I invite our first witness to introduce herself.
I am Rosemarie McIlwhan, and I am the principal officer at the Scottish Human Rights Centre.
Thank you for the paper that you sent the committee in advance, which has been useful. I shall not ask you to make an introductory statement, as we have your paper in front of us. We will begin with questions, if that is okay.
No problem.
One of the issues that keeps cropping up is this: what is to stop a state from having some sort of inverted show trial, with a preconceived notion of acquitting people? How might conflict arise between the provisions of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill and a country's domestic law?
There is nothing to prevent a state from having a show trial. However, if it was felt that a show trial was taking place and that the person was not being tried properly, the international criminal court could hold a separate trial of its own at which the person would be tried properly.
How would that impact on double jeopardy rules? Most jurisdictions—certainly ours—have a presumption that, once someone has been acquitted of an offence, they cannot be retried for the same offence. In effect, we are setting up a system whereby retrial could become the norm.
I acknowledge what you are saying. That might be the perception but, in the first instance, that person has not been tried—there has been only a show trial and window dressing. The second trial would be the first legitimate trial. Nevertheless, we have concerns about that situation and we would like clear guidance to be given regarding when a second trial would take place.
I appreciate that it is difficult for you to answer this question, but how can we legislate for that? One person's show trial is another's fair trial. How are we to find the balance between what is deemed acceptable in some countries and unacceptable in others? Politics will play a large part in that judgment.
That is true, but there are basic principles—such as those that are laid down in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—that everyone will agree are fundamental to a trial. Those principles would include having a judge who is independent and is seen to be so and a person's right to have witnesses examined for and against them. I think that the whole world would agree with such ideas. There are some basic principles that could be used to ensure that trials were not just show trials.
I realise that my question will be almost impossible to answer, given that what Scott Barrie just said is true. There will always be differences of opinion on what constitutes a show trial and what does not. Imagine the situation of a British national being tried under international court jurisdiction in a faraway country, with a judge who does not speak English. You can imagine how a free press in this country might comment on that. You can see where the political pressure would come from to set aside that court's finding.
I will start with Margo MacDonald's last point. It is hoped that an international criminal court will act as a deterrent to people who would commit such atrocities as crimes against humanity. That is the idea behind having the court.
The argument of deterrence—the fact that there will be a come-uppance for people—is a big argument in favour of the court. How does that square with the resolution of conflict and social divide that we witnessed in South Africa, where there was an informal tribunal, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission? If there has to be a healing process afterwards, how does that square with there always being a threat to people of their being called before the bar, or before the international criminal court?
It is a matter of deterrence. If people are going through a healing process, there is the potential that, if they have committed a crime against humanity, they should still be tried. They may be acquitted, if that is seen fit, or they may be convicted, depending on the situation. The international criminal court is set up in such a way that, in the first instance, people should, if possible, be tried under their national jurisdiction. That comes under the principle of complementarity. There would be a bit more leeway if, in the country in question, the court could consider the evidence and—having come to the view that sufficient reparation had already been made—decide to acquit.
Is the deterrent value the best argument in favour of having an international criminal court?
The argument is twofold. First, there is the deterrent factor. Secondly, if a state is unable or unwilling to prosecute, the international criminal court can ensure that someone who is suspected of having committed crimes against humanity can, at some point, be brought before a court and tried for their alleged crimes—whether that happens in their own or another state, or in the international criminal court.
I have a wee supplementary to that; I find this very hard to follow. If someone has committed a crime against humanity in their own state, as often happens during civil wars, surely that state is the last place where the trial should be held. It would be more desirable to hold the trial outwith that nation. The case would then be taken outside the political forum that the crime was committed in.
That is one of the reasons for our pressing for universal jurisdiction, certainly in Scotland. There is a lot of leeway for states to ratify the Rome statute, and either universal jurisdiction, or Scotland's proposal—that countries could try only their own nationals or residents—could be chosen. That highlights the problematic matter that was raised by Christine Grahame.
Micronesia, for example.
If we moved down that road, which seems to be the commonsense thing to do, would the international criminal court decide the appropriate jurisdiction for particular cases? It does not appear to have the authority to do that. One of the problems that the committee has with the court is that it is, generally speaking, a consensual operation.
