Justice 2 Committee, 27 Mar 2002

Meeting date: Wednesday, March 27, 2002

Official Report 201KB pdf

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Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service

Item 5 is the committee's inquiry into the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service. This morning, we will hear evidence from the Faculty of Advocates. I welcome Neil Brailsford QC, Alan Dewar QC and Simon Di Rollo QC. Thank you for the paper that you submitted, which has been very helpful in addressing some of the issues. I apologise for keeping you waiting, but I hope that it gave you an opportunity to hear the discussion. In view of the time, we will go straight to questions. At the end of the session, we can deal with issues that you feel have not been covered.

You are probably aware of the committee's discussions and of the questioning that took place in our last evidence-taking session. One issue about which I am uncertain and unclear is the claim that is made by advocate deputes to a special form of independence that is denied to the procurators fiscal. What are your views on the subject? So far, witnesses have failed to show us the practical difference that that independence—if it exists and if it is justified—makes and how it manifests itself in the way that things actually work. Lay people, such as myself, do not see it as yet.

We have read the Official Report of at least part of the committee's previous evidence-taking sessions and we have seen what Derek Batchelor said. He clearly attempted to set out some of the background to the independence of Crown counsel. I understand that it is a difficult concept and we have given thought to the dialogue that took place about that.

The first point, in a sense, is a reiteration of what Derek Batchelor said, although I will try to avoid repeating what he said. Crown counsel are independent; they are not employees. The Lord Advocate appoints them and, as a concomitant of that, he can remove them whenever he wants to. Of course that does not happen very often, but our understanding is that advocate deputes have been asked to leave in the past, for whatever reason.

Procurators fiscal are employees. I am not impugning procurators fiscal in the slightest; they are very able people who are doing their job and no one has any criticism of them in that regard. However, they are part of a career structure and the difficulties that that career structure presents them are part of their concern. We are concerned that the career structure puts certain pressures on them. If procurators fiscal were appointed Crown counsel, there is no doubt that they would either remain in the Procurator Fiscal Service or go back to the service after a period of time. Members will appreciate the fact that Crown counsel usually serve for about three years, give or take.

We think that there is a possible perception that procurators fiscal might be concerned—even subconsciously—with their prospects for promotion within the Procurator Fiscal Service. There is the perception that that might impinge on the decisions that they would have to make as Crown counsel.

As the committee knows, Crown counsel have to mark cases. Members can imagine, at least at perception level, the possibility of difficulty if a procurator fiscal, Crown counsel, advocate depute were to receive papers from a very senior regional fiscal who had marked a case and made a recommendation. One can see the possibility that the Crown counsel who is going back into the Procurator Fiscal Service might be perceived as wishing not to go against the wishes of the recommendation or view of that very senior fiscal.

How do you respond to the point that the fiscals are independent by right of their having a direct commission? Given what you have just said, the advocate depute could be in fear of being dismissed by the Lord Advocate. I see those two points as somewhat balanced. The fiscal is part of a broader legal profession and has a variety of career opportunities within and outwith the fiscal service. Coupled with the direct commission that fiscals hold, that ought to prevent difficulties applying in practice. The direct commission, which is similar to the advocate deputes' direct commission, could make people in the broader community see procurators fiscal as just as independent. How do you respond to that, if it is a fair point?

It is a perfectly fair point and I accept the fact that the procurators fiscal and Mr Richard Stott made it to the committee very forcefully. I accept the fact that procurators fiscal hold a commission and are meant to be independent—they exercise independent judgment. However—I stress the point about perception—they are part of a career system and there might be some difficulties with the perception of that.

The second point is the fair comment that procurators fiscal are part of a broader legal profession and have opportunities within the fiscal service. That is undoubtedly true and whether that is good or bad does not really matter—it is entirely neutral. Procurators fiscal fulfil different functions at different times in their careers. Sometimes they have a managerial function and sometimes they appear in court; they do a variety of jobs. That is part of the career structure. I do not think that it is either pro or against the proposition.

