Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change Committee, 16 Dec 2008

Meeting date: Tuesday, December 16, 2008

Official Report 286KB pdf

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Strategic Transport Projects Review

Agenda item 2 is an evidence session with the Minister for Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change, Stewart Stevenson, on the strategic transport projects review, which sets out the Scottish Government's strategic investments in the transport network until 2022. I welcome the minister and his officials: Lawrence Shackman, the Forth replacement crossing project manager from Transport Scotland, and David Anderson, head of transport, economics, analysis and research at Transport Scotland.

We have a packed programme today, so we will launch straight into questions, with a relatively easy opener. The STPR identifies a number of specific projects. Have Transport Scotland's consultants prioritised those according to cost and benefit, or are you able to do so now?

The interventions are numbered from 1 to 29, but that gives no indication of priorities. As was clearly indicated, we have made the new Forth crossing a priority. In addition, we are prioritising a range of railway interventions that will proceed in parallel. However, in general terms, given that this is a long-term study, each successive comprehensive spending review will inform timing and sequencing. Of course, as is always the case with major civil engineering projects, they will also be influenced by the market's ability to respond to what Government seeks to do.

When we debated the STPR in the chamber last week, members commented on the lack of a sense of priorities among the different projects. Does it not strike you that there will be raised eyebrows around the country because people who are interested in specific projects will see them on the list but have no idea whether they will happen?

Oh, no; they will all happen.

People will ask when.

They will happen within the term of the review. We have said that the review covers up to 20 years out. The 29 interventions, which are the Government's strategic objectives, were drawn from a very wide range of interventions that were potentially available right across Scotland. The 29 interventions therefore represent the Government's priorities.

So there is no intention to produce a list of the projects in order of priority so that people can have a sense of which ones will come along in which order.

The order is not important; what is important is that we proceed with the 29 priority projects that we wish to undertake at a strategic national level. We considered many other projects that are not in the 29 interventions.

So the order in which the interventions will happen is not important.

The order in which they will happen will be influenced by what happens in the future. Comprehensive spending reviews, the ability of civil engineering to respond to our needs and the preparatory work that is required will determine, as we understand more detail of each project, when and how we can proceed with them and implement them.

I am a little confused by your comment that the order of the projects is not important. To whom is it not important?

Each project is important to the communities that benefit from it. Their relative importance in respect of the sequence in which they are done is a matter of another order, which will be influenced by the availability of finance in comprehensive spending reviews, by the available capability in the civil engineering industry to respond and by the speed at which we are able to develop the detail of the projects.

Can you produce for us a list, which I think should be available, of the projects ranked by their cost benefit ratio?

The costs are provided in the STPR, so if you wish the projects to be ranked by cost, that is a straightforward thing to do.

By cost benefit ratio.

We could give you a view on that if you wish, but it would in no way inform you of the order in which the projects will be undertaken, because the order will not be determined on that simple basis. However, if you wish us to provide the committee with such information, we can of course do that. I caution the committee that the interventions that we are talking about are not interventions that will necessarily happen at one point. Those interventions contain within them a significant number of projects. The cost benefit analyses are at this stage preliminary, but they have clearly played a part in determining which of the 29 interventions we have included to bring forward. If the committee wishes us to provide it with such information, I am sure that we can do that.

I appreciate that. Can I clarify whether you are saying that you will, if the committee wishes, produce the cost benefit ratio or that you will publish it? Has it already been produced?

You will find that the reports that we have produced contain such things. We can extract that information from the reports and provide it to you. We will not be providing you with new information.

It would be helpful to have such a list. Can you tell me what the top five projects are in respect of the benefit to cost ratio?

If you do not mind, the important issue is the projects that require to be done. We will provide the list, as I have said we will.

That should surely be a fairly straightforward question to answer.

It is and we shall answer it.

Can you not answer it now?

I will not answer it now because I want, as you have requested, to produce the cost benefit analysis for the 29 projects. I come back to the point that we have not determined the order in which we will do the projects on the basis of cost benefit analysis. If you are trying to lead me to make that the basis on which we make our decision—

I made no inference. I simply asked you to give us a list of the benefit to cost ratio for the 29 projects and, as a supplementary question, I asked you to tell us which five projects come out of that mechanism, which you have in place—the well understood Scottish transport appraisal guidance system—with the best benefit to cost ratio. That should be a fairly straightforward question.

As I am sure that you are aware, STAG assessments have not been done on all the interventions.

You said that one of the influencing factors in determining which project is first would be the preparatory work that you do, as that would help to inform when a project was delivered. How will you prioritise that preparatory work?

Our immediate priorities, which we have made clear, include the Forth replacement crossing, which will dominate the work on the road network. We are engaged in substantial preparatory work on that project, as evidenced by the fact that Mr Shackman, who is the Transport Scotland project manager for it, is sitting on my left. We have indicated that we set a high priority on the Edinburgh to Glasgow rail improvement programme—EGIP—on which we are already working. We have already started work on a range of projects.

We know that you have prioritised the Forth crossing and the Edinburgh to Glasgow rail link. Beyond that, how will you prioritise the preparatory work that you need to do to determine which of the projects you will take forward?

We have to engage with the regional transport partnerships and councils to develop the details of our interventions. On the road network, we have already said that our future programme is dominated by the Forth crossing, which will take a large proportion of our work to 2016. In the next few years, we will engage to determine what we have to do on the other projects. Engagement and consultation with the RTPs is an essential prerequisite to answering the question that you asked.

I will allow a final brief supplementary from Des McNulty.

I have a point of clarification and then a supplementary.

Minister, you said that there were projects that had not been STAG appraised. Which are they? I thought that they had all been appraised.

They have been STAG appraised to different levels of detail. Some of them were appraised only to STAG 1.

When you give us the list of the benefit cost ratios, it would be useful if you could identify at which STAG level the projects are appraised.

