Subordinate Legislation Committee

Meeting date: Tuesday, May 15, 2012

Official Report 397KB pdf

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Social Care (Self-directed Support) (Scotland) Bill: Stage 1

Agenda item 3 provides an opportunity for members to ask Scottish Government officials questions on the delegated powers in the bill. I welcome the officials: Bette Francis, who is head of the self-directed support team; Craig Flunkert, who is the self-directed support bill team leader; and Chris Birt, who is from the Scottish Government legal directorate. Thank you for waiting patiently.

Before I start the questions, it is worth putting it on the record that committee members have received and considered a submission from the national carers organisations. It is fair to say that although we understand the substance of their comments, we do not believe that they necessarily relate directly to the subordinate legislation that we are looking at—a point that officials may be in a position to comment on as we go.

It is also worth putting it on the record that we received a submission from the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations on the same matter.

I invite Bette Francis to make an opening statement.

Thank you for allowing us to give the committee some information on the development of the definition of self-directed support in Scotland and the background to the four options for self-directed support in section 3 of the bill.

Since 1996, legislation has provided for direct payments as a mechanism whereby eligible people can receive a cash payment to purchase their own care. Initially a power for councils to use when they considered it appropriate, the duty to offer direct payments was introduced in 2003. Over that period, eligibility for direct payments was also extended to wider client groups.

Despite the shift to a duty to offer direct payments and wider eligibility for them, the uptake of direct payments remained variable across Scotland and was lower than in England. A review of the reasons for that low uptake included scrutiny by the Scottish Parliament’s Health Committee in 2006.

The policy intention behind direct payments was to provide flexible and responsive support by allowing individuals to have more control over tailoring support to their needs. In practice, local authorities implemented direct payments in different ways. At worst, rigid criteria on the use and governance of direct payments have permitted little, if any, flexibility. At best, direct payments have empowered citizens to shape their support around their lives and to live independently. When they work, direct payments contribute significantly to the improvement of individual outcomes.

Around 2009, personalisation became a term that was used in health and social care policy to describe that drive to give citizens power to shape the care and support that they want. Building on that positive experience of direct payments, the personalisation agenda has aims of empowerment, choice and control. A 2010 literature review commissioned by the Scottish Government highlighted confusion about the use of terminology in this area of policy and a lack of clarity about the existing legislation at that time.

The definition of self-directed support—in the national strategy and in this bill—has been developed through significant consultation and engagement with a range of interested parties and individuals. The Scottish Government’s first consultation on potential new legislation sought views on making direct payments the default position for social care. There was significant opposition to that proposal. The main concern was that it would not achieve the goal of providing people with real choice. The Scottish Government therefore developed the bill with choice as the default position. Option 3 in the bill—for services to be allocated by councils—has in effect been the default position until now.

Option 2 in the bill enables individuals to select their provider and to have more control over their support, without taking responsibility for handling the cash payment. It addresses concerns that were highlighted in evidence about barriers to direct payments for those who do not wish to and are not in a position to handle the additional responsibility of commissioning their own support.

Option 2 extends the options for those who want more say in the provision of services locally. In recent years, some retendering activity has resulted in people who might not have wanted to take a direct payment opting for that route to secure support with the provider of their choice. The approach is sometimes referred to as an individual service fund.

Option 2 is not widely available. However, as with direct payments in the past, the option has evolved from small pockets of innovative practice, which in this case providers have mostly led. As in the past, legislation is catching up with innovation in practice, to make an option available to everyone who could benefit from it.

The bill aims to provide a statutory framework for the current and future evolution of personalised approaches to service delivery. As the bill is enabling legislation, the intention of its additional powers is to respond to new and innovative approaches that might suggest further or amended options for the bill.

Self-directed support has evolved and will continue to evolve as public services take account of the aspirations, capabilities and skills of people who use them. The Scottish Government believes that the four options in the bill are defined broadly enough to deliver flexibility, but history suggests that unforeseen restrictions on delivery might occur. The bill has therefore been developed to allow sufficient flexibility to respond to changing circumstances.

The involvement of a broad range of interests in developing the bill will continue through a group that has been convened—it will begin its work tomorrow—to help to develop draft statutory guidance and the regulations that will need to be in place for the bill’s enactment.

Thank you for that substantial discussion of the bill’s purpose. We have little disagreement with that, although policy is not our remit.

