Crown Appointments
The next item of business is a debate on motion S2M-4380, in the name of Donald Gorrie, on behalf of the Procedures Committee, on its second report in 2006, on procedures relating to Crown appointments.
Thank you. I am happy to be moving the motion on behalf of the Procedures Committee.
I emphasise that the committee was asked to look at a very narrow aspect of the commissioners and their role—their reappointment. Since then, other committees and groups have become interested in the cost of the commissioners, whether we need so many, their remits and so on. The committee had nothing to do with any of that. Our report is only a small part of the overall picture. However, because of those other interests we will not press any of our recommendations, other than those on the standing orders. We will lay our recommendations on the table and push for them at the right time during the overall discussion.
The changes to standing orders on which members are being asked to vote are relatively minor. They will tidy up the system of reappointment and lay down rules that will enable the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body to bring whatever reappointment system is adopted to Parliament to be voted on. The same rules on the length of debates, majorities and so on will apply to appointments and reappointments.
We propose to delete two rules because they already exist in the Scotland Act 1998 or in the Scottish Parliamentary Standards Commissioner Act 2002. We do not see any point in having a standing order that just replicates a bit of an act. Whatever views members have on other aspects of the commissioners, I hope that the proposed new standing orders will receive general support.
For our report, we were asked to consider a number of different issues, the first of which was how to reappoint commissioners. Taking the approach of the Eurovision song contest, I say that the third and least popular proposition was that we just pat the incumbent on the head and tell them to carry on. That proposition received nul points.
Coming in second was the proposition that we rerun the initial competition. If a commissioner wanted to be reappointed, they would have to fight for their place against allcomers. That proposition was supported by Bruce McFee, who no doubt will speak with vigour and eloquence on the subject.
The remaining six members of the committee supported what we might call the middle road—a reappointment process that rigorously scrutinised how the incumbent had performed through a proper grilling by the SPCB. The difficulty is that if the commissioner's strength lies in the fact that they are entirely independent, how do we evaluate how well they have done? We grappled with that question for a long time and came to the conclusion that we should have an assessor who is knowledgeable about the commissioner's work to advise the SPCB on how the person had performed against the job specification and the legislation that set up their position. The assessor would not judge individual cases, but they would judge how well a person had performed in managing their operation, and they would provide advice to guide the SPCB's vigorous grilling of the commissioner. Six members of the committee thought that that was the best way forward, and I hope that it will be pursued.
I do not know whether I missed this point in the committee's report, but I cannot recall reading it: if a commissioner's reappointment is going to be turned down because they have received an unsatisfactory performance report, should not their bosses have warned them during their four or five years of tenure that their performance was becoming unsatisfactory, to give them a chance to remedy it? That is what would happen with a normal position. People do not suddenly get told that their performance is unsatisfactory and they are going to be dismissed. How do we get round that particular employment law problem?
That is an important point, and I should have mentioned it. The committee discussed and agreed that more use should be made of the annual report that the commissioner is supposed to make. The relevant committee would question the commissioner on their annual report and obvious dissatisfaction would be made apparent. That would address Mr Morgan's point. I think that the report covers the issue but, if it does not, it is certainly one of the points on which we were keen.
We have tried to find what we think is a sensible route. It is difficult to attract very good people to these arduous jobs that might last for only four or five years. It would be easier to attract people to the jobs if they knew that, as long as they were performing well, they would get eight, nine or 10 years in the post. That had to be balanced against an open competition.
Donald Gorrie assumes that even if the person is doing a good job and is the most suitable candidate, they would not be reappointed in an open competition, but presumably they would get the job for a second term if they were the best person for it.
Somebody even better might apply. The person in post might do well, but there might be somebody who the appointing committee feels is even better. There are difficulties in any approach to this issue, but the committee feels that its proposition is the fairest.
I will deal briefly with other points that the committee was asked to consider. We are totally against third-term reappointments, unless in very exceptional circumstances. On the removal of Crown appointees, the committee feels that the existing rules are adequate and that we do not need more of them. However, we made one minor point about voting thresholds: they are marginally different for different commissioners and they should be tidied up.
Just before Donald Gorrie summarises, will he tell us where the consumer's voice comes into this? At the moment, it appears as if we are Pooh-Bah and we do it all, yet there is supposed to be an ombudsman who responds to public complaints.