I will clarify the matter so that we do not have to return to it: the 29 priorities are not projects; they are interventions that have a range of projects within them. Some are sufficiently large that it would be proper to say that they have a series of programmes within them, each of which has projects within it. You must be aware that we can give you an answer—which will simply extract the information that you request from the strategic transport projects review—at whatever level of detail is appropriate. If the level of detail that we provide is different from what you want, we will be happy to provide more if that is appropriate and necessary.

I appreciate that it is a 20-year list of priorities but, within that list, there must be a five-year programme. Anyone who has had any involvement in major infrastructure or transport projects is engaged in an immediate set of tasks—things that they are building now—and has plans for five years pretty well established and in place. What other work will be done between now and 2014, apart from the Forth road bridge, the Edinburgh to Glasgow rail electrification and the projects that have previously been announced?

If the member is asking for what work we are already undertaking preparation that will inform what is done in that period, we can provide that as part of the answers to the questions that the committee has given us.

Those are fairly obvious questions and we expect the answers today.

Des, you will have to make that the last question.

The point is that the minister says that he will write to us. I did not come here for answers on a postcard.

I appreciate the difficulty of extracting answers, but there is a limit to the number of times that we can ask the question.

I will make a brief comment. I have said—and repeat again—that, on the roads network, the substantial project that the Forth crossing represents will clearly engage the majority of our efforts up to 2016. On railways, we have spelled out a considerable number of interventions over the same period. I am perfectly happy to confirm that in our answers and extract the detail from the report that is already in front of the committee to ensure that we short circuit the process and that the committee can see the answers to its questions on that period.

Members have explored the issue to a reasonably full extent, but your initial answer was that there is no order of priorities. However, you have prioritised two projects: the Forth crossing—I am unclear about whether the word "replacement" has been dropped—and the electrification of the Edinburgh to Glasgow railway line. You said explicitly that those projects are higher priorities than the others because you have made timescale and funding commitments on them. Do you intend to make funding or timescale commitments on any of the other projects during the term of this Government?

Consideration of the next comprehensive spending review will start within the term of this Government, which will provide us with insight into the funding that will be available for the period 2011 to 2014. It is clear that as we bring forward projects that will extend beyond the next election—the Forth replacement crossing is clearly one such example—we are making commitments that will bind future Administrations, whatever their character. The nature of transport is such that that is a pretty normal thing to do. If one is wise, however, one does not commit all the money that is likely to be available until one has a pretty clear idea of the total sums of money that will be available. In the context of the reduction in our funding of £1 billion over the next few years, such caution is wise.

Given that the Government has decided to commit to two projects on the list, it is pretty clear that we do not know whether the other projects on the list will go ahead.

They will all go ahead.

How do you know?

I say that all the interventions will go ahead but, as I cannot tell you what funding will be available in the comprehensive spending review period 2017 to 2020—for the sake of argument—I cannot tell you the pace at which they will be undertaken and—

Surely you also cannot tell me whether any future Government will have a different set of priorities.

In planning on a long-term basis—I think that this is the first time that planning has been done on quite such a long-term basis—it is proper and reasonable to give a view on what the Government wishes to achieve as regards strategic transport projects. The convener is perfectly correct to say that it is always possible for such commitments to be changed, as happened when Sarah Boyack made her announcement to cancel a number of the previous Government's commitments, not long into that Administration's term.

Today we are dealing with the commitment on which this Government should be judged—our set of 29 interventions, which we believe represent Scotland's future needs. We believe that those interventions should be delivered, and I and the Government will put our force and energy into ensuring that that happens.

So it is always possible for the list of projects to be changed. The present list represents the projects that the current Government wishes to see happen.

Correct.

The term "wish list" might be understood.

I absolutely do not accept that it is anything other than our firm intention, commitment and belief that the 29 proposed projects, which have been arrived at analytically through a process of the most intensive research on the operation of our present transport infrastructure network to identify future needs, represent the investments that need to be made to ensure the future economic health of Scotland and the effective operation of our infrastructure.

I want to ask about the cost of the STPR exercise, which has resulted in the publication of a hefty set of documents. Do you think that the exercise represents value for money, given the amount of time that has been spent on it, the amount of paper that has been used up and the fact that it has given us a list of investment priorities that are already well known?

I certainly would have preferred not to produce the document on paper, but that is a minor matter in the grand scheme of things. If we want to get the best bang for the public buck, we need a rigorous analysis of what is required.

The review has worked successively down from the national transport strategy, which derived from the previous Administration's work. It inputs the current Government's objectives, examines the performance of the whole network, considers a range of modes of operation and looks at how transport relates to the Government's economic objectives to improve Scotland's economy. Such intense analytical work is necessary if we are to avoid wasting money on interventions that do not contribute to the Government's objectives and to Scotland's economic health.

We have not finalised the overall cost of the exercise—some invoices have still to be dealt with. The review has been a substantial piece of work but, in the long term, it is likely to pay for itself many times over by ensuring that we are focused on the right priorities.

Was the consultation process to deliver the review satisfactory, given the level of interest in the list of 29 projects that you have published?

The consultation was substantial. We held stakeholder meetings with a wide range of bodies, especially when working up the processes by which we determined the shape of the programme. The process of engagement with regional transport partnerships and councils will continue now that the Government has accepted the STPR's recommendations and adopted the 29 proposed interventions as the Government's way forward.

Engagement has taken place for a considerable time. Getting right the basis on which decisions should be made leads naturally to the interventions. As ministers, we avoided becoming involved in the consideration of projects or direct interventions until the whole decision-making process had been thoroughly examined and understood.

That leads to what happens next. Consultation work took place as the projects review was finalised. What do you plan to do with the results and with the entire publication? Do you plan to produce action plans or to change the national transport strategy? How can external interest groups feed in their thoughts on the review?

The key development at the moment is the eight-week consultation on strategic environmental assessment, which we are required to undertake. What emerges from that might influence the STPR's shape, although the environmental assessment that was done for the review was robust—it is the major part of the review.

The main way in which we will develop the position is through the engagement that we expect to have with transport authorities throughout Scotland. We will of course engage with Network Rail and the railway network franchisee. When I met Network Rail yesterday, we discussed the review and high-speed rail, which the committee will discuss later this afternoon.