Standard practice under international law is that, where there is conflict over jurisdiction, the states involved should resolve between them who will accept jurisdiction.
Universal jurisdiction has been mentioned by most of the witnesses from whom we have heard, either orally or in writing. Would the Rome statute have to be amended to deliver universal jurisdiction?
No, only the bill would have to be amended.
Would every country have to pass domestic legislation to ensure the operation of universal jurisdiction?
Universal jurisdiction is at the discretion of each country. The Rome statute says only that countries have to provide assistance to the international criminal court. Best practice would be for the states to accept universal jurisdiction, rather than the situation that we are in whereby states try only their nationals and residents.
How effective would it be if only a proportion of the countries that signed up had universal jurisdiction?
As I said, the acceptance of universal jurisdiction by all the countries concerned would be best practice. The system would work if states tried only their nationals and residents, but life would be made much easier if people could be tried in any state. That is where universal jurisdiction comes in. A state that has accepted universal jurisdiction can try a national of any state in the world.
On the other hand, if Scotland were the only country in which universal jurisdiction was built in to the bill, that would also cause a problem. If France decided not to have universal jurisdiction, the French would not be happy with us prosecuting a French national.
That is the essence of an international criminal court—
Please let the witness answer the question.
I do not think that the problem that the convener describes would arise. As I said, there would be consensus between the states as to who would try the individual concerned. Our acceptance of universal jurisdiction would promote the Scottish system as being one of the world's leading legal systems.
I agree. We are talking about the essence of the notion of international criminal justice. We have discussed the impact on that of political and diplomatic considerations. If the threat of justice is universal, the system will be more effective.
Yes, but the court is also meant to provide a forum where war criminals could be tried, whether at the court or in another country.
How many of the 29 countries that have ratified the Rome statute have decided on universality?
I am afraid that I do not have that information.
I still cannot get my head round this. How can universality work if only one or two countries decide to have it? Either everyone is in the pot, or no one is in it.
It can work. For example, if Scotland decides to have universal jurisdiction, we could try not only Scottish nationals or residents, but any other national of the world who is under a warrant for arrest and who happens to be in the country.
Not if that particular country has not agreed universal jurisdiction.
If Scotland has universal jurisdiction—
There would be a political furore.
There would be political ramifications, but, technically, Scotland could try such a person. I accept that there might be political problems if that happened.
There would be huge international and legal problems. Other states can agree, through legislation or treaty, to let us have jurisdiction over certain matters as long as they have reciprocal jurisdiction—I am thinking in particular of enforcement of decrees. Scotland cannot just decide to try anyone from X who happens to be in the country. If X does not agree to universal jurisdiction, we cannot just blast on. For any such proposal to be workable, there must be political consensus; if you will forgive my saying so, international law is basically pragmatic. Unless I am being very thick, I cannot see how universal jurisdiction will work without a consensus among major states.
Obviously, I am not a politician. However, if Scotland leads the way and decides on universal jurisdiction, more states will come on board. That can be only beneficial. I accept that a state might not want Scotland to try its nationals, but if the option to try them is open to us, we also have the opportunity to have dialogue with that state about putting its nationals on trial. For example, if there had been universal jurisdiction in England and Wales when General Pinochet was there, there could have been a dialogue with Chile about whether he should be tried in England and Wales, or Spain or Chile instead of the whole hoo-hah that happened.
Can I ask another question on this point?
We are running out of time and I want to move on from universal jurisdiction. You can have the last question.
If America says no to universal jurisdiction, is the bill worth the paper that it is written on?
It will be. I recognise that America is a big political power, but it is not the only state in the world. If enough other states are behind the court, it will be workable. I know that the UK Government is pushing the United States to get rid of its many reservations about the proposal; we will just have to wait and see. I am sorry that that answer was not more satisfactory.
We will leave the subject of universal jurisdiction, although I am sure that we will return to it.
I am disappointed to find that the trust fund has been left out of the bill. The fund would provide money for reparations to victims where the assets of the convicted war criminal would not cover those reparations. It seems odd to try someone without making reparations to the victims, so there should be some scope for Scotland to contribute to the fund.
You may not know the answer to this question, but do any other nation states' bills contain such provision?
Some do and some have even gone further. For example, as well as contributing to the United Nations trust fund, Canada has a domestic fund for victims of war crimes.
