Audit Committee, 06 Feb 2008

Meeting date: Wednesday, February 6, 2008

Official Report 227KB pdf

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“Police call management—An initial review”

Agenda item 2 is "Police call management—An initial review". Before us is Robert Gordon, who is the director general—I believe that that is the title—in the justice directorates and whatever else may be there. With him are Linda Rosborough and Stephen Woodhouse. Welcome to the committee.

Before asking questions, I will make a comment to Mr Gordon that also applies to any future correspondence with accountable officers. The committee has discussed Mr Gordon's response to its letter. We were disappointed that not all the questions that we asked were fully answered. The committee felt that the response was circuitous and vague, and we will pick up on some of the details. When we write to accountable officers in the future, we might specify that they should answer each point that we raise.

I will ask a general introductory question about 0845 and 0870 numbers. The trend for using such numbers seems to be increasing among public agencies. I understand that some might feel that if the cost of calling an 0845 number were the same throughout Scotland, that would be equitable and fair. However, we live in an era in which many people no longer use land-lines; they use mobile phones, which incur a significant cost in calling such numbers. Many people have inclusive call packages that do not cover such numbers. Therefore, for many members of the community, particularly poorer people, a disproportionate cost is involved. There is also an opportunity to look at the use of 03 numbers—the equivalent of 0800 numbers. Would you consider doing that?

Thank you for the welcome, convener. I will ask Linda Rosborough to respond to the question. Before I do so, if I may, I will answer your earlier point.

Certainly.

I thought that I would be given the opportunity to say a couple of words at the outset, by way of introduction.

Sorry—I beg your pardon.

In considering my letter of 23 November, some members thought that it was written too much in the style of Sir Humphrey Appleby. As you know from previous experience, convener, that is not my preferred style. I apologise unreservedly to the committee for failing to provide a response that met its expectations.

Some of the difficulty may lie in the division of responsibility among chief constables, police authorities and the Government—that oft-quoted, but less well-defined, tripartite relationship. I am sure that we will return to that matter in questioning today, as members seek to clarify who is responsible for what.

I will take the example of the investment programme in call or contact centres, which began in the early part of the decade and which Audit Scotland describes in its report. I guess that that programme reflected a different understanding of where the responsibilities lie than exists today. As the session proceeds, I hope that we will come on to some of the steps that have been taken over the past two or three years to clarify and set straight the relationships and responsibilities among chief constables, police authorities or boards and the Government. We will probably also talk about the various bits of machinery that were established when the Parliament legislated for the Scottish Police Services Authority to provide common services. For example, from April this year, the SPSA will provide all information and communications technology support. It will also support other mechanisms, such as the group that developed the policing performance framework, on which all parties came together. I hope that we will come on to that later.

Again, I apologise unreservedly for not satisfying the committee in my response, convener. Linda Rosborough will deal with your question on 0845 and other numbers.

The 0845 number was set up to provide a system that worked well when most people used land-lines. People could access a number and pay the price of a local call. Public authorities and wider business could advertise a single number and handle calls efficiently, which was attractive to the public sector and beyond. However, the usage of mobile technology has grown. People are now on variable tariffs, including pay-as-you-go services, that make some calls very expensive. Any call beyond a simple call to a land-line is charged at an expensive rate. However, practice varies as to whether tariffs include free calls to 0845 numbers.

In the past, the Office of Communications has looked at 0870 numbers and has tried to tighten up things in that regard. It has also said that it will look at the regime around 0845 numbers. Indeed, at one stage, it said that it would consult on new ways forward by the end of last year, but no such document has appeared thus far. It has recently brought out 03 numbers that provide for the call to be charged at 01 or 02 rates. Significantly, it has said that suppliers have to include those numbers in the packages that they provide. The public sector has the option of using those new 03 numbers. They were introduced as recently as last May, so experience is still filtering through, but they may provide a way forward.

I know that other agencies are looking at options such as providing a national number with a geographic code as an alternative to an 0845 number. Grampian Police is providing a number that can be used for texts, which are relatively cheap for people using mobile technology. There are a number of different options that agencies can use as alternatives to 0845 numbers, to supplement such numbers and to provide people on the more expensive packages with a cheaper option.

Will you discuss with the forces the advisability of providing an 03 option and of making available a normal land-line number for those who wish to use it—not just for this, but for other functions?

I have been involved personally in discussions with local authorities and forces that are interested in the 101 experiment. At our next meeting in March, I will bring to their attention the issue that you raise.

I want to pursue the same issue. The question of 0845 numbers is relevant not only to people who use mobile phones but to people who call from land-lines. The historical position was that a standard local rate was charged. However, now many people are on packages that provide them with free local calls, so an 0845 number may represent a substantial additional cost, compared with what they would regard as a local rate.

