Official Report 166KB pdf
Good morning. I welcome everyone to this meeting of the Transport and the Environment Committee. I have received apologies from Adam Ingram. Des McNulty is on a train and will join us when it comes in. I welcome Bruce Crawford, who has taken part in many of our deliberations on the water industry.
Good morning. I noted the convener's interesting comment in his introduction that the committee had had a very successful meeting in Aberdeen. The inference to be drawn from that is that I have to try to maintain that high standard.
Is he a warm and smiling assassin? We will find out soon.
What is the time scale for the competition element to the industry? Why was the licensing scheme, which was discussed in the Executive's most recent consultation, not included in the bill? Does the Executive intend to license Scottish Water as well as new entrants for activities that concern the provision of water and sewerage services to customers when the market is opened up to competition?
I make the fundamental point that I took the committee's report seriously. I read it with great interest and bore it in mind. The committee pointed out that the issue was the creation of Scottish Water as a matter of principle and the question whether we should introduce in parallel the licensing regime to deal with the competitive elements. The strong recommendation of the committee was that we should separate those two matters. I regarded that as sound and that is the decision that I have taken. A simple water industry bill—I choose my words carefully—is before the committee.
In essence, you have set up a water company that looks like a private company, in many ways acts like a private company, has many of the powers of a private company yet does not have private investors and has its risks borne by the taxpayer. What is the difference between that company and a fully privatised company and why did you not go the full way?
Scottish Water is fundamentally a publicly owned company. The Executive and I have a strong view that even when we have the competition element, the use of the network is a quasi-monopoly. I am opposed to private monopolies—I do not see any benefit to them. The public has an interest in dealing with monopoly provision. There are solid, sound and fundamental reasons why water should remain in public hands.
Do you believe that a public monopoly is likely to deliver cheaper water more efficiently than a private one?
Where there is a monopoly, there is potential for abuse. It is right that the public, through Parliament, should control that abuse. Abuse is a potential risk. I do not believe that the private sector should exploit a monopoly for the benefit of a narrow range of shareholders. I want the people of Scotland to receive a high-quality service at the most competitive price.
What will be done to ensure that investment does not decline after the reorganisation? It has been suggested that such a decline happened after the previous reorganisation of the industry. Will Scottish Water have the power to borrow more money than the combined amount that is available to the three authorities?
There is no question about borrowing powers. The statement of what we want to achieve is clear. In his most recent review, the water industry commissioner asked within which framework he was to operate. The crucial response that I gave was to set out my expectations for the quality of water service and sewerage service provision and the investment that is required to meet them. The key is that ministers set the standard—we cannot do that but not provide the investment.
I am encouraged by what the minister said in his opening statement. I have read the letter that he sent to you, convener, about section 28 and how far the single authority will be able to go towards privatisation. I look forward to the material that the minister intends to produce at stage 2, which I hope will be a comfort to many people.
I have seen the extensive correspondence with the water authorities.
We received a letter from West of Scotland Water, which shows that its programme for this financial year is split 50:50 between capital finance from revenue and capital raised from borrowing—£96 million is from revenue. That has a direct effect on charge payers. We also have the figures in the 500-page document that the WIC published on Monday. I have not managed to read it all, although I tried to—it was late before I got to bed.
There is a summary.
I have that. The document details total borrowings and total levels of investment. By my reckoning, there is more than £507 million of capital finance from revenue, which has a direct impact on charge payers. The figure may be higher than that if one considers the current profile of capital as compared to borrowings. At a previous meeting of the committee, I discussed the matter with Ian Jones, who was an adviser to the committee on the inquiry into water and the water industry. At the end of his deliberations he said:
What is your question? You must get to the question.
I realise that, but the issue is important because of its impact. Before I ask the question, I must ensure that people understand where I am coming from. The system of capital finance from revenue has an impact on charge payers and the investment programme. Would it not be a better strategy to allow money to be borrowed over a longer period of time? That would allow the necessary investment in the water industry, but keep charges under control.
That is a matter I have wrestled with at some length. I do not wholly agree because we have to take a view of the charges and debt levels of any structure. We are close to the point where, if we consider the total revenue generated, we have a little leeway for the next three or four years. The figure of £2 billion represents a substantial investment. As Bruce Crawford knows, there were write-offs when the existing authorities were created. I am not persuaded that borrowing is the key to driving down charges.
