Official Report 159KB pdf
Land Reform (Scotland) Bill
Welcome to the fourth meeting in 2002 of the Subordinate Legislation Committee. I offer a particular welcome to our guests from the Scottish Executive environment and rural affairs department and the office of the solicitor to the Scottish Executive. It is always a delight to see them.
As the convener says, this is flagship legislation. In many ways, it is novel legislation.
Yes. We anticipated that answer and most people will see the sense in that, but my learned friend has a point.
We practise cynicism in the committee, because we always try to work out not what nice people will do, but what not nice people will do. Section 4(1) states that ministers
We concede that the powers are wide. We considered long and hard whether we should take such wide powers. As Ian Melville said, the reason that we are doing so is that we are dealing with concepts about which members of the public are concerned. They are particularly concerned that we will strike the right balance on the responsible exercise of access rights. It is because of the possibility that we might not have got the balance quite right, at the margins of what is currently in the bill, that we felt the need to have this reserved power to change the law, if that were thought to be appropriate. I also concede that, because we are not certain of precisely where in the bill we might need to make the changes, we felt the need to give ourselves a great deal of flexibility so that we could modify sections 2 and 3 substantially.
We accept that that is your intention; we are not absolutely sure that we can make it stick.
I want to say two things. This committee has a slight abhorrence of provisions that grant huge powers about which people say, "They would never be used politically", as if the powers were qualified by such a phrase in brackets. If a power is never to be used and there is no political method to use it, why is that power given?
Could not the power be subject to the super-affirmative procedure?
I do not think that the power could be subject to the super-affirmative procedure. Our line is that sufficient protection is provided by way of the affirmative procedure.
If it is a good idea to put that on record, it would do no harm to do so, whether or not it is needed.
I will let Bristow Muldoon ask a question, then I will ask again about why further consultation would not be required before the power could be used.
My question concerns the same subject that Gordon Jackson asked about. To some degree, I am reassured by the answer that the Executive will go away and consider whether wording that would reassure us can be inserted. Sections 2 and 3 are fundamental, because they provide individuals with access rights and impose obligations on landowners to allow people to exercise those rights. I would be reassured by any change to the wording that ensures that it is clear that the general thrust of sections 2 and 3 cannot be changed by subordinate legislation.
Is the committee unanimous about that? Should we say that we want to see that, not simply that we would be reassured by that?
The question is whether that can be done. I am not a draftsman. If the clarification can be made, I do not see why it should not be inserted.
My only qualification is that the question is ultimately for the draftsman. The way that the process works is that we tell the draftsman what we want in policy terms. I do not think that we would have any difficulty in saying to him that it is not our policy that the powers in section 4 should be exercised in a manner that would frustrate the purposes of sections 2 and 3. I suspect that he may say that the power provided already has an implied limitation to that effect, but we will put the point to him and convey the committee's thinking on the matter.
I recognise that, in the light of experience, the Executive may need to amend detailed parts of the bill, but could not that be done by amending the other sections that are covered by section 4(1)? Section 14 contains a lot of the detail on how landowners are expected to allow access. Section 9 deals with the restrictions on access rights. The power to amend those sections seems to address the requirement of the bill to be flexible enough to deal with things in the light of experience.
If I interpret you correctly, you are saying that ministers could take care of the necessary changes by having the power to amend the other sections, such as section 14, which deals with prohibition signs, obstructions, dangerous impediments and so on.
It seems to me that it is important to have powers to amend sections 9 and 14, which contain a lot of detail about the responsibilities both of those who take access and of landowners. Those sections are more likely to be amended in the light of experience, rather than sections 2 and 3.
One of the prime concerns in providing for this reserve power, which is there to ensure that the bill is sufficiently flexible, was to respond to the concerns that were expressed about the need to strike precisely the right balance on the key concept of the responsible exercise of access rights. That core concept is contained in section 2. The other sections to which Bristow Muldoon referred are supplementary to what is in section 2. For that reason, we felt that we needed to focus in on sections 2 and 3 but also, because of their supplementary nature, refer to those other sections. Our position is that, if we limit the section 4 power so that it would not allow modifications of the provisions about when a person is exercising access rights responsibly, that might actually take away the flexibility that we and others think might be needed.
Bristow Muldoon is absolutely right that, in practice, the section 4 powers would mainly be used to modify some of the detail in the later sections. However, sections 2 and 3 lay down what is responsible exercise of access rights and what is responsible land management to comply with those access rights. Perhaps there is a need to go back and modify sections 2 and 3 to make specific provision about why something is a responsible exercise of access rights or why it is responsible land management.