It would be quite useful if the clerks would provide us with a note of other nation states that have such trust funds and, if they are signatories to the statute, whether they incorporate funds within their bills.
We have some questions on the age of criminal responsibility. We are quite interested in the differences between the statute and Scots law in that respect.
I had intended to leave this question for Dr Scobbie to answer, because his paper raises the matter. The issue is whether the bill is watertight on the age of criminal responsibility. The definition of the age of criminal responsibility in the bill will not impact on Scots criminal law. I am concerned about that. What is your view?
It would be better to leave that matter to Dr Scobbie—my organisation did not consider it.
We did not cover state and diplomatic immunity. I see that you are concerned that that is covered in the statute, but not the bill.
We are concerned that if state and diplomatic immunity is left out of the Scottish bill, somebody who is defined as a state or diplomatic official will be immune from prosecution in the international criminal court. That would be a major anomaly.
Can you clarify whether, if one was charged under the bill for a crime that was defined in the bill, would one be prosecuted under the bill, rather than under Scots common law?
One would be prosecuted under the bill.
We thought that if a person had already been tried, acquitted or their case found not proven, that person should not be tried again on the basis that somebody cannot be tried twice for the same crime. According to what you say, that should not arise, because a person would not be prosecuted again for the same offence.
I am sorry; I did not understand that point.
If a person is prosecuted under Scots law for, for example, murder, and is then acquitted or their case found not proven, that person cannot then be prosecuted for the same offence under the bill. Is that your position?
Yes. The only circumstance in which a person would be tried again would be if the first trial had been a show trial and had not been proper. I do not foresee that happening in Scotland.
It would be for the ICC to decide that the first trial had been a show trial, so we are into politics again.
Yes.
I have a straightforward question. What about the provision for a defence in countries where there is no developed system of defence?
Do you mean in terms of the right of the accused to have a solicitor and so on?
Yes.
I would expect the international criminal court to examine the trial and ensure that it was conducted properly.
We must stop there. I thank Rosemary McIIwhan for her evidence, which has been very useful.
I return to my magnificent obsession, which is the role that is played by the American Administration in the setting up of the international criminal court. I think that it is correct to say that the American Administration cannot change the statute.
It could change it by negotiation, but that is hardly likely to happen.
Is there some other mechanism whereby the American Administration can make amendments to the treaty?
There will be review conferences but, if I remember correctly, the first will not take place for seven years.
What is the current situation? When Clinton left office, he signed the statute, but he said that he did that so that it could be amended.
That is so that the United States would have a chance to participate in any review conference. If Clinton had not signed the statute, he would have been time barred. That would mean that, if the United States wanted to sign up to the statute, it would have had to ratify it, and not merely signed it; there is a technical difference.
Thank you—of course, I do know that that is the case.
Yes.
The US point of view is that they would become the fall guys in all the international conflicts that the US sought to quell.
US nationals would be the fall guys only if they committed a war crime. President Bush is perhaps showing a lack of confidence in his own troops.
Or in his smart bombs.
Whatever.
It does not look as though the Bush Administration is minded to allow that; Senate leaders have said the same thing. If that Adminstration does not do so, does that invalidate the notion of an international criminal court or, because of its deterrence value, is there still a strong enough reason for having such a court?
Even without the United States, there is a strong enough reason to have an international criminal court. The statute is attracting a lot of attention; it has a lot of signatories and an increasing number of ratifications. From anecdotal evidence, it seems that the statute has a deterrent effect. When the Yugoslav tribunal was set up, anecdotal stories were heard that warlords who were involved in civil wars decided that they had to examine how they were conducting conflicts.
You should be a diplomat.
I doubt it.
We will move on to questions from Christine Grahame about article 26 of the Rome statute.
Sorry, which question is that?
The committee wants to ask some questions about the points that you made in your paper about article 26 of the Rome statute. That article states:
Oh yes. Sorry, I was I was lost in something that I was reading about universal jurisdiction.
Are you asking about the age limit?
Yes.
If the bill does not apply to people under 18, all that means is that such people cannot be tried for crimes that are defined in the bill. People under 18 would still be liable for prosecution under common law. It is interesting to note that New Zealand excluded jurisdiction for those under the age of 18 from the act that it passed last year to implement the ICC statute. The idea that New Zealand has taken up does not make people under 18 immune from prosecution—they simply do not fall within the terms of the statute.