What will follow is quite a large number of questions on the detail. I will give you the headline. We understand the basic principles, which are pretty clearly laid out, and we understand the need for flexibility. Most of the questions will be along the lines of asking why the building in of flexibility through subordinate legislation is so complicated. I think that we will often suggest that there is conflict between some of the provisions that might not be helpful.

After that brief introduction, I will let Chic Brodie lead the way.

Indeed, we shall do what you suggest, convener. I am sure that the group that will be convened will look after customer interests and financial interests as appropriate.

Section 12 provides the power to modify section 3, which contains the options for self-directed support. In what future circumstances and for what purposes does the Scottish Government envisage that power being exercised?

As you point out, section 12 provides the power to modify the options, of which the bill presents four. I return to what Bette Francis said—ensuring flexibility and future proofing the range of options that is available to individuals were the main reasons behind including in the bill the power to modify the options.

As Bette Francis explained, the power reflects the experience of direct payments. The feeling in some quarters was that narrow definitions of the direct payments option could lead to narrow interpretations of what could be done. During the consultation on the bill, there was quite a lot of debate about how to define each option. That experience is the main reason why the power was taken.

I will draw out an example for the future. Option 2 is

“The selection of support by the supported person and the making of arrangements for the provision of it by the local authority on behalf of the supported person.”

That describes an individual directing their support, but not necessarily taking the cash payment. In the consultation period, a number of consultees pushed for the description of the financial resource that someone would direct to be somewhere in that definition. Other consultees did not think that that was a big issue. There are certainly no plans to amend any of the options in the immediate term if the bill gets through the parliamentary process successfully. However, if in future a consensus built around including the financial resource in the description of the option, the bill could be amended by way of regulation. Such amendment would not justify an entirely new bill, given limited parliamentary time—

15:15

We are talking about options. What other options have been considered and discarded, not necessarily in relation to financial resource?

Do you mean other options for people to direct their support?

Yes.

There was consultation and the four broad options that people came up with probably accurately reflect the options that the sector wants, as Bette Francis said. It is difficult for me to predict a fifth option that might appear. In some cases—

I am surprised. Did the consultation come up with only four options that were worth considering, or were there other options?

There were no other options. When the discussion about defining self-directed support began, the direct payments mechanism was the only option. Option 2 is a new mechanism, which allows people to have some control. The initial policy discussion was about whether there could be options other than direct or third-party payments.

Section 12 will give the Scottish ministers the power to modify section 3 in any way that they see fit, which could include adding options. You carried out a consultation. Why is it necessary to give ministers such a broad power to achieve the Government’s aims?

As Bette Francis and Craig Flunkert explained, it is impossible for us to foresee additional options that might arise in future. In the not-too-distant past, individual service funds had not been contemplated. The power in section 12 could have been drawn differently. For example, it could have allowed ministers to vary, remove or add an option. What it does is allow ministers to modify section 3.

The power to modify is bound by the terms of section 3; we can modify only what is in section 3, which is four options and the definitions that go with them. The power is wide, but a narrower drawing up of it would have amounted to the same thing.

I was not talking about narrowing the power per se. That is why I asked how many options had been considered as part of the consultation.

Was consideration given to limiting the scope of the power that ministers will have? If so, why was that not considered appropriate?

As we said, the power in section 12 reflects the policy intention, which is to provide flexibility to move with social work practice in future.

The power to modify section 3 by regulation will be subject to the affirmative procedure. Why does the Government think that that will provide a sufficient level of scrutiny?

It is a similar story to the one that you heard from the bill team for the Local Government Finance (Unoccupied Properties etc) (Scotland) Bill. The options had been widely consulted on prior to the bill’s introduction. I assure you that there are no plans to use the power at present, and that any making of regulations would be done with extensive consultation with stakeholders.

The affirmative procedure means that the Government will not be able to do anything if the Parliament does not approve of the proposal. We think that that is the appropriate level of scrutiny.

Okay. I will move on. Given that the right to choose one of the four options in section 3 is fundamental to the bill, does the Government accept that, regardless of this Administration’s intentions, the power in section 12 could be used in future substantially to restrict the effectiveness of that choice?

Would you clarify exactly what you are asking? Are you asking whether ministers would ever use that power to restrict or remove options?

Yes.