I want to ask again about consultation. As there was such an extensive consultation to establish the agreed core principles of the bill, and as you agree that it is possible for those principles to be changed under section 4—always accepting that the change would need to be made by subordinate rather than primary legislation—I would like to know why you do not agree that any such change should be subject to the super-affirmative procedure. That would mean that consultation would be built in. Why is there a resistance to requiring that there be consultation first?
We did not mean to suggest that there would be no consultation. In accordance with the Executive's ordinary practice, we would expect to consult widely and for a reasonable period of time—the general guidelines within which we operate allow for three months—so we envisage that there would be widespread consultation before the section 4 power was exercised.
I know that you are nice people, but the bill does not say that you need to consult.
Quite often now, rather than have statutory requirements to consult particular bodies, we rely simply on our general guidelines. We concede that we create legitimate expectations that we will consult, which, in practice, could be enforced as a matter of law.
I realise that there is a difficulty in deciding how many organisations to consult. As you said, "as they think fit" could mean that ministers could talk to nobody. However, if there was a requirement to consult interested parties, and if that requirement was advertised, that would take away any lingering suspicion that people might have that something might happen—as Gordon Jackson said earlier—if the bad guys were in charge.
There would have to be some qualification on who the interested parties are. I say that from experience. It is a worry if the phrase "interested parties" is used but is not defined, because it is difficult for us to ensure that we satisfy that requirement when we consult. That is why we tend to qualify such provisions with "such interested parties as appear appropriate to the Scottish ministers." "Interested parties" on its own is not much help. However, we could go away and give further thought to the issue.
I would be satisfied if you did. We accept that there is good will all round, but sometimes we have to tie a knot in things.
Yes. During the early consultation involving Scottish Natural Heritage and the access forum, it was realised that decisions on access should be taken locally, taking into consideration local circumstances and local pressures. The proposal that emerged was that the legislation should provide for the local management of access and that the appropriate bodies to undertake that management would be local authorities.
You said that a period of exemption of 30 days or more would require confirmation by ministers. Forgive my ignorance, but what does that mean? Does that mean that the minister simply writes back saying, "Okay lads" or does it mean a process?
It means a process. Usually, when we confirm things such as byelaws, which we confirm quite a lot, we do so by sealing the confirmation on the byelaw. The byelaw is made by the local authority and given to us. I would expect the same procedure to be followed in this instance. Usually, the order will be submitted in draft and we will make comments and suggest modifications. When we are content with the order, it will be sent to us, we will affix a seal and a minister or an official on behalf of the minister will sign it.
At the back of my mind is the fact that the process does not involve the rest of us. In other words, a local authority—with the connivance, collusion or agreement of the minister—could simply exempt any piece of land from access rights, whether the Parliament liked it or not.
Not quite.
Forgive my cynicism.
Section 11(2) states that before making any order, whether it extends beyond 30 days or otherwise, the local authority has to
But the bottom line is that the power to restrict access to land will be delegated by this Parliament—rightly or wrongly; I am not saying—to local authorities, with the connivance or collusion of the minister, without even as much as a statutory instrument saying, "From now on, access to this land is being restricted." Nothing comes through us at all. Maybe that is right enough.
The procedure is, in essence, local in character. It is likely to be of limited effect and to apply to particular activities in particular areas with only a local interest, but it is possible that that might not always be the case. I should have said that not only will many of the orders be local, they will be of limited time duration—they will be transitory—but where that is not the case, there is the procedure involving ministers. Public notice should be given to those in the locality who need to know about the issue and who would have a legitimate interest in objecting. If those objections merit it, the Scottish ministers will have to consider whether it is appropriate to have a public local inquiry.
That all makes sense, but we will draw the issue to the attention of the lead committee anyway.
This is a theoretical question. What is the upper time limit for which a local authority could exempt an area of land, and how big an area could it exempt?
It could be indefinite.
And it could be huge.
The provision is limited to
I have an area of land in mind—Clyde Muirshiel regional park, which is in the west of Scotland. I do not think for a minute that anyone would consider exempting that area, but it would remain technically feasible for the local authorities involved and the minister, if they so desired, to exempt the area without consulting Parliament. That is the problem. It is a big area.
That would be "a particular area" within the terms of the provision, so it could be done, but there is protection by way of public notice objections. If the exemption were indefinite, it would have to come to ministers. If objections so merited, they would cause a public local inquiry to be held.