We raised the issue in our correspondence with you. Mr Gordon, in your reply you say that there are two strands of work that

"are likely to lead to consideration of several of the issues raised by the Committee, including the use of 0845 numbers".

Can you say more about those strands of work? When is a conclusion likely to be reached on the subject, which is of concern to the public?

I will let Linda Rosborough talk about the strands in which she is involved as part of the wider public service reform agenda. Doug Cross, who is the corporate director of Tayside Police, is leading a short-life group on national call-handling standards. The Government will want to engage with the group, which has just been formed. Issues of the kind that are being discussed today will be part of that conversation.

Following the rapid developments in technology that have taken place, different forces here and south of the border have looked at the options that are available. We can say more about the 101 experiment, but the model has been tested and there is a possible use for it. We need to keep abreast of developments such as the emergence of 03 numbers and the possibility that Ofcom will tighten up regulation to deal with some of the issues that the convener and Murdo Fraser have raised.

If we are to make the best possible decisions, we must take account of the point that different police forces have reached in the development of numbers locally. We want to be part of that conversation. I would like conclusions to emerge in the course of this year, although implementation of those decisions may take longer. The pace at which the process will move forward will be driven partly by other parties. Clearly, all the parties to which the recommendations in the Audit Scotland report are addressed need to respond within a reasonable timescale.

If I may say so, that does not sound like a particularly accelerated timescale for trying to reach a conclusion. I am aware that a number of police authorities south of the border have introduced an 03 number. I would have thought that if they are capable of taking that decision and moving forward on it, with a clear benefit to the public, we would be able to move rapidly on it in Scotland. I am not entirely content with what you say about the likely timescale for implementation.

I offer that timescale because I have not had a detailed discussion with Mr Cross of Tayside Police or, indeed, with any police interests. From my experience of these areas in the Crown Office and over the past five or six years, I know that it takes time to secure agreement among a range of bodies that have to agree before moving forward. However, you may be assured that I will use my best endeavours to ensure that we move as quickly as we can.

I have a couple of questions that partly flow from that. What is the experience elsewhere—if there is any—of the effectiveness of an alternative to the 999 number? What is your emerging thinking on that? In other words, what are the logistical and operational implications of trying to concentrate emergencies on the 999 number and having an identified alternative number for non-emergency or lower-ranked issues? How well has that approach worked elsewhere? If it has not been tried elsewhere, what is your emerging thinking on it?

I will let Linda Rosborough add something in a minute. The difficulty is that the 999 number is well known to everybody, but other numbers have so far not achieved the same currency. The Audit Scotland report shows that if people are not sure which number to ring, they ring 999. There is obviously an issue about marketing numbers and educating people to understand the difference between them. Some forces that have marketed 0845 numbers have evidence that shows that, to some extent, people use that number rather than the 999 number. Obviously, if a 101, 03 or whatever number was well known, people might make a distinction between it and the 999 number.

The Audit Scotland report also shows that the availability of call centres and the likelihood that calls will usually be answered mean that the number of calls that go through has increased significantly, but the demand for the 999 number has not decreased significantly.

The Home Office has funded a major programme with five pilot areas working with a 101 number. The programme involves a partnership between police and local authorities on dealing with non-emergency issues that generally fall into the antisocial behaviour category. The police and local authorities work together with a defined series of eight services to ensure that there is sufficient call-handling capacity to capture calls and that they can do something about the problems that are brought to their attention.

The pilots started in 2006—members might have heard of the Cardiff pilot and others—and the experience of those pathfinders is that the services are popular with the public: people are generally satisfied by how their call is dealt with and by the service provided. However, the jury is still out on whether the pilots have successfully reduced the number of 999 calls. The research showed that, when asked what they would have done if they had not phoned 101, 15 per cent of people said that they would have dialled 999, but the number of 999 calls in the pilot areas has not shown a consistent drop of that order. The picture is mixed.

The Home Office paid the total cost of those pilots, but it announced fairly recently that it would not meet the local costs in the future. It will continue to maintain the central contract, but local partnerships will have to decide whether to continue the service. In practice, of the five pilots, two have decided to continue, one has dropped out, one will retain a small element in one geographical area and one is undecided. There is a mixed picture of people's enthusiasm.

The evidence is that the service brings to the surface quite a lot of suppressed demand, which might involve abandoned cars or antisocial behaviour, so good ways must exist to deal with that demand. The service to support the number must exist if confidence is to be retained.