We are keen that they should be able to respond to public complaints without coming under pressure from us, but I do not think that there is any way of having a sort of plebiscite on whether a person should be reappointed. The situation would be dominated by two or three people who were not satisfied with a particular decision.
I want to make one other point about independence. Some rules allow the Parliament or the SPCB to give directions on the form and content of the annual reports of commissioner-type people. The committee feels that those rules should not be in place. They should be changed in due course and, until they are, the Parliament and the SPCB should not press the point. The independence of commissioners is key.
Members are not voting on such issues today, but I am presenting the Procedures Committee's report to Parliament. I hope that members will support the suggested changes to standing orders.
I move,
That the Parliament notes the Procedures Committee's 2nd Report 2006 (Session 2), Procedures relating to Crown appointments (SP Paper 515) and agrees that the changes to Standing Orders set out in Annexe A to the report be made with effect from 19 May 2006.
As Donald Gorrie suggests, the Procedures Committee's report was wide-ranging and it has been narrowed down to one proposal on changes to standing orders on the reappointment of Crown appointees.
I am aware of the Finance Committee's report on the accountability and governance of commissioners, and of the clear impacts that it had on the Procedures Committee's inquiry and report because of the crossover points. I hear the different views on how this Parliament should ensure that commissioners and ombudsmen are performing their duties well and stewarding public money properly. It is correct that we have a debate. However, the Procedures Committee's report accepts that such assessments should be a continuing process rather than a single event towards the end of a commissioner's term of office. Of course, we must always ensure that a commissioner's independence is not infringed. Those issues will take time to digest before recommendations can be made.
One issue of which I am certain is that the assessment process—whatever form it takes—should not prevent this Parliament from ensuring that it has the best available person for the job. Unfortunately, the proposed changes to standing orders will prevent that. They will, at a stroke, hand to the SPCB the ability to refuse to advertise a position, to refuse to seek or accept applications, to permit only one individual to apply—namely the present postholder—and to abolish competitive interviews. At the end of the process, everyone will express their surprise when the present postholder is reappointed.
There is no doubt about what will happen: the closed process will be followed by the SPCB. Time and again, the SPCB has told us that that is what it wants to do. It wants a non-competitive administrative process to reappoint commissioners. That is exactly the process that it used in the one opportunity that it had: there was a non-competitive interview.
During our inquiry, the Procedures Committee was never told about the drivers for change or about why we must adopt a closed-doors, non-competitive, shoo-in procedure. First we were told that the reason was cost. Then we were told that it was not cost but expertise and continuity—only for us to discover that, if the existing postholder possessed the appropriate level of expertise and other attributes, they could go forward to a competitive interview. Then we were told that a five-year term would deter people from applying in the first instance. Not a single scrap of evidence was provided to support any claim.
However, thanks to Donald Gorrie today, we now know why we need a non-competitive, closed-list, one-application-only procedure: it is in case there might be somebody "even better" for the job. What a wonderful principle on which to base reappointments to posts—"For God's sake, don't open it up to competition, because we might get somebody who's even better."
Not a single scrap of evidence was provided to the committee to demonstrate why a change to a non-competitive administrative reappointment process was required, or why such a process was more desirable than an open and competitive process. We were told that cost might be a reason—it could be around £20,000 for the full process—but I submit that that is nothing compared with the millions of pounds that are spent by commissioners and ombudsmen.
A principle must be upheld any time that this Parliament makes an appointment or reappointment: the best candidate must get the job. That principle will be sacrificed if the proposed changes to standing orders are accepted. Not only will it leave us open to charges of offering jobs for the boys and girls, it will confirm that things are not done differently here and that, in the brave, new Scotland, positions are protected and challenge is not permitted.
Reappointments should be honest, open and competitive and should be aimed at driving up standards, not at accepting mediocrity simply because we do not want to rock the boat.
Bruce McFee is a hard act to follow. Throughout this whole process, he has been persistent in taking his isolated line.
Will the member take an intervention?
A very brief one.
Does the member agree with Donald Gorrie that we do not want to open up the reappointment process to competitive interview because there might be somebody even better?
No, I do not, and I do not think that that is what Donald Gorrie meant either.