That is the difficult point, with all due respect: if the status is changed indefinitely, is not that changing a primary, core part of the legislation?
Once again, we do not envisage the power being exercised in that way. The fact that any order of indefinite duration has to be monitored by ministers, and the fact of public involvement, should provide sufficient safeguard against anything being done that is in any way inappropriate.
But there is nothing in the bill that says that if an indefinite order is put on an area, that order will be reviewed every so often. There are no belts and braces here, Murray.
That is right. There is no sunset clause.
Perhaps you could have a wee look at that matter.
As you are probably aware, representations have been made in evidence to other committees that access rights should apply only during the day, not during the hours of darkness. The Executive sees no reason for applying access rights for daylight hours only, but it does not rule out that, in particular circumstances, there might be a case for excluding access at night. That was the reason for the provision in section 11(1)(d), which was not intended as a general provision.
It was in case folk step on traps.
At certain times of the year, the hours of darkness could be from 4 o'clock or so in the afternoon. Is it intended that the provision should be applied at sunset? If not, will the provision be applied, for example, at a particular time in the evening?
The provision could apply to sunrise and sunset.
It is difficult to respond to that without knowing the particular circumstances. If there were a good case for excluding access rights for the period between sunrise and sunset, that would be fine. If there were not a good case for doing so, there would have to be public consultation. There is also a provision to consult ministers, who must be satisfied before they agree to an exclusion from access rights.
We provided local authorities with flexibility in all the provisions, because we think that that is a good thing.
If we could anticipate all the problems and local difficulties that might arise, we would provide for them, but we are not confident that we can do that. That was one of the difficulties that we tried to provide for by providing the powers to ministers in section 4 and the powers to local authorities in section 11.
I appreciate that it is difficult for the bill to marry up provision with local circumstances. One would think that it would be common sense for as much as possible of the decision making to be done as close as possible to the ground—or the land. However, one can envisage situations in which local authorities might exercise political judgments. The bill and the subordinate legislation give local authorities the power to exercise political judgments that might run counter to the spirit of the bill as it has been constructed. We should ask the lead committee to look into that matter.
I was just going back to clarify that for my own purposes. I do not think that I gave an undertaking. I intended to say that we have to concede that there is no self-imploding mechanism for any of the orders. We do not normally use such mechanisms, but it is fair to say that there are provisions elsewhere in the bill for reviewing byelaws. We can go away and consider whether a review mechanism would be appropriate.
I see that Gordon Jackson has left us, but I assume that he has not gone for good. Do the other members of the committee agree with me that Murray Sinclair's suggestion is fine?
Members have no further points to raise on section 11.
I note from the committee's letter that you accept that primary legislation is not the best way to set up and amend the maps of urban settlements. We said, in the consultation on the draft bill, that we would define urban Scotland as that part that lies within settlements with a population of more than 3,000 and that everything else would, therefore, be defined as rural. We said that we would not include that definition in the bill, but put it in an affirmative order that would be based on maps that are produced by the General Register Office of Scotland. The maps are based mainly on census and other data that the GROS produces, which give us an objective definition of an urban settlement.
Fundamental judgments are being made here. Do you want to comment, Gordon? Are you satisfied that the mechanism will be sensitive enough?
I am not so bothered about that. It does not seem to go against the purpose of the bill. I hope that I am not being too sanguine—that would not be like me.
I am not as cynical as you are. I did not think that any of section 30(2) was meant to go against the purpose of the bill. The issue is whether the provision in section 30(2) could be inadvertently exploited.
That is what I mean. I am not cynical about anyone who is present or alive; I am just cynical.
Your attitude is less one of cynicism and more one of caution that is born of experience, history and law, is it not?
Absolutely.
If you are satisfied that there would be enough—
Perhaps I am not following the discussion, but I presume that we are dealing with the power to work out what is excluded and what is registrable land. That is right, is it not?
Yes. Such definitions will be changed by subordinate legislation and—this is important—the bill's core principles are involved, so perhaps there is an argument for using the super-affirmative procedure. That involves consultation, which Gordon Jackson is usually keen on.
I could be super cynical and say that it is never going to get to Govan, no matter how you change it.
Well, after that declaration of interest—[Laughter.] Would there be anything against having more structured consultation? Or would that be difficult, because you anticipate the order being changed often?
We expect to consult whenever the order requires to be changed, which is likely to happen fairly frequently. As usual, we will consult interested parties. Although there will be a lot of interest in the first order, there should be less interest in subsequent changes, as long as the basis on which the order is drawn up in terms of population densities and the basis on which it is determined by GROS and others is clear.
