Criminal Proceedings etc (Reform) (Scotland) Bill: Stage 1
I welcome members to the 17th meeting in 2006 of the Subordinate Legislation Committee. I have received apologies from Gordon Jackson, who is chairing an event in his constituency. I remind members to switch off their mobile phones.
Are members content for the use of the power in section 7(2) to be subject to the negative procedure?
We raised two points on the power in section 35(4) to increase the maximum term of imprisonment to 12 months.
Secondly, we asked about the definition of "relevant power" in section 35(6). Members will have seen from the Executive's response that it is satisfied that the drafting covers the point that we made. We could draw the Executive's response to the attention of the lead committee and the Parliament. Do members want to do anything else?
We can certainly draw the Executive's response to the attention of the lead committee and the Parliament, but paragraph 14 of our legal brief suggests that
I am sorry, Murray, but I cannot hear you very well.
And you are sounding very tinny, convener. Our sound engineer is doubtless wrestling manfully with those difficulties.
To which power were you referring?
Paragraph 14 of the legal brief suggests that
I agree. We should flag up the matter to the lead committee and the Executive.
Yes. The bill is at stage 1, so the Executive has plenty of time to reconsider the matter.
Okay. We will mention the amendment that may be required. We could say what paragraph 14 of the legal briefing says.
Section 39(1)(f), on the power to make provision for fixed penalty discounts, will insert new section 302(7A) into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. Members may remember that we asked the Executive whether the use of the word "may" in paragraph (a) of new section 302(7A) would preclude the order requiring a discount to be applied in appropriate circumstances. Members will have seen from the Executive's response that it has agreed to consider whether an amendment is needed. Are members content with the response and to monitor developments at stage 2?
Are members content that the power be subject to the negative procedure?
I welcome Jamie Stone to the meeting.
The Executive's response should simply be referred to the lead committee. The matter is a policy matter. I am content that the power be subject to the negative procedure.
Okay. Section 43 deals with the power to make further provision as to fines enforcement officers—FEOs—and their functions. Members will remember that we asked the Executive for more details on the proposed contents of any regulations that are made under the power and that sample regulations be made available to the Parliament. You will have seen that the Executive has supplied further information on the contents of regulations. It has said that it is not possible to provide sample regulations, but that the intention is to refine functions and responsibilities in the light of practice. The Executive also says something about experience and evaluation. The process will be an on-going one.
Obviously, it is unfortunate that we do not have sample information at this stage. The Executive did not explain why we do not.
Do we agree with Ken Macintosh?
Section 43 inserts into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 new section 226F(6), which includes the power to make detailed provision regulating the execution of relevant diligences by a fines enforcement officer.
Section 50(2) concerns the power to provide that a justice of the peace court be constituted by one JP only. We raised two points on the section.
It strikes me that this is an odd way to go about what the Executive wants to do. It thinks that it wants single-JP courts but it is not sure. I would have thought that it should set out a clearer policy approach towards that end. Later, if the Executive feels, in the light of experience, that it does not want single-JP courts, it will not need to commence the relevant section. I think that it would be more appropriate for the Executive to make up its mind on the matter by stage 2, rather than at some point in the indefinite future.
Are we all agreed that we would like more information on this before stage 2?
I agree with Murray Tosh. It seems an odd approach to have a section in the bill that confers the power to provide that a JP court is to be constituted by one JP only and then say, "We haven't decided whether we will constitute a court using one JP." If that is the Executive's decision, it should just go ahead and put it in the bill. As Murray Tosh has said, if, in the light of experience, it decides not to go down that route, it does not need to commence the relevant section. That seems to be an entirely reasonable way to proceed. For the Executive to say at this stage that it is not sure seems bizarre.
The Executive could have gone either way. The section confers a power to provide that a JP court is to be constituted by one JP only; it does not say that a JP court is to be constituted by one JP only. That is a small point, but the fact is that the Executive is flagging up the fact that it has not made up its mind but would like to have that power at a later stage if necessary.
There is an interesting point in all of this that we might like to ponder. It appears that the use of the word, "power", implies a lack of any decision or clear policy.
I am sure that there is more that we could say about that.
I do not disagree. I thought that Ken Macintosh made a valiant attempt to defend the Executive's position but, frankly, I was not convinced.
One could argue that the Executive is saying that, because it cannot decide until other developments have taken place, it needs to put in place a provision that will allow it to adopt the proposed policy.
We have made clear our concern. We are more worried about the policy than the subordinate legislation. If the Executive goes down the route that it intends to go down, we are content with the proposed method of subordinate legislation. Our view is that, as a matter of policy, it might be preferable for the Executive to choose a different route. Is that not our role?
