European Union Budget Review
I apologise for our taking a short interval, but we have a packed agenda. Each of the three items is extremely interesting. Agenda item 2 is the European Union budget review. We will start with an opening statement from Professor John Bachtler, to whom we are grateful for coming to give evidence, before moving on to questions.
Professor John Bachtler (University of Strathclyde):
Good morning. I am from the European policies research centre at the University of Strathclyde. I specialise in the development of regional policy—in particular, European cohesion policy. Today, I have been asked to talk a little more widely about the purpose of the budget review, about specific aspects of the budget and about the implications for Scotland and parliamentary engagement.
It is important to see the current review against the background of what happened in 2005, when EU leaders had difficulty in agreeing on the current financial perspective. The arguments centred on three things, the first of which was the total level of spending on EU policies. Members might recall that six member states, including the United Kingdom, took a particularly strong position on budget discipline. The second argument was about the allocation of spending to different policy areas, the key areas being agriculture policy, cohesion policy and other competitiveness policies. As member states benefit differently from different policies, it was also, de facto, an argument about what member states would get from the budget. The third argument was about how the EU budget should be financed—how much each member state should pay into the budget. The British rebate was a major sticking point in that respect.
To reach consensus, a clause was included in the institutional agreement requiring the European Commission to undertake a full and wide-ranging review of all aspects of EU spending including the common agricultural policy and the British rebate. It is important to understand that background, because similar issues and fault lines will be prevalent in the forthcoming negotiations on the current review.
When the review was announced, different member states took different views on its importance. Some saw it very much as a tidying-up exercise after the difficult negotiations in 2005; others saw it as laying the groundwork for the post-2013 programme of EU spending. The Commission has very much made a virtue out of necessity so as to give the review potentially more impact than some might have anticipated.
There are a number of important features to the review. First, as the Commission has said, the review is rightly described as a unique opportunity because it covers all policies, whereas agriculture spending was effectively excluded from the debate in 2005 because of a previous agreement. Secondly, the review is seen as having a strategic aspect. In other words, it is not just about money but about the direction of policies. The Commission in particular sees the review as an opportunity to match the lofty aspirations of EU leaders with the reality of constrained spending. Thirdly, the review is seen as a completely open exercise without taboos or preconditions, although the current set-up will inevitably be a departure point. Lastly—and importantly—the Commission paper lays down several principles for the future direction of spending. Those principles include efficiency, added value, proportionality and subsidiarity. Subsidiarity means the inclusion and involvement of Parliaments, Governments and actors at all levels.
The way in which the timetable will proceed is still somewhat open. The current consultation exercise on the budget will run until the spring. There will then be several major conferences, after which the Commission will prepare its proposals. Exactly how matters will be handled is not yet clear as the French, Czech and Swedish presidencies may each play a different part in that process. Ultimately, the intention is to reach agreement by late 2010 so that the review provides the basis for the next financial framework.
Some important aspects of the budget are up for consideration. As members may be aware, the current framework contains provisions for commitments of €860 billion, which is around £600 billion. That is quite a large sum in absolute terms but it is very small in relative terms—it is equivalent to about 1 per cent of European gross domestic product or just over 2 per cent of public expenditure.
On the expenditure side, most of the budget—about 80 per cent—is allocated to two spending areas, which are basically agriculture and cohesion policy. A further 9 per cent is allocated to so-called competitiveness policies such as research and development and lifelong learning. External aid and other overseas activities are allocated about 6 per cent.
On the payment side, the generation of the budget is quite complex but many of the payments into the budget are essentially based on the gross domestic profit of member states. Of course, as I said, each member state benefits differently from different Community policies. In some policy areas, such as cohesion, there are clear allocations to each member state. In other policy areas, such as research and development, it all depends how much use member states make of framework programmes on R and D, for example.
I turn to the UK's interests in terms of receipts from the budget. In 2006, which was the last year of the previous period, it was recorded that the UK received about €8.3 billion of European spending, of which more than half was in the form of agriculture and rural development support; €3 billion was in the form of structural funds; about €600 million was in the form of research and technological development funding; and there were smaller amounts of funding for vocational training and so on.
The implications for Scotland of the budget review relate partly to the money issue of how much Scotland will benefit from future EU spending; partly to the policy issue of what the future objectives of the EU should be; and partly to the means of delivery of those objectives.