We will move on to the projects that have been committed to. The business case for the Forth replacement crossing—I will still use that title—was based on the assumption that the current Forth road bridge would not be available for use in future years. Ministers have said that repeatedly and on the record to the committee. What impact has the decision to keep the existing bridge had on the business case for the new bridge?

Let us move right back to the top level. Having an effective lower Forth crossing is vital for the economy of Fife. That is pretty universally accepted and has been at the core of what we have sought to do.

Information on the existing Forth crossing—the building of which started in 1958; the bridge opened in 1964—continues to come in and further work will be done. It is clear that the deterioration of the road crossing is less rapid than was previously thought, but it continues to deteriorate. It is quite evident that deterioration has taken place. The main factor that will influence the speed at which deterioration takes place is the weight of traffic that crosses the bridge. It remains the case that, within a period of time—the exact period will depend on further work—there will come a point at which, for the existing load of traffic, the bridge would have to be closed. In that context, a replacement crossing must be put in place. It remains a replacement crossing in that it will take the cars, taxis and heavy goods vehicles that cross the existing bridge that was opened in 1964.

However, two factors have changed the situation. First, we believe that the deterioration of the existing crossing is of a character—particularly if we reduce the weight on the bridge—that will enable us to leave bus services, cyclists and pedestrians using that bridge. In addition, preliminary engineering advice tells us that it is possible—this has been done elsewhere—to put guided busways, trams or light rail on the existing bridge. That advice was absolutely key to our consideration of what facilities need to be provided on the replacement crossing. Our original intention had been to include the provision of an extra carriageway for guided busway, light rail or tram on the replacement bridge, but it is now clear that we can provide those facilities on the existing bridge.

A two-crossing strategy also gives us a fall-back position. In addition to reducing the cost—something that we were keen to do if we could—we now have a more flexible arrangement in having two crossings on the lower Forth. That will give us considerable insurance in relation to the continuing deterioration of the 1964 crossing.

The business case has become slightly less good, but it remains positive. The number is in excess of 1, so we will get a return on our money. In any event, the bottom line is that, if we do not have an effective crossing, the economy of Fife will suffer severely.

Minister, I refer you to various statements by the Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Sustainable Growth to previous meetings of the committee. Earlier this year, the cabinet secretary said:

"we will assess the other characteristics of the Forth crossing by assuming that we are constructing a new, replacement crossing and that there will not be an existing crossing … We must undertake those assumptions on the basis that we do not have a reliable existing crossing. … I have to plan on the basis that the bridge will not be available at some stage in the future".—[Official Report, Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change Committee, 15 January 2008; c 362-4.]

Today, you have stated as a fact that the existing bridge will need to close to certain types of traffic, although that was expressed as a possibility in previous meetings. The situation seems a little unclear. You are now saying that the existing bridge is good to carry public transport for the long term and will become the public transport mode across the Forth.

The question was asked previously whether the business case and the cost benefit ratio were calculated on the assumption that the bridge could last, as well as on the assumption that it could not. That seems to me to be an even more urgent question, before £2 billion is spent on an additional bridge.

The situation in relation to the existing crossing continues to develop, but it is clear that a bridge that was designed to have a life of 120 years is suffering considerably after some 44 years, and that without interventions it is unlikely to reach 120 years. It is worth saying that the bridge is carrying traffic somewhat in excess of what was envisaged in the original design brief.

As our knowledge increases, we see the shape of the future of the bridge more clearly, but not perfectly. We are clear that the bridge is approaching the point at which it will be unable to carry its existing traffic. There is little realistic prospect that anything will emerge that runs counter to that. However, as our knowledge increases, we can expect to see the point at which it would be necessary, with existing loads, to close the bridge. That point has moved back, which is good news. At one point, it was thought that heavy goods vehicles would need to come off the bridge before 2016, which is the target date for completion of the new crossing, but it seems that that is no longer the case.

What is beyond doubt is that, in the long term, the existing bridge cannot continue to carry the loads that it carries at present.

In the past, we have been told that the new bridge will not increase the total road capacity over the Forth. Is that still the case under the new proposal?

The number of carriageways on the new bridge is the same as on the existing bridge. The number of carriageways on the approach road is the same as with the existing bridge. To all intents and purposes, the capacity of the new bridge is broadly similar to that of the existing bridge.

I said "broadly similar", but for clarity, and so that I do not mislead you, I point out that the new bridge will be much more wind-resistant and therefore less susceptible to being shut when there are high winds, so there will be an advantage in overall capacity in those terms. There will also be a hard shoulder, and there is the possibility of exploiting that not simply as a refuge for broken-down vehicles but for future expansion. However, as implemented at the outset, the new bridge will have the same number of carriageways as the existing bridge, so it will provide a broadly similar capacity.

A similar capacity.

Yes. Given that the buses will remain on the existing crossing—

Except in high winds, I take it.

That is likely to be true, yes. That is correct.

Where will the buses go in high winds? Will an additional lane be allocated on the new bridge when high winds close the existing bridge?

That could be considered. At this stage, it would be unreasonable for me to give you an exact answer on that, but on the relatively few occasions when the existing bridge has to be shut, the opportunity exists for buses to be integrated with the traffic on the replacement crossing.

I am not sure that it is unreasonable to ask for precise answers to such questions now. However, I will bring in Des McNulty to ask a supplementary question before I come back.

I will ask for one piece of clarification, then I will ask my supplementary. If I get you right, you are saying that, buses aside, the new bridge will only be able to take the exact amount of vehicular traffic that the current bridge takes. There will be no net benefit in terms of traffic, other than perhaps for some bus traffic.

Correct, although there is potential to use the hard shoulders in certain circumstances. In one of our other interventions, we are considering intelligent management systems and asking how and under what circumstances we might use hard shoulders on motorways. The same could apply to the replacement crossing.

