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Displaying 223 contributions
Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee
Meeting date: 15 September 2026
Duncan Massey
The questions that Kate Campbell raised relate to one of the big themes, which is how we deal with intermittency. As far as I am aware, data centres require extremely high uptime—effectively 100 per cent uptime. Most of the data centre plans that I have seen require a lot of diesel back-up. In America, data centres in effect seem to operate 100 per cent on natural gas. I thought that those questions teased out some of the issues. Take, for example, a hypothetical data centre in the middle of Scotland. How would that be powered with the current mix? That is more of an open question for all the panel members.
If any other member wants to come in on the theme of intermittency, I would welcome that.
Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee
Meeting date: 15 September 2026
Duncan Massey
Sorry to interrupt. Callum, did you want to come in?
Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee
Meeting date: 8 September 2026
Duncan Massey
Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the third meeting in 2026 of the Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee. I do not know whether it is standard to keep counting the numbers all through the year, but we will see how it goes. We have no apologies from members.
Agenda item 1 is to decide whether to take agenda item 3, on pre-budget scrutiny, in private. Do members agree to take that item in private?
Members indicated agreement.
Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee
Meeting date: 1 September 2026
Duncan Massey
Agenda item 2 is an overview of Scotland’s energy sector. I refer members to papers 1 and 2.
I welcome Professor Dieter Helm from the University of Oxford—many thanks for joining us this morning, Dieter. He will give us a short presentation, and there will be an opportunity to ask questions afterwards.
Professor Sir Dieter Helm (University of Oxford):Thank you very much indeed. I am professor of energy policy at the University of Oxford, and I wrote the “Cost of energy” review for the British Government in 2017. That seems a long time ago, but I think that most of its points stand.
I thought that it would be helpful to make a few high-level remarks about Scotland’s energy policy and strategy and then leave as much time as possible for questions, so that I can try to respond to whatever anyone wants to challenge or to throw at me. In any case, thank you very much for the invitation, and I am sorry that I am not with you in person.
Scotland’s policy is pretty clear—it is net zero by 2045—and its energy strategy is to have some 20GW of additional renewables by 2030. That is in the context of a peak demand of about 5GW, and I should point out that that figure has been declining over the last 15 years down from 6GW or 7GW peak demand in 2010. It is pretty obvious that the gulf between how much capacity there is in the system and how much Scotland actually needs is pretty vast, and it essentially means that Scotland’s system is primarily directed at exporting to England and through England to Wales and so on.
The system that is being developed contrasts very strongly with what was there before. Not that long ago, in 2010—that is, 15 years or so ago—Scotland’s system was made up of nuclear plus coal plus gas plus hydro, with a bit of wind, and nuclear and the fossil fuels represented the overwhelming firm power supplies to Scotland. At that time, the industry in Scotland—and industry demand for electricity—was substantial. Since then, industrial demand has declined, and of course, there have been big closures or moves away. Grangemouth is just one example, but one can also look at the Clyde and elsewhere and see other examples of where new energy-intensive demands, particularly for electricity, have not developed or where industry has been exiting. The situation is not specific to Scotland; it is common throughout Britain, which has been de-industrialising for some considerable time. It is not just about exits, although major industries in Britain as a whole, including petrochemicals, fertiliser, steel, car production and even fiberglass production, have been on an exit path. That has flattened the emissions numbers.
What matters is not so much what has left but what has not come to Scotland or Britain over the past 15 to 20 years. We are not a base for virtually any incoming energy-intensive industries. We will have a few data centres, but the US, whose energy prices are four times lower than Britain’s, will be the centre for energy-intensive industries as we go forward, as will China, whose energy costs are at least two times cheaper than Britain’s.
That is the context. The first question to ask is whether what we are doing is making any difference to climate change, which is the clear objective that, I am sure, everyone shares. My answer is that it is not. It could do, but it is not currently.
Are we producing cheap and affordable energy for customers and to encourage industry? No. Our electricity is about the most expensive in the developed world. Is it useful energy? What is going to happen to all the intermittent energy surpluses that Scotland is producing? The answer is not at all clear. It is not at all clear what the demand for that energy will be in the future, who will pay for it and where it will go, because, as well as Scotland and Britain, northern Europe will have surpluses when the wind blows and the sun shines and will have deficits when they do not.