I go back to my understanding of the situation. At the moment, the Executive does not think that it is in a position to decide, but it wants to put in place a provision that will allow it to come back and do what has been proposed at a future date. That may be a valid approach.
The Executive says that it wants to make the proposed change in stages, but I would have thought that it would have been more reasonable for it to state its policy position and to admit that that position might change in the light of experience. The Executive could choose to implement its proposal through a series of commencement orders, but that would not matter if the relevant sections were not commenced.
I agree with that. I do not think that we are encroaching on the policy position; we are entirely neutral on the policy position. We are saying that the Executive should state a policy, provide for it in the bill and control its implementation in the way that it did with the Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003. We think that that is the proper way to proceed, which the Executive should emulate.
Are we agreed that that is what we will write to the Executive about?
The second point on which we asked for clarification was how the Executive intends that the functions that are contained in section 50(5) will be conferred. The Executive has told us that ministers' ability to confer functions on clerks of court allows them to make practice directions, which are largely administrative. In other words, we are talking about other functions, so to speak.
But by taking that line, the Executive is surely making the case for the use of an instrument that is subject to the negative procedure.
Yes.
That is usually the case that is advanced in such circumstances. However, I do not think that the Executive intends to do that on this occasion; it intends there to be no parliamentary scrutiny.
That is right—that is the big issue. Are we saying that ministers' ability to confer such functions should be dealt with in an instrument that is subject to the negative procedure?
It strikes me that that would be consistent with the position that we have taken in other circumstances in which powers have been of an administrative nature. We usually argue that the use of an affirmative instrument would be unnecessary, but would it not be reasonable to say that a negative instrument should be used to define, or to change, the duties in question?
I tend to agree. What do other members think?
I do not have a strident view one way or the other. I accepted the Executive's argument that, because only minor administrative changes were at stake, the making of an instrument was not necessary, although I understand Murray Tosh's point about consistency. I would be happy for us to ask for further explanation or to flag up the matter to the lead committee—it is not an issue that I would die in a ditch over.
We could just bring the issue to the attention of the lead committee. Do members have any other thoughts?
I thought that the functions were administrative matters concerning the courts. The Executive follows different routes for similar matters, which are sometimes issued in guidance and sometimes dealt with in subordinate legislation. The issue does not strike me as particularly important.
There is nothing to stop our asking the lead committee to follow up the issue. Although it may not be of much concern, we could ask the lead committee to ask the Executive why directions are necessary. Is that agreed?
On section 51(4)—which provides powers to repeal provisions of the District Courts (Scotland) Act 1975—and on sections 51(5), 51(6) and 51(7), we raised points about the fact that the powers are wide and unrestricted and are subject to the negative procedure.
On section 54(5), which provides powers to regulate the procedure and consultation to be followed in certain appointment processes for justices of the peace, we asked three questions of the Executive.
When we discussed section 54(5) last time, did we consider that the powers should be exercised subject to the affirmative procedure?
Yes, we did. The issue is whether we want to ask for consistency across the board.
Why has the draft order been constructed in such a way that it combines powers under sections 54 and 56, given that there is a case—although that is our position rather than the Executive's position—for using a different level of procedure for each power? If we were to press the need for an affirmative procedure for powers under section 54, would that be unreasonable? What would that require the Executive to do?
I think that the Executive would then need to make two separate instruments.
Sorry, I did not catch that.
Margaret Macdonald will clarify.
The Executive would need either to make two separate instruments or to change the procedure for section 56.
What would it entail for the Executive if it had to introduce two separate instruments?
I suppose that it would involve a bit of extra work for the Executive and for the Parliament, as there would be two instruments instead of one.
Would having two separate instruments result in any operational difficulties for anybody who was affected by them, or affect the efficacy of the powers?
I suppose that it would be difficult to have one without the other. If there was an affirmative instrument and a negative one, there might be operational problems if one failed and the other did not.
Is harmonising the procedure more important than arguing the case for the powers under section 54 to be subject to the affirmative procedure, given that it seems that the powers under section 56 ought to be subject to the negative procedure?
Probably, yes.
I think that that is the crux of the matter. Shall we write to the Executive to ask about the need to harmonise? We need either to have two separate instruments, as outlined by the legal adviser, or to proceed in another way. I think Margaret said that there is a second option.
To exercise both powers in the same instrument, one would need either to stick with the negative procedure for the power on appointments or to change to the affirmative procedure for the power on training.