The package that the Home Office negotiated through Cable and Wireless and Ofcom for all providers involves a flat-rate charge of 10p a call, regardless of the caller's package or type of phone, and a charge of 1p a minute to the recipient. That package is fairly cost effective for both sides.

We in Scotland have been interested in how applicable such a scheme might be and what the opportunities are. Last year, we commissioned Glasgow City Council to examine readiness in Scotland, to visit pilot studies and to evaluate the ways forward. As the Home Office has ended its pilot stage, I have talked to it about where it is going and what the opportunities for Scotland might be. The Home Office is preparing a model of how partnerships beyond the original five, including partnerships in the United Kingdom outside England and Wales, could be part of the 101 scheme. The Home Office is working out protocols, what it would expect and what would be required. I am discussing that with the Home Office.

I have a problem. We have heard many words, but I am not sure what they mean; I am having difficulty in comprehending them. We are addressing a practical problem that requires a practical solution. In the real world, the consumer chooses the best-value service and buys it. Can you indicate what, so far, represents best practice and best value, instead of simply relating the different options that we have heard about so far?

We seem to be lost between a short-life group, call centre standards, looking at options and—somewhere along the line—the tripartite relationship and who is responsible. The system seems a recipe for confusion. Should not such relationships be clarified and simplified? Should not a practical solution be found to a practical problem? Nothing that I have heard even heads in that direction. When and how will you solve the problem?

We will solve the problem by engaging with police forces through the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland's group. That is how such matters are taken forward when the responsibility lies primarily with police forces, with some Government interest to encourage them in the direction that the committee wants them to go in.

Given where the Government wants to go in its relationship with local government, we are not in a position where the centre—ministers—can mandate that a particular solution is to be applied. We need to work with the people who have the primary interest, including police authorities, which would find the resources from the budgets that they have been allocated to make a non-emergency number happen.

That fits in with what you said in your letter:

"The two strands of work outlined above are likely to lead to consideration of… the issues raised by the Committee…"

However, one strand requires "substantial resource costs" and the other involves funding that you tell us the Home Office has said it is withdrawing. In other words, we are no nearer a solution. The problem is a practical one and it requires a practical solution. I see no solution emerging from anything that I have heard thus far.

My view is that we will get to a practical solution. We will work assiduously to reach one. Evidence of successful working together in other areas should be applicable to this area, too.

I share Andrew Welsh's confusion and frustration. I have a simple question: have you decided that there should be a national non-emergency number?

No. That is not a firm decision as yet. There has been—

Have you taken a decision that there should not be a national non-emergency number?

No.

So you are in limbo.

No. With other stakeholders, we are working out the best way to do this. There is evidence, one example of which is the arrangement in the Grampian Police area involving the use of the 0845 number.

The current situation reflects how things have happened in the past, when different solutions were applied to different areas. We are trying to find a solution that will apply across the piece.

But the last meeting of those involved was held on 13 November and we are now into February. People are using 999 calls for all sorts of purposes. The radio and newspapers tell us again and again about the misuse of the 999 number. There is an urgent need to get agreement on a national non-emergency number. I agree with Andrew Welsh: you seem to be sitting around waiting for a solution to come from Cardiff or London, or out of the blue. Surely you should be taking some proactive action.

As I said earlier, we are engaging with Doug Cross and the ACPOS representatives—they are the practitioners. Linda Rosborough described the work that is going on in other areas. We cannot simply say, "This shall happen," and it happens overnight.

Why not? Scotland is not a big country; we are only 5 million people. The Government could decide that it would be in the public interest to have a national non-emergency number. Having taken that decision, and working within the framework of that decision, you could then discuss and negotiate implementation with the local authorities and police.

If the evidence from the Home Office's work in a number of partnerships across England and Wales had been that investing in a 101 number—which is complicated and expensive—had led to a sharp and clear-cut reduction in the number of 999 calls, we would not be speaking to the committee in this way. However, the evidence was that the jury is out. Having spent a lot of money putting in place an alternative to the 999 number, the Home Office found no sharp and clear reduction in the number of 999 calls.

If that is the case, you will have to come to a decision at some point to reject or accept the option. You cannot just drift on. At what point will you make the decision on whether the evidence from England and Wales is sufficient to justify rejection or whether you should try a Scottish option? If you can answer the question today, that is fine. If you cannot answer it, I hope that, once you have discussed the matter with ACPOS and the local authorities, you will come back to the committee relatively quickly and tell us when a decision will be made.

We will seek to get that decision as soon as possible.

Whatever happens, do you have plans to improve education and awareness about the use of 999 and, if there are to be alternatives, the use of other numbers?