Let me quickly sketch out the points about the difference that is being made to climate change, whether we have an effective climate change policy, why energy is so expensive and whether what we are doing is useful. I advocate climate realism—we should consider the facts rather than people’s hopes, aspirations and optimism. I am not pessimistic or optimistic, but I am deeply concerned about climate change and how little is being achieved.
Let me put the situation in context: climate change is global. It does not matter whether emissions are created in Edinburgh, in Shanghai or somewhere in Texas, in the US; they are global. That is a crucial point.
How are things going? The answer is disastrously. We have added two parts per million to the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere every year since 1990. We are now adding three parts, which is taking the parts per million in the atmosphere to 428. There has been no progress in even slowing down the increase in the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere. The concentration of carbon in the atmosphere is the only figure that matters, because that is the greenhouse effect—it is the net of emissions and sequestration. We have done enormous damage to sequestration globally, particularly to the rainforests and the oceans, but elsewhere too. If the current policies are the ones that are supposed to address climate change, one more heave is not going to make much difference.
We must bear in mind that about 77 per cent of the energy in Scotland comes from fossil fuels, but everyone thinks that we are just about to become a clean energy superpower. In England, the figure is between 75 and 77 per cent, and the global figure is between 80 and 85 per cent. There is no transition from fossil fuels globally, and there has not been much of a transition in Scotland and England either. It is crucial that we consider the big bulk of oil and gas that is not going into electricity, plus the stuff that is going into electricity.
If we want to no longer cause climate change and create emissions via fossil fuels, the scale of what has to be done in Scotland and in Britain is huge. What we are doing with electricity helps, as long as it does not deter production at home while creating production overseas, but it is a small bit. Given that there is a reasonable expectation that global energy demand will roughly double by 2050, decarbonisation means not only decarbonising the existing economy but decarbonising a whole new world economy within 25 years.
Those are facts—if the doubling of energy is not a fact, it is very likely—and that is the scale of the challenge. We should always remember the size of the share of fossil fuels within energy production, within which electricity is encapsulated. It is true that more and more of the economy will electrify and that electricity really matters, but we must think about that as part of the challenge and not as the whole challenge.
Renewables are also not clean, although they are cleaner. If we look at where the minerals come from and at the supply chains, we realise that there are shades of clean and dirty and that it is not a case of black and white or clean and dirty.
Another area relates to the cost of that stuff. People go around quoting the marginal costs of wind and solar and saying that those are free. They might argue that water is free too and that we should have it for free because it does not cost us anything. That is nonsense. It does not much matter how much a solar panel or a wind turbine costs per se; the question is about the cost to the system of having those things. I can give you an illustration. Britain as a whole used to have about 45GW of peak demand, which we met with about 60GW of capacity. We already need just under 120GW of capacity to meet a peak demand that is lower than 45GW of demand. We need twice the grid capacity and we need batteries and storage. Those are all additional costs for an intermittent, renewables-based system.
I have nothing against renewables per se, but the idea that that stuff is cheaper than fossil fuels is, in my view, only sensible if we examine the system cost of the alternatives. Intermittent wind and intermittent solar come with expensive system cost requirements because they need a huge amount of additional capacity and a huge amount of transmission and distribution addition, and because they also need batteries, storage, extra pumped storage and so on, which are not needed in a world of nuclear, coal, or gas power. That is not to say that we might not prefer that new world, but if we want to have a low-carbon world we are going to internalise the pollution, which will cost. That is why electricity prices in Britain and Scotland are among the highest in the developed world.
That brings me to an additional point, which is that we are paying for that by using contracts for difference. CFDs pay a generator to generate at a fixed price. It does not matter whether the power is used or is useful. The generator pays nothing towards the transmission system, the excess capacity or the backup that the system requires. They do not pay any of the system costs; they are just paid to generate and, as we know, if the power is not needed they are still paid, as long as the wholesale price is above nought.
That is really serious because the renewables that are coming online in Scotland and Britain lock the prices in until 2040 and perhaps beyond. In a CFD-driven world—particularly in allocation round 8, given that the capital cost has gone up a lot because we now have the highest cost of Government debt in the developed world—electricity prices are going to be high for the whole of the next decade. That is crucial. It may be that the wholesale pool price is nought. If there is massive excess capacity in the system, which is what we are creating, prices in the wholesale market may well collapse, but customers in Scotland will not be paying that price. They will pay the CFD price of £70, £80, £90 or perhaps more than £100 per megawatt hour. Some of the offshore wind in Scotland already costs £113 per megawatt hour.