Once the policy decision has been made that the cut-off point is 3,000, drawing up the map is a matter of fact.
Yes.
We will see how such a big undertaking works out. Are people able to object if the definitions of rural and urban are changed?
We will consult primarily on two definitional matters, the first of which is the population densities that set up the settlement. As GROS has carried out that work for many years, there is a lot of background to that issue. The other matter is our choice of 3,000 as the cut-off point. We have already partly consulted on that because it was in the consultation paper on the draft bill, although it was not written into the draft bill. We received a fair number of comments on whether that was the right cut-off point. Some people wanted it to be higher and others wanted it to be lower.
I am probably betraying the fact that I am very much a townie. Section 39 might be used to alter drastically the community right to buy. How and when does the Executive expect the power under section 39 to be used?
The section gives ministers powers specifically to amend sections 37(4), 37(5) and 38 in part 2 of the bill which set out the transfers that are exempt and therefore would not give rise to the community right to buy. They also define what constitutes an action taken with a view to transferring land, which is where we effectively define putting land on the market.
I know that this is a hypothetical question, but you must have worked it out in such a way. Section 39 gives you the power to adjust the categories. What are the categories and how would you adjust them?
The categories are set out in section 38, which also defines who constitutes a member of the same family, as we have stated that transfers between family members are excluded. Section 38 sets out in detail the definitions of those categories. Terms such as family members and relationships are defined elsewhere, mainly in UK law. In future there may be changes in, for example, the law on marriage and who constitute family members. If changes to UK law were made on those matters, the powers under section 39 would give us the opportunity to adjust the act in line with those changes.
Would you require to change the definition of family relationships only in those circumstances—if there were changes in what we might call family law at a UK level?
It would be that sort of thing.
Does section 39 not also apply to section 37(4)?
It applies to parts of section 37(4).
Yes, and there is all the business of when section 37(1) does not apply, such as when a transfer occurs for reasons other than for value and occurs within the same family. It applies to quite a lot of other circumstances.
The categories could also be amended if it was found that a certain exemption was being abused or if another class had to be created.
I have the impression—I may be wrong—that this is one bill where to an extreme extent the Executive or people like yourselves have taken the view that this is new and requires a belt-belt-belt-and-three-pairs-of-braces job to provide the power to change the legislation in future. I am not being provocative. Am I right in saying that such an approach has been taken to a greater extent than it normally would? It seems to be an extreme case of saying, "We can change every single thing in this act if we think we need to change it in future." I am not suggesting for one minute that it is an abuse of subordinate legislation, but it does seem to be an extreme use of it. Is that a fair comment?
As responsibility for the bill is divided between part 1, for which Ian Melville and I are responsible, and the other parts, I can only speak for part 1, in relation to which the answer to your question is yes. Although we began with draft provisions that defined the bill's core concepts, we reached the view that such an approach might be inflexible, because in some way that we could not foresee, people who want to exercise access rights or landowners might act in a manner that is not objectively responsible.
I echo those thoughts for parts 2 and 3. Although the concept of community right to buy may be simple, members will know from the bill's provisions that it has turned out to be complex, particularly in relation to trying to fit it into the current conveyancing system in Scotland and protecting owners and sellers. As a result, we have taken fairly wide powers to accommodate what might be defects in the bill.
We should probably draw that particular exchange to other people's attention, as it refers in some ways to what is almost a policy decision. However, we can discuss that matter.
Yes, in private.
In private, but not at night in a rural setting. [Laughter.]
No.
We could exclude the local authority.
As far as the wider powers are concerned, we understand the difficulties in part 2 and we will mention the matter in passing to the lead committee.
How do you envisage that the provision in section 59(5) will operate? Will you put flesh on its bones and give us a hypothetical wee scenario of what you think that the provision is about?
Section 59(1) defines, under four headings, the circumstances in which people would be entitled to compensation from ministers. Some of the circumstances are specific, such as in section 59(1)(b) which mentions
Why will ministers provide compensation? I am trying to understand section 59. I understand why we should pay out compensation for some things, but why should the fault of X, which causes loss to Y, be compensated for by Z? Compensation usually comes from the people who cause a loss. What will ministers—or we—pick up the tab for in this respect?
Section 59 will, in part, reassure landowners and those whose sale proceedings are disturbed by the right to buy that if the right to buy does not go exactly as the bill sets out because things happen, they are entitled to compensation. As ministers propose to set up the right to buy, they should be responsible for providing such compensation.