Ian Jones's evidence has been raised. He also said:
Was he saying that there would be no difficulty in servicing the debt even if it increased?
Yes. He was considering the projected cost structure of how the models would work and he said that servicing debt is normal and doable, for want of a better word. That evidence from Ian Jones is relatively recent so, arguably, he backs up your point about what can be done to increase the investment and maintain the balance between revenue and capital.
We have been assuming an increase of £500 million of total debt. The issue is very important. We have discussed it and I appreciate that Ian Jones is the committee's expert on the matter. It would be helpful if I responded to Bruce Crawford's question in writing and drew on our evidence. I am not saying that there is an argument, but it might be important to set out the basis on which have discussed debt with the water industry commissioner. We need to see whether we are talking apples and oranges or whether there is a closer relationship.
I do not suggest that all charges can be controlled by reducing capital financed from current revenue—CFCR—and relying entirely on borrowing. I recognise that there is a role for efficiency savings and will come back to that later. Last year alone, West of Scotland Water spent £96 million through CFCR. All that we will save by way of efficiency savings is £168 million. In terms of the scale of what can be achieved, there is more scope in CFCR than has been recognised. I ask the minister to bear that in mind when he is deliberating on the issue.
I am sure that the minister will deal with that issue.
That is a fair question.
Looking back at Ian Jones's evidence, I think I am right in saying that the acting chief executive gave the committee similar evidence about an acceptable level of borrowing. The minister might wish to examine that evidence.
Yes.
I think we all accept that the creation of a single water authority will lead to a period of upheaval. Will the resources available to establish Scottish Water be sufficient to meet the environmental objectives and efficiency targets and to develop a competitive focus?
We believe that those resources will be sufficient. We have been fortunate in being able to establish a group to co-ordinate the integration. You have put your finger on it, John. The real trick in effecting a merger is to bring together, with the least dislocation, three disparate organisations with different cultures, backgrounds and operational styles. As you rightly suggest, there is an imperative there. We have had extensive discussions with those engaged in the process. Resources have not been an issue—we have reviewed what is required and have not been told by those engaged in the task that they are being starved of resource. My team is cognisant of the fact that any merger can be difficult—you need only read about what happens in the commercial sector. I was involved in that kind of thing in my past life—this job is so much calmer. We are cognisant of the dislocation that can occur in such circumstances.
In the policy memorandum it is clearly recognised that annual savings of between £100 million and £168 million—which I referred to earlier—are achievable. At the previous meeting, the commissioner said that savings of £130 million were achievable. How much detailed work has gone into examining how much of that is realisable?
The work is high level, but from a very detailed base. I regret to say that you will have a few sleepless nights because of this. If we consider the level of detail that the water industry commissioner goes into, it is at a high level—he does not go down into departmental level. He does a lot of mathematical and econometric modelling of the performance of what he believes to be broadly comparable companies in the UK. He studies incidence and variations where he believes that savings can be achieved in the delivery of the different services.
Your last hurrah, Bruce.
That was very useful. At the previous meeting, the commissioner was clear, in an answer to Fiona McLeod, that the specifics that you have described were an issue not for him, but for the managers of the water companies.
The WIC will have done that comparator econometric modelling and said "I can't see any difference at a high level."
Let us get this question nailed.
We are discussing efficiencies now. Most efficiencies in most organisations are driven out by staff costs. We have an organisation that costs about £800 million a year; staff costs are about £200 million a year.
To be fair, the Aberdeen meeting was a long one. As I recall, the WIC and the water authority chief executives also said that there were a number of issues involving investment, resources and the use of bids and capital equipment.
Absolutely. It is not a single issue. This is the WIC's second report. It was the WIC's first report that highlighted the fact that the present configuration of the water companies simply could not deliver what he was asking for. At present, the individual water companies are, as the convener said, examining what is required in asset management and efficiency, where the management weaknesses are in managing an organisation of that size and what manning efficiencies are required.
A thousand jobs?
That is not news. That figure has been in the public domain and has nothing to do with Scottish Water. That was discussed even before I assumed ministerial responsibility for water. The real trick is how we achieve the other savings, rather than putting the whole burden on to manpower savings. That is what would happen if we were to go down the same road as the Welsh Water model.
We have a vast wealth of knowledge on these matters, because we have raised the same issues with every witness we have had. We have a lot of business to get through.