It is crucial to understand that the policy means that we have locked in a very high price, even though the wholesale price might be extremely low. Also, the problem with a very low wholesale price is the question of who is going to use that power. You might think, as I do, that that represents a fantastic opportunity, but the people who are going to use it must be able to use intermittent energy.
09:15
The problem here is that the future industries are not low-energy-intensity industries, and, at the moment, they are not industries that are able to use intermittent power. To use it, they need to have a hell of a lot of back-up and storage and so on, which involves additional costs. The new industries are among the most energy-intensive industries that the world has ever created. When it comes to data centres or artificial intelligence systems, people talk about the five nines—the 99.999 per cent availability and reliability that they require.
In Britain, we are building a system that is exactly the opposite of that. That is not to say that we should not do it, but we must recognise that one of the consequences is that the opportunity for an inflow of substantial AI and data centre technologies will be limited. Nearly all of that work is taking place in the United States. Although there will be some data centres here, because companies need to be close to customers, it is no accident that, around the world, operators of data centres are looking at small modular nuclear reactors, and many of them are building their own back-up diesel and gas generation to handle the intermittency of the wind that is being brought on to the system.
Is the huge surplus of energy that is being built up useful? Who is going to use it? That will be a major challenge in the future, because there will be big surpluses. When that happens, will we export it through the 10GW of cables to the continent, when it is also sunny and windy in the Netherlands, Germany and Scandinavia? Are those cables secure? That is a big, open question.
We also need to think about what we will do when the wind does not blow and the sun does not shine. The answer to that question is that Britain is already projected to need 35GW of gas on standby, running perhaps 4 or 5 per cent of the time, by 2030. That is a huge cost. In effect, we are talking about replicating, in a context of a peak demand of 45GW or 40GW, nearly the entire system with gas standby stations. That is a cost of intermittency.
In the “Cost of energy” review, I advocated that we should focus on firm power, that we should use equivalent firm power auctions and that we should treat the existing locked-in subsidies to past renewables as social costs. However, in shifting the costs from customers to taxpayers, it is really important to remember that, for the UK, the costs do not go away simply as a result of moving around the deck chairs when it comes to who pays. Ultimately, those costs are still the same.
If Britain wants to be a competitive economy and wants to achieve the economic growth that I think that all political parties agree on—why would they not?—we must face the fact that, when it comes to the three variables that count for competitiveness, which are the cost of energy, the cost of capital and the cost of labour, we have to do something about the really high cost of energy that is faced by industry. I have some suggestions about that.
We also have to do something about our having the highest borrowing costs in the developed world—I am talking about the 5.1 per cent return that is required on 10-year gilts—and to think about whether, in a world in which productivity is very low, increasing the costs of employing labour is going to increase our competitiveness. Of course, if productivity rises very strongly, the labour costs, relatively speaking, will be very different, but, right now, they are very high because productivity is low. Sadly, productivity is particularly low in the public sector—indeed, in some areas, it has not got back to pre-Covid levels.
That is the context. We can deal with climate change. As well as making a difference on climate change, we can deal with cost competitiveness and affordability. However, that will have very significant and, I would argue, painful consequences. I am glad that I am not in the political world, because trying to persuade the British public that paying for pollution is something that we will have to do is a task that is in your domain, not mine. I am grateful for that.
I hope that those introductory remarks help. I am happy to answer to the best of my ability any questions that members might have.
Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee
Meeting date: 1 September 2026
Duncan Massey
Thank you, Simon. That was another tremendous presentation. Colleagues, we will move to questions, and Kris Leask is first.
Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee
Meeting date: 1 September 2026
Duncan Massey
Thank you. I note that it is 10.45, and I think that we have had a—[Interruption.] Oh, sorry, Kate. I will bring you in now.
Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee
Meeting date: 1 September 2026
Duncan Massey
Thanks very much, Dieter. That was a tremendous presentation and introduction.
Do members have any questions?
Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee
Meeting date: 1 September 2026
Duncan Massey
We have time for probably just one more question.
Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee
Meeting date: 1 September 2026
Duncan Massey
I welcome Dr Simon Gill, director of grid innovation strategy and principal knowledge exchange fellow at the University of Strathclyde, who is our second speaker. There will be a similar format—a presentation and then questions afterwards.
Economy, Tourism and Energy Committee
Meeting date: 1 September 2026
Duncan Massey
Thank you. I call Daniel Johnson.