There is certainly no expectation that that is how the power would ever be used. The principle and fundamental policy purpose of the primary legislation is to provide a range of options and choices to individuals, and it would be against that policy intent to use that power to restrict. The modification is really around modifying technical descriptions of options or, if new options came about, to add to them.

I do not think that the matter is very technical; if it were, I would not understand it. What the four options are looks very clear. At heart, the issue is whether the power in section 12 could be used in future substantially to restrict the effectiveness of the choice.

That would certainly not attract any stakeholder support whatsoever, and such a move would be very difficult to justify without sufficient evidence that all the parties concerned felt that it was necessary.

Okay.

I would like to come in on that, to support what has been said. Forgive me—this is not a criticism. We respect and do not have a problem with what the current Government wants to do, of course, but it will be a Government only for the next four years. In principle, we are putting things on the statute book for ever, so part of our remit is to consider what a future Government might be empowered to do and whether it is appropriate to give it that power. The fundamental question is therefore whether the variability that is inherent in the provision is consistent with the basic purpose of the bill. Should it be possible to get rid of the options by delegated legislation?

Bette Francis and I have answered from a policy perspective in respect of what the current Government would do, but there may well be a question for Chris Birt on how wide the legal effect of the power is.

Obviously, there are different ways of saying the same thing, and we are open to suggestions about how the power might be drawn more narrowly to achieve the aim. However, if, say, the power were drawn so that options could be added or removed, all the options could just be removed. It is simply theoretical. The Parliament could refuse to agree to regulations under the affirmative procedure. If a future Government with different intentions with regard to the use of the power rejected the original intentions, the Parliament could refuse it.

Let us move from the theoretical to the practical. What consideration has been given to safeguards to protect the fundamental principles of the bill? We have talked about the affirmative procedure, but has any consideration been given to the use of a super-affirmative procedure—for example, to ensure that there is an opportunity for detailed consultation on draft regulations?

As I have already said, we can assure members that there will be detailed consultation on any provisions, and that will follow the affirmative procedure. The super-affirmative procedure is ill defined as it is, but we understand that it involves detailed consultation followed by the affirmative procedure. As we have said, we can assure members that that will take place.

Okay. I have a final question. Section 12(b) of the bill confers a specific consequential power to modify sections 4, 6 and 7 when using section 12(a) to modify section 3. Section 20(1)(b) confers a general bolt-on power to make ancillary provision in any regulations that are made under the bill. Does the section 12(b) power exclude the possibility of using the bolt-on power in conjunction with the section 12(a) power?

No, I would not say so. The specific power in section 12(b) would allow us to make any consequential changes to the bill. We thought that it was preferable to have an explicit power to do that rather than rely on the general power in section 20(1)(b).

Okay. Thank you.

Why, then, is it considered necessary to be able to exercise both the power in section 12(b) and that in section 20(1)(b) in conjunction with section 12(a)? In what circumstances do you envisage the Scottish ministers needing such extensive powers to make ancillary provision in connection with a modification to section 3?

It is not possible to speculate without knowing the terms of any changes to section 3. As I said, the specific power in section 12(b) would be used to amend the bill consequentially. If another amendment were needed to a further enactment—say, regulations regarding direct payments—we could use the power in section 20(1)(b) to make a consequential change there. However, we cannot speculate without knowing—

The specifics.

Yes.

Okay. Thank you for that.

Let us move to section 13 and questions from John Pentland.

You will be pleased to know that I have only one question to ask about section 13. As you will be aware, section 13 allows the Scottish ministers to make further provision via subordinate legislation about direct payments. The negative procedure would appear to be appropriate in respect of administrative and technical provision, but as section 13(2)(a) and section 13(2)(b) might be operated substantially to restrict access to direct payments, provision under those paragraphs seems to be substantive rather than technical. Why does the Scottish Government consider that the negative procedure provides a sufficient level of parliamentary scrutiny in making such regulations?

Section 12B of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 is where the current direct payments primary statute sits, and the regulation-making powers attached to that are currently subject to negative procedure. That includes the power to restrict access to direct payments for specific persons and in specific circumstances. So there is precedent and the bill would carry on those same regulations, albeit perhaps in a different form and following consultation.

I invite Chris Birt to add to the general reasoning about what provisions are appropriately subject to negative and affirmative procedures, although I think that we have stated that in relation to the previous provisions, too.