Throughout the process, Bruce McFee, representing the Scottish National Party, has taken the view that we have been discussing some kind of automatic reappointment, but never at any stage did the committee believe it was talking about that. The request for us to consider possibilities for the process of reappointment for a second and possibly a third term was reasonable. Having considered the possibilities, we believed that it was reasonable that, if the right person was in the job and was doing a good job, they should expect to have a route by which they could be reappointed for a second term.
Will the member take an intervention?
No, not at the moment.
We went on to decide that third-term reappointment was inappropriate and that, in order to deal with any difficulties in appointing a replacement at the end of the second term, there should perhaps be limitations on the time of the second term, to allow some flexibility.
The one concern that the committee got bogged down in reflects the very point that Bruce McFee is most concerned about—that is, how we assess the quality of the person who is in the job so that we can decide whether it is appropriate for them to continue. That is the issue on which the committee found itself slightly at odds with the SPCB representatives who gave evidence. Yes, it is essential that the performance of incumbents is rigorously assessed, but how do we decide whether they have done the job appropriately and well, and how do we decide whether they are worthy of entering the reappointment process?
The corporate body seemed to think that it was in a position to make that assessment, and it may well be qualified to do so, but we disagreed, because there must be a truly unbiased, independent and non-political way of determining the performance of office-holders. We all know that we will disagree with decisions that they make, often for fundamentally political reasons. That should never be a reason for us to object to their holding their jobs. The competence and independence of those people is key, which is why we came to the rather clumsy but inevitable conclusion that an assessor has to be involved in the process. Although the corporate body resisted that idea, we have insisted that someone should have that role.
I turn to some of the other proposals. As Donald Gorrie said, a number of suggestions emerged as a result of the committee handling the SPCB's request. We have indicated that, at some time in the future, primary legislation might be necessary to end the possibility of reappointment for a third term; to standardise the procedures relating to the removal of postholders and the reasons for such removal; and to take away the power to direct the Scottish public services ombudsman on the nature of reports. Perhaps there should be independence on that.
Will the member give way?
No.
I am keen to hear the views of members and the Executive on whether the Executive could introduce legislation to deal with those matters or whether a committee bill—which would enable the committee to make decisions about how to proceed—is likely to be necessary. I await their responses with interest.
I am pleased to take part in the debate. I suppose that it is unusual for a committee member to acknowledge that the Executive will not accept all the committee's recommendations. As both the convener of our committee and Alex Johnstone mentioned, we hope to be able to address that situation later in the session by introducing a committee bill to deal with some of the issues that we uncovered in the course of our inquiry into the reappointment of Crown appointees.
As other members have said, some time ago the Presiding Officer asked the committee to examine the issue in detail. Bruce McFee said that the reappointment process should be open, honest and above board, but I do not agree; it must be open, honest and above board. There is no room for any doubt. The process must also be seen to be open and honest by members of the Parliament, the public and the office-holders concerned.
Will the member give way on that issue?
I will move on. [Interruption.]
Order. Mr McFee, the member who is holding the floor is not giving way.
Thank you for your protection, Presiding Officer.
The committee was asked to consider the possibility of Crown appointees being reappointed and the introduction of procedures to deal with that. It was also asked to determine whether standing orders could be amended to specify the special circumstances under which it would be possible to reappoint some Crown appointees for a third term and whether a parliamentary mechanism could be introduced to facilitate the removal from office of Crown appointees. Those are all important issues.
As well as taking evidence, committee members brought their experience as parliamentarians to bear on how matters should proceed. We felt strongly that reappointment should not take place automatically and that an office-holder should be able to demonstrate that they have carried out their job confidently and ably and in a way in which we would have wanted it to be done.
According to the letter from Margaret Curran that was distributed yesterday, the Executive does not accept the requirement for a second assessment. If a commissioner who is up for reappointment receives a good assessment that says that he has done his job well, on what possible grounds could that individual fail the subsequent interview?
We will have to wait for an answer on that and talk the matter through. In our report, we mention that there must be a mechanism to allow someone to be removed from post, as well as a way of measuring how an individual has carried out their job.
I hope that the Executive will find time in the parliamentary timetable to deal with those issues, because it is important that we get the process right. Although the present number of Crown appointees is manageable and the existing legislation can cope, we must ensure that we adopt a uniform approach to all Crown appointees' terms of office and to how they can be reappointed or removed from office. I hope that the Executive will welcome the adoption of such an approach as being in the interests of the good management of its organisation, of the Parliament and of public office-holders, who are accountable to the people of Scotland.