It is important to appreciate that an institution like the Procurator Fiscal Service creates a way of thinking and a particular mindset—there is no question about that. My experience as an advocate depute reviewing decisions on whether or not to prosecute demonstrated to me that those decisions had been taken as a result of a mindset. For example, there was a general mindset that tended to put health and safety cases into the summary court, when it was generally felt by Crown counsel that they should be prosecuted under solemn procedure at a more serious level. Road traffic cases, such as causing death by dangerous driving, were the same. Decision making in relation to prosecution constantly requires to be looked at with a fresh mind. If such independent review is removed from the system, something very important will be taken away. I realise that it is difficult to express, but I feel strongly that there is a danger of not realising the importance of that check in relation to decision making.

Richard Stott made it perfectly clear that he did not want somebody reviewing his decisions. I suggest that it is a good thing that somebody reviews decisions. It means that, at the end of the day, the decisions are the right ones, by and large, although obviously mistakes are made. The decision-making process is improved, because decisions have to be looked at with a fresh and independent mind.

I would like to take up that point, because I was struck by some of Stewart Stevenson's questioning in particular. At one stage of the dialogue that Stewart Stevenson had with Derek Batchelor, Stewart Stevenson made the point—with which Derek Batchelor did not agree—that to his way of thinking the difference between independence from the point of view of an advocate and from that of a fiscal was paper thin. Derek Batchelor did not accept that for one minute. I suggest that he was right not to do so.

I will try to illustrate that point by referring to Richard Stott's evidence. I am not here to do Richard Stott down—none of us is. I have also been an advocate depute in my time, and I overlapped slightly with Richard Stott when he was one of the permanent staff in the Crown Office. I have the highest regard for him, but he himself recognised—in particular in response to Duncan Hamilton's questions—that from time to time he came under pressure from certain agencies, such as the police, the Health and Safety Executive, HM Customs and Excise, and so on.

There is a significant difference between the roles. Fiscals have a different role. They are in daily contact with outside agencies that report to them and therefore are liable to come under the sort of influence that advocate deputes simply do not, because advocate deputes do not meet those agencies in that way. In fact, the only time that they will meet those agencies head to head in any shape or form is when they come to prosecute a particular trial.

As I read Mr Stott's evidence, the only reassurance that he was able to give to indicate that he saw himself as independent was that you were to rely on his integrity. I have no desire to question his integrity—he is a man of high integrity. However, can we be satisfied that every fiscal in the service is of that ilk? Can we be satisfied that on every occasion even a man of the highest integrity, such as Mr Stott, will take the right decision?

Mr Hamilton's and Mr Aitken's questions were very well taken. They raised concerns about whether the integrity of fiscals was a sufficient guarantee. Advocate deputes—who are not part of a career structure, who do not have an axe to grind and are involved in cases for only a limited period—are much more likely not be influenced, even subconsciously, by factors such as those that have been mentioned.

Although the independence of Crown counsel is a difficult concept, it is not a paper-thin concept; it has existed for a very long time. Although many elements of the prosecution system may be criticised, the role played by advocate deputes is not one of those. In this case we should apply the principle, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it".

I am very pleased that Mr Dewar picked up on the issue that I raised last week, as it was the most concerning aspect of the evidence that we heard.

Can you help the committee to understand the advantages of the independent role that you advocate? Your written submission makes four points that I would like you to expand on. Mr Di Rollo has already mentioned the first of those, which is made on page 4 of the submission. You say that an independent view is taken on the marking of cases that is occasionally different from the view taken by the fiscal. Of what proportion of cases is that true? I understand that, even if the advocate depute confirms the fiscal's opinion, it is advantageous for an independent view to be taken on the marking of cases, but how often do the advocate depute's and the fiscal's conclusions differ?

I take it that the member is asking in what percentage of cases the advocate depute disagrees with the marking of the fiscal. That is very difficult to assess. As the committee has heard, advocate deputes usually work in pairs, but marking their own cases. They work for a week at a time. For that reason, we do not know the overall figure for the percentage of cases in which advocate deputes disagree with the marking of the fiscal. I would say that it is very low—less than 5 per cent, and probably 1 or 2 per cent. However, I stress that those can be very important decisions.

We looked into this issue, because we know that the committee is interested in actual examples. I understand why—it is easier to understand things with the help of a concrete example. We have found one that Mr Di Rollo can tell you about rather better than I can, because he was involved. It relates to a murder case that was subsequently prosecuted to conviction, but in which the fiscal's original recommendation was not to proceed.