While the overarching budget review is under way, a series of specific policy reviews is also being undertaken. You will be aware that the directorate-general for regional policy is undertaking a major review of the future of structural and cohesion funds. The directorate-general for agriculture and rural development is also undertaking a so-called health check of the common agricultural policy. The directorate-general for employment, social affairs and equal opportunities is consulting on a new social agenda. The directorate-general for health and consumer protection has produced a paper on the future challenges for the period 2009 to 2014. Other major strategies or policy reviews have either just been launched or are under way in areas such as energy, transport, the environment, fisheries and external development. Of course, we in Scotland have an interest in all those areas. There are important avenues for making views known.
On the expenditure side of the budget, it seems to me that we need to address a number of key policy questions. What do we want from a future cohesion policy? Should it focus on economic and social issues, or does it have a broader remit in addressing issues such as climate change, demographic ageing and so on, as the Commission proposes? Should the policy be restricted to the poorest countries and regions of the EU, or should richer parts of the EU, such as Scotland, also benefit in the future? How should the future governance of the policy be organised in terms of the division between European member state and sub-member state levels?
On the CAP, the questions are whether and how that policy should respond to issues such as climate change, biodiversity and water management. We must also consider the broader implications of trade negotiations. To what extent should there be a shift from direct agricultural aid—aid that is provided to farmers in various forms—to providing support for rural development? How should the policy be financed? Should it be financed solely from EU level or co-financed? How would we like the rural development funding to be managed, particularly with regard to its relationship with structural funds?
Under the heading of competitiveness, where do Scotland's interests lie in terms of any future increase or emphasis on competitiveness funding in areas such as R and D and lifelong learning?
There are, of course, other policy areas that get very little funding at the moment and in which the EU is already debating its policy. Those areas include energy, climate change, the environment and migration. There are important issues on the income side in relation to how the EU budget is generated. The most radical question is whether there should be an EU tax as a means for generating resources.
I turn finally to the options for parliamentary engagement, on which the consultation period runs until 15 April. The directorate-general for budget has encouraged parliamentary engagement. It is clear that Parliaments in many countries are discussing the budget review, but it is not clear to what extent national or sub-national Parliaments will make an input to the consultation. None is listed on the DG budget website, although it is said that the regional Parliaments in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg are planning an event with the Governments of those states in Brussels to launch their views on the budget agreement.
When the consultation period is over, there will be an important phase in which the European Commission will develop its own proposals. That will be a significant phase for lobbying inputs and other forms of dialogue with the Commission; we can do that indirectly, via the UK, or directly with the EC or the European Parliament. I am not sure whether Andrew Duff mentioned the budget review specifically. However, the European Parliament will have a much more important role in the next round of financial framework negotiations, which may well change not only the dynamics of how that is conducted but its outcome.
After the Commission publishes its proposal, there will be a third phase in which the negotiations will start. Again, there will be opportunities for input from this Parliament, either via the UK or directly into the European institutions.
Thank you for that thorough and comprehensive introduction. Clearly, we are mainly interested in how the changes are likely to impact on Scottish interests. We have written to the Minister for Europe, External Affairs and Culture about that, and we await a more detailed response.
We will start with structural funds, on which you made general remarks. I suppose that people assume that there will be a considerable reduction in structural funds to Scotland—I do not know whether you can say more about that. The other question about which I am slightly curious is the relationship between the major review and the DG regional consultation on cohesion policy. Will the latter feed into the wider review? How do those two reviews relate to each other?
I will take the second question first, and then return to the issues for Scotland.
Cohesion policy, which is one of the major spending areas, is the area in which, until now, member states have been able to identify how they will benefit from the EU budget, which is central to any consideration of future financing. The cohesion policy review is motivated by two factors. First, it has been clear for some time that cohesion policy is not operating satisfactorily. It has been difficult to identify what its impact and added value has been. In the context of individual regions, one can certainly see the benefits, but it is difficult to perceive them at European level. The policy is becoming more complex and there are increasing concerns about aspects of its implementation. There are also issues around what its objectives should be in relation to wider European objectives. The review is generally motivated by a desire to get a better policy.
On the other hand, the directorate-general for cohesion policy is very much aware that it will be under great pressure in the negotiations, so it is not surprising that, as a spending ministry, it is keen to demonstrate that the policy is forward looking and that it can meet European objectives and provide value for money. There is, if you like, a political agenda there as well. However, the DG consultation is seen as something that will feed into the overall budget review and establish good ideas for future EU policy that pass the Commission president's tests of efficiency, subsidiarity, added value and proportionality.