The Audit Scotland report showed that there were areas in which such work had been done. Part of our engagement with the group that Mr Cross chairs will be to see that that is spread across the country, in the context of seeking a standard non-emergency number of the sort that has been discussed this morning.

Convener—

Is it on something that has not been covered? I want to move on quickly to the subject of response times.

I have one further question for Mr Gordon.

You said in reply to the convener that you would return to the matter. Tayside Police has already introduced an 0845 number. Lothian and Borders Police is considering it. They are getting ahead, while you are sitting around doing nothing. It will cost people substantial amounts of money to use those numbers. Lothian and Borders Police and Tayside Police will presumably promote them. You have been considering the experiments that have been taking place down south, but forces there are giving up 0845 numbers and moving to 03 numbers. All that is happening while you are sitting around doing nothing.

We are not sitting around doing nothing. The primary responsibility has traditionally been with individual forces, and there is an issue about the extent to which the Government intervenes. The context is one of a tripartite relationship, in which we must respect the position of the chief constable and the police authorities, and play our role. It is about discussion, negotiation, and reaching consensus and agreement. I have given you the assurance that we will assiduously seek to play our part in that.

Of course different initiatives are being taken in different parts of the country. That is the way in which things have been done until now. The Audit Scotland report uncovers that and we are seeking to move as quickly as we can to a better solution. I am sorry if you are unhappy with the pace of progress, but it is a matter of negotiation with a number of interested parties.

The 999 number would never have been introduced if the Government of the day had taken the attitude that you are taking, would it?

I do not think that that is—

What if we had to wait around for every police force to decide? A national emergency number was introduced because the Government took the initiative to adopt 999 as the emergency number. Central initiative requires to be taken to achieve something like that.

People move around the country, but they can phone 999 in Aberdeen, Belfast or wherever they are. It is a United Kingdom number. At least in Scotland, a decision could be taken about a non-emergency number. You could bring the police and the local authorities along with you.

We will certainly seek to achieve that, but—

How? When?

In the way in which we have done a huge number of such things, which is by engaging with other partners and reaching consensus. In other contexts, I would be severely criticised by committees if ministers or civil servants simply told police authorities and police chiefs that they had to move in a particular direction.

That is not the alternative, though. What do you mean by "engaging with"? You might come to a consensus, but that has not happened yet. What does "engaging with other partners" actually mean?

It means participating in the working group that they have set up to reach conclusions. That group will hear from different people in different parts of the country, who have tried different things, with different levels of success. As Linda Rosborough said, the 101 experiment was not universally successful in reducing the number of 999 calls. Such issues must be thought through before investment is committed to something that we hope will work.

You can detect from these exchanges that there is a degree of frustration on the part of the committee, as well as a sense of urgency, because the matter needs to be resolved. We hope that you will be able to revert to us at an early stage.

I do not want to sound too controversial to my committee colleagues, but I accept Mr Gordon's point on the tripartite arrangement. I am a member of the Justice Committee as well, so I have learnt a great deal about the arrangement over the past few months.

There is an opportunity to introduce a non-emergency number. Page 4 of the Audit Scotland report says:

"There was no national strategy to assist forces in establishing their new call management systems."

There was no strategy in the past, but there is an opportunity for the current Government to drive the matter forward. It is incumbent upon the officials and the Government to do that in conjunction with the partners in the tripartite arrangement. It should be put to the forefront rather than taken at a slower pace as appears to be the case at the moment.

Thank you, Mr McMillan. I agree entirely with that. We can talk about initiatives that have been taken since the initial investments were made in related and other areas, which have shown that the Government can take the initiative and in which parties have worked together to find solutions. For instance, with the Airwave radio system, it was necessary to find a solution for the whole country at once because of changes in frequency. That was done on a national basis. The setting up of the Scottish Police Services Authority to provide services for all forces is another example of action that was taken by the previous Executive but endorsed by the current Government.

One of the questions that the committee raised in its letter to you related to police response times to incidents. Although we accept that that was outwith the scope of the Audit Scotland report, a number of questions on it arose in discussion within the committee. As you are probably aware, the public concerns that are expressed to us as elected members include questions about how long it takes the police to get to an incident and how many incidents they do not get to. My understanding is that the Airwave system, which was introduced a number of years ago—I hope that you will clarify how long it has been in place—allows the collection of those data to take place. You have said that there will be an indicator on that in the framework that will be put in place soon. Will we begin to see some data from across the forces on how long it takes the police to get to the prioritised incidents that they are asked to attend and will we be able to see how many incidents they are not able to attend in any given year? When might that roll through into public reporting?