My first question concerns the structure that you have decided to go for—a single public corporation. Other possible models have been examined, and I want to ask about the co-operative model, which the committee considered in the water inquiry. As you will be aware, some people in the community and some MSPs still think that that model is worth examining. Did the Executive consider that model as an alternative?
We have had a number of meetings about that model. With a more co-operative or mutualised model, public ownership can be retained, but the debt has to be moved out of the block to someone who is prepared to lend.
The committee's overall position agreed with the public corporation model that the Executive is pursuing.
It is extremely important that I made that commitment on the public record. Such a statement by a minister has serious implications. This is a committee of the Parliament, so by making a commitment to the committee, I make a commitment to the Parliament.
The earlier, the better, for us. If we have the documentation at stage 2, that will allow us to lodge less detailed amendments. I appreciate that other pressures come from the overall bill. We will correspond with the minister on the matter.
In what situations does the Executive expect to use its power to take back excessive funds or funds that are not being invested properly? If there are no examples, why is the power in the bill?
The situation would have to be clear. The definition of surplus returns us to my answer to an earlier question. The job of ministers—whoever they are—is to set standards for achievement. Those standards go wider than simply financial standards. Water quality is the key factor and environmental objectives will also have to be set.
What scope does the bill provide for the Executive to invest in some of the commercial ventures that it has been said Scottish Water might become involved in?
We must learn to walk. I do not wish to give directions about engaging in non-core activities. It is imperative that the putative management performs. Whatever the shape of the board, it must show its consumers and Parliament that it can perform. I am not anxious to give directions that would allow the company to divert its energies into non-core activities.
Following Bristow Muldoon's question, we were going to move on to Scottish Water's core activities, but you have indicated that you will correspond on the directions you can issue and the powers you have.
Section 47, on environmental matters, comes under the heading "General duties". Is that an appropriate place for environmental matters to appear in a water bill? Should those matters not be up front—at the start of the bill? How do we ensure that Scottish Water works in a sustainable fashion? Will Scottish Water be asked to produce evidence that it has in its annual report and, if not, how will the company be measured to ensure that it adopts acceptable working practices in relation to sustainable development?
There are two issues. The prospective legislation for the water framework directive is clearly an environment bill. I regard the environment as an extremely important aspect of my responsibilities, but we must remember that the core function of the company will be to provide water and sewerage services. That is not to downgrade the importance of the environment, but it would be rather odd if the environment was the core concern. What is important is that we have incorporated a section in the bill specifically directed at environmental issues. I would be interested to know whether any previous minister has inserted in legislation anything like section 47(4), which says that Scottish Water
Will you clarify why Scottish Water will not be asked to produce an annual report on its environmental and sustainability work over the previous year?
Reporting is not necessarily best handled within the body of a bill. We are examining the financial and reporting requirements and will produce those in the regulations. That is an obligation on the Executive. If Scottish Water has to report on the wider discharge of its functions, it is logical that it should also have to report on its discharge of section 47(4).
So you are saying that the requirement will appear in the guidance.
That would be logical.
That being the case, will you give examples of circumstances in which section 47(5) would apply—in what circumstances would it be inconsistent to require sustainable development?
There is a difficulty. If there was a major accident, it would be invidious to argue that environmental obligations had to be met in dealing—perhaps over a longer period—with that accident. Any service provider that has underwater carriers always has a problem in consistently dealing with all the environmental and sustainability issues. There must be some leeway, but that must be the exception rather than the rule. The clear obligation in section 47(4) is the primary obligation that Scottish Water must discharge. My view is that any reporting by Scottish Water must include all the matters that it is statutorily charged with discharging.
The bill states that the principles of sustainable development—
Number 14.
The question is on the Scottish Environment Protection Agency. I was so busy working out everything I was going to say that I missed the place.
Your question raises two issues. First, we directed the water industry to set out its expected quality and standards—indeed, those were the governing criteria for the water industry commissioner. As a result, the position can be reinforced through those criteria. As Fiona McLeod pointed out, we will not always achieve the perfect solution, but—although I cannot give an absolute guarantee on this point—if there is a quality and standards obligation and an obligation to meet certain environmental standards, the water industry will have to square how on earth it makes those matters priorities, given that the duties are statutory.
SEPA also raised the interesting issue of the social dimension. The organisation was particularly worried about sewerage in rural villages. It felt that, despite the fact that there are places where better sewerage would be of great social benefit, it was not being provided because it was either easier or more lucrative to deliver facilities elsewhere. SEPA thought that there should be special Government support for sewerage schemes that bring social benefits to a particular area. Do you have any comments on that issue?