Any impact on Scotland will depend on wider decisions about the EU budget. I see a number of scenarios, the first of which is that the status quo with regard to the overall budget will be maintained. In other words, member states will find it difficult to agree anything, and we will muddle along with pretty much the same kind of budget that we have had for the past 20 years, perhaps with a somewhat different share allocation to various policy areas. There might, for example, be a bit more for competitiveness, a bit less for agriculture and much the same amount for cohesion policy.
On the other hand, some major net contributor member states might well argue for a more restrictive budget and less spending at European level. Indeed, similar arguments were deployed at the last negotiations. That said, at the other end of the spectrum, a reshaped European budget that focused more on policy areas that command support from net contributors might mean a larger budget. In any case, what happens to cohesion policy must be seen in that wider context.
Although this is pure speculation, I think, looking to the future, that one of the more likely scenarios is that the trend since the last negotiations of reduced funding for Scotland will continue. The challenge will be not only to find ways of using cohesion policy but to maximise any possible opportunities under other budget headings—for example, if spending for various competitiveness policies such as R and D is increased.
I want to follow up some of those themes. The money that is being spent on cohesion is less than 0.5 per cent of the EU's GDP. Has there been any overarching assessment of the policy's impact and, if so, what results did it show up? Did it suggest that it was value for money?
Cohesion is, in some ways, a successor to the old regional development policy. I have carried out a lot of consultancy work in the Baltics and I would not put EU assistance in whatever form particularly high up the list of reasons for the high economic growth rate in the three Baltic countries. Indeed, I imagine that people in Estonia, the most successful of the three, would probably put their country's success down to, for example, their flat tax system rather than to EU subsidies. In that context, how important are cohesion funds in bringing those economies up towards the European average? Is the policy value for money?
If I were asked whether cohesion policy had been successful, I would, in typical academic style, say, "Yes. No. Maybe." The various attempts to assess the policy's impact have had mixed outcomes. The Commission uses figures that are based on models that project the macroeconomic impact and it uses ex post evaluations of what has been achieved. Those studies produce reasonably impressive figures for the contribution of structural funds to growth and for employment. Other academic research has been less positive. Having recently examined quite a number of studies, I can say that, on average, cohesion policy in the past 20 years might have contributed an extra 0.5 per cent to GDP growth, particularly in poorer countries, and it might have contributed to the creation of 1 million to 2 million jobs, particularly in poorer countries and regions, but not exclusively—that includes performance in Scotland.
As for value for money—
If those are the figures, the cost per job must be horrendous.
It is impossible to determine the cost per job, particularly because of the complex way in which structural funds are spent. For example, a huge amount of spending has been on infrastructure, particularly in southern Europe. One strategic problem with much of that spending is that it has been done somewhat in isolation—it has been somewhat disconnected from the demand side. Much investment has been made in the supply side of the economy, but investment in the demand side—in promoting business development and exploitation of that infrastructure investment—has been insufficient, although it is likely to happen over time. The spending of structural funds has increased in efficiency and is becoming more strategic than it was in the 1990s. However, the research suggests that a fair amount of spending has been used inefficiently, particularly in the 1990s.
One can see positive effects in some regions and in some countries, but much depends on the degree to which cohesion policy spending has been linked to wider economic and labour market policies, such as openness to trade and investment, having flexible labour markets and establishing an entrepreneurship climate that facilitates the creation of small businesses. It is fair to say that, since about 2000 and since the emphasis was placed on the Lisbon strategy, such issues have been recognised more, which is why I expect assessments of the efficiency of cohesion policy to be more positive for the recent period than they were for the 1990s.
Your second question was about the contribution of cohesion policy in central and eastern Europe, specifically in the Baltic countries. You are right to say that, until now, the effect of cohesion policy has been marginal there. Until 2007, the amount of money that was spent on cohesion policy in the new member states was very small, and money was spent on cohesion policy only from 2004 to 2006. Now, significant funds are going into those countries—for example, Poland is receiving more than €60 billion, which is about a fifth of the cohesion policy budget from 2007 to 2013. The Poles are very aware of the focus on them and on other central and east European countries, because if they cannot show in that period that they are using structural funds effectively, there is little hope of member states agreeing to maintain or increase the budget in the future.
Your reference to Estonia is important. The success of Estonia and other Baltic states is because of other policies, such as macroeconomic monetary policy, fiscal policies and labour market policies, that they are introducing. The Estonians are particularly anti-subsidy in how they think about their policies.