We are proud of the Scottish policing performance framework, which came out of a recommendation by Her Majesty's chief inspector of constabulary and was a joint endeavour involving Audit Scotland, the conveners of police boards, police chiefs and the Government. We are beginning to see the first fruits of it and the first iteration—the first national publication of material in the policing performance framework—will be in August this year.

We started off with a limited number of indicators that we could all agree and negotiated with Audit Scotland about what it wanted. We are adding to that year on year. Does user satisfaction with the service include response times?

Yes, and feedback from the police about keeping people informed of what happened.

User satisfaction with the service will be included in the system from April 2008. The results of that data collection will be made publicly available a year-plus later. However, they will be available to police forces and police authorities quarter by quarter thereafter, which will make monitoring possible. The group decided that there should be full publication of results only after a year, when the material could be cleaned for publication.

It seems that the data on response times are probably not as clear as I had hoped. I understand that the Airwave system has been in place for a number of years and that it allows the collection of such data. Why has it taken so long to put in place an indicator on response times? The public express their concern to me, as an elected member, about how long it takes the police to attend incidents. The issue is not how long it takes the police call handlers to pick up calls, but how long it takes the police in the field to attend. Will that kind of indicator be included in the new reporting framework?

There will be an indicator on how long it takes for the police to respond to emergency calls. There have been no common command-and-control systems among the forces, so it has been difficult to get consistent and comparable data. However, the forces are moving to a new system called STORM MA, with the exception of Northern Constabulary, because of difficulties with the system in the outer islands. That system will allow a common approach to pulling out data. Data will be recorded in the same way throughout the forces, which will mean that the new indicator will be much more meaningful than anything we have been able to get before.

Are those data only for emergency calls?

At the moment, they are only for emergency calls.

That would still worry me. The public must get an indication of how the police respond to the wide variety of incidents that they are called to help with. We have no indication of how long it takes the police to attend such incidents. We might have to come back to that issue in the future.

Has there been discussion about what realistic police response times might be? The person who makes the 999 call, or who rings whatever number is eventually made available, probably thinks that they are calling about a significant issue that deserves an immediate response. However, the call may have a low priority for the police, depending on what is going on in their area—for example, a murder or a serious road accident. I know that there has been discussion of how calls are assessed, but has there been discussion of how the public are made aware of response times or of what an appropriate response time would be?

There is agreement among all eight forces about the categorisation of calls and responses, ranging from those where someone is at risk through to less serious issues, including those that do not need a police response at all. Stephen Woodhouse will respond on the extent to which police forces publicise their targets on that, but I will respond to Mr Coffey's point first.

Getting the policing performance framework in place and getting everybody to agree to it was an achievement in itself. I think that all the partners would agree that we started with something that is not ideal. However, it uses the information that is available, and we are committed to adding to that year by year. An indicator on responses to emergency calls is the first priority, but we will seek as soon as possible to secure agreement among the partners to add an indicator on responses to non-emergency calls.

In the first year, the data will probably not be as good as they might be; they will have to be improved over time. However, we have found—the Audit Scotland report highlights this—that Grampian Police gets considerable benefit locally from the data. That shows that the performance framework is for the benefit of not only police boards, the Government, the Parliament and the public, but police commanders in their local areas. A lot of good is coming out of the performance framework already—I do not want to belittle that achievement—but there is much more to be done.

Grampian is noticing a slight reduction in non-emergency calls. We attribute that to the fact that more calls are being answered, so the police are getting less repeat business. The system is enabling the force to manage calls better.

On the information that is provided about response times by the police around Scotland, the picture is fairly patchy. Some forces have an informal procedure whereby they respond faster in urban areas than in rural areas, which is perhaps understandable. We think that HM inspectorate of constabulary's thematic report on providing feedback will be interesting, because it will make recommendations about improving customer service, if I may use that term, and the quality of service in particular, by telling people what will happen. It is not for me to prejudge what the inspectorate will say, but that seems to be the thrust of what will emerge. I think that the report will answer some of the committee's concerns about ensuring that the public are kept informed about when the police might arrive and what will happen after they have arrived. Audit Scotland picked up that important point.

What is the role of the Scottish Government in ensuring that there is a national strategy for call management?

The Scottish Government has a developing role. As I tried to explain, the starting point was that police forces were left to decide how they would deal with the people who phoned them up. Then, in the early part of the decade, there was a sense that moving to call centres and contact centres was the right thing to do to deal more effectively with the calls that were coming in and to answer more of them first time. The strategy at that time was to invite forces to make business cases and to approve them if they seemed to be reasonable. However, as the Audit Scotland report points out, no single model was being applied.