I understand that. However, will the bill erode the position on the age of criminal responsibility under Scots criminal law?
No, I do not see how it could have that effect. Other countries are merely making statutory exceptions.
Some acts that a young soldier might commit—who, at the age of 15 or 14, would be exempt from prosecution for those acts under the statute—would be the very acts that, if committed on the street, would lead to prosecution for murder. I know that there is room for discretion, but there could be circumstances in which the act that was committed was sufficiently independently motivated to preclude the buck being passed back to the commanding officer.
The young person—as we call them nowadays—would still be liable under the common law, but we are taking them outside the scope of this bill.
I am talking about something that might have a persuasive effect that could seep into Scots law. If somebody who is relatively independent of their commanding officer can commit certain acts at age 14 or 15, and if that person is not found guilty under the bill, that might impact on Scots law. If that can happen in circumstances in which there are pressures and a different environment, and that person is not found guilty, why would that person be prosecuted under Scots criminal law for similar—if not identical—acts?
That falls back to prosecution under the common law; what we would not be doing is to label a person as a war criminal, or as somebody who has committed genocide. An international discussion is going on about the age of criminal responsibility and about what we should do with child soldiers—particularly in relation to what happened in Rwanda. The question is being asked whether young people should go through a criminal trial process or whether there should be something more like truth, reconciliation and rehabilitation. I am not up to date on the details of the debate, which is being conducted more by psychologists and politicians than by lawyers.
You have drawn the committee's attention to this issue in your paper and I am grateful for that. However, does not it seem odd that we in Scotland should recognise that the age of criminal responsibility in respect of international crimes is 18, while the age that applies under Scots law is 16?
That is anomalous, but it is one of the things that will happen when one tries to implement a system of international criminal law. Here is another anomaly: if a person was prosecuted under what would be the international criminal court (Scotland) act, corroboration would be needed to get a conviction, which would not be needed south of the border.
Following Christine Grahame's point, there is little problem if there is not universal jurisdiction—is that right?
Yes.
However, if there is universal jurisdiction, there is a problem. Let us consider Rwanda and Burundi. If there were universal jurisdiction, it would be possible for an action to be raised in Scotland against child soldiers in those countries. Is that right?
Yes—but arguably, that would be possible at the moment. It is generally accepted that universal jurisdiction exists under customary international law for war crimes and crimes against humanity—and probably genocide as well. The argument about the implementation of the Rome statute is that the statute itself does not provide for universal jurisdiction. However, universal jurisdiction already exists under customary international law. For a recent ruling on that, we can consider the House of Lords' third judgment in the Pinochet extradition proceedings—Pinochet III. I cannot quite remember all the details, but Lord Miller went as far as to say that universal jurisdiction exists for war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture and possibly genocide. The introduction of universal jurisdiction into the Scots bill does not change the law; it simply restates customary international law.
On universal jurisdiction, I will ask the same question as I asked the previous witness. We do not know how many countries have signed up to universal jurisdiction. Do you know the answer?
There is no answer to that question in the sense that, if we are talking in the context of the Rome statute, the statute as a treaty does not provide for universal jurisdiction. However, there is strong reason to argue that many, if not all, the crimes that it lists as core crimes—not those that are related to the administration of justice, but those such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity—already attract universal jurisdiction in customary international law.
So; universal jurisdiction is not included in the Rome statute.
Merely by the operation of the law, universal jurisdiction already exists.
We are being asked in Scotland to adopt universal jurisdiction. What effect would it have if only a small proportion of the countries that are signatories to the Rome statute signed up for universal jurisdiction?
That would depend on prosecution policy—whether people were tried under the legislation that implements the international criminal court or whether they were tried under customary international law.
I am in territory about which I do not know much, as is obvious from my questions. My question is about universal jurisdiction. What are the mechanics of its operation? Would it involve extradition proceedings? I am trying to find out about how it would work politically. That is what I was getting at when I asked whether it has to be consensual. It is all very well declaring universal jurisdiction—a lot of countries are—but the politics are not that we should just submit to it without due process. Am I correct?