I want to probe you about the existing bridge. One problem that I have is that you have come up with a way forward with your proposal, but I am not sure that we have anything like enough information about the engineering factors associated with the existing bridge or, indeed, about some of the engineering issues with the new bridge. On the existing bridge, we have information in a report to the Forth Estuary Transport Authority that the dehumidification process appears to be working, although my understanding is that only a relatively small number of cables were examined. In addition, there is considerable concern about the anchorage housing for the cables for the existing bridge and whether there is significant corrosion.

My understanding is that the investigation that is under way might shed some light on those matters and allow greater definition of what you have just asserted. Do we not need to know for certain what the engineering problems are with the existing bridge and what the prognosis is for sorting them out before we start to make quite heroic assumptions about the potential implications of the policy solution that you are proposing?

We know several things, but there are several things on which we require further information. We know that the condition of the bridge has deteriorated to the point where we are close to having to take traffic off it. That is relatively well understood, partly because the amount of traffic on the bridge greatly exceeds the original design parameters from the 1950s. Deterioration of the cables has taken place, so there is a loss of physical strength and the ability to carry weight that derives from it. There are encouraging signs that the rate of deterioration may be slowing down.

Mr McNulty makes a point about the anchorages, which is perfectly correct. I understand that the anchorages have not been examined yet, not least because it is quite difficult to find a non-destructive way of examining them.

It is clear that, were we to wait for a point of certainty—which we may never reach, given the difficulties of examining the anchorages—before taking decisions on crossings on the Forth, we would, without very much doubt, find ourselves without a lower Forth crossing for a period of time. That is simply untenable for the economy of Fife. It would be heroic to roll the dice with pretty strong odds that Fife would be without a bridge, given our understanding of the state of the bridge, albeit that the information is, of course, as yet incomplete. There is an equal probability of further bad news. Any good news will be limited to the rate of deterioration being less than we thought it might be. There is little doubt that deterioration of the existing crossing is a fact of life.

I think that we should spare the hyperbole. If the whole approach is predicated on the fact—as it was in the first instance—that the bridge will last only a relatively short period of time and therefore a replacement bridge will be needed, that is a relatively straightforward proposition. However, your proposition is different: you are now saying that the existing bridge can continue to be used for a significant period in a new guise as a public transport bridge, but you are making that assertion on the basis of an inadequate engineering assessment of the current problems with the bridge cables and no analysis of the anchorage of the bridge cables. That is a pretty poor evidence base on which to propose a solution, particularly one that costs £2.3 billion, which is a significant sum of money.

We are not arguing about the principle of having an operational bridge to Fife—I take that as axiomatic—but asking whether you have the information that you require to tell you that your proposition is the best operational solution. Have you looked at the option of rebuilding the existing bridge to the standard that is proposed for the new bridge? I have to say—

I think that we have got the gist of the question.

Today's announcement that repairs to the expansion joints will be deferred for five or six years is a further cause for concern. The proper engineering information is needed to justify the proposition. I am saying not that your proposition is wrong, but that you have not given us anywhere near enough information to justify it.

On the question whether the existing bridge can be repaired, the answer is probably. However, if we are to achieve that, the bridge will need to be closed for a period of four to seven years, which will be an enormous economic hit for Fife. The engineering advice is that the bridge cannot be repaired by single-carriageway working given existing traffic volumes and the present state of the bridge, and without taking account of further deterioration.

If I understood him correctly, implicit in Mr McNulty's line of questioning is his acceptance of deterioration in the bridge. He put the questions to probe whether we understand fully the nature and timescale of the deterioration. I have said clearly that there is a range of possibilities and probabilities for that deterioration. I reiterate that we are very close indeed to the point when the existing traffic cannot be carried safely on the existing bridge.

Mr McNulty has one final short supplementary.

Are you aware of the study that Jacobs Babtie undertook in 2005, which advised the then Minister for Transport that running trams on the existing bridge would not be possible without a major reconstruction of the deck and its supports?

One of the key things that I asked for before concluding that the existing bridge could be used for light rail in the way that I have described was an engineering input. Light rail has been used on this design of bridge elsewhere. I am assured that it can be done.

Before we move on to other lines of questioning, I will tie up a couple of issues. You spoke of a range of possibilities for the existing bridge. What if the news is bad? Where would public transport go?

There are several options. In setting them out, I am not describing what will happen. We will have two crossings. If buses were unable to use the existing crossing, there would be several options. Of course, one could put buses on the new crossing, which has potential for hard-shoulder running if required for volume purposes. It would also be possible—because I have accepted that it is possible—to repair the existing bridge during the time that the buses use the other bridge, if the economics said that it was the right thing to do.

But you said that those repairs would close the bridge for seven years.

Correct. I make it clear that I said four to seven years.

In that four to seven-year period, buses would run on the hard shoulder. Is that right?

That is one option that would be available to us.

Would dedicating the hard shoulder in that way, for four to seven years, be a realistic option?

It is being examined. Using the hard shoulder for a range of traffic is being considered more generally for our motorway network. It would be an option. The other very clear option would be to integrate buses with other traffic on the replacement crossing.

The main reason for the additional bridge's reduced price tag is that the multimodal element has been removed from it. Previously, we heard clear commitments from the Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Sustainable Growth and from you that the multimodal element of the new bridge was central to Government thinking. When was the decision taken to abandon that central element of your thinking?

We have not abandoned it. We have put the multimodal element on the existing crossing, because that is the most economically appropriate way to proceed. In addition—

No, I am asking about the thinking around the new bridge. It was said on the record on a number of occasions that the multimodality of the new bridge was central to Government thinking. When was that dropped?

Once we became aware that the existing bridge was deteriorating more slowly than previously thought, and—this is the important "and"—once I received advice that it was possible to use the existing bridge for all the multimodal facilities that we previously thought we had to provide on the new bridge, it became possible to revisit the position.

We have not revisited the strategy, which remains to provide public transport multimodal capability across the Forth, at the lower Forth point. It is the implementation of the strategy that has changed, in that we now understand better the capabilities and the life prospects of the existing crossing. The tactics and the implementation, not the strategy, have changed, the benefit of which is a substantial cost reduction and an improvement in the multimodal capability, because no longer will it simply be the bridge crossing that provides multimodal capability—a significant part of the road networks north and south of the existing crossing will provide greater speed, less congestion and a more reliable and effective public transport connection. It is a better and cheaper solution.