We now have the agreement of all stakeholders and, obviously, the overwhelming agreement of the Parliament that we should have a common police services body in the Scottish Police Services Authority, which should progressively take on more tasks to support the police service in Scotland as appropriate. From April this year, the SPSA will take over ICT for all the forces. That provides a context in which a national strategy can be developed through the SPSA, in conjunction with the police forces, which are represented by ACPOS and the conveners of police boards on the SPSA board.

We are moving in various directions to achieve the joined-up approach that Lord Foulkes seeks, and fora in which clear decisions can be taken about the ways to progress. There are frustrations about how long it takes to get everyone to agree to move in a particular direction, but we are moving further and faster than we were in the past. Indeed, the policing performance framework was a good example of people getting together, agreeing that something had to be done, and getting on with doing it.

Will the SPSA undertake the role of making a centralised policy for police call management in the future?

One way of addressing incompatible ICT systems would be to have everything done by the SPSA. Indeed, I pay tribute to the work of Chief Constable Colin McKerracher in leading the business change side of ACPOS by bringing together all the deputy chief constables and driving through decisions on consistency of approach. They will build on that in the future.

It is for the group chaired by Mr Cross, to which I referred, to reach agreement about the best forum in which to take forward the national strategy for call handling and, moving into the future, to keep an eye on developments in both technology and what could be called customer expectations.

During the Justice Committee's inquiry into police resources, we spoke at some length about the SPSA, which appears to be an organisation that will bring many benefits to the eight forces in Scotland. However, there were some reports in the media of concerns that the SPSA may have too broad a remit and might take over specific roles or functions from the individual forces. Are those concerns valid? If call handling went to the SPSA, would that exacerbate those concerns?

First, there has had to be a period of adjustment with the change in practice, and there are different views about the best way to do things. There are some issues about the chief constables having operational responsibility for certain things and needing to reassure themselves that they also have the control that they require. That is part of the debate about whether calls should be handled by one body, or whether each force needs to continue to have ownership of aspects of call handling.

The key is to have a consistent policy that allows for local variations—Stephen Woodhouse referred to whether different arrangements need to apply to the islands and remote Highlands. We need a consistent approach that meets the needs of the public and the operational needs of the police. The issue lies in achieving a common mind among eight chief constables, each of whom has a significant personal operational responsibility in their area.

I have one final question on call handling. Has there been any consideration not so much of greater centralisation, but of greater working partnerships and relationships not solely within the police but among the police, ambulance and fire services, perhaps involving fewer locations from which to undertake the services?

There have been conversations about that, but again it is a question of dealing with a number of bodies that have specific views about the best way of working. I would be wrong to say that there is a meeting of minds on the fact that it would be better to do things differently. There is also a question of scale. The police deal with about 6 million calls a year, while the fire service deals with about 120,000 calls.

It is 113,000.

Yes—113,000.

I declare a small interest. I am a board member of Lothian and Borders Police.

Scotland is quite a small country—there are about 5 million of us—but the report tells us that more than 25 systems are operating in Scotland. That has caused several problems, including difficulties with the transfer of information between different systems and forces. If I understood you correctly, you said that you left the forces to develop their own systems. That shows a lack of guidance. Everybody around the committee table is interested in best value and best efficiency. Why is it necessary to have more than 25 systems in Scotland? Is that efficient government?

No, absolutely not. I said that that was how things had been and that that had come about in the early part of the decade. That may have represented an understanding at that time—I was not there, so I do not know—of relative responsibilities. It was thought that it was for individual police forces and boards to determine what would be best in their area and to persuade the Government that it should be funded, but we have moved away from that approach.

Again, I refer to the work that Chief Constable Colin McKerracher has done to get all the forces together to agree on common systems and common command-and-control systems. That is a challenge, because different forces were at different stages of development of different systems. One issue is what would be the best time to move over to a single system. A lot of critical systems are now being worked through with the aim of getting to single systems for all forces as quickly as possible. That involves investment by individual forces. Some forces will benefit if the system that they are using becomes the standard, because they will not need to invest; others will have to invest in new systems.

That work seems to be going forward very well. My colleagues—in what used to be called the department, but is now called the directorate—are now engaged on all the ACPOS business area groups, which take forward different aspects of policing. One of the issues is always to look for a common solution. We have much better engagement with the forces and the conveners, so that, rather than seeing things in terms of eight different forces, we can move forward for the benefit of a country of 5 million people.

Everything goes back to whether the forces all have different 0845 numbers, which is completely inefficient. You said that we are working towards having one system. When will that be in place? It should be a matter of urgency.