Apart from the economic impact, which is important, the Commission has often stressed the wider added value of its cohesion policy, that is, not just the economic aspect, but the contribution of structural funds to good governance and effective strategic planning in economic development. Some of the evidence from Poland and some of the other new member states shows the considerable impact of cohesion policy in governance, which is because the budgets involved are so significant. They are driving not just the governance of cohesion policy but changes in how national policies are governed and implemented, for example in public procurement, public management reforms, personnel management, and strategic thinking and planning. A recent paper from the Polish Government dwells heavily on that point and contributes to the debate. Those changes have occurred not just at national level, but at sub-national level—in the regions, which are getting sizeable cohesion policy budgets.
Perhaps we should give the London Government some cohesion funds to help it to improve governance. But anyway—
This is a good point at which to pass over to John Park.
Thank you for your opening remarks, which were very interesting, professor. You have spoken about the make-up of the budget and how priorities are changing. Can you say a little bit more about what that might mean for delivery on the ground in Scotland? What might that look like? What might we expect to happen over the next few years, as priorities change? On engagement by the Scottish Government, what does it need to do to influence priorities—how and where money is spent—at the EU and UK levels? What must the Scottish Government do to have the most effective impact on behalf of the Scottish people?
This is speculative, as we have no idea which way things might go, but let us consider some scenarios. First, what might happen to the common agricultural policy? The chances are that there will be a reduction in agriculture spending as a proportion of the EU budget. There will be a big political debate about that, but it is likely that there will be a reduction in the overall level of spending. If there is not a reduction, there will be a shift within the agricultural budget from aid to farmers to aid for rural development, in other words, aid to everything other than farms—diversification, tourism and so on.
The agricultural people in Brussels are talking in particular about climate change, the importance of the environmental agenda, strengthening the ability of rural communities to cope with the impact of rising temperatures in southern Europe and greater turbulence in weather events, and the sustainability of agriculture. Potentially, greater importance will be accorded to rural development, so funding for it could come to Scotland.
Secondly, on cohesion policy and structural funds, a major shift has already happened in Scotland, so that instead of structural funds being focused on the economically disadvantaged parts of the country they are available Scotland-wide. Greater flexibility is important for Scotland—in other words, less prescription and more ability for the Scottish Government to adapt the budget to the priorities that it feels are important.
Competitiveness incorporates a lot of different things, including R and D and lifelong learning, but there is a potential challenge, because if the system continues as it is at the moment, funds might not always be pre-allocated to them. In other words, funds are made available for certain policies, but the degree to which member states and Scotland take advantage of them depends on how actively they get in there. We recently examined the way in which Scotland is geared up to access such funds, and one of the messages that came out was that although we are not doing too badly, there is scope for a more strategic approach among all the stakeholders that have an interest in accessing the funds.
Beyond that, there are issues on which the EU has not spent a great deal up until now—such as energy security, in terms of investment in renewables, and demography, in terms of migration and ageing—that might become important and will have budgetary allocations attached to them. We have interests in such areas, and there are potential budgetary benefits.
With regard to the Scottish Government and the kind of influence that it should have, the key issue is that it makes its voice heard on what the priorities and objectives of the EU budget should be from Scotland's perspective.
In addition, and equally important, is delivery, because one of the fundamental questions for the future is not just the priorities at European level but how they are managed. In other words, what level of competence is allocated to different levels? So far, the default position of the European Union—or the European Commission, as the main executive body—has been to take a top-down approach. The key issue is to ensure that subsidiarity actually means something, and that we have maximum flexibility for the different policy areas. It is partly a question of trying to influence the priorities and the spending decisions, but—crucially—it also partly about how the money is spent.
So you say that the EU's policy priorities are pretty much set within the context of the budget, but we require much more flexibility in the detail of the delivery. Is that a fair assumption?
Yes. The budget review is, at least in the way that the Commission has presented it, very much open. We should not necessarily expect the current configuration of the budget to remain after 2013, but there will be a big political fight to change it radically. We need to consider not just the scenarios in the overall budget but, as you say, the detail of how they will be implemented on the ground.
As you know, I am very pro-European, but I am becoming increasingly cynical about EU budget reviews—maybe I have just been through too many of them. One of the major challenges that we always face is reform of the common agricultural policy. The CAP takes up a very substantial part of the budget, yet despite that it was actually removed from the negotiations last time round. I heard your response to John Park's question but, given that British farmers tend to be much more efficient, relatively speaking, than their European counterparts, and given that the UK Government consistently takes a view on CAP reform, what gives you grounds for confidence that this time round we will be able to persuade other member states of the need to take that issue on?