That question goes back to the distinction that I drew earlier between somebody being present in the territory and somebody being abroad. If that person is abroad, we must go through extradition. It might be that the state in which they are does not want to extradite them, which is what would happen in the context of another party asking for that person to be handed over.
I have feelings about the politics of extradition, and about when one should accede to an extradition warrant. There is so much politics involved in the matter.
It depends on how a country's extradition system is set up. Currently, in the United Kingdom there is Executive discretion in deciding whether to extradite. I believe that the extradition law will be changed to remove that discretion.
That is an interesting observation, because extradition is a reserved matter. That observation strengthens the point about universality, and about being consensual. It is all very well declaring the law, but it all comes down to its operation.
There has been one successful private prosecution.
That was the prostitute case.
Yes, the Glasgow rape case.
Do you see that as worthy, and not just a casual thing? I think it is worthy; it leaves intact the rights of individuals who feel that there has been a miscarriage of justice through non-prosecution.
The situation with the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill is rather like the situation with the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, in that private prosecution in Scotland was just not thought about when that act was drafted.
That was an oversight.
Yes.
Maybe we should tell the Executive about it.
That is a political matter, which is up to you.
It is on the record now.
To go back to extradition, if a country agrees to universal jurisdiction, is it also agreeing to agree to extradition requests, or is there still a way in which to refuse to extradite?
As was the case with General Pinochet, the country could refuse to extradite. In effect, he was being extradited because of allegations that he had committed torture or been involved in torture, and universal jurisdiction exists for torture. Although the House of Lords said finally that he could be extradited to Spain, the Home Secretary said that he could not because was too old and too ill.
That is the point.
On age, article 8 of schedule 1 of the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill lays down that it is a war crime to conscript or enlist children under the age of 15 years into national armed forces. Why was that age chosen?
That age has been around in international instruments since the late 1970s. It is the age that is used in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and it is the age that was used in additional protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions in 1977. It is, if you like, the established international age.
You do not see a contradiction between choosing that age and using the age of 18?
I do not know enough about the ins and outs of the drafting of the provision, but if you think about it, we let people join the army when they are 16, so I imagine that there would be problems for us. The article is saying that you cannot raise the age of being non-combatant to 18.
I know that you are short of time. Can we move on to the point about article 22 of the statute and the definition of a crime in your submission? Am I right in thinking that your point is about incompatibility with Scots law, because we tend to have a flexible definition of crime under a common-law system?
Yes. It is the case that there will be less room for creativity on the part of Scots judges.
Most of us are not lawyers so we want to put this in a context that we can all understand. Could the chap who is a prisoner of Colombian guerrillas take out a private prosecution against the guerrillas, if Colombia and the UK had signed up?
For hostage taking? That must be covered somewhere in the definitions of crimes.
Yes—in article 8.
If we are considering war crimes, the question is whether the guerrillas are a party to the conflict. It boils down to whether there is a conflict in Colombia, to which the guerrillas are a party and which is recognised internationally as an internal conflict. I suspect that the conflict in Colombia is too sporadic for that. It does not fall within the ambit of—
So how does that chap get some sort of recompense for the criminal acts against him?
The classic answer is that he should approach the Foreign Office to see whether the United Kingdom Government will take a case against Colombia, arguing that Colombia has allowed his human rights to be infringed.
That is under existing statutes.
That is under existing international law.
Do we need to build flexibility into what constitutes a crime, so that changes can be made, depending on developments in international law? I asked the justice department about case law and its view was that case law would be very persuasive. Surely the cases, with the facts, will lead to an evolution of the stark, though comprehensive, definitions in the bill. Will it not happen anyway that there will be interpretation of the body of cases that build up either at a national level or at the level of the ICC?
To some extent you are right: cases will have a persuasive function.
I have been told that they would be very persuasive.
It depends on the court. I would think that the international tribunals will have greater weight than domestic ones, although how domestic tribunals interpret the ICC statute is not without interest. Their decisions will be persuasive. There have been interesting jumps in the ICC's jurisprudence, where a case—such as the Rwanda tribunal—has developed things a lot. The obvious example is the ICC's definition of crimes against humanity. It is in case something like that happens that you might want a saving clause such as that which is provided in section 4 of the Canadian act. We can take account of developments in international law.