I am still concerned about some of the apparent contradictions—they seem like contradictions to me—between saying that you are now much clearer and surer about the expected lifespan of the existing bridge and saying, as you did just a few minutes ago, that you are still completely unsure of how long the bridge will last and what type of traffic it can carry.

My question, however, was about when the decision was made to drop the multimodal element of the additional bridge.

The idea of considering that came up some time ago, but we could not be certain that we could pursue it until we—

When did you become certain? When did you make the decision that the multimodal element of the additional bridge would be dropped?

In the autumn, when we completed our studies.

It would be helpful if you could provide us with a clear answer—in writing, if necessary.

In order to be absolutely clear on the limitations, the idea has been around for some time. Ministers asked for various aspects of the idea to be explored. Certain things had to be in place before that was possible, then consideration had to be given to whether the decision—

You understand my concern, do you not, minister?

I just wish to be clear—

Order. You understand my concern, minister—

No, I do not, actually.

For months we have been told that the multimodal element of the additional bridge—not of the crossing strategy—was central to Government thinking. Are you telling us that the idea of dropping that element has been around for some time?

The certainty that that idea could be pursued depended in particular on the question—which has been mentioned—whether the bridge could carry light rail. That was one of the fundamental questions, and unless the answer could be established, the idea, which has been around for some time, could not be pursued.

In any event, I am not saying that there has not been a change in the approach: it is clear that there has been, and it is a natural and necessary response to an evolving and changing situation. It is a tribute to the project team that we are getting innovative ideas that actually improve on where we started from and that reduce the price, which will be widely welcomed.

I accept that the Government is entitled to change its view, but I would be concerned if the Government were telling us that one view was central to its thinking while contemplating another.

We have retained absolutely—and, I argue, improved on—the commitment to the functionality that we have always wanted to deliver. It is entirely proper for us to seek both the biggest bang for the public buck and a more flexible solution that gives us insurance policies in a range of scenarios. We have taken the right decisions, based on those considerations.

Let us hope that the wind allows you to maintain the functionality to which you refer.

You have not really retained functionality. You have taken quite a gamble and downgraded the role of public transport. You could have given public transport a key role in the project from the outset, making it central to the new bridge for 100 or 120 years and ensuring that it had a key access route across the Forth. Instead, we have heard from you already this afternoon that there may be more bad news and that buses may have to move to the new bridge. If we put trams on the old bridge and there are further problems, they cannot readily be moved to the new bridge. It seems that your decision is based on a gamble.

We have upgraded, not downgraded, the facilities that will be provided. By using the existing bridge, we will provide substantially more capacity for buses. On the roads approaching the new crossing, buses will mix with other traffic. Separating them off much earlier will enhance, increase and upgrade the public transport option.

What would be necessary before we put trams on the existing bridge? We would have to be certain that the bridge genuinely had a long-term life. I return to the fundamental point—by having two crossings, we will create the space to close one crossing to repair it, in a variety of ways, without the disruption that would be created if there were only one crossing. We may be able to repair the existing crossing by closing a single carriageway, depending on how the engineering calculations stack up and what weight is carried on the other carriageway—it may not be necessary to close the whole crossing. However, that is a matter for another day, when further work has been done.

It is correct to say that, if trams go on the existing bridge, shutting it will disrupt the tram facility substantially, because it will not be possible to take the trams around to the new bridge, where there are no tramlines. That is precisely why we will need to undertake work to ensure that the bridge is fit for light rail, trams or tram-trains in the long term when we come to consider them. It is important for us to make use of the opportunity that will be created by greater understanding of the existing bridge. The strategy that we have adopted also creates a substantial financial opportunity.

We have talked quite a bit about using the current bridge as a dedicated public transport corridor. Can you state categorically that it will be for the exclusive use of public transport, cyclists and pedestrians?

Yes.

We are looking not only at the bridge but at the approach road. You have already mentioned some items relating to that. Can you detail how the scheme that you now propose will improve not only what exists at the moment but some of the initial proposals for the replacement crossing?

At the initial stage, we had before us a range of options for the road networks both north and south of the bridge. In the next couple of months, we will engage with the communities that are affected. A key advantage of our proposal, particularly on the south side, is that road connections with the M9 will run not simply in the direction of Edinburgh but west. Although we have sought to reuse as much of the road infrastructure as possible, a substantial amount of road building will be needed on both sides of the bridge.

In light of the suggestion that capacity for cars on the new bridge might be the same as that on the existing bridge, there has been some discussion about whether there will be queues for and congestion on the new bridge, particularly at peak times. Is it realistic to expect that the current bridge will be available only to buses and cyclists? I suppose that we are seeking a categorical reassurance that the current bridge will be for public transport only.

The existing bridge must be only for public transport because, whatever the engineering prognosis turns out to be, the key to its future is to reduce the weight on it. Of course, the other advantage of putting bus services on the bridge is that that particular flow of traffic is relatively predictable and can, to some extent, be controlled. As a result, one can manage the weight on the bridge at any one time. We feel that those factors are necessary to allow us to continue to use the existing bridge safely. In any event, we have always pointed out that we are not seeking to add capacity to the Forth crossing. Our strategy, instead, is to build a replacement bridge.

There has also been some discussion about whether trams could use the current bridge. Do you think that the difficulties of putting trams on the replacement crossing highlight the inflexibility of tram systems and the fact that they are not necessarily a panacea for all problems in the Lothians?

There is a variety of views on trams. The Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Sustainable Growth has said on a number of occasions that he is not intrinsically opposed to trams, and I think that trams are an appropriate intervention in the right circumstances. The fact that we integrated tramline 1A into our surface access strategy for Edinburgh airport shows that we as a Government are very interested in seeing its success. Of course, not everyone who is currently suffering because of some of the difficulties of building a tram network will feel quite the same way about that. Trams have been successful in many cities, not only in England but throughout the world, and we will watch with considerable interest what happens with the facility that is being provided by the City of Edinburgh Council. After all, it is the council's project, not mine.