I will make a couple of very important points. In paragraph (b) of section 46, we make specific provision for people who
My next question, which is about the drinking water quality regulator, centres on the European convention on human rights. Although the evidence that we have taken on that aspect of the legislation is broadly favourable, it was pointed out that section 8(3) provides protection for persons regarding disclosure of confidential information—I know that that follows Court of Session rules—but that section 9(5), which concerns power of entry to premises, makes it an offence to refuse to provide the regulator with information. Furthermore, there is no protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings, which creates something of a discrepancy with the Environment Act 1995. What is the reason for the omission? Are you convinced that the bill is ECHR-compliant?
Those are two quite complex questions. We were aware of ECHR problems when we drafted the section. After taking separate advice, we believe that section 8(3) is ECHR-compliant.
Sections 8 and 9 focus on getting to the bottom of water quality problems. There is a distinction to be drawn between collecting information to rectify something in practice and collecting information for prosecution purposes.
Are you saying that the information could not be used in a prosecution?
Yes. The collected information would probably be inadmissible in a court because of ECHR implications, but it would still be useful for the regulator to have the information so that he could go about ensuring that the problem did not arise again.
I see the distinction.
The first distinction I draw is between the regulator, wearing his hat as a regulator, and—I choose my words carefully—ordinary civil servants.
Is there such a thing?
Ordinary civil servants cannot come to decisions without ministerial approval. The regulator can do that; he can ignore me. That places him in an interesting position, but it is the right position to be in. If that individual believes that, given the information that they have, action needs to be taken, it would be absurd if the minister could make a decision on different criteria, such as pressing cost. That is the fundamental difference and we believe that, by making the distinction, we have taken a slightly different route from that taken elsewhere.
You say that you want to give the regulator a statutory basis, that you want to move from the informal position and that the regulator can say no to you in a way that a civil servant cannot, but that he will still be placed in the civil service within your department. What consideration did you give to other locations for the drinking water quality regulator? I am thinking of the Food Standards Agency, which was mentioned last week, as it is involved in public health regulation.
The slight difficulty with the Food Standards Agency is that although we have a branch in Scotland, we do not have a Scottish food standards agency. The Scottish water authority will be controlled by the Scottish Parliament, so it is appropriate that the drinking water quality regulator should be part of the Scottish process. The situation should not be confused by there being a cross-border organisation.
The minister said that there will be Scottish regulation of Scottish water. When we allow new entrants in, post-common carriage, will it be clear that they will be regulated by the Scottish DWQR?
Absolutely.
That will be clear.
Absolutely.
I will ask about the function of the water industry commissioner. We asked the WIC whether he was happy that Scottish ministers need not take on board his charging advice. His reply was:
I suppose that we could be. That is a danger. On the other hand, the crucial reason why I have no difficulty with that is that the WIC's essential job, as we discussed earlier and as the committee no doubt discussed with him, is to set the revenue cap on the consumers' behalf. He does that with regard to water quality, the level of investment required and resources. As part of the process, he explains how he arrives at the cap and what is required of the industry to meet his figures.
In other words, the WIC has to produce advice that is based on his economic models.
Remember that ministers cannot reject the WIC's recommendations in private. There is no prospect of a minister getting away with having received the WIC's report and slipping it into the night: there is a statutory requirement for the report to be published. If a minister chooses to ignore the WIC's advice, he cannot do so quietly. He has to be public and explain to you, who represent the public, why he has chosen to ignore the WIC's advice or to come to a slightly different view.
Do you think that the WIC's independence is sufficiently enshrined in legislation or are we relying too much on the strength of the incumbent's personality?
I mean no disrespect to the individual concerned, but I hope that we are not dealing with the WIC on an individual basis, although I concur with the view that Mr Alan Sutherland is robust. We are talking about the transparency of the system, the way in which the WIC provides advice and the fact that it has to be published and so we have to give a public response. That seems to me to open up all the opportunities for the appropriate committee of the Parliament—in this case, the Transport and the Environment Committee—to hold ministers to account on why they might take a view different to that proffered by the WIC. That seems to me to be the proper way of holding ministers to account in this key area.
