where this apparently limited form of modification might be used?

I ask Laurence Sullivan to respond to that question.

The power covers consequential, incidental, supplementary and transitional provisions. Although I could provide a brief description of each of those terms, members will be aware that such provisions deal with minor amendments rather than substantive policy matters. The changes would be consequential on or incidental to provisions made for a reserved purpose, such as—to use Jim Murphy's example—the renumbering in acts of the Scottish Parliament of references to provisions of UK acts that have been amended by a regulatory reform order. The power covers things of that nature rather than substantive policy matters.

Let us consider what happens when such changes happen in reverse. Under paragraph 3 of schedule 4 to the Scotland Act 1998, the Scottish Parliament has power to make modifications that

"(a) are incidental to, or consequential on, provision made … which does not relate to reserved matters".

However, that is provided that such modifications

"(b) do not have a greater effect on reserved matters than is necessary to give effect to the purpose of the provision."

Can the committee be enlightened as to why a similar qualification does not appear in the bill? Would the Scottish Executive like to see such a qualification?

There is not an exact converse between what we can do in reserved areas and what Westminster can do in devolved areas. Westminster is a sovereign Parliament, whereas this Parliament is not. Westminster can legislate on any matter. Under the Sewel convention, we have an agreement that Westminster will not legislate in devolved areas. The exception is that a Westminster provision on reserved matters that has minor, incidental or consequential effects on devolved Scots law can be included in Westminster legislation. The situation is not really converse in the way that Mr Wallace suggested. That is why the wording in clauses 2(4) and 8 does not replicate that in paragraph 3 of schedule 4 to the Scotland Act 1998. The two situations are not opposites in that way.

However, the bill could replicate that wording. We know that, in theory, Westminster can legislate on whatever it likes, despite the convention. However, if the purpose of clause 2(4) is to allow the relevant Westminster minister to make such provisions as he "considers appropriate"—the wording is pretty wide and loose—should not such provisions be required to be subject to both a Sewel motion and, when the situation is the obverse, a qualification similar to that which is provided in the Scotland Act 1998? Is it unreasonable to ask that such a qualification be incorporated in the bill if its purpose is simply to deal with the renumbering of references to provisions?

Under clause 3(2), there are some quite onerous preconditions for regulatory reform orders. Given the obstacles that must be overcome, a secretary of state will not be able to do what he likes through a regulatory reform order but will be required to stay within the specific conditions that are set out in clause 3(2).

The phrasing of clauses 2(4) and 8 replicates the position between the two Administrations that is set out in devolution guidance note 10, which concerns Westminster acts on reserved matters that make incidental and consequential changes to the law on devolved matters. If you are asking why the exact wording of schedule 4 to the Scotland Act 1998 is not reproduced in clauses 2(4) and 8, the answer is that the clauses are phrased in the way that the Westminster department instructed them to be phrased and in the way that parliamentary counsel in Whitehall drafted them. I doubt whether they used schedule 4 to the 1998 act for their drafting style. We do not have input into the exact wording of a Westminster act. However, clauses 2(4) and 8 restate the status quo; they do nothing novel.

Laurence Sullivan has said a couple of times that the words

"consequential, supplementary, incidental or transitional"

just repeat what is in the Sewel convention as laid out in the convention memorandum, with which he is much more familiar than I am. Does the existing provision contain the words

"as the Minister making it considers appropriate"?

Do you mean devolution guidance note 10?

Yes.

The note does not contain those words exactly—it talks about consequential and incidental changes. The bill includes transitional and supplementary provision, which is not significantly different from consequential and incidental provision.

I have no problem with adding the words "supplementary" and "transitional". If we leave aside the additional two words, you have repeatedly told us that the provision in the bill is the same as what appears in existing guidance, but my difficulty is that the guidance does not contain the words

"as the Minister making it considers appropriate."

I do not doubt Jim Murphy's good faith. When he says that the provision will be used for what it is meant to be used for, I am content. However, like Irene Oldfather, I envisage that 50, or even 10, years down the line, a stand-off between Westminster and Holyrood could take place. The people might not like one another, even—I was going to say something else, but perhaps I should not. In a situation of bad faith, in which Westminster and Holyrood are at odds politically, a stand-off has occurred and people are looking for ways not to implement legislation in good faith but to use it to put the boot in, the words

"as the Minister making it considers appropriate"

would worry me—and, I suspect, other members. The minister can say, "That gives me carte blanche. Okay, clause 3 contains a precondition, but I have a policy objective." Clause 2(4) has the potential to be used in bad faith to do something that it was never intended to do. Is that impossible?

That is not impossible, but I must repeat some of what I have said. The preconditions in clause 3 are fairly onerous and, in all sorts of circumstances, the secretary of state will be unable to meet them. Under clause 2(4), the secretary of state will also have to exercise his powers reasonably.

Is it onerous to say that a policy objective cannot be met without legislation and that a measure is proportionate?

That is all subjective.

I do not see how it can be described as onerous for a minister to say that the preconditions are fulfilled.