There have been very obvious inconsistencies and inefficiencies in the past—for example, pouring money into tobacco subsidies while at the same time promoting a positive European health agenda—yet we have never really been able to tackle substantially the difficulties that are associated with the CAP. You say that there may be opportunities for CAP reform this time round, but we did not even get the issue on the table last time round. Is it something in the positions of other member states that gives you grounds for confidence or has the Commission's approach changed?
You are right to be sceptical. Perhaps I should have put more emphasis on the word "may" in talking about the scope for change. On the other hand, the reason why agriculture was not included in the previous review was that, during October to December 2002, France and Germany agreed a deal whereby agricultural spending would be agreed until 2013. The German motivation for that was to ensure that there was no French opposition to enlargement, which was seen as the overriding objective and was going to be agreed in 2002. That deal took agriculture out of the equation. However, in the forthcoming debate, agriculture will be very much in the equation and will become another one of the so-called adjustment variables in the search for agreement.
If we based our judgment on past history, we would anticipate relatively little change in 2013, but there are grounds for believing that that might not be the case. The first is the external pressure from the World Trade Organization negotiations on agricultural subsidies—there will be continued strong pressure from those global negotiations. There are also internal pressures. In some senses, the European Union is facing a crisis of public confidence. Public opinion surveys show a fair degree of scepticism, not about the EU per se, but about European institutions and policies. People see European leaders making lofty statements and agreeing about the importance of issues such as climate change, competitiveness and investment in research, but the EU ploughs 80 per cent of its funding into agriculture and cohesion policy. If the EU is to reinvigorate itself, that must change.
Principally, the matter will come down to the French leaders' attitude to the CAP—although France is not the only country that benefits from the CAP, other countries have been happy to let France make all the running—and the UK's approach to the rebate. France and the UK have a big responsibility. The question is how flexible they are prepared to be. Sarkozy has made several speeches in the past year that could be interpreted as signifying greater flexibility, although different interpretations of those speeches could be made. He has presented himself as being very much in the vanguard of driving European reform, but let us wait and see.
Further, the present European Commission is the most reform-minded Commission that we have had for some time. Of course, the Commission is up for re-election but, depending on how the new Commission progresses, it will have a bearing. Also, as I said, the European Parliament will play a different role, which could change the dynamics of the negotiations, depending on the approach that the Parliament takes to the budget configuration. So, at this stage, perhaps I am a bit more hopeful than Irene Oldfather.
I return to a point that Alasdair Morgan raised earlier: perhaps an EU president with an understanding of the British position might assist. I will not ask Professor Bachtler to comment on that.
John Park and Irene Oldfather have gone over most of what I was going to ask on the CAP. Irene Oldfather confesses to some cynicism about the CAP ever being reformed, and you said that you were sceptical about it, Professor Bachtler. I put it to you that many of us are equally sceptical about the common fisheries policy ever being reformed. Do you believe that there is any scope for major reform of the CFP in the current review?
I am not an expert in that field so I cannot really comment, except to say that, as with all other areas of policy reform, reform of the CFP depends on a coalition of countries or interests to push for it. As there has to be unanimity on the outcome, all interests must be satisfied, so a major change in such a policy would require a fairly powerful coalition of member states.
Is not part of the problem the fact that many landlocked countries are involved in votes on the CFP? That kind of coalition is impossible to break. If people have no specific interest in the CFP but they have votes on it, how are we ever to reform it?
It depends. If one or more countries considered it sufficiently important that they were prepared to make it a red line, it would have to be taken seriously. This is a narrower point but, for the Nordic countries, support for sparsely populated areas under cohesion policy is a totemic issue, because it is of fundamental political importance for their regional policies. They have made specific support for their interests a condition of agreeing to reforms of cohesion policy and, indeed, part of the overall budget negotiations.
On the other hand, those measures are relatively small and relatively cheap, so it is possible to get the Nordic countries' support for a budget deal without too much problem. Reform of the CFP is quite different and, presumably, member states would argue for and against it. However, as I say, I am not an expert on that, so I may be underestimating or overestimating the possibilities for change.
I have a process question. Once the consultation on the budget review is over, what will the timescale be for the negotiations and final agreement? You have already said that the European Parliament will have a new role in the process. What role could this Parliament or the Scottish Government play post the consultation? That point is coming up quite soon and we want to think about what the process will be after the consultation is concluded.