That is all that needs to be said. Such cases crop up regularly. I do not agree with the proposition that advocate deputes disagree with fiscals' marking in 1 or 2 per cent of cases; I think that the figure is rather higher. Decisions are being—or ought to be—questioned rather more often than that.

In the murder case to which Neil Brailsford referred, the recommendation not to proceed was made by a very senior fiscal. After considering the case, Crown counsel decided that the case should proceed, resulting in a conviction. I am not saying that the recommendation was wrong, but the decision that was made was much better because fresh consideration was given to the case. The decision that was made was the right decision, because the case was independently reviewed by someone who was detached from it and who had an opportunity to consider the evidence. That person decided that there was enough evidence to proceed with the case and that it should proceed. That is what we will lose if we remove the tier of independent decision making from the process.

I do not disagree with anything that has been said, but I share Simon Di Rollo's view that the percentage of cases in which there is disagreement between the advocate depute and the fiscal is probably higher than 1 or 2 per cent. However, it is very difficult to put a figure on that. I do not think that an analysis has ever been done of the matter.

I caution against viewing this issue in statistical terms. I suggest that the system itself is a good one because, when procurators fiscal and precognition officers—who are not lawyers—prepare such reports for consideration by Crown counsel, they benefit from knowing that their thinking will be reviewed by someone else. High-quality decision making is much more likely to be achieved at first instance level—when the report is being researched, written and submitted—even though Crown counsel may not agree with the recommendation at the end of the day. Examining the statistics is one way of looking at the problem, but it is by no means the whole story.

Page 2 of your additional submission states:

"The benefit of such independent scrutiny cannot be over-emphasised".

You go on to say that Scotland has avoided the miscarriages of justice that have occurred in England because of the independent scrutiny. Will you speak a little more about that, so that we can understand the seriousness of the issue?

The point that we were trying to make is that Scotland has not had the same public scandals that have occurred in England, such as the Birmingham six, the Guildford four and other high-profile cases of clear miscarriages of justice. One reason that the Scottish system has not been victim to such problems is the role of independents and the level at which they exercise that role. The police, too, are conscious of the fact that their actions will be carefully scrutinised not only by the procurator fiscal, but by the deputes of the Lord Advocate, who is the minister responsible. That whole position is a safeguard against miscarriages of justice.

The submission also cites negotiated pleas as another advantage of the independence of the advocate deputes. You say that the complainer benefits from having that independent advice, especially in sensitive cases. Can you unpack that a bit more?

It is simply that, because the advocate depute is wholly independent, the advocate depute can take any decision that he or she wants in any case—with the exception of murder and rape cases, for which the consent of a law officer must be obtained.

From my personal experience as an advocate depute, I can say that the advocate depute examines a case objectively and sometimes takes hard decisions. The hardest decision is the decision not to proceed with a case. That decision might need to be taken on qualitative factors, not simply on the quantity of evidence. One looks at the evidence that one has. It sometimes happens that, although there is technically enough evidence, it is of such poor quality that one appreciates that proceeding with the prosecution would not further the public interest. I believe that it is easier to take such decisions if one can do so from a wholly independent standpoint.

There are highly sensitive cases, in which there are several serious charges—such as a mixture of assaults, possibly including sexual assault—which may have a number of victims. If the accused person is prepared to tender a plea to some or one of the charges, the victims of the other charges to which a guilty plea is not taken might feel aggrieved that they have not been vindicated. It is difficult to reach a view on such delicate cases, but we feel that it is more likely that we will get that difficult balance right if such cases are dealt with by someone who is truly one step removed from the system and who is there only for a limited period.

I want to emphasise the point about the mindset that can arise. As has been indicated, those who come from the bar to serve as advocate deputes tend to serve about three years—sometimes a little more, sometimes a little less. Towards the end of my own three-year period—I served a little more than three years—I was aware of being rather more prosecution-minded than I had been at the outset. The danger of such a mindset is that you tend to see things in a more blinkered way and to think of the person in the dock as being guilty before the case is finished. One has to guard constantly against that. As a result, the fact that one serves as an advocate depute for a limited period is an additional advantage that confers either independence or something closely related to it. Anyone from the fiscal service who came into the Crown Office would have been in the system for a long time; because they were prosecuting in the High Court, would still be in it; and indeed, would know that, in all likelihood, they would be returning to it. As a result, there is the danger of having a subconsciously blinkered attitude when prosecuting cases.