I simply reiterate what Craig Flunkert said. If the committee considers it more appropriate for regulations made under these provisions to be subject to affirmative procedure, we will consider that in due course. As we have said, we have simply reflected what was in the previous statute.

Okay.

Thank you very much. We move on to section 21. The questioning will be led by Mike MacKenzie.

Given the overlap between the power in section 21 and that in section 13(2)(b), why are both powers considered to be necessary? Does section 13(2)(b) confer power to do anything that could not otherwise be done under section 21?

The potential application of section 21 cuts across all the options for SDS. In relation to option 2 in the bill, which is not the direct payments option, there have been discussions with consultees around some of the recipients of social care who are at the outside edges of those whom social work departments support—people whose need arises from homelessness, drug addiction or alcohol addiction. The sector may not be ready to respond to the increased flexibility of option 2—the individual service fund option—in the short term, at least. Therefore, it was felt that a power to modify the application of the act was necessary as well as the DP option. Chris Birt may want to add something on the technical legal background.

Section 21 is intended to be used, as it says, to disapply section 4(2) or section 7(2)—that is, in essence, the choice. Any way in which section 21 was used would say, “You have no choice. In these circumstances, the local authority will provide the services as the local authority sees fit.” However, sections 13(2)(a) and 13(2)(b) would be able to restrict the choice and to say, “You have a choice, but your choice is between options 2 and 3 and option 4”—in as far as you could mix options 2 and 3—whereas section 21 would say, “You don’t have a choice.” That is the distinction. Is your question simply whether you could do what sections 13(2)(a) or 13(2)(b) would do by use of section 21?

15:30

Yes. If both powers are thought to be necessary, what criteria will be applied to determine which of the two powers ought to be exercised in any given case?

One of the bill’s principal aims, along with increasing flexibility and so on, was to consolidate the law on direct payments and bring it all into one place. Practice has diverged from how the Government wanted direct payments to operate and we thought that one of the reasons for the divergence was the complexity of section 12(B) of the 1968 act and regulations made under it. Our intention is to bring direct payment regulations into one place so that where services or people were ineligible for direct payments, that would be stated in the regulations that deal with all other matters regarding direct payments.

We foresee the section 21 powers being used separately and only for the purposes of taking away the choice. We would not intend at all to use section 21 to relate to a particular option; it is about removing the options.

Thank you. The committee was concerned to note from the delegated powers memorandum that when the bill was introduced the Scottish Government did not know what the power in section 21 would be used for. Have the divergent views mentioned in paragraph 24 of the delegated powers memorandum been reconciled? Can you advise the committee as to the circumstances in which the power in section 21 might be exercised? I appreciate that you have partially answered that.

It might be useful to provide another example. Paragraph 24 of the delegated powers memorandum refers to the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. We should bear it in mind that the provision of the four options applies not only to adult support under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 but to support provided to children under section 22 of the 1995 act. That section is quite wide-ranging in terms of council powers to provide support to children in need and I believe that it links to later sections in the 1995 act that are much more about child protection and intervention. That is probably a good example of where a regulation may potentially be introduced under section 21 to clarify for practitioners that the provision of the other three options would not apply where the support that has been provided is about intervening and protecting a child. In other words, there is a restrictive aspect to it, rather than a choice and flexibility aspect.

That example of how section 21 may be used in practice has come up in discussion with stakeholders, and the Association of Directors of Social Work mentioned it recently in evidence to the lead committee.

I clarify that section 22 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 is similar to section 12 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 because it is a power to promote the general welfare of children in a local authority’s area. We are not experts in the child law aspects but, as far as we understand it, that is often used for the softer edge of child protection services, although not the compulsory elements of the 1995 act.

I have one further question. I am still a bit confused, but if the power was exercised to disapply sections 4(2) or 7(2), to what extent would the other provisions in those sections continue to apply? In particular, would sections 7(3) and 7(4) continue to apply, or is it your view that they would be disapplied by necessary implication?

Essentially, yes. If your choice was removed, then clearly the other provisions in the section that relate to that choice would be disapplied.

Section 6 makes, in respect of adult carers, similar provision to that in sections 4 and 7, but the choice for carers in section 6(2) has been exempted from the scope of the power in section 21(1). The DPM states that it would not be appropriate for the power to apply to the choice in section 6(2). Why does the Scottish Government consider the power in section 21(1) to be appropriate in respect of adults and children who receive support, but not in respect of adult carers?