I do not expect to see you at the launch, then, minister.

I hope to travel on the first tram, convener.

I will remind you of that.

When he was city treasurer, my great-uncle was responsible for the trams. I would just be following a family tradition.

I see that Des McNulty wants to ask a supplementary. Des, it will have to be one and it will have to be short.

I hope only that the minister does not suffer the fate of William Huskisson, who in 1830 was knocked down on his own railway.

I am seeking some information, on which you can get back to us. First, given the specification that you have suggested for the new bridge, we will need a detailed analysis of how you will manage road traffic congestion, particularly with regard to cars and public transport. We will also need to know about any associated proposals for physical infrastructure—for example, access roads—and your targets in that respect.

Secondly, will you provide a breakdown of the costs of the major projects that will be required to keep the current bridge open, including strengthening the suspended span deck truss, replacing bearings on the approach viaduct, augmenting and replacing the main cables and dealing with anchorages, and link that into an assessment of the maintenance and running costs of the existing bridge and the maintenance and running cost projections for the new bridge?

Thirdly, why is it now proposed that the replacement of the main expansion joints—which was deemed urgent and was due to take place in 2010—will be delayed until 2016? We have to bear in mind the fact that the safety of the public is paramount.

Finally, I would like an analysis of the cost of rebuilding the existing bridge to the specification that you are suggesting for the new bridge.

I am happy to pass the member's questions on the bridge to FETA, whose responsibility it is to provide the figures. I am only the postbox.

The member asks about anchorages. No view has been taken on that subject, because there is no understanding as yet that intervention is required. We do not know one way or the other.

No, but you have asserted—

I am afraid that there is no time to explore this in detail.

The minister has asserted that the current bridge will exist for 80 years, so he must substantiate—

I appreciate the importance of the point that you are making, but you have, in effect, read out a long list of written questions.

Minister, we look forward to a detailed written response on many of those issues, but would you like to add anything now?

As engineering studies of the bridge continue, we will continue to gain knowledge of the interventions required.

You must have done some calculations in order to decide that the capital saving in relation to the new bridge was worth while. You must have balanced the cost of operating and maintaining two bridges against the capital expenditure required for repairing the existing bridge.

I have some general questions on funding. When did you first approach the Treasury to discuss reprofiling the Scottish Government's capital budgets, and what further dialogue have you had with the Treasury on that?

I do not have the exact date for our approach to the Treasury, but it was within the past month. However, the Treasury's support—or non-support—does not influence anything other than the timescale. We are not asking for money; we are simply asking to draw money forward to an earlier point in the spending cycle.

I have just been passed a note: we wrote to the Treasury on 27 November. I repeat that the issue here is simply the timetable, and not what will be done.

You do not really need a plan B for building the Forth replacement bridge, but—

Financially we do not.

Whether or not it was approved, what impact would reprofiling have on future Administrations' ability to invest in infrastructure?

We have asked the Treasury for the ability to do what it is doing itself for its capital spending on infrastructure—that is, drawing from expenditure that had been intended to be made later, and making that expenditure sooner. Drawing that money would clearly reduce the ability to invest in projects in future. However, if the sums of money that we are talking about do not change, and if the projects do not change, I guess that future Administrations will not be materially inhibited or encouraged. The same projects will be done with the same money; the only thing that will be different is the timetable over which the projects will be carried out.

Who will bear the costs of any overruns on the project?

We are looking for a fixed-price contract and we have every belief that we will have one, so the contractor will bear those costs.

In contract negotiations, there are always discussions about whether risks will be left with the contractor or with the Government. For example, in the M74 contract, a small, quantified amount of risk is left with the Government. In exchange for that, the cost of the project is reduced.

We are looking for a fixed-price contract, but I do not want to mislead you into believing that that might not leave some risk with the Government, if that was our choice.

Will you explain why the Scottish Futures Trust was rejected as a funding mechanism for the new bridge?

The Scottish Futures Trust was not the appropriate mechanism for a single, £1.7 billion borrowing project. The Scottish Futures Trust is about delivering, through aggregation, to smaller projects the advantages that exist for larger projects. If we aggregate projects when raising money instead of capturing them in a single funding vehicle such as the private finance initiative, we spread risk and reduce the risk pricing that is associated with funding, to the benefit of projects.

The SFT also gives smaller projects the benefit of skills aggregation. That happens naturally in a big project, in which there is aggregation when project offices and skill sets are established. All the borrowing is also in one chunk. We are talking about very different kinds of project.

As with any borrowing vehicle, the Scottish Futures Trust can support only a proportion of what we are doing. We will always continue to have a substantial proportion of infrastructure investment coming directly from public funds.

Which of the 29 projects in the STPR have you identified as appropriate for the SFT mechanism?

As I think I said earlier, the funding of the 29 interventions—there are a large number of projects, not just 29—will depend on consideration of the finance that is available to successive Administrations over many years through many comprehensive spending review periods. Administrations will consider which part of a project they will fund by using direct public funds, by borrowing through the Scottish Futures Trust or by using any other mechanism that they choose.

Des McNulty mentioned the FETA discussions on the potential delays to repair work. Public safety is obviously paramount for the Government and FETA but, now that FETA has more information about the replacement crossing, is it correct for it to consider whether any repair work can be delayed until the new bridge is opened, thus saving both itself and the Government money and ensuring that it makes best use of the available public funds?

FETA has responsibility for, expertise on and detailed knowledge of the existing bridge. If it believes that it can move the work to 2016—it is worth noting that there are savings associated with delaying the work until after the opening of the new bridge—the bottom line is whether it is safe to do that. FETA believes that it is, so it is appropriate for it to take a view on when the work should be done. I will certainly not second guess or outthink it; it is for FETA to work out what maintenance is needed and to discuss its requirements with Government.