Yes. So there are two separate options. We should ask about the possibility of changing either of the two procedures in order to harmonise things.
I am not following you. The crux of the issue is that the two powers have to be combined in the same instrument because there could be operational problems if they were separated into two instruments and one went through but the other did not. If we accept that, surely there is nothing to write to the Executive about. We accept its view that it is reasonable for the powers to be combined in the same instrument.
Yes, but the question is whether we still wish the affirmative procedure to apply to the powers under section 54. If we do, we would have to argue that the affirmative procedure should also be used for the powers under section 56. I think that that is perhaps excessive in the circumstances and that we should accept the use of the negative procedure for both.
Exactly.
So what you are saying, Stewart, is that we should accept the negative procedure for both.
Yes.
Okay. So we are moving away from what we said previously, then.
Sometimes we do that in the light of responses, convener.
I am just checking.
Indeed, I think that our record of flexibility is probably better than the Executive's.
To be clear, we are saying that we do not need to use the affirmative procedure for the powers under section 54 and that the negative procedure is sufficient.
We thought that we should use the affirmative procedure but, on balance, it is preferable for the powers under the two sections to use the same procedure. That outweighs the disadvantages of not applying the affirmative procedure to the powers under section 54. Therefore—with reluctance and reservations—we accept the Executive's argument that the negative procedure should be applied in both cases.
Are we agreed?
We accept what the Executive says and agree to the negative procedure.
Section 54(7)(a) contains the power to specify the date on which the appointment of justices of the peace will cease to have effect. We asked the Executive why it has not included a date on which JPs' appointments will cease. The Executive has provided further clarification. Are members happy with the response and with the fact that the power is subject to the negative procedure?
On section 55, "Conditions of office", we considered it odd that a scheme for the payment of allowances to JPs should be determined by ministers. We also noted that section 17 of the District Courts (Scotland) Act 1975 contains a similar provision but that, in that case, the power is exercisable by way of a statutory instrument subject to the negative procedure.
The power is okay. Again, it will relate to minor, administrative matters. We should not clog up parliamentary business unnecessarily.
Yes. The scheme will be for the payment of allowances, not salaries, so it will relate to mileage rates and other such matters.
Are we happy with the Executive's response?
Section 58(6) will confer on the Scottish ministers a power to make provision for tribunals for the removal of justices of the peace. We asked the Executive first for further justification for choosing the negative procedure, given that the provision will replace a power in the 1975 act that is subject to the affirmative procedure. The Executive responded that the provisions would be largely technical, but said that it will give further consideration to which procedure is to be used. Are members content with that response or do you want to emphasise the need for use of the affirmative procedure?
We note and welcome the fact that the Executive will reconsider the procedure. We will await the outcome of the Executive's deliberations.
Secondly, we asked the Executive whether it proposes to list the tribunal in schedule 1 to the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992. The Executive said that it will consider the matter further and consult the Scottish Committee of the Council on Tribunals. That is also welcome. Are members content with the response?
We will monitor the situation at stage 2.
The Executive gave an example of an exemption in its response to our questions on section 54(5). It said that it might waive the requirement to re-advertise a post that had been advertised only three months earlier, if the first advertisement had generated a shortlist of suitable candidates and there was no need to go through the whole procedure again. That is a fairly sensible approach, so I am happy with the provision.
Are we generally happy with the power? I will give members a few more minutes to look at the papers, which contain a lot of meat this week.
On the second point that we raised, the Executive said that it would reconsider the matter and acknowledged the importance of the process whereby judicial appointments are made. We should refer the matter to the lead committee, so that it can consider how much parliamentary input there should be and whether the affirmative or negative procedure should be used. The issue is a policy matter.
There are a number of areas in the bill on which the Executive has not yet made up its mind, as we know. The Executive says that it will give further consideration to section 61(9), which might be fruitful, so we should simply note the Executive's response. I presume that the Executive will advise us about the decision that it reaches, at which point we can form an opinion.
We will consider the matter again at stage 2. In the meantime, we will report on the Executive's response and pass it to the lead committee for consideration. As Ken Macintosh said, many policy issues arise from the response.
That is right. If the Executive wishes the matter to be dealt with under the negative procedure, it should be up to the lead committee to signal that the issue should have more significance.
The issue is difficult, particularly when we do not know any policy details. Stewart, do you have any thoughts on this matter?
I have nothing in particular to say, given that the Executive has said that it will reconsider the matter.
We should leave things as they are for the moment.
Indeed—or at least until we get a definite answer. I am not particularly convinced one way or the other on the matter.