It is worth stressing that the purpose of prosecution in the public interest is not to get a conviction, but to put before a judge in summary cases or before a jury all the relevant facts, persuasively and to the best of one's ability. It is then a matter for the judge or jury to decide.

I do not think that that is the public's perception.

No, but the point is worth mentioning.

I completely accept your arguments for the institutional independence of the advocate service. However, should everyone from the fiscal service be precluded from becoming an advocate for that three-year period, because of the perception or reality that they are tarred by being part of the fiscal service's career structure? That is what you seem to be saying.

At the start of your question, you mentioned joining the Faculty of Advocates. Any procurator fiscal can resign from the Procurator Fiscal Service any time and, providing that they have the qualifications—which they would obviously have—become a member of the Faculty of Advocates. There is no difficulty with that; it is one of the career options open to procurators fiscal. However, through no fault of an individual, the fact that they are an employee of the Procurator Fiscal Service gives rise to the possible perception of a lack of independence.

As I do not have a legal background, will you explain how one becomes an advocate?

Do you mean an advocate or an advocate depute?

An advocate depute.

Becoming an advocate depute is entirely at the gift—if that is the right word—of the Lord Advocate of the day. As none of us has been Lord Advocate, we do not know how the decision is made, but presumably he consults the Solicitor General. I would not be surprised if they also had a word with some of the senior judges, the Dean of Faculty and other senior colleagues. However, I do not know that specifically. The Lord Advocate decides the depute who will exercise his role and have all his powers when in court. Given that the Scottish bar is and always has been a fairly small body and that there is a limited number of courts, the Lord Advocate is likely to know a person's abilities. Historically, people have not been asked to become advocate deputes until they have become very experienced advocates.

Such people have usually been at the bar for a minimum of eight to 10 years, depending on their previous experience before coming to the bar. If they have practised as a solicitor or been a member of the Procurator Fiscal Service for an extensive period, that might cut down the length of time. However, the amount of time is usually considerable. Certainly people must have cut the mustard in practice for the Lord Advocate to ask them to become advocate deputes. To be asked is obviously regarded as a privilege and, until relatively recently, most people have been happy to accept.

If the committee is concerned that we are putting up some false barrier with respect to people from the fiscal service becoming advocate deputes, I want to say that that is not the case. As the committee heard last time round, several people have been members of the fiscal service, have chosen to leave the service, become admitted to the Faculty of Advocates and have been appointed advocate deputes—indeed Mr Batchelor fell into that category as did Johanna Johnston, who also gave evidence to the committee.

The question relates to another concern about career structure, which in turn is related to the perceived lack of morale in the fiscal service. The Pryce review of planning, allocation and management of resources in the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service—not that I pretend to have read the whole document—highlights a certain degree of disappointment in procurators fiscal that, as things stand, they are not allowed to progress to advocate deputes within the system. The recommendation is that that matter should be considered further.

The fact that someone within the fiscal service cannot progress to become an advocate depute is not something that ought to weigh heavily in a consideration of the whole system. We are talking about whether we have a good prosecution system in the public interest, not whether it would please procurators fiscal to become part of that system at the higher echelons. I am not trying to make a cheap point, but the procurators fiscal knew that that was the situation when they entered the service. If people within the system are dissatisfied that, as matters stand, they cannot become advocate deputes, there is nothing to prevent them from leaving the service and following the route that we have suggested. There is no artificial barrier.

We are not dealing with individual procurators fiscal, but there is a public interest in the whole inquiry and we must ask whether the public are being failed because we are not keeping experienced procurators fiscal. We are trying to get to the bottom of that. The Crown Office would welcome such a mindset, because it would suggest that we have a store of experience that we do not have currently. That experience is fundamental to a quality prosecution service.

I am listening carefully to what you and Crown counsel have said, but I do not understand about the issue of independence. I put the question to Crown counsel last week and I was not satisfied with the answer. Why is independence an issue for the High Court, but not an issue for the sheriff court?

It is an issue throughout the whole system.

Do you see the distinction that I am making? We have procurators fiscal prosecuting in the sheriff court, although they do not prosecute in the High Court—why not? Surely the issue of independence is crucial in sheriff courts? How do the two sit together?

Solemn cases have the benefit of independent decision making in the sheriff courts. In all sheriff and jury cases, Crown counsel has been involved in the decision-making process. That is where the independence is.