The Procedures Committee has given the matter a great deal of detailed consideration. We believe that it is important to put in place a mechanism that will allow us to deal with the necessary processes in the coming months, which are galloping towards us. We should agree to the motion in the name of Donald Gorrie, which seeks to put in place an administrative mechanism that will ensure the good and smooth running of the Parliament.
On behalf of the SPCB, I thank the Procedures Committee for undertaking such a comprehensive review of Crown appointees who are nominated by the Parliament. Throughout the committee's inquiry, the SPCB provided written and oral evidence and we are grateful to the committee for allowing us to do so.
The SPCB invited the Procedures Committee to consider changes to standing orders that would allow reappointments to be made and would clarify the special circumstances under which it would be possible for an office-holder to be reappointed for a third term, if that was desirable. The committee was also asked to assess the extension of standing orders to allow for the removal of those office-holders who are not already covered.
In general, the SPCB welcomes the recommendations in the committee's report and we will consider how we can give effect to most of them as soon as possible. In particular, we welcome the conclusion that the Parliament should adopt a largely administrative reappointment process, as part of which office-holders would be subject to a panel interview conducted by the SPCB. It is already the case that an assessor is appointed to oversee any interview process to ensure the probity of reappointment proceedings.
We note the committee's recommendations that, prior to interview, an independent assessor should be appointed to undertake an appraisal of the office-holder's performance against a published set of criteria and that a report should be sent to the SPCB. We are considering the mechanics of introducing an appraisal process because we acknowledge that by introducing one not only would the SPCB be provided with an independent and comprehensive picture of the officer-holder's term in office, but the Parliament would have added confidence in the reappointment process.
The member will be aware of Margaret Curran's letter, which states the views of the Executive. Doubt is expressed about whether it is necessary to have two assessments, which is a requirement that some members of the committee have hung their whole case on. After an assessment has been carried out and the SPCB has received a report that says that a commissioner is doing their job reasonably well, how could they fail a subsequent interview? On what grounds could that individual's reappointment be turned down?
I am afraid that I am not aware of the letter. That is a matter of regret. If I may, I will move on.
Given the provision in all the enabling legislation for the SPCB to appoint an acting office-holder, we note the committee's recommendation that third-term appointments should not be made.
The committee also recommended that second-term reappointments should, as part of standard practice, be limited to four years. Although we will give serious consideration to that recommendation, our view is that we require the flexibility to be able to offer a shorter term in certain circumstances. For example, an office-holder might advise us that, for personal reasons, they wish to remain in post for only a further three years.
The committee has invited views on whether it should formally propose a committee bill to give effect to its recommendations for legislative change. The SPCB views that as desirable. In particular, we welcome the proposal to regularise the position of all office-holders in relation to removal from office and the provision of specific grounds for removal.
We are aware that the Finance Committee is undertaking an inquiry into the costs and accountability of commissioners and ombudsmen, on which I will give evidence to the committee in June. That inquiry might highlight other changes that need to be made to the enabling legislation, so it might be prudent to await its conclusions before we further consider whether the Procedures Committee should lodge a committee bill.
The SPCB welcomes the Procedures Committee's proposed changes to the standing orders to provide for reappointments, and, for consistency, to delete rules 3.12 and 3A.2, which provide for the removal of office-holders. We welcome the proposal that the Parliament should instead rely on statutory provisions for the appointment and reappointment of all office-holders.
The Procedures Committee is to be commended for undertaking its comprehensive review of the subject and for its identification of gaps and inconsistencies in the relevant legislation and standing orders.
I do not take issue with the recommendation that the SPCB should take the leading role in determining whether various office-holders should be recommended to the Parliament for reappointment for a second term. However, in paragraph 14 of the report, I note that the committee considered the option of reconvening the original selection panel, but discarded it in favour of the SPCB fulfilling the role. The committee did that because
"some or all of the members of the original Selection Panel may have moved post or left the Parliament altogether."
In that context, it is worth while making the observation that turnover in the membership of the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body is not exactly unknown. Indeed, not only does none of the original five members of the corporate body still serve in that capacity, but Sir David Steel and my friend John Young are no longer members of the Parliament. That said, I believe that the members of the SPCB can bring the necessary qualities to the role in question, the determining factor of which is not continuity of personnel but the ability to build corporate expertise over time and to demonstrate a degree of independence of judgment.