We will keep an eye on what happens at stage 2.
Are members happy that the provision will be subject to the negative procedure?
Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Bill: as amended at Stage 2
The stage 3 debate on the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Bill will be held on Thursday 31 May, so we will be able to consider it again next week. However, because of the Edinburgh holidays at the end of this week, the Executive will not have a long time to look at our recommendations.
Secondly, are members content with the provisions in new paragraph 9(6A) of new schedule 3A, which relates to specifying diseases and will be subject to the affirmative procedure?
At this point, my brief refers to
Are we now on section 2?
Yes. Did you have any questions about section 1, Murray?
No. Section 1 is fine.
Two amendments to section 2, "Slaughter of treated animals", which will insert new section 16B into the 1981 act, are in response to concerns that we expressed at stage 1 about enhancing the level of parliamentary scrutiny. Are we content with new section 16B(7A), which relates to prescribing compensation and is subject to the negative procedure?
We move to new section 16B(11A), which again relates to the slaughter of treated or vaccinated animals. Unlike the amendment to section 1, there is no requirement for the procedure to apply only to emergency situations. As a result, the opportunities for scrutinising any order that will be made under the power will be curtailed. Does the amendment address members' concerns about use of the affirmative procedure?
I do not know what the timescale is for this, but are we able to seek further clarification from the Executive on how it would ensure that the procedure would be used only in emergencies or that a different procedure would be used in non-emergencies? Would the Executive be able—and, indeed, willing—to lodge an amendment to that effect? After all, it would be better if such an amendment came from the Executive.
I welcome the fact that the Executive has amended the bill to reflect our concerns. Unfortunately, it seems to have left a door open, perhaps inadvertently. I certainly do not think that it means for the power to apply in non-emergency situations. I suggest that we draw the matter to the Executive's attention before stage 3. Is that right?
Yes. We hope to receive a response that will clear the matter up before next week's meeting. Is that agreed?
We move on to section 3, "Biosecurity codes". Three amendments are involved. First, we have the amendment to proposed new section 6C(2), which section 3 will insert into the 1981 act. We also have an amendment to proposed new section 6D(1). Given that the amendments are largely of a drafting or cosmetic nature, I assume that they are okay. Are members content?
Thirdly, proposed new section 6D(6) has been amended in response to the recommendation that we made at stage 1 to enhance the level of parliamentary scrutiny. The amendment is similar in nature to those that were made to the previous sections. Are members content?
I clarify that the class 1 affirmative procedure will be used, and the class 3 procedure will be used in the case of emergency orders.
Secondly, proposed new section 8A(6A) has been added to new section 8A by way of a non-Executive amendment. It provides that an order
It seems to be rather odd that the Executive accepted the point, given that it is clearly unnecessary. I do not know what happened at stage 2, but it is strange that we have ended up with a superfluous amendment.
Yes.
If it bans something that is not possible, does not that make it declaratory? In general, does not the Executive resist all declaratory amendments?
That is what our brief highlights.
It also says that the amendment does no harm. However, ministers would normally say that they do not want this sort of provision in a bill. Given the declaratory nature of the amendment, it might be useful for us to ask the Executive whether it intends to let it stand. The Executive may detect a meaning in the amendment that our legal advisers have not found. Although that is almost impossible to conceive of, I note it anyway.
Is that agreed?
We move to section 7, "Seizure of carcases etc". Two amendments are involved, both of which are policy related. They reflect the wider focus of the bill in preventing the spread of disease. However, the reference to "creatures" in proposed new section 36ZB of the 1981 act does not sit well with the wording in new section 36ZE, in which the phrase "animal, bird or amphibian" is used, with the word "animal" defined in new section 36ZA(5). Are we content to note the amendments or should we raise with the Executive the points that our legal adviser has made on the references? I refer members to paragraph 111 of the legal brief.
Does the reference to "creatures" bring humans into the scope of the bill?
No.
No. Our adviser is shaking her head.
Is "creatures" defined in the bill?
No.
The point is pertinent. If the bill includes a definition of "animal" in terms of "animal, bird or amphibian", it is odd that it does not also define the word "creatures", which it introduced. We are being given the hint that there is a difference between "creatures" and "animal". Perhaps we should write to the Executive and ask for clarification. We will have to do so before stage 3.
Okay. Are we agreed that we will ask for a clarification on the point in question?