That comes back to the point that I made about the breadth of section 12 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and section 22 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, which relate to the power to promote social welfare. That is an enormously wide power that affects a range of people—not just disabled people, who often become the focus of the power. Our new power to provide support for carers is a limited power that relates to people who provide care. We have already said that it is difficult to foresee our limiting the choice in sections 4 and 7, but we can envisage situations in which that would happen. However, we could not come up with a justification for using the section 21(1) power in relation to section 6, so it was intentionally excluded.

To clarify, does that mean that adult carers will not lose out in any way under the proposals?

The specific intention is not to restrict carers. By dint of the fact that they provide care, they probably are not subject to some of the more restrictive levels of support or protection to which other people are subject.

I return to the examples that I gave about the use of section 7. We could all foresee when an element of choice would not be appropriate in a child protection situation, but when would a choice not be appropriate in giving support to a carer?

In what circumstances might the supplementary power in section 21(2)(b) be exercised to modify or disapply any other section of the bill in consequence of a disapplication of section 4(2) or 7(2)?

Chris?

You got the easy one, Mr Birt.

The power would be used for, for example, the provisions on providing information. I forget which section those are in—I think it is section 8. It would be sensible to disapply local authorities’ duty to provide information on choices if somebody did not have a choice. That is one example.

Would the aim be to avoid giving people unnecessary information?

Yes.

Do you accept that, on the face of it, the supplementary power could be exercised to disapply section 6(2) in consequence of a disapplication of sections 4(2) or 7(2)?

I think that we are leaving that one to you again, Chris.

It appears that way. [Laughter.]

It certainly has not crossed my mind that that would be the intention. It would be for Parliament to decide, but that would clearly be a strange use of the power.

Regulations that are made under section 21 will be subject to affirmative procedure. As we have asked previously, why does the Scottish Government consider that that procedure provides sufficient scrutiny?

The answer is the same as it was previously.

It is a broken record, I am afraid.

The right to choose one of the options that are specified in section 3 is fundamental to the bill, and that right is found in sections 4(2) and 7(2). What consideration has been given to safeguards that would protect the fundamental principles of the bill from being circumvented by exercise of the delegated power in section 21(1)? In particular, has any consideration been given to the use of super-affirmative procedure? I think that the response will be the same as previously.

Yes, it is.

Thank you. That makes the point that the same question has been asked in relation to different sections. We respect the fact that very rarely will there be different answers.

We will continue with the various ancillary and transitional provisions, on which subject we are in the hands of Michael McMahon.

My question is almost the same as those that were asked by Chic Brodie about how sections 12 and 21 relate to section 20(1)(b), but it comes at the matter from the other direction. The bill contains only three substantive delegated powers. We have already mentioned sections 12 and 21 and the ancillary powers and provisions in sections 24 and 25, but what is the purpose of having another section that gives powers to ministers? Is it just a belt-and-braces thing? Is it overkill? Is it a power grab?

You can choose the terminology.

It is a power grab. [Laughter.]

Thanks very much for that. At least you are being honest about it.

The powers in section 20(1)(b) are parasitic, or are a bolt-on, to the other regulation-making powers and are consequential on the regulations. However, sections 24 and 25 provide an order-making power that is to be used separately. As we have said in the delegated powers memorandum, we foresee section 24 being used to make consequential amendments on the repeal of section 12B of the 1968 act, which is referred to in a number of other enactments.

I suppose that we are simply seeking clarity; I am sure that you want the bill to be as clear as possible. The point is that even though all those powers are separate, they will still interact with each other. Can the powers in section 20(1)(b) be exercised concurrently or do they have to be exercised separately? Can you give us some clarity about how they sit together?

I cannot speak for every other bill, but the provision in this bill seems to me to be a reasonably common way of putting together ancillary powers. Certain ancillary powers are made to go with other regulation-making powers to ensure that there are not two sets of regulations doing two connected things. We could, for example, make provisions on direct payments under the section 13 power and then set out amendments consequential to those provisions in the same instrument. However, if we have to use the power in section 24, we will need a set of regulations and an order; in such a situation, I would see no benefit to the statute book in having more than one instrument.

I know that you responded light-heartedly to my earlier question and I realise that the provision might not necessarily be a power grab. However, under sections 24(2) and 25(2), the power can be used to “modify any enactment”. That reference seems to be quite wide-ranging. Does it include powers to modify the bill itself, or does that assessment go too far?