Can I stop you there? Are you saying that the approach to independence is the same as for High Court cases?

No, that is not what is being said. Mr Batchelor referred to "institutional independence" when he gave evidence. The way in which that works—

I am sorry to interrupt, but I understand what you are saying about how it works. The point that I do not understand and on which I would like an answer is the difference between the High Court and the sheriff court. Are you saying that there are differences? The independence issue is not the same, is it?

I want to deal with that issue, but to answer the question properly, one must recognise the way in which the system operates from the beginning. Anyone appearing at first instance, when charged in a serious criminal matter, appears in the sheriff court on petition. That is the case whether the person is then prosecuted in the sheriff court or the High Court. That is the beginning of the prosecution process.

In every case in which a person has appeared on petition in the sheriff court, there is an obligation on the Procurator Fiscal Service to report the case to the Crown Office. That case is then marked by Crown counsel and may well go back and be prosecuted in the sheriff court, either with or without a jury. Institutional independence is part of the marking process, whether the case is then prosecuted in the High Court or in the sheriff court.

I understand. Why could the same not happen for prosecution in the High Court?

It does happen. Every serious case starts with a petition being presented.

If I understand her correctly, the convener is asking why the fiscal cannot prosecute in the High Court in the same way.

You make the decision. Why can they not prosecute?

You are getting away from the issue of independence and moving on to the issue of presentational ability.

I am just trying to understand your argument about why procurators could not prosecute in the High Court. I am listening to what you are saying about independence. You will know that we have heard people ask why the same advocate depute who marks the case does not prosecute it. We have been told that that is impossible. Given what you have said, why is it impossible for others, such as experienced, professional fiscals, to prosecute in the High Court?

The answer is that that could happen. However, as we have said in our written submission, we maintain that there are advantages in having a Crown counsel or advocate depute do it.

With respect, at the level that we are talking about—the High Court—I suggest that the best people available for the job, in the public interest, are to be found in the Faculty of Advocates. That is my evidence. You can either accept it or not, but I suggest to you that that is the situation as regards presentation.

Perhaps I can describe the situation slightly more graphically. If you found yourself accused and being prosecuted in the High Court for a serious crime, you would probably want to be represented by someone like Donald Findlay or Gordon Jackson, to pick two obvious examples. [Laughter.]

Now, now.

Members may have their own preferences, but the fact is that you would want to be defended by an experienced High Court practitioner. I asked members to put themselves in the defendant's shoes, but let us look at the matter in a slightly more detached way, from the point of view of the public interest. Would you prefer serious criminals, or anyone appearing in the High Court, to be prosecuted by a Donald Findlay equivalent—if there is such a thing—or by someone who regularly prosecutes cases to do with routine assaults, drunk driving and so on?

We are talking about the aspect of equality of arms. Moving away from independence for a moment, we are here to say that experience and skill must also come into the matter. In addition to the point about independence, we are saying that there ought to be equality of arms. If the best people are defending in the High Court, the best people should also be prosecuting.

We are listening to what you are saying, but only yesterday we were listening to procurators fiscal, who say that they, too, could be the best people for the job. Some of the more senior fiscals have a lot of experience in prosecution.

Many of them have not been in court for a considerable length of time, which is a big problem with the way in which things are organised. I can appreciate why it must be difficult for you to understand, as you are hearing competing views. Some of the things that have been said in the debate are not correct. It is not correct to say that able advocates who have been defence practitioners do not make excellent advocate deputes, or that able practitioners in civil cases do not make excellent advocate deputes, because they do.

The Lord Advocate or whoever is responsible for choosing an advocate depute must do so with care. They must consider whether the person has the experience and the ability to do the job. That is all that matters for the public interest. There are people in the Faculty of Advocates who are of the calibre that is required and they should be available to do the job on behalf of the public.

An objective point that could be made—indeed, the convener made it—is that, although there are many experienced people in the Procurator Fiscal Service, the career structure means that they do not spend all their time prosecuting but do a variety of jobs. For example, they might prosecute for a while before going into management. Advocates are specialist pleaders. By the time we are appointed an advocate depute, we have spent a long time in court, handling evidential matters daily.

I am afraid that we will have to close down the discussion, as we are running out of time. That is unfortunate, because the discussion that we are having is good. I will allow our witnesses to make some brief points before they go.

