Official Report 198KB pdf
Okay, colleagues, the next item on the agenda is the "Brussels Bulletin". I am pleased that Ian Duncan, who is just grabbing a cup of coffee, is here to talk about it, after which members may make points. Do you want to draw any particular points to our attention, Ian? The bulletin is comprehensive.
It is very detailed.
Do we have the outcome of that referendum?
Yes. The outcome was broadly supportive of independence, but the turnout was abysmal. It was said that the real measure of the referendum's success would be the turnout, which had to be more than 40 per cent in order for the referendum to be considered successful, but the turnout was lower than 30 per cent. It was an informal referendum, not an official referendum sanctioned by the Spanish state, but the politicians are keen to learn lessons from it.
Okay. Thank you very much. You made a number of interesting points.
It is hard to know what lessons politicians can learn from the referendum in Catalonia. My understanding is that it was absolutely a rigged referendum. Indeed, it was not even a referendum. I understand that the organisers took the decision to hold it in places where they thought that they would get a positive response.
The referendum was interesting by virtue of the nature of the way in which it was conducted—you are right.
Absolutely. It was pretty blatant.
There were aspects of selectivity that were questionable.
It sounds as if it was not quite a referendum.
I know someone who was over there as an international observer. He paid his own way; it did not cost anyone any money—apart from him, unfortunately. He thought that it was very interesting. I can bring an unofficial report to the committee, convener.
I do not think so. To be honest, when Ian Duncan said that it was a referendum, I thought that it was an official referendum.
They happen every other year. Catalunya does them all the time. Obviously, coming from the party that is in government in Scotland, I am interested in the fact that the referendum was apparently unofficial; I am also interested in how it was funded and whether it was funded at a local level. From the feedback that I have had, it was not done as selectively as some folk make out. I am looking forward to having a wee look at it. I think that the turnout was more than 40 per cent in some regions; it may have been less in others. I do not know about the median figure that was given, but I can certainly confirm what it was.
Do you mean the group that is concerned with agriculture and the CAP?
Yes.
It has 22 members, which is why it is called the 22 group.
How is the group organised?
The best description is that France invited its pals.
Is it paid for out of European funds?
No. It is an entirely informal group. France is looking to secure the strongest lobbying position that it can and is trying to find member states that are likely to support its cause.
I was just interested in whether the group had funding.
We will take a careful note of the point.
I am happy to follow up on it.
I am very interested in finding out what is happening in Catalunya. It sounds as if we can learn some interesting lessons. If Sandra White wants to provide a paper—officially or unofficially—I would be very interested to see it.
A non-paper allows the authors—usually the Commission—to put together a position without necessarily having to defend it as an official line. It is a way of putting out into the open issues for discussion without the ideas being directly attributable to the author. It is a device that is commonly used to stage a debate, if you like, and not as a definitive statement.
That is useful.
I am interested in Ian Duncan's view on Iceland and the fisheries negotiations—indeed, I raise the point for Ted Brocklebank, who is absent. I am also interested in the so-called 22 group. Is it a significant development? The UK is not one of the 22 members; it is one of the other five. Is that a difficulty for us?
France would claim that it did not deliberately not invite the UK—that is its position. Apparently, the UK was invited after lunch in an observer capacity—I am not sure whether to observe lunch or some policy discussions. At the moment, France is very keen. As the single largest recipient of CAP funds, it will be the single largest loser if there is any substantial reform. It is marshalling arguments as to why the CAP needs to be maintained, which include arguments about food security and the need to deal with climate change and some of its manifestations. France is keen to put forward the boldest argument that it can, fully aware that it may be whittled back in the negotiations. The more bold the argument, the less whittling will take place. The UK will be keen to be aware of what is going on and to participate in that, as its view—that the CAP requires fundamental reform—is nearly the diametric opposite of the French view.
The vast majority of member states are in the 22 group, if my sums are right.
The strange reality is the discrepancy between France, which is a major recipient, and the new member states to the east, which would like to be major recipients but seem to have got on the bus just as it is approaching its terminus, which is unfortunate for them. You might recall that, when those countries joined the EU, they were excluded from the full support of the CAP with the interesting argument that they would not really understand how to spend the money. I thought that that was a strangely patronising view; nonetheless, that was what happened, and that argument allowed France to retain the lion's share. So, although France is an established agricultural state, it manages to retain more funding for its agriculture than would, for example, Poland, the Czech Republic or the other eastern states.
On the common agricultural policy, it is interesting that we embarked on this blue-skies-thinking EU budget review because, the last time, France got away with a deal such as everyone said it would never get again. France agreed that it would not get that again—that it was a one-off, once-only deal and that there would be a proper review of the EU budget. It is interesting that France seems to be changing its mind on that. I think that we will watch this space.
Members indicated agreement.
No one is happy with the deadline. It seems that President Barroso was concerned that it might have appeared that he was not doing anything when there was a vacant period in which something could be done—so that was the something. It is not clear why they chose the deadline of 15 January, given that the new Commission may not be in place until 1 February. I cannot believe that this could ever be anything other than an interim step toward greater consultation with all the affected parties; otherwise it turns on its head the way in which the EU has been moving, which is towards greater consultation and more inclusion and discussion.
That is helpful to know. We should look to programme a meeting on that early in the new year. Do members agree?
You said that the Welsh Assembly had sent a letter. Has our Government sent a letter? I would ask that it does.
The European and External Affairs Committee of the Welsh Assembly sent the letter. It was in a position to do that because it had a meeting on 1 December, just after completing a report on cohesion. It was therefore well placed to say "These are our findings and we're not very happy with the way you're conducting this inquiry." That committee was therefore a bit ahead of us, which is why I suggest that we take our role in this matter quite seriously and look to programme in an evidence session in the new year. I would hope that, as a result of that, we could contribute something to the Scottish Government, the UK Government and the Commission, if members agree.
Members indicated agreement.
I thank Ian Duncan. Do members agree to note the contents of the report and forward it to the relevant subject committees?
Members indicated agreement.
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