Finally, can you confirm again that there will be no tolling on the replacement crossing?

There will be no tolling; there will be no shadow tolling.

We have been offered on-going engagement with the project management. Can I take it that, if we pursue that in writing, we can establish a schedule for liaising with you and your officials on the project management?

I am sure that that would be mutually helpful. Obviously, I would be aware of it as it took place. It is our earnest desire to ensure that the committee has oversight of what is going on at whatever level it regards as appropriate.

Des McNulty has a question. Is it very brief?

Yes. Minister, on funding arrangements, you said in response to Alison McInnes that you wanted to bring forward money and spread the costs of the new bridge over a longer period. What do you think would be the sensible maximum percentage of transport spending to spend on the bridge project in any year? On current projections, how much would that leave for other projects? A parallel example might be the Glasgow southern general—

We have the question, so can we leave the example? We have only a brief time left.

I do not think that we are that pushed, to be honest.

The Government's annual capital spending programme is about £3.2 billion to £3.5 billion. That gives a sense of the proportion of our capital spending that the replacement crossing occupies. It is clearly a substantial sum, and we have asked for assistance in drawing from future funds to ensure that we can maintain the timetables that we and others wish to see for other projects. However, it does not in any sense whatsoever change the projects that we would do; it simply enables us to do them in a more timely fashion. It does not mean that there would be no more money or inhibit our ability to do projects.

Good afternoon, minister. The rest of Scotland expects, of course, to gain things from the proposals in the strategy. I hope that we will hear answers about some of those things. Can you explain why the on-going costs of maintaining Scotland's rail infrastructure were included as an investment in the STPR, but the costs for the on-going maintenance of Scotland's trunk road network were not?

Maintaining the rail network is, of course, about upgrading parts of it that are clapped out—to use a technical term. By the same token, we are making a number of broadly similar interventions in the road network. Of course, not all Scotland's roads are the Government's responsibility; mileage-wise, they are overwhelmingly local government's responsibility.

I referred to trunk roads.

Yes. I was simply making that point. The overwhelming majority of traffic is on the trunk roads, so that requires us to make interventions. In particular, we will seek to include in our strategy interventions that focus on safety, because people would expect that. We have contracts in place, of course, for roads—in fact, we do not own part of the M74. Things are done in a range of ways. Essentially, when we put money into the rail infrastructure, we create new infrastructure. That is probably the key point to make in response to Rob Gibson's question.

Thank you for that. On the clapped-out railway system to which you referred, can you explain why you have included the electrification of the lines to Perth, Inverness and Aberdeen in the STPR when that will not be delivered in the STPR period?

It is important that we set a strategic context. In the national planning framework, we set the aspiration of electrifying all Scotland's railways by 2030. Clearly, such an intervention influences in a variety of ways what we do in the short term on, for example, signalling upgrades. Signalling is a huge issue, not least because signalling standards will change over the years to come. Much of our signalling infrastructure, particularly in the far north, is approaching the end of its life.

I return to your previous question, the answer to which has just been given to me. This is about what we term the colour of money. Maintaining the rail infrastructure is about capital spending; maintaining the roads is about revenue spending. That is the strict accounting answer as to why the two are dealt with differently in the STPR. I should, of course, have twigged that myself.

I understand what you are talking about, but I am interested in what is included and what is not, in terms of railways. Your explanation about signalling and so on was interesting.

In September 2007 I asked you about the timescale for the delivery of the upgrades on the railway from Perth to Inverness and from Aberdeen to Inverness, and referred to a 25-year period. At the time, you said:

"We want to make early progress with that work. The timescale will certainly be substantially less than the 25 years."—[Official Report, Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change Committee, 11 September 2007; c 37.]

Given the lines' significance in the national planning framework, to which you have referred, can you give us any indication of the timescales for those major rail upgrades?

To some extent, we remain in the hands of others. Part of the discussion that I had yesterday with the chief executive of Network Rail, Mr Iain Coucher, centred on what funding would be available from the regulatory asset base, which is the primary funding mechanism. The next control period will be 2009 to 2014, and we are approaching the end of the discussions on what the funding profile will look like. There has been discussion between the Office of Rail Regulation and Network Rail, with input from us and the Department for Transport.

There is still a bit of a gap in some of the numbers. Of course, it will depend in part on credit ratings for Network Rail, which is a body that neither the DFT nor the Scottish Government can instruct what to do. It is distant from Government and off balance sheet—that is an important point to bear in mind.

However, the improvement of services to Inverness and Aberdeen is not a single project; a whole range of interventions are planned. For example, a more distant intervention in relation to the line up to Aberdeen is the twin tracking of the railway at Montrose, where there is approximately two miles of single track. There is a clear pinchpoint on the route there, and that twin tracking is in the plan—albeit at the end. Signalling interventions will come much sooner. Some parts of the route are being examined, and across Scotland's rail network we are establishing where the speed limits are inappropriate and no intervention is needed other than a change to the plate that says what the speed limit is. A number of interventions of that character can be made very quickly.

We are already starting to make improvements, some of which can be effected simply through timetabling. Nevertheless, some interventions, such as that at Montrose, will come at the far end of the plan and, at this stage, we cannot give an exact date for that.

That will be only a small piece of dualling, whereas 60 per cent of the line between Glasgow and Inverness is single track—and therefore a much more major issue. Could dualling of the Glasgow to Inverness line be brought forward, or will it come at the end of the plan? Will signalling come first and dualling come second, or what?

Addressing signalling gives the quickest win for the lowest amount of money, albeit that there is a significant shortage of signalling engineers, which is a difficulty. There is scope for additional passing loops, in particular to achieve dynamic passing so that trains do not have to stop to make way for other trains. That will make a significant contribution.

As much as anything, simply working on the timetables can make a real difference. The context for that is that we want to see increased use of the railways, especially by freight, which is a further factor. There will be additional freight services on the line up to Inverness starting, I think, next week—certainly, this month. Therefore, extra traffic will be using the line, and we need to take that into account as well. We can achieve significant changes without huge interventions.