May I explore a what-if scenario? I know that you will not want to comment on it fully, but I will paint the picture nonetheless. In the run-up to an election for the Scottish Parliament, the water industry commissioner might say that prices should rise to secure more investment, which would not necessarily be acceptable to the Scottish public at large. One can easily envisage that the minister might come to Parliament and say, "I am not allowing prices to rise." That would probably be accepted by Parliament, yet in the long term, it would damage the structure and efficiency of Scottish Water. Would you care to comment on that scenario, which I perceive as being a real possibility?
You have obviously worked out that scenario using the dates that we have for the elections. You must be referring to a situation that might arise some time in the future, given that the present run of the review is 2002-06. Your question is hypothetical and I am reluctant to speculate on it. It is not a view that this minister in this office takes. You may be proffering it as a position for another party to take, but it does not represent the view of the Executive.
I will probe you just a bit more on the possible tension between the water industry commissioner's role as the economic regulator and his role as the consumers' champion. In that context, should the water industry commissioner have powers to produce social and environmental action plans as the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets does for energy markets? Has that role been considered in the context of the bill?
No it has not. You are talking about a very much more substantial office. With the level of expertise that the water industry commissioner is expected to bring, his key task is to have regard to economics. He cannot ignore the framework within which the industry is set. We have to consider the amount of time, effort and energy that goes into the focus of seeking to protect the customer. The revenue cap is recommended to set the framework within which charging would subsequently be arranged. It seems to me that the stakeholders' wider interests ought to be part of the accountability function that is retained by the key accountability stakeholder—the Parliament.
I am concerned about the role of the commissioner and the advice that he gives to you being focused so heavily on economic issues and efficiency. That might make it difficult for other considerations, such as social and environmental issues, to be taken into account.
In arriving at his decisions on what it is fair and reasonable to impose on the industry, the water industry commissioner has to take account of all the duties that are placed on the industry. Although it is not his prime function, he cannot ignore a direction under section 47(4)—or whatever the section that Fiona McLeod was pursuing was. That is a duty and an obligation. He cannot say, "There is no cost attached to that, so it does not come into my equation". He is required, under the legislation, to take account of any direction or statutory obligation that is placed on the industry. He does not operate in a vacuum, although his prime focus is to arrive at an economic decision.
That is right in terms of the legislative obligations, but he will make economic judgments about one investment option versus another investment option, the social and environmental costs of which might vary. In a sense I am highlighting the fact that social and environmental considerations are often particularistic and local and are not necessarily to do with legal obligations. Are we constructing a situation in which the water industry commissioner is producing models that do not necessarily relate to circumstances on the ground and that make it difficult to take account of the social and environmental consequences of decisions?
You must go back to my first or second answer to Bruce Crawford. The detailed management and running of the company must rest with the board. We cannot allow the water industry commissioner or anybody else to try to second-guess local and national projects. We must draw a distinction between the duties and obligations of the board to discharge the functions of the company, and its accountability to Parliament. That distinction must be drawn—as I said in answer to Bruce Crawford's questions on level of detail—at a fairly high level. Notwithstanding the fact that an enormous amount of analysis and work goes into the process, it would be wrong for the water industry commissioner to act as a quasi-auditor. That would not be a helpful development and would not produce the results that Des McNulty wants.
Are you saying that section 47(4) puts the duty of sustainable development on the board and that therefore there is no need for a similar section to give the same duty to the water industry commissioner?
No. I am saying that, as stated in section 32(3)(d), the water industry commissioner is required, when forming his advice, to take account of all the statutory duties and obligations that are placed on the company and the board. He cannot arrive at an econometric model, part of which simply discounts the costs that are attached to sustainable development, water quality and the minister's direction on quality and standards. He must take all those into account when arriving at the advice that he tenders to ministers.
Is that strong enough to ensure a commitment to environmental matters and sustainable development? Do we need to insert a section 32(3)(f) that says that the water industry commissioner must consider sustainable development?
I do not wish to be flippant about the question. The bill places a huge number of obligations on Scottish Water. It seems to me that the proper and sensible approach is to place an obligation on the water industry commissioner to take into account all the obligations, but it is not necessary to repeat all those obligations in the bill. The option of using that obligation is available. If it is believed that the commissioner is not taking the obligations into account, there is clear statutory cover for saying that the commissioner is not properly discharging his duties. The bill is explicit as to what the commissioner must take into account.
If there are no more questions on the WIC, we will move on to questions on consultation panels.