The precondition in clause 3(2)(e) is that

"the provision does not prevent any person from continuing to exercise any right or freedom which that person might reasonably expect to continue to exercise."

It would be very difficult to use a regulatory reform order to take a function away from someone, because paragraph (e) would operate to prevent that.

I agree that that would be very difficult, but I am trying to prevent anyone from trying.

It would be difficult. If the question is whether it is impossible, the answer is that it is not impossible, but that the preconditions facing a secretary of state under clause 3 are onerous.

I take the point that is being made. We wish to pursue that point with UK ministers.

Did I hear the deputy minister say earlier that Jim Murphy gave an assurance to a Westminster committee that there will be consultation with Scottish ministers before certain provisions in the bill are used?

Jim Murphy gave the assurance to that committee that consultation will take place with the Scottish ministers before a regulatory reform order is made, if the order will have an impact on devolved matters.

We seem to be setting great store by what Jim Murphy said to a Westminster committee. I used to play football with Jim Murphy, so I know that he can be a tricky character at times. Has the Executive made representations to Jim Murphy or anyone else in the UK Government to ensure that such consultation is made statutory so that UK ministers will have a legal obligation to consult the Scottish ministers?

As I said, we do not usually reveal the contents of current discussions with UK ministers. However, I have given an assurance to the committee that we are making representations on some of the matters that the Subordinate Legislation Committee and this committee have raised.

Do you accept that there are many precedents for having statutory consultation before ministers lay an order? Indeed, clause 3 almost lends itself to an amendment in that regard, because it introduces preconditions that must be satisfied before a minister can make a regulatory reform order.

I accept that point. We are in discussions on the matter with UK ministers. I take the points that members have made.

I urge you to seek an appropriate amendment to clause 3.

Minister, do you expect to have answers to members' questions before next week, when the Parliament is expected to decide on the motion?

We hope to be able to report at some stage, although I cannot say whether that will be by next week. We clearly have to wait for responses from the ministers down south.

I, too, have a question about the timetable. The minister has told the committee that he has made representations on the concerns and issues that members have raised. I believe that the Parliament will consider the motion on the bill next week. It will be difficult for us to adhere to that timetable, given that we all have questions that remain unanswered.

I understand that the bill is to be debated further at Westminster on 10 May. I return to the fact that the concerns are being raised at Westminster, which is the body that will ultimately legislate on the matter. Concerns have been raised here and it is up to the committee how it expresses those concerns in its response or report. However, ultimately, action will be needed down south in the UK Parliament if those concerns are to be addressed.

Several of us are saying that we understand the principles and intention and accept the good faith behind the bill. We would like to say that in the debate in the Parliament, but we need clarification on several issues. Laurence Sullivan's point about clause 3(2)(e) was helpful and gave me a little reassurance. However, I return to Gordon Jackson's point that the use of the provisions in bad faith would not be impossible, although it might be unlikely, and to my point that personalities, ministers and Governments change.

That applies to the Scotland Act 1998 as things stand. If a Government that was hostile to the devolution settlement got elected down south and differences of opinion emerged between the parties at Holyrood and the parties at Westminster, it is perfectly possible that it could pass legislation that would dramatically change the Scotland Act 1998.

But such changes would have to be made in primary legislation, which would be open to parliamentary scrutiny. We are talking about changes that, technically, could be made using statutory instruments.

I understand that the debate that is taking place at Westminster on parts 1 and 2 is about the scope of the provisions and the amount of power that it is proposed will be given to ministers. However, those are not matters for me to comment on. The UK Parliament must take decisions on whether what the bill proposes is appropriate.

I invite questions from Phil Gallie and then Jim Wallace.

I will let Jim Wallace go first. Although my question is on the same theme, it is on a slightly different area.

The lawyers are all lining up, so you could be waiting for some time.

That is all right. It is better to see the point out before I raise another one.

It has been helpful to tease out some of the issues. Is it right that if the bill were enacted it would be possible to use it to remove clause 8, which would mean that the UK Parliament could amend Scottish Parliament legislation by statutory instrument?

I think that that is correct.

It gets worse and worse. Carry on, Mr Wallace.

Before the committee produces its report, it would be useful to have a supplementary memorandum that addresses the points that we have raised.

I will certainly consider that suggestion.

For the avoidance of doubt, let me say that I fully understand Laurence Sullivan's point. It is obvious that no one wants separate Sewel motions to be required for every wee legislative tweak when genuinely incidental or trivial matters are being dealt with. We would never be done, and no one wants that. However, I would like you to apply your mind to how we could encourage the Government to strike the right balance—perhaps you are doing that already. Although we do not want to make it impossible for minor changes to be made without considering separate motions, we want some protection to be built in. It might be going too far to ask Westminster not to touch the Scotland Act 1998. I do not know whether you would be able to make efforts in that direction, but it would give us some comfort if better protection were built in for our own legislation.

I understand exactly where the committee is coming from. I will take away and try to make progress on the points that have been made, and I will report to Parliament when the debate on the legislative consent motion is held—if there is to be such a debate.