We move on to section 8, "Specified diseases". The amendment to the section was made in response to our recommendation at stage 1 that the level of parliamentary scrutiny of class 3 orders be enhanced. The issue that is raised is similar to that which we discussed earlier in relation to new section 2 of the 1981 act, which is that the effect of the provision would be to limit the opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny. The recommendation is that, in this case, we take the same view that we took to the amendment of section 2. Are members content to do that? Is the amendment sufficient to address the concerns that we expressed? The class 3 affirmative procedure will be used.
We should take the same course of action that we agreed earlier.
Okay. Is that agreed?
There are two amendments to section 10, "Livestock genotypes: specification, breeding and slaughter". The first will insert new section 36O into the 1981 act, which provides for regulation-making powers for identifying genotypes and livestock, which are to be exercisable by statutory instrument. The second relates to new section 36W of the 1981 act, in response to recommendations that we made at stage 1 to enhance the level of parliamentary scrutiny in relation to compensation orders. Are members happy with the amendments and that the powers in section 36 are to be subject to the negative procedure?
Two amendments have been made to section 18, "Mutilation", by the insertion of new subsections (5)(b) and (6). The first relates to offences and the second introduces a statutory consultation requirement.
I note the inclusion of a statutory requirement for consultation. The power is subject to the affirmative procedure, but there is also a statutory requirement for consultation.
Yes, there is. Section 18(6) introduces the statutory requirement for consultation. Are there any other views on the matter?
The argument about whether the correct balance has been struck between primary and secondary legislation is something that the lead committee might wish to decide.
It can do so in its on-going debate.
This is one of the most controversial elements of the bill, but this is as much scrutiny as we can give subordinate legislation. The question is simply whether it is a matter for primary legislation, which can be amended by members as well as by the Executive. That is a matter for the lead committee and the Executive to ponder further.
I agree. As far as subordinate legislation is concerned, this is as much scrutiny as we can give it. The statutory requirement for consultation is very important. If Parliament decides at stage 3 to support an amendment that puts the matter back into the bill rather than into regulation, that is fine; it is not really for us to decide.
Right. We will leave that where it is at the moment.
The lead committee is clearly happy with the amendments, and although the affirmative procedure is not onerous, it requires a degree of parliamentary scrutiny beyond the normal scrutiny. I am content from that point of view.
I agree with Ken Macintosh. I welcome the exclusion of zoos from the definition of "other premises". That seems to be perfectly sensible.
Okay. We will leave it at that.
There is a stronger case for asking for the revocation of a code to be notified if a new code comes in. If one was to consult on a new code, would one wish to conduct a separate consultation on revocation of the former code? That seems to be a bit oppressive.
The publicising of the fact that a code has been revoked is important. We should raise that issue.
The only change from what I said is that, rather than conduct a consultation, it would be sufficient merely to publicise the revocation of the code.
Is it possible that a code would be revoked and not replaced by another code? It is not just a case of one finishing and a new one starting. A code could be revoked without anything replacing it. Perhaps a reasoned argument can be made about consultation.
The suggestion is that consultation on the removal of the old code would be implicit in consultation on a new code, and that the requirement to consult on the removal of a code would apply in circumstances in which a code was being removed but a new one was not being introduced. That is a legal point that is worth pursuing. It is almost as savoury as double negatives.
We will write to ask for more clarification on that point.
Section 46, "Regulations", has been amended so that different provisions may be made for different cases and classes of case. Are members content with the amendment? The power will be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Members have received a copy of the correspondence that we received from the Kennel Club. It relates to the policy matter of shock collars. I bring the issue to members' attention, but it will be dealt with by the lead committee.
It would be appropriate to write and explain that, rather than simply ignoring the correspondence. The Kennel Club approached us in good faith, not understanding entirely what our role is in respect of the legislation. It would be appropriate for that organisation to be told how the system works, so that it can e-mail members about stage 3 amendments, which is the proper way for it to exert pressure.
As chair of the cross-party group in the Scottish Parliament on animal welfare, I second that.
Have you e-mailed us, convener?
Not directly.
Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill: as amended at Stage 2
The next item is delegated powers scrutiny of the Police, Public Order and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill, as amended at stage 2. Members will recall that, after last week's meeting, we raised one issue with the Executive. We need to report on the bill after today's meeting because the stage 3 debate will take place on Thursday.
Given that the power apparently has precedent, we can be more confident about the European convention on human rights implications.
The stage 3 debate on the bill will take place this Thursday, so there is nothing that we can do about it. A manuscript amendment could be lodged, but I doubt that it would be accepted.
I suppose that we could stand up and raise the issue.
We could make the point, but I do not see the point of that.
Are members content that the power should be subject to the negative procedure?
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Executive Responses