The convener of a consultation panel is to be appointed by you, minister. That convener will then appoint the members of the panel. How will that provide the new customer consultation panels with a broad and representative membership? How will the new consultation panels be more independent than the present committees?
As Fiona McLeod is aware, there is presently one consultative committee for East of Scotland Water, one for West of Scotland Water and one for the North of Scotland Water Authority. I am rather concerned that, as we are creating a single Scottish water authority, the consultation panel ought to contain a broader range of domestic and non-domestic customers to take account of the local sensitivities in a service that covers all Scotland.
When will you publish the guidelines on ministerial appointment of the convener and on the convener's appointment of board members? Everything seems to come back to the Scottish minister.
The minister can correspond with us on that point. We want to ask more questions. I am happy for us to correspond on that matter. Is there anything else that you wanted to cover, Fiona?
No, I think that we have covered what I wanted to ask.
In evidence, both the chairman designate and chief executive designate of Scottish Water said that they would, in all likelihood, support direct billing of their customers as opposed to billing through local authorities—as is currently the case. They believe that one of the possible benefits will be improved collection rates of domestic bills. Has the Executive had discussions with local authorities about the potential of such a move? If so, how have local authorities reacted? Would such a move require primary legislation and was any consideration given to putting that provision in the bill?
I last spoke to local authorities yesterday afternoon when I met the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities to discuss billing, which is a serious issue that Scottish Water faces. It is not a change that will be made in the next two or three years. We need a statutory instrument to extend the existing system and I think that we will do so to cover the years until 2005 to give cover to the industry.
I have a supplementary question about an issue that the Subordinate Legislation Committee raised with the Executive when it was considering the bill. The issue is associated with local authorities and section 54 of the bill. Section 54 gives Scottish ministers power to require local authorities and assessors to pass information to Scottish Water to enable it to set charges. I want to tease out what sort of information the Executive envisages being passed. Would it include summary information about collection rates of council tax and water rates? Would it include detailed information about individual customers? One concern could be that sensitive information about individuals' or businesses' outstanding council tax debts might be passed to a third party, such as Scottish Water. Is that the intention or is the intention for overall collection rates to be passed to Scottish Water?
I am fairly certain that under data protection legislation, local authorities are not entitled to give information to Scottish Water other than information relating to the collection of water rates debts. However, I understand what you are getting at because it is a uniform collection system. Scottish Water will certainly need successful collection rates and—as the chairman and chief executive have no doubt already said—it will need to have a better profile of the nature of individual customers in order for it to arrive at the right decision.
I know that we are pressed for time, so a written response might be helpful. I was referring to section 54(3)(a)(i), which refers to
That is high-level information so we had better correspond on it.
I want to deal with one substantial issue before the minister leaves, which is support and targeted relief for the voluntary sector. As the minister will be aware, that has been a big issue for the committee's report. The committee is of the view that a targeted relief scheme should be established.
This is an extraordinary and very serious issue. We could start at the philosophical level, and ask what is the appropriate way in which to deal with persons who need relief, and whether that should be dealt with separately. In other words, we could simply accept that the water industry and Scottish Water have duties and obligations that are broader than water delivery. Those duties and obligations encompass environmental obligations, which also come under the industry's prime function.
We are aware of that bigger debate and we, too, seek evidence on a possible solution. Once we find that big idea, we will get it to you as quickly as we can, minister. However, you have more resources than we do—but that is another matter.
I want to highlight a particular issue, because this is not just a question about the size of charities. There are particular charitable organisations, such as churches or scout groups, that have traditionally held premises as part of their operations. Although I accept the general principles that the minister highlights, the committee is concerned about the specific effects on particular types of organisations of the proposals that are before us. We want to highlight that concern to the minister and his ministerial colleagues.
Given that the wider debate on charities relief is still to be had, will you use section 37 to extend the transitional relief scheme until we have an answer to the bigger question?
I cannot give that commitment, but I have not closed my mind on the matter. I explained that my political inclination is to recognise the seriousness of the issue. The committee acknowledged in its report that the measures that we are talking about could apply either to the organisations that are covered by the existing transitional arrangements or—as Des McNulty highlighted—to a fairly narrowly focused group. I am happy to continue to consider the matter, but I do not wish to give a commitment, for the reasons that I have outlined.
That completes the questioning. I thank the minister for attending—I know that he has other engagements today. We look forward to including his remarks in our report.
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