I was intrigued by the discussion of the performance assessments that independent assessors might undertake when the question of reappointment arises. In particular, I was intrigued to note the recommendation in paragraph 21 that the performance assessment should not be published. Of course, any objection to the proposal may impose an intriguing dilemma for at least one of the office-holders whose reappointment may be under consideration.
The committee should be commended for its review of the maximum term that the various appointees can serve. I whole-heartedly endorse its recommendation that that should be rationalised and that a two-term limit should be set on all appointments. In that respect, the proposed committee bill to amend the various statutes would mirror the 22nd amendment to the constitution of the United States of America that was ratified in 1951. British Prime Ministers may aspire to go on and on, but presidents of the United States cannot do so. In my judgment, the US model is a better constitutional model for us to follow in the case of all our appointees.
We support the motion.
I congratulate Mr McLetchie on livening up the debate. I will pass no comment on the longevity of certain office-holders in British political life.
I thank the Procedures Committee very much for its report and take this opportunity to emphasise the committee's contribution to the running of the Parliament. In my post, I am often in discussion with the Procedures Committee—usually our discussion is consensual, although I get the odd challenge from time to time. The Parliament is moving towards ensuring that we create parliamentary processes that fundamentally work. That is in the interest of members. The Procedures Committee, of course, champions that approach. The committee discharges its work effectively; this morning's debate is part of that.
The report makes recommendations on the reappointment and removal of Crown appointees and other ancillary changes in that regard. Those are primarily matters for the Parliament, given that it controls the governance of the posts, but the Executive has an interest in the matter. We sponsored the legislation that established the Scottish public services ombudsman—I need to think of a way of saying ombudsperson without it sounding clumsy—the Scottish information commissioner and the commissioner for public appointments in Scotland. It is clear that the Executive has a policy interest in the matter.
Of course and more generally, as members, we have an interest in the good governance of public bodies to ensure that value for money is achieved for taxpayers, from whom the money ultimately comes. Often, what is associated with the commissioners is the expenditure of public moneys, for which we are all accountable. The Executive welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the debate.
I acknowledge my appreciation of the Procedures Committee for taking on board the wider points that I made in response to its inquiry. I think that we are all aware of the broader interest in the Parliament in the effectiveness, governance and accountability of the commissioners. That interest is cross-party and widespread; indeed, it has been the subject of debate in a number of avenues in the Parliament. Accountability and governance in relation to commissioners and similar appointments is the subject of a current Finance Committee inquiry. In addition, with the agreement of the Parliament, the Scottish Commissioner for Human Rights Bill will lead to the appointment of a commissioner for human rights. The Justice 1 Committee has a strong interest in that bill. I appreciate the wording in the amendments to our standing orders that the Procedures Committee proposes in that regard.
From my discussions with colleagues, I am aware of the strong consensus in favour of having coherent frameworks for governance and clear structures around accountability for the various commissioners and other appointments with which we are involved. It is important that the Parliament holds that broader debate. I welcome the approach to those broader issues that the Procedures Committee has taken in its report.
The Procedures Committee was tasked with offering a view on how best the Parliament should handle nominations for the reappointment of Crown appointees. In its report, the committee focused on the importance of establishing transparent procedures that would incorporate an assessment of an office-holder's performance of the relevant function to date. The Executive welcomes the committee's approach in recognising the need to establish the appropriate mechanisms to support the statutory obligations that are placed on the Parliament but which also preserve the independence of the office-holders. That point was emphasised in the debate.
Although the Executive respects, and in certain cases has promoted legislation to support, the independence of Crown appointees, there is obviously a requirement for the Parliament to have procedures under which the performance of those who hold positions of independence can be considered as objectively as possible. Clearly, that is unavoidable when there is a need to ensure the integrity of public functions and, of course, the best use of public funds. The committee's response addresses those issues and recognises the challenges and difficulties that need to be overcome.
Clearly, the arrangements that need to be put in place will differ from those that the Executive uses routinely for its appointees. The role of the Parliament's Crown appointees is substantially different and requires an approach that underlines their degree of independence and takes account of the way in which they undertake their respective functions. Appraisal arrangements must reflect in principle and in practice that relationship, which is often different for the Parliament.