Do we need to do that in Scotland, where the bulk of our criminal law is developed on case law and not statute—for serious crime, at any rate.
It depends whether you think that there is a possibility of an accused questioning the relevancy of an indictment by saying that it does not refer to one of the crimes that is set down in the act—whereas it is actually an interpretation of them.
You would rebut that, would you not, by arguing the case law?
But it may not be Scots case law—it might be Italian or Canadian.
So this would be a belt-and-braces approach.
Yes.
I do not know whether you can answer this: how many of the other countries that are agreeing to ratification are in favour of the UN trust fund for victims? Why should countries be in favour of it?
Do you mean how many have taken legislative steps?
Yes.
I cannot answer that, but as your previous witness said, I think that Canada is setting up a domestic fund. I am not sure about other states. The problem is one of laying hands on information on what is happening in other legislatures. The trust fund is a good idea. It gives people compensation for harm that they have suffered.
I know that you have to go shortly, Dr Scobbie.
The procedures are being drawn up by the Preparatory Commission for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. I think that it has drawn up the procedural rules. The section on elements of crime has existed in draft form since late June 2000. We are waiting for the states that are party to the ICC to adopt the elements of crime.
Will there be a problem in the first set of cases that the ICC takes on? Such cases might not be straightforward and the ICC will have to interpret the statute.
That will undoubtedly happen, but it is not problematic—that is what courts do.
Which law will the court use for interpretation?
It will apply international law. It depends on the nature of the objection that has been raised. For instance, the first case that the Yugoslav tribunal had to deal with was the Tadic case. The first phase of the Tadic case was a complaint against the court's jurisdiction. The court said that it had jurisdiction and that it had been properly set up. Such procedural matters must be expected. There is now sufficient experience of international adjudication. The procedural problems are not insurmountable.
Dr Scobbie must leave soon, so there can be only two more questions.
I want to ask about procedures. A pre-hearing of the ICC was mentioned. Would that be rather like the sifting procedure of an industrial tribunal?
The pre-hearing issue concerns whether the court should assert jurisdiction over something that has allegedly been dealt with at a national level. What do you mean by deliberations? Do you mean the court's deliberations or the pleadings?
I mean the court's deliberations or findings and its reasons for those findings. Will there be written pleadings in such cases?
I have not looked at the procedure. I would imagine that there will be written and oral pleadings. That is the norm for international courts.
I see. Are those documents usually public or are they for the parties only?
The only standing court that I really know about is the International Court of Justice. All ICJ pleadings are in the public domain once the oral hearing is open.
That is interesting. I was thinking about where there was a decision with reasons for the decision. Obviously, decisions of pre-hearings will be important.
I imagine that the court will have to make public any decisions that are taken in pre-hearings. That accords with the international justice process.
Decisions would then be put on record for us.
I said that I imagine that that will be the case, but I cannot say it with any degree of confidence.
Those decisions will be persuasive for other jurisdictions.
Christine Grahame has had a fair shot.
Dr Scobbie talked about the jurisdiction simply being stated by the court, as in the tribunal on Yugoslavia. What about countries that have incorporated Sharia law as part of their justice system? If the courts of such countries have a properly qualified and independent judiciary, will the validity of the international criminal court's jurisdiction be recognised? I just wondered whether that applies universally, even in countries that have elements of Sharia law in their justice systems?
Sorry, I am not quite with you.
I do not want to sound pejorative, but what about some of the legal systems that one might find floating around the middle east?
Many of the lawyers that are found floating around the middle east have been trained in the UK.
Aye, I know.
Many of the very senior lawyers.
The lawyers have been trained here, but the politicians have not necessarily been trained here.
Lawyers sometimes become politicians. As long as any trial is seen to be a fair trial, your point about Sharia law should not be a problem. I also imagine that, given the kind of legal elites that exist in some countries of the middle east, such countries will not sign up to the Rome statute unless they are sure that they can live up to it.
Yes. I was looking for some names that I would recognise, but I did not see any.
I have not searched the signatories.
Our clerks can get that information for us. I know that Dr Scobbie has to go now, so I thank him very much indeed.
It was a pleasure.
Item 5 on the agenda also concerns the International Criminal Court (Scotland) Bill. I ask the committee to agree that at our meeting next week we discuss our line of questioning in private. That will save a bit of time.
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