I know that on a number of occasions the committee has considered the use of the phrase “including this bill” after the phrase “any enactment” but it is not really appropriate for me to share with the committee my views on what that might or might not mean. The phrase “any enactment” in section 24(2) is intended to refer to primary and subordinate legislation, which means that we would consequentially amend any references to section 12B of the 1968 act in both primary and subordinate legislation.

So, that is a possible yes. You could modify the bill with the provision.

It is a possible maybe.

We have no intention of modifying the bill. That is as much as I can say.

Convener—

Forgive me, Chic; I will come in briefly, here. With respect, the Government’s intentions are completely irrelevant because the statute will, in principle, be around for our grandchildren. The question to which I do not think we have had an answer is whether the provision will enable regulations to modify the bill when enacted. However, if you are not sure—

As I see it, I might be sneaking into the territory of giving legal advice to the committee, which is not appropriate. If the committee wants to consider the matter in its report, we will be happy to respond to it in due course.

In that case, I make the obvious suggestion that if that is the intention and if such an intention is within the Government’s grasp, it could simply say “amend this and any other enactment” or whatever wording would be appropriate.

As I have said, there is no intention that the power will be used.

In the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Bill that phrase was used in order to get the clarity that we are talking about. Could that not also be used in this bill?

As I have said, there is no intention that the power will be used to amend the bill as enacted, so those words are not necessary.

15:45

Can I ask one more question?

Yes—unless Chic Brodie has a specific follow-up.

If Chris Birt believes that, I am not sure that I understand the restriction on his giving us advice. If you do not envisage the power being used, why is it in the bill?

The power to modify any enactment will enable us to modify enactments, other than the bill as enacted, that we require to amend.

So, you do see the power being used.

Yes—we see it being used to amend enactments other than the bill as enacted.

I want to get this pinned down. Would it not be better to do what has been done in the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Bill and clarify the position in the bill?

As I said, we do not need such wording, but we will consider the matter.

You will watch out for what we say in our report, so that you can consider it.

Absolutely.

I want to come back to the issue that we raised with regard to sections 20(1)(b), 12(b) and 21(2)(b). It seems to me that this is far worse than any exam that any of you will ever have had to take. I sympathise. As you will be well aware, the powers in those sections are all about modification. I guess that the question that worries our advisers, and which still worries me, is whether you are happy that those three powers can interact in a way that is not potentially obstructive.

I would be lying if I did not say yes. It would perhaps be easier for us to consider in more detail, once we receive your report, the exact problems that you foresee with the interaction of the powers. As I have explained, the powers in sections 21(2)(b) and 12(b) are specifically for amending the bill as enacted. They are there because we think we need those specific powers. We would prefer not to rely on general powers.

Okay. Thank you. I hear what you say. We have no desire to trip anyone up; we just want to ensure, as you do, that we get legislation that works and which will survive the courts and any misdemeanours on the way.

I appreciate that.

I am being pointed in the direction of what is a standard question, but one that has not been asked in this connection. Although an order that is made under section 25 may modify any enactment, the negative procedure will apply—if I read the provision right—even when textual amendments are made to primary legislation. That is not consistent with general practice; there is a recognition that textual amendments to primary legislation should be made by way of affirmative procedure. We have heard that many times from other officials. Is that an issue that you considered?

It is. I had thought that it was general practice that such revisions would be subject only to negative procedure, because I cannot think of ways in which transitional or transitory provisions would modify the text of primary legislation. We intend to use the power in question for the continuation of direct payments that are made under the existing system, which we want people to continue to be able to use.

We consider that the negative procedure is the correct procedure to use. If the committee wishes us to reconsider the matter, we can deal with that in due course.

Thank you for that answer. I understand that there is no expectation that such an order will be used to alter the text of primary legislation. It is quite likely that the committee would like to stick to the principle that we have enunciated on several occasions—that affirmative procedure should be used when the text of primary legislation is to be altered—even should that turn out to be irrelevant, as we accept is the case here.

As colleagues have no further questions for this long-suffering panel, I thank the witnesses for their excellent answers to some extraordinarily detailed questions, for which I am very grateful. I suspend the meeting briefly to allow our visitors to escape.

15:49 Meeting suspended.

15:51 On resuming—