However, we are pleased that, as a starting point, the committee took account of the requirements that are placed on the Executive in relation to reappointments. Our general view is that the proposals for assessing the performance of commissioners and the reappointment procedures are sensible in principle. We probably go along with the SPCB's concerns about whether involving two assessors in the reappointment procedures is proportionate or practical. Perhaps a single assessor could undertake the tasks. However, that issue is not critical and it certainly does not jeopardise the Executive's support for the committee's proposals.
We note that the report recognises the independence of Crown appointees. We approve of the emphasis on that and of the recommendation that the criteria against which an office-holder's performance is measured should be made public. That recommendation aims to make clear the basis on which suitability is assessed and to avoid the accusation that decisions by an office-holder have impinged on their chance of being reappointed.
The Executive is happy to support the committee's motion and looks forward to considering the remaining recommendations in due course. I will take advice on legislative timetables. It would be wrong of me to make a legislative commitment now and to provide time for that, because many issues need to be factored in. However, I am happy to discuss that with the committee's convener and other appropriate people.
I call Karen Gillon to wind up the debate for the committee. You have just over 13 minutes for your speech.
Aye, okay. Thank—you—very—much—Presiding—Officer. [Laughter.] It is not funny. Why do I always get the job of winding up? Donald Gorrie will do it next time.
I can help the member with an intervention.
I am happy to take an intervention—as many as members like.
As Donald Gorrie is a Liberal, my intervention may open a door to Karen Gillon. Does she agree with his assumption that one problem of opening the reappointment procedure to competition is that someone who is even better for the post might be found? Is it valid for the Scottish Parliament not to open reappointments to competitive interview simply because somebody who is better for the job might be found?
I promise to answer those questions after I have given the gist of my speech.
I thank all members who have spoken in the debate, which has been interesting. Alasdair Morgan made a fair point about appraisal. It is important for the Parliament continually to appraise the roles and responsibilities of people whom we appoint. That is a difficult job that we must perform while maintaining the postholder's independence. I hope that if somebody went way off the line, the Parliament would pass a motion of no confidence and that person would be removed from the post.
Bruce McFee has maintained his position throughout the committee's consideration of the subject. I have some sympathy with the points that he has made about having a competitive process. Under the non-competitive process, the SPCB must first assess whether the postholder is doing the job as we set it out. The SPCB always has the option of saying no and of opening the post to competition. The non-competitive process is cheaper and simpler when there is no good case for looking beyond the postholder, but it keeps options open when there is a case for doing that.
I will proceed with my point.
I understand the point that Bruce McFee makes about the view of my colleague Mr Gorrie. Sometimes, I disagree with the positions that the committee's convener takes in his various capacities. My response is that I hope that we have the best person in the job in the first place. Finding that person is the role of the initial interview and selection process. Continuity in such posts over two terms has benefits. Postholders need time to get into their job, to make contacts, to build relationships and to develop their team of staff. Having continuity over two terms of office allows a good-quality postholder the time in their second term to build on the experience and expertise that they gained in their first term.
I will take an intervention in a minute.
If we are serious about appointing to posts the best people—the people whom we want to take such positions—we must offer them at least the option of having eight years in the post, if they are doing a good job. If we do not offer that, the quality of applicants for posts will be lower, because the posts will offer no job security. Bruce McFee knows that as the holder of a four-year fixed-term position that is reviewed under an open selection process. Some would say that that is why he will not go through that open selection process at the end of his four-year term. Postholders are given a role and responsibilities. If they fulfil them, they must have surety that they will be able to have their post for eight years.
Perhaps a good argument has been made for non-competitive interview.
Does Karen Gillon accept that if an individual is doing the job that they are supposed to do, existing legislation offers every possibility that they can be reappointed for a second term as she desires? Will she answer the following question, which I have asked three other members who made the same proposal as she has? If a sitting candidate is given a good assessment and they have a non-competitive interview, on what grounds can they fail that interview?
I could have a great assessment but answer a question at my interview about how I intend to do my job in the next four years by suddenly changing my position. I could say, "Actually, I think what we've done in the past four years was a lot of rubbish and we should do this instead." If that diverged completely from what had been done, we could say that somebody should not be reappointed. If it emerged in the interview process that a person was flawed—if they made a racist, sexist or homophobic remark—that would give the corporate body reason to consider whether that person should be reappointed.
The member is struggling.