Those are the old principles of nationalising and not compensating or nationalising and compensating.
It is not compensation in terms of the value of the land, but compensation for somebody's failure to do something.
It is compensation in relation to other things that happen as a result—
Of a policy change. The people who change the policy are held to be responsible if someone is disadvantaged because of that change. That is quite socialist, is it not? It is quite a good idea.
I suspect that, whatever else section 59(1)(b) may be, it is not socialist.
Are we content with section 59, or would we prefer to see some guidelines about how the regulations would work?
I do not yet have a feel for how the legislation would work in practice. I presume that the order would simply set out the method of compensation.
Yes. The order will set out a basis for compensation. The kinds of things for which compensation will be payable will be broadly similar to that which exists for compulsory purchases, although the business of compulsory purchase is itself under review at the moment.
Perhaps we might want to see the instrument before we have gone too far down the tracks.
Yes, I think so.
Do you mean a draft of the regulations?
It has been quite common for the committee to receive a draft of how the Executive proposes that such things would work in practice. I must say that such an approach has been helpful. The Executive has tended to undertake to provide by stage 2 a draft of anything that has worried us. Perhaps the Executive will not be as helpful this time but, historically, when various committees of the Parliament have asked, they have tended to get a draft of the regulations that might be made under a provision that has concerned them.
It seems to be important that we should get a draft of the regulations.
When we have been asked, we have generally been prepared to come forward with drafts. As it would be for Ron Grant to draft the regulations—
I would like the committee to receive a draft because I do not have much of a feel for this provision.
Is it possible that we could get sight of a draft, Ron?
I do not see any difficulty with that. The general principle is that nobody should lose out by the exercise of the right to buy, or by the failure to exercise that right after it has been commenced. To tell the truth, I do not think that there will be anything fancy in the regulations. They will simply give the methodology of the calculations. I am quite happy to provide a draft.
It would be good for the committee to know what the regulations might be.
I thank Ron Grant for that.
Section 74 provides that, in assessing any application to buy additional land, the Scottish Land Court must undertake various tests, which are set out in section 74(3). It is proposed that there should be a power to amend those tests. As far as we are aware, the whole area that is covered by section 74 is a completely new concept, which is not covered by the Scottish Land Court at the moment. The tests that are set out in section 74(3) are fairly strict.
Do you anticipate—I know that you do not know this, but I do not have any feel for crofting at all—that there will be a lot of applications to the Scottish Land Court?
For additional land? No. That is one of the reasons for my saying that use of the powers in section 75 is a long way away. Although a number of applications might be made to buy croft land, the number of applications to buy additional land will be more limited.
With all due respect, you cannot judge that now, so the manner in which section 75 is set out is very important.
There would be no consultation on the issue of somebody buying additional land, because the person would take up that matter with the Scottish Land Court. Existing provisions provide that that court would deal with the matter. There would be consultation on any proposal to change section 74(3). Consultation would be conducted on the issue on which we are taking the power to make an order. If we intended to make an order, we would certainly consult. Far-reaching changes could not be made without consultation.
Is Gordon Jackson concerned about the fact that this can be done by subordinate legislation?
I have some sympathy for this provision. It would be a pity if, 10 years down the line, the Scottish Land Court came back to the Executive and said that the purpose of the bill was to allow purchase of additional land but that there was a loophole so the criteria would have to be modified slightly. That is not all that likely—the criteria look all right—but you never know. If there was not a procedure in place to do such modification by means of a statutory instrument, time would have to be found for brand new primary legislation, or else the whole thing would be snookered.
This is a subsidiary purpose, in a sense, as additional lands are an extra. It is intended to be an extra opportunity.
Section 75 does not undermine the bill. I cannot see how it could be used to undermine the purposes of the bill. It enables the bill to be fine-tuned so that it works. Others may feel less comfortable with the provision.
My concern is about the principle of being able to transfer land under an order. If the provisions in section 74 were not working to your satisfaction, you could effect a big change.
It gives the court slightly different criteria to apply. The power would be required only if the court came back and said that the procedure was not working.
The provision in section 75 cannot create a situation in which the Scottish Land Court would not be involved. It would be used only to change section 74(3), which contains the criteria that the Scottish Land Court uses. The provision does not change the basis on which the means of dealing with this aspect of the bill operates. It could change the criteria that apply when that procedure operates, but the procedure is unaffected.
It is to allow fine-tuning that is a long time away.