Airwave is the same system throughout the country, with all the interoperability that that permits. The command-and-control systems are being introduced and they will be in every part by—

By the end of the year, I think.

By the end of this year, or the beginning of next. That system is already in place in a number of forces.

Similar developments are taking place with other systems that the police use. Not all those systems are as operationally critical as command and control and Airwave, but I believe that they are getting there. ICT for the whole service will be provided by the SPSA from April this year, so a common approach will be taken.

That is good to know. We will keep a close eye on that.

You have talked about common approaches, consistency, simplification, a number of services being provided by one organisation and the SPSA's increasing responsibility. With respect to effective call management and consistency throughout the country, is having eight police forces the most effective way to deliver police services?

I will not be drawn on that, thank you very much. We have an interesting topography in which one force covers half the population and a variety of forces cover the rest. One might speculate on whether that is the best design, but it is what we have and the Government is committed to keeping the eight forces.

If I remember rightly, the forces were a product of local government reorganisation in the 1970s.

Those were the days.

We will move on to accountability and governance.

I can see that relationships may be complex and sensitive, but simplicity and completing action are important. The Audit Scotland report found that police authorities and the Scottish Executive had a limited role in the establishment of the new call management arrangements. The extent to which police authority members could exercise proper scrutiny of local developments was not always clear, and it is not always clear in the existing tripartite arrangements where proper accountability for national strategic decisions that affect local police services lies.

A lack of clarity about accountability is a common theme. Relationships and responsibilities are not clear, but such clarity is surely a basic essential for proper decision making. Given Audit Scotland's findings, what is the Scottish Government doing to ensure that police boards and authorities play a full part in decision making and in scrutinising decisions that forces take?

As you acknowledged, Audit Scotland's report describes a historical position. Much has changed since then. Most recently, following the election, we have worked with the new police authority conveners on their roles and responsibilities. We have issued updated guidance on their roles and responsibilities that takes account particularly of the responsibility that the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003 gave police authorities to secure best value. Engagement with police boards and their conveners on their scrutiny role has been positive.

I referred to an expansion in the definition of the responsibilities of the Government, police authorities and chief constables. The Government is clear about and is developing positions that the previous Government took on a strategic view of policing—on assurance about resilience, capability and capacity. Tools such as the policing performance framework can show how performance is moving from the Government's point of view and from police boards' point of view in their areas, which can be compared with other areas when that is relevant. Chief constables can examine the performance of their forces and of parts of their forces.

The SPSA's creation puts in one place and drives through—under an accountable structure with a board that comprises independent members, representatives of chief constables, representatives of police board conveners and an independent chair—the development of better police support services, according to directions that ministers give.

Other work is taking place. I mentioned the department's engagement with ACPOS business areas. Work continues on ways in which capacity and capability can be arranged—that takes account of forces' different sizes and capabilities.

There is now much greater clarity about the relative responsibilities of the Government, police boards and chief constables.

So you are saying that, through guidance and the policing performance framework, the clarity problem has been solved. Does the performance framework or the guidance that you have issued directly address the call management problems? Will those problems therefore be solved?

Aspects of call management response times are covered in the policing performance framework. Specific issues such as call management and single non-emergency numbers can be addressed in the context of that strategic framework, with clarity about the roles and responsibilities of the various players. What is described in the Audit Scotland report is not the situation that we would have today if we were embarking on a project to introduce call or contact centres throughout policing in Scotland.

With respect, it is not addressing problems that is crucial but solving them. Where is action being created to solve specific practical problems?

Action is being taken in the groups that I described. The area is complex and there is a deliberate division of responsibility between chief constables, police boards and the Government. They work together to get the best solutions. That approach reflects and respects the different roles that the partners play.

That is built into the system.

What is the Scottish Government doing to ensure that police boards and police authorities review the performance and effectiveness of police systems and services?

We should remember that police boards and police authorities are made up of democratically elected representatives of local communities. There has been induction training for new police boards, which covered their roles and responsibilities under the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 and more recent legislation including the 2003 act. However, the Government does not intend to direct police boards to operate in a particular way, other than to expect them to fulfil statutory responsibilities and engage with the guidance about how their roles might be performed.

The representatives on the boards undoubtedly have responsibilities. How can you ensure that, in exercising those democratic responsibilities, they review the performance and effectiveness of police systems and services? The call situation is an example.

My expectation is that they would address that because it would be of concern to their constituents. We worked with others to develop the policing performance framework, which is a tool to help police boards in their work of holding forces to account.

How effective are the boards in reporting to their constituent authorities on the use of resources and the effectiveness of what is being done? You talked about constituents. I have been a councillor as well as a member of the Parliament. Sometimes, boards are a mystery to councillors, never mind the public. Do the boards report properly to their constituent bodies on the use of resources?