I am not struggling. We must ask whether we want a full competitive interview process. I do not want such a process, which would not be in the best interests of the commissioners' posts. My personal view is that Scotland has far too many commissioners. The Finance Committee's inquiry should consider whether we have too many commissioners, whether duplication is taking place and whether there is room for considering existing roles and responsibilities. Before we establish any more commissioners, we should consider whether they are needed or whether other people could undertake the proposed roles.
David McLetchie made a fair point about selection panels. I accept his suggestion that we should seek to build up expertise in the corporate body. Perhaps the report's wording was not as clear as it could have been. The question that faced the committee was whether we should recall an initial selection panel after four years or whether a more appropriate body in the Parliament could undertake that panel's role. If the first interview panel was recalled and it involved people who were no longer MSPs, they would no longer be accountable to the Parliament, so committee members felt on balance that it would be inappropriate for those people to be members of a reselection panel.
The corporate body's personnel might change in four years, but it is still the corporate body of the Parliament and it still has roles and responsibilities. Its members are accountable to the Parliament and are elected by the Parliament. That is why we felt that as the reappointments process operates—several reappointments will be due—the most appropriate body for the task was the corporate body, whose members are elected on a free vote of the Parliament.
Does Karen Gillon accept that, to take on board the Procedures Committee's points, introducing an annual appraisal—as she has suggested—will go a long way towards satisfying everybody's desire for office-holders to do their jobs as best they can in the Parliament's view?
We have been grappling with this matter of reappointing for some time, as we always seem to do in the Procedures Committee. We do not like to do anything—and I mean anything—quickly.
Even speaking.
I am trying to speak very slowly.
Having an annual appraisal process will help, but it is important for the way in which people perform their functions that there is a level of independence. I have been present when a person's character has been ripped to shreds on the floor of the Parliament. That person did his job, I think, completely without fear or favour to any party, yet he had to sit and listen to Mr McFee's colleagues ripping apart his character here in the chamber for no apparent reason. That illustrates one of the principal reasons why we must be careful how we appraise people and how we go through the reappointments process.
Commissioners and the Parliament are in a no-win position, whatever we do. If we choose to appoint somebody, the accusation will be levelled that they are just our poodle; if we choose not to reappoint a person, the accusation will be levelled that we are getting rid of them just because they did something that we did not like. We have a free press in Scotland, which can hold the Parliament to account. We have parliamentary committees that pride themselves on taking their job seriously and on carrying out their responsibilities.
It is important that there are relationships between the commissioners and the appropriate committees, so that annual reports can be considered and so that committees can consider what issues to pursue and what legislation might need to be changed. We can consider whether there are issues on which we might need to challenge the Executive. Are there ways in which the job of the commissioner in question could be improved or developed? The Parliament will have to take such decisions. It is a matter of doing so properly while maintaining the postholder's independence. The Parliament has to be very clear on that.
Will the member note the current position in legislation, whereby appointees cannot take up office in public life again for three years? That issue has not been introduced into the debate. However, it means that the candidates of a suitable quality whom we might seek will put themselves in an inhibiting position when they first apply, especially if they have only one term in office. They might be excluded from taking up many positions for three years thereafter.
Mr Scott makes a very fair point. Despite my well-known reservations about commissioners, I am exceptionally keen to ensure that, when we choose to appoint them, we get the best people for the job. Mr Scott's point about people then not being able to do another job in public life is a fair one, as I said. If somebody has been doing a job and there is nothing in the way that they have done that job or in their interview that suggests that they have acted inappropriately; if the corporate body makes an assessment of that; if an appraisal of their job skills is made; if an independent assessment is made of their interview; and if all that is seen to be fair and accountable, that person should be given the opportunity to retain their post for eight years. That is entirely appropriate and we should accept it. That is the right way for us to proceed. Having said that, I respect those who hold a different point of view.
Will the deputy convener reassure Mr McFee—perhaps I should have done so in my opening speech—that the proposed standing order changes will in no way inhibit his proposition from going through in due course, if that is the decision that is taken? It is not necessary for him to vote against the proposed standing order changes today. They merely tidy up the arrangements, whichever way we decide to deal with reappointments in due course.
Far be it from me to prescribe to Mr McFee the way in which he should vote. If the corporate body believes that an open selection process is appropriate for a particular job, I hope that it could implement that within the rules. I support the motion in Mr Gorrie's name and I urge the Parliament to support it at decision time.