I come from a totally different angle, although I go along with everything that my wiser legal colleagues have said. One of the bill's objectives is to ease the implementation of EU regulation. I sometimes have problems with the implementation of EU regulation as things stand. The Executive claims that the bill will widen the powers that are available to the Scottish ministers and will give them greater flexibility. That is all very well, but where does Parliament come into it? How will Parliament know what Scottish Executive ministers nod through with their wider powers?

As you well know, every SSI goes to a parliamentary committee. The supplementary legislative consent memorandum makes it clear that when we propose to amalgamate instruments that are subject to different procedures, the amalgamated instrument will be subject to the more onerous procedure—in other words, it will be considered under the affirmative rather than the negative procedure.

We plan to use the bill to simplify the implementation of some EU legislation by statutory instrument, but when we amalgamate negative and affirmative instruments the resulting instrument will be considered under the affirmative procedure, which means that a committee will have to scrutinise it and consent to it. In that way, Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise such instruments.

Thank you; that was an easy one.

I want to draw this part of the discussion to a close. You have obviously picked up that committee members have huge concerns about the bill, and we have picked up from you that the Executive has similar concerns. Irene Oldfather elicited the information that the bill will not be considered further at Westminster until 10 May, so there is no great rush for the legislative consent memorandum to go through the Scottish Parliament next week. Rather than the committee reporting to the Parliament after this meeting to allow the legislative consent motion to be lodged, could you come back to us with further information and perhaps a revised motion that we could consider with the greater knowledge that we will all have as a result of Westminster responding to the Executive's worries?

I will need to double-check what flexibility there is in the Scottish Parliament's timetable to move a possible debate or decision. However, if the committee agrees, officials and I will be happy to provide a supplementary memorandum on issues that have been raised.

We will have a chat about that and decide on our course of action.

I thank the minister for attending the meeting.

What are members' views on what we have heard and on how the committee should proceed? We must produce a committee report.

I want to follow up the point that I made when I cross-examined the minister. Rather than there being gentlemen's agreements, the committee should urge the Executive to seek an amendment that makes consultation with the Scottish ministers statutory.

The minister indicated his willingness to come back to the committee on the matter. Coming back to us after a parliamentary debate on it would be pointless. We should consider the spirit in which he made his offer. Perhaps we could say to the Parliamentary Bureau—or whatever the appropriate body is—that before the Parliament is invited to reach a decision, it would be in the interests of the Parliament and the committee to receive the Executive's response, which should include any feedback that the Executive receives following the representations that it has clearly made to Westminster.

I support Jim Wallace. That is the best way forward. We should have a debate in the Parliament when what we are debating is much clearer, otherwise we will go to the chamber next week with many unanswered questions. It would be better if the minister came back to the committee. As Jim Wallace said, he indicated his willingness to do so if the bureau could timetable matters appropriately.

I cannot see why clause 2(4) could not be included in the Sewel motion. For the sake of argument, let us say that the lawyer who gave evidence is right, and clause 2(4) is totally harmless and what will be done in Scottish legislation will simply be what is being done under the existing convention. I am sure that that is true. Nevertheless, there would be a provision in an act of Parliament that would affect Scottish legislation. Whether or not clause 2(4) would affect Scottish legislation in a trivial or non-consequential way, it would affect it and it should, therefore, logically be included in the Sewel motion. To say that the substance of the proposal is what is already done informally seems to be a red herring.

I think that we agree that the stated objective of the bill is fine, and that the stated intentions of the Minister of State at the Cabinet Office, Jim Murphy, are commendable, but the trouble is that the bill goes much further than those and it would create powers that are contrary to the basic principles of devolution and the Parliament. We have a strong case for going back to the Executive and our colleagues at Westminster and asking them to think again and to legislate for what they intend to do, rather than for something that could be the basis for something much bigger but which no one intends will happen.

I am picking up that the committee is not happy to issue a report that will allow the legislative consent motion to go to the Parliament next week. Instead, it wants the minister or the Executive to come back with further information about its discussions with Westminster and to address the points that were made today, particularly the additional point that Dennis Canavan made a moment ago about looking for safeguards to be put in legislation. I think that I am right in saying that that is a separate issue from those that are raised by the legislative consent memorandum.

Gordon Jackson also made the point that the motion should address the implications of clause 2(4).

I do not see why not.

Should it also address clause 8?

Yes.

Is it agreed that the terms of the discussion that we have had since the minister left the meeting will apply?

Members indicated agreement.

That means that the debate will not take place in the Parliament next week.

We have no chamber and no debate. What are we going to do?

We will just all go home.

It solves a problem.

There is lots of panicky talk going on here. Do the clerks need us to clarify anything?

No, it is reasonably clear.

The clerks are clear, so we will draft an appropriate letter to the Executive to reiterate the committee's points. Does the committee also want to write to Westminster or the chair of the standing committee that is dealing with the bill, or are members happy for the Executive to come back with its response?

I am sure that the Executive will do that anyway.

Okay.

That was a long session. Daniel Kleinberg is still waiting for the next item.