Before we move on, I would like to ask for a brief point of clarification. Simon Di Rollo mentioned his involvement in cases in the sheriff court. What triggers the involvement of Crown counsel in the review of a case? Is it the seriousness of the case?

The trigger is simple. All cases involving someone who appears on petition at the beginning of the process are reported to the Crown Office. The cases are then marked, or reviewed, by Crown counsel. A large part of the marking process is the decision about whether a prosecution, if there is to be one, should be in the sheriff court or the High Court. Any case that the Crown counsel has decided should be prosecuted before a sheriff and jury goes back to the local procurator fiscal's office to be dealt with by the procurator fiscal. However, before it gets to that stage, there is the element of independence that I described.

The last question will be asked by Bill Aitken. In replying, it would be helpful if the witnesses could raise any points that they feel should have been mentioned. I apologise for the fact that we have run out of time. This has been an interesting discussion and perhaps we can continue it another time, if we can find a suitable slot.

It is evident that the criminal justice system in Scotland is under tremendous pressure—that is not in dispute. That has resulted in suggestions—I will put it no more strongly than that—that there should be a diminution of the 110-day rule. Does the Faculty of Advocates have a view on that?

We have no formal view on whether the 110-day period should be shortened. We have not considered the matter. We have a way of making representations to the committees and the Parliament and the matter has not come up in that process.

That is entirely accurate: there is no current view on the matter. Lord Bonomy asked the Faculty of Advocates to make a submission to his review of many matters relating to the prosecution process in the High Court, including the issue that Bill Aitken asks about. A small sub-committee, of which I am a member, has been set up and views will be formed on that and many other issues.

We look forward with interest to hearing those views.

Are there any additional points that the witnesses would like to mention?

One point about precognition must not be lost sight of. Having read the Official Reports of previous meetings, I want to stress that one should not focus on presentation to the exclusion of preparation. The major problem with the justice system relates to preparation rather than presentation. The precognition of cases is a skilled task that requires a great deal of legal experience. I do not have that experience, as I am not a solicitor and have not carried out work in that regard.

When we discuss matters such as who is the best person to present cases, the importance of precognition should not be lost sight of. Precognition should be done well by properly qualified people.

I crave the convener's indulgence to raise one final matter. It follows on from what Mr Aitken said, but in a slightly different way. Mr Aitken was referring to a large degree of stress within the procurator fiscal system. Last week, an article in Scotland on Sunday referred to a Crown Office report on stress levels. I understand that the report, which I have not seen, was an internal document. The suggestion in the article was that one in 10 "prosecution lawyers"—that was the term that was used—suffer from symptoms that are akin to those of clinical depression and that two thirds of staff in the Procurator Fiscal Service suffer from stress.

Against that background, I must ask a serious question. Does the committee want to add to the stress in the system by giving procurators fiscal the additional responsibility of prosecuting in the High Court? I suggest that now is not the time to do that.

I am afraid that we must end our evidence-taking session there. I am absolutely sure that the basis of our inquiry is not—

I will make one brief point. It is quite important.

If you let me finish, I will let you make your point.

Sorry.

I do not want witnesses to insult the committee in any way by suggesting that we do not know where we are going with the inquiry. We are examining a service that is underfunded and which should have proper career structures—other people agree with us on that. We are holding a debate about the best way forward for the service. We will take all the evidence into account. I will give Stewart Stevenson the last word, if he makes it brief.

Because I am named in the Scotland on Sunday article, I want to make it clear that the issues that are referred to are in the Jonathan Pryce report—in annex E. That report is in the public domain.

There might be another document, but I am not sure.

There is another document. What has been discussed in the public domain comes from public sources. It is important that I make that point. I have not drawn on anything that is confidential.

Absolutely. I did not intend to insult the committee in any way. I draw the matter to members' attention, in so far as it is not already at the front of the committee's mind, as a serious point. In a situation in which there is a high degree of stress, the matter ought to be at least a consideration in deciding whether the responsibilities of fiscals should be increased.

I thank you for your evidence. The discussion has been interesting. I assure you that everything that you have said this morning will be considered seriously in the course of our inquiry. Thank you very much for appearing.

We agreed that we would deal with item 6 in private. That should take us four or five minutes.

Meeting continued in private until 12:15.