That is correct.
I am most cynical about things that are said to be a long time away, but I see the sense in this provision, more than I do in others.
I always have a residual suspicion about how something may go wrong, but I accept what Gordon Jackson says, as this is not a potential attack on the principle.
We will leave that one for now, in that case.
One could seek to exercise the power in a way that would run into trouble with state aid rules, but the Executive's intention is that we would ensure that we complied with state aid rules. We would have to ensure that any proposal for a grant scheme complied with state aid rules before we developed the proposal.
So you are saying that you do not need to state that; it is taken as read.
We take it as read if we are going to give grants to organisations. We expect that we can frame a grant scheme that will comply with state aid rules, but we would have to ensure that that was the case.
Are you content with that, Gordon?
Yes.
It sounds like hours of work for lawyers.
It is the sort of thing that gets really screwed up, but I am not sure that an anti-screw-up section can be written into the bill.
The session has been helpful.
Indeed. I thank the witnesses for their attendance and for the information that they have provided today.
The same applies to today's witnesses.
That is what I think as well.
They were quite helpful.
I thought that they were trying to be very helpful. Is there anything that members wish to pick over, or do we have enough information for our report?
Obviously, Alasdair Rankin will draft the report. I want to highlight to the lead committee the exchange that I had with two of the witnesses, who both conceded that they were taking incredibly sweeping powers. I floated the idea that what they were doing was much more extreme than usual, and both said that that was the case. That might be right or it might be wrong—it might or might not be justified—but the witnesses openly admitted that they are going right over the top with subordinate legislation powers. That exchange in particular should be provided to the lead committee almost verbatim, and we should say, "That is what they are doing."
I am not taking a position.
No, but we are clear about what the Executive is doing and why.
We should be saying that the bill has hugely sweeping subordinate legislation powers. We should be under no illusions.
It is important for the style of other bills that we put it on the record that we have asked the Executive witnesses questions, we have heard their explanations, and we will draw the issue to the attention of the lead committee.
We need to watch that this new Parliament does not start to follow that trend. It may be legitimate for the Land Reform (Scotland) Bill to provide that everything can be totally changed by statutory instruments, but once draftsmen and legislators get into that habit, that might become the norm in every bill. That would worry me quite a lot.
Given the fact that this is a radical bill, which is detailed and has wide-reaching effects, perhaps it is understandable that the Executive wants to be able to change so much by subordinate legislation. On the other hand, because the bill concerns people's basic rights over the use of land and access to land, there will be disputes.
I can understand that. That is why I would like to change the bill to insert the rider or caveat that the purposes of the bill cannot be changed by subordinate legislation. I can understand why the Executive has done what it has done, but I worry slightly lest we set a precedent in our new Parliament and become huge over-users of statutory instruments. Perhaps not every bill will be like the Land Reform (Scotland) Bill, but the issue is of the sort that we should highlight to lead committees and to the Parliament. It is not for us to say whether the bill uses too many statutory instruments, but there is an issue about the extent to which statutory instruments should be used in legislation.
We should register our concern. Our criticisms of the bill should be given an edge.
We would be concerned if the bill were to set a precedent. In this instance, we are prepared to accept that, because of the bill's complexity, there may be a need for maximum flexibility so that—to use the example that was given—we do not have the expense of a formal public inquiry. Perhaps Alasdair Rankin could include those points in his report.
The provisions of the bill are almost invariably succeeded by another section that says "We can change any of the above." Fundamentally, that is what the bill does.
Sections 74 and 75 come to mind. When we asked why section 75 existed, we were told, "Well, we do not know whether section 74 will work."
That is how the bill is structured.
It was very honest of the Executive officials. We can understand where they are coming from. Nobody has done this before.
Okay, we have got the picture. Are we happy that our report should draw those points to the attention of the lead committee?
Should the attention of the lead committee be drawn to the various undertakings that were given?
Yes, it should.
It was quite interesting that the one time that the witnesses were lost for words—I mean no disrespect to them—was when we asked how the compensation scheme would work in practice. Witnesses are normally very articulate and can tell you things, but on that occasion we had the goldfish scenario: there were no words coming out of their mouths.
They had not thought it through.
They did not have a handle on how the compensation scheme would work in practice.
It was mildly embarrassing.
Another scalp for the Subordinate Legislation Committee.
That was the only issue on which they were not confident.
They were uncomfortable. I think that they will go away and talk about that—which might be as much the purpose of today's exercise as providing us with information.
Next
Executive Responses