I am unclear exactly when one can anticipate the launch of the Commission's proposals. As far as I understand, it depends on which presidency decides to take it on. We have the French, Czech and Swedish presidencies in succession from the second half of this year and they will determine how the process is managed. That is quite important, as it determines when the different pressure points arise.
Beyond the current consultation, the phase when the Commission is developing its proposals will be important. The Commission is particularly open not so much to a statement of positions and member states saying, "This is important to us," as to creative or innovative ideas—based on reality—about how the objectives that are set in the budget review can be met, regarding either their priority or their delivery. Such ideas might, for example, point to successful ways in which to address, within Scotland or elsewhere, climate change, energy security, demographic ageing, migration and competitiveness, and they could provide a model for policy development.
That is the Commission phase; then comes the negotiating phase, once the proposals are published. The critical issue at that stage will be what the UK negotiating line is. It will be necessary to influence the development of the UK negotiating line or, if there are issues that are important for Scotland that depart from that negotiating line, to find alliances with other parts of the European Union through which to make common cause in influencing the policy-making process.
I am sorry, but I have forgotten your second question.
It is okay; it has been covered.
You have talked mainly about the expenditure side of the budget—perhaps inevitably. Are there likely to be any significant changes on the resource side? You mentioned that there is likely to be pressure from the net contributing countries to cut the gross national income-based resource. There was pressure for that to happen in the previous budget review, too. Might there be some pressure to reduce reliance on the GNI resource base by increasing some of the other resource bases or by looking for a further source of funding? Do any of those things have implications for Scotland? Does the fact that the overall EU budget is restricted have implications for what Scotland can get out of it?
It is difficult to say. Ultimately, it depends on the balance of income and expenditure. However, I have some comments to make on the own resources side.
The implications in terms of own resources depend on the overall level of spending. The main issue is whether there will be any kind of reform of the current system, especially regarding rebates. Although the UK rebate is the most important, other countries have, increasingly, benefited from special concessions. I am thinking of Austria, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden. Those concessions have been based on similar concerns that the countries are paying too much into the EU budget in relation to what they are getting back. It has become increasingly complex and messy.
If the system remains the same, it is in the interest of the net contributor countries to reduce spending. However, some people have suggested that, if we are to make any progress on changing how we decide the expenditure policies, we must address head on the issue of net balances. It has been suggested that some sort of agreement be reached at European level about what constitutes an equitable share that can be expected from each member state. The suggestion is that there should be a mechanism—leaving aside policy questions and dealing with budgetary questions—by which member states agree on a fair share for each country. One could play with various kinds of weightings, although it is difficult to imagine anything other than gross domestic product being the primary factor. Assuming that agreement could be reached, member states could then move on to discuss policies—focusing on the quality and delivery of policies, as opposed to focusing on what they could get out of the policies to improve their net payments or net receipts.
There are variants, and I have made some quite crude generalisations, but those are the kinds of discussions that we are having as we consider how to address this knotty issue.
In relation to maximising the structural funds coming in, you said that the taking of a more strategic approach by certain stakeholders would have helped. Had you any particular culprits in mind?
I do not want to talk about particular culprits; I want to talk about the system as a whole. We are now in the seventh framework programme for research and development, and the degree to which we exploit it and receive funds from it depends on individual universities, or departments within them, working with agencies or businesses to apply for funding. Scotland Europa is active in increasing awareness and ensuring that different stakeholders maximise their share of the seventh framework programme. It is also active in areas such as lifelong learning, vocational training and other smaller budgets. However, the resources that are available to Scotland Europa for that work are quite limited. A disparate set of stakeholders are each doing their own thing. There is no sufficiently strategic approach to targeting funds and getting more receipts for Scotland. A strategic approach will become much more important if such European funding increases in future.
Will more Government involvement be required?
It is more a case of more co-ordination being required. At Government level or in the agencies, the level of resourcing is not huge—it is fairly minor. We have to ensure that the right people are talking to each other around a table like this one, so that everybody is aware of what everybody else is doing. A quick response will be required to any opportunities that arise. We need more coherence in approach and more co-ordination in practice, initiated from the centre through, for instance, Scotland Europa.
We could quite happily go on for another hour, but we have another major agenda item to consider. I thank Professor Bachtler very much. He has given us very useful information.
Meeting suspended.
On resuming—