I am afraid that I do not have that detailed knowledge. I have experience only of meetings with most of the new conveners, who certainly seem seriously engaged with the role that they will play. I assume that that includes reporting back to their constituent authorities. Of course, the new funding arrangements under the concordat will mean that the funding negotiations between individual authorities and police boards might be more intense than was perhaps the case in the past. Presumably that will involve a two-way street as authorities will want to know what their money has bought.

I have one preliminary question. Audit Scotland has produced a very good report that makes a number of findings, including the one that Andrew Welsh mentioned a minute ago. How are all the findings being looked at and followed up within the Government?

The limited number of findings that are addressed to the Government are being taken forward within the police and community safety directorate. We will respond to Audit Scotland shortly. However, as some of the findings straddle the responsibilities of Government, police boards and chief constables, we are also working with others—primarily with ACPOS and the short-life working group that Mr Cross is chairing, but also with the conveners forum—to work through other issues.

Are the police boards, the local authorities, the conveners forum and ACPOS considering how to respond to the recommendations?

Presumably, the reason for setting up the short-life working group is to do just that—

Is the issue on the agenda of each of those bodies?

—but I would need to be guided by Audit Scotland on the route through which the recommendations that are addressed to forces and boards will be reported on. I assume that they will report to the Accounts Commission.

On several occasions, you have mentioned that ACPOS is key to dealing with these issues. To whom is ACPOS accountable?

Individual chief constables are accountable to—

No, I am asking about ACPOS as an organisation. To whom is ACPOS accountable?

I do not think that ACPOS is accountable to any board; ACPOS is a limited company.

Should that be looked at? If ACPOS plays such a central role in decision making, should it perhaps have some kind of accountability? The SPSA is accountable to a board of members with an independent chairman. That is a welcome development. If ACPOS plays such a big role, perhaps some thought ought to be given to that.

My final question also follows up a question that Andrew Welsh asked. Many of the responses that we have heard today have been, "This is really not for us but for the boards or local authorities to deal with." How do you clarify which areas are the responsibility of the boards and local authorities and which areas are the responsibilities of the Government?

It is not possible to say definitively that every issue that arises is the responsibility of one of those three but, over the past two to three years, we have sought to clarify the Government's strategic role. For example, the new Government has set up a serious and organised crime task force to bring together the various agencies. The Government has an interest in the strategy that is followed to deal with such issues. We also have a clear view on the roles and responsibilities of police boards for local policing and community policing. However, as I said earlier, the situation is complex and responsibility is shared. I am happy to write to the committee with the definition of the matter that we sought to provide recently for the Police Advisory Board for Scotland.

That would be helpful. Some of your answers today have been what might be described as holding answers. When might you be able to come back and give us more definitive answers to our questions?

We will certainly want to get back to you, in writing or orally, within three months.

Right. Thank you.

That is helpful. Thank you.

You have talked about the way in which things are evolving. You said that responsibility for the evolution and development of community policing would be shared. Can you please clarify that?

In relation to that and the additional officers who are going to be recruited, we have—following the model of the policing performance framework—set up a working group that is chaired by my colleague, Bridget Campbell, who is the director of police and community safety. It involves police conveners and representation from the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, ACPOS and other bodies. The group is seeking to establish the baseline of community policing—to agree a definition of what community policing means—and to see how, over time, we can increase the number of officers on the front line who are undertaking community policing.

So the decision whether to have policing in the community and on the use of resources is no longer solely a matter for chief constables; it is a matter of that joint determination?

The specific decisions about the deployment of officers on a daily basis are clearly the responsibility of chief constables. The issue is about ensuring that the additional resources that are being invested in the recruitment of additional officers are devoted to additional officers who undertake predominantly front-line duties.

If a chief constable sets his or her face against what the public expect, which is the deployment of staff in the community, will something be done about that?

That is a hypothetical question. At the moment, as far as I can tell, all the chief constables are committed to increasing the community policing presence.

But it seems, from what you are saying, that under the new agreement the decision will not be left solely to chief constables—the Government will have a stake in that determination.

The Government is taking an interest in the recruitment of additional police officers and their deployment, but if there is an emergency that requires a large number of police officers to be redeployed from communities to something else, the chief constables must still have the operational discretion to do that.

In general terms, my sense is that there is agreement all round that more front-line police officers are wanted. Everybody is working energetically together to deliver that.

Thank you very much for your input. I welcome your commitment to get back to us on several points and your expectation that some of the information for which we have asked will be available within three months. We will reflect on what has been said today.

Thank you.