It is worth saying that although we are talking about dualling only two miles of track at Montrose, another bridge across the basin will be needed, so those two miles will not be easy to dual. The dualling on the line to Inverness will be rather more straightforward.

I appreciate the information about the increase in freight. I am sure that we will come back to the issue in our inquiry into the potential benefits of high-speed rail services.

For future reference, I would prefer officials to sit at the table rather than pass notes to the minister if he requires information or support.

Will the minister expand on the rationale for rejecting the Glasgow crossrail scheme in his strategy?

On the contrary, our objective is to ensure that we have rail services that cross Glasgow.

During the next few weeks we will discuss with Strathclyde partnership for transport capacity at Glasgow Queen Street and Glasgow Central stations. We think that the capacity of the upper and lower levels of both stations will be fully utilised during the lifetime of the STPR. SPT takes a different view, for whatever reason—it might simply be that SPT is not using the same timescale. I am anxious to sort out the issue, because if SPT is correct, its approach to supporting services that can go through Glasgow from the north-east to the south-west, which our interventions deliver, might potentially be cheaper. However, I have considered the issue since I talked to the convener of SPT and I suspect that our view, which is that capacity at the two existing stations is inadequate, is likely to be correct—I hope it will be otherwise.

I am not aware that great emphasis was placed on that issue in the background documents to the STPR. In table E3 in annex 3 of report 3, you say that Glasgow crossrail has been rejected because

"it does not make best use of the rail network",

and that proposed improvements to the rail network, in particular between Edinburgh and Glasgow, will

"negate much of the potential benefit of Glasgow Crossrail".

Will you talk about that?

You have correctly quoted from the report, but we are looking to enable services that cross Glasgow. Crossrail is a very specific proposal, of course. I am happy to explore whether our view on constraints to do with station capacity in future is well founded; if it is not well founded we will revisit the matter. It is about achieving services that cross Glasgow, by whatever means and whatever the label.

I know that you are anxious to do something about connections to the Loch Ryan ports, but you have focused exclusively on improvements to the A75 and you have not considered rail services to Stranraer. Under your strategy, if I want to go by rail from Ayr or Stranraer to Edinburgh, Rosyth or wherever, will I have to change in Glasgow? You talk about services that will "cross Glasgow"; do you mean through services, or will people have to change trains and platforms at Glasgow Central station?

Under our strategy, it might be at another station that is neither Central nor Queen Street.

We are investing not just in the A75 but in the A77, because we acknowledge the ports' importance to the economy not just of Scotland but of Northern Ireland. The majority of supermarkets in Northern Ireland are provisioned through that ferry route.

You ask whether your journey will involve changing trains in Glasgow. I suppose that, ultimately, that will depend on where you want to go. You ask whether trains will run all the way through, and that will depend on timetabling and the options that exist. However, if we create the physical capability and the demand exists, I will of course want trains to run all the way through.

So you have in mind a superior scheme to SPT's proposal.

We have a scheme that recognises what we understand to be the constraints at the two main railway stations in Glasgow, but I say openly and straightforwardly that Councillor Alistair Watson told me his definite view that the stations had the capacity, and we will sit down to discuss that. I know that SPT's approach is analytical and unemotional, and we have sought to take the same approach. If we find that assumptions on one or the other side of the table are incompatible, we will seek to work out why and to respond, because we share the objective of creating the ability for trains to run through Glasgow.

There is no sign in the latest draft of the national planning framework that you are reconsidering SPT's version of crossrail or thinking more about how you would achieve similar benefits by other means. That tends to make all that a gleam in the eye.

The STPR contains the substantial intervention of the west of Scotland strategic rail enhancements. The national planning framework is a planning document and not a transport document; it is about clearing the way for planning difficulties.

If you are thinking about a super-duper crossrail station in the centre of Glasgow, that is a big planning issue.

My official reminds me that the west of Scotland strategic rail enhancements are in NPF 2.

So as far as you are concerned, your superior version of crossrail is in the national planning framework.

I will not rise to the bait of saying what is superior or inferior, because that would perhaps mislead.

Anyway, the national planning framework says that you will reconsider both versions of the scheme.

The national planning framework is about high-level strategic planning and area planning, so the scheme is not material to the framework either way.

Prima facie, a difference of view exists about the capacity of the two main railway stations in Glasgow. I am always prepared to listen to SPT, which has substantial expertise and experience. I wish to explore why that difference of view exists and to ensure that we end up with the same view. I cannot say which view that will be. Our preliminary look at the issue suggests that the difference arises simply from our taking different time horizons. If so, that will colour the discussion that we have with SPT in the middle of January.

In recent weeks, some north-east politicians have accused the minister of allowing the Aberdeen crossrail project to wither on the vine. The failure to mention the project in the strategic transport projects review has caused that accusation to resurface. Does its exclusion from the review mean that it has no prospect of being implemented, or do the review's terms still offer the prospect of developing enhanced local rail services in the Aberdeen area?

We are already making substantial changes in that area. For example, the timetable change on Sunday increased from three to eight the number of morning peak-hour rail services from Inverurie to Aberdeen. Through-rail services between Montrose and Inverurie are substantial, with an increased number of evening services. We have clearly signalled our intention to look seriously at reopening Kintore railway station as an additional stop in what is a rapidly growing part of Aberdeen's outer commuter ring. We are seeking firmly to improve rail services to and through Aberdeen.

Would it be fair to say that the restrictive nature of the strategic transport projects review is such that one would not have expected station developments to be included? It is a strategic, rather than local, plan.

The proposals for additional stations in Aberdeen are certainly of local significance, so it is right that they should be pursued by the north-east of Scotland transport partnership. At this stage, the proposals show a negative return on investment and suggest the prospect that they will damage patronage for rail services overall. Because passengers appear to be very sensitive to time, the addition of new stops that would increase journey times by about three minutes would reduce the number of people who are prepared to use the railways. However, the incremental approach that we have adopted—which we are able to do without major capital investment at this stage, although investment will be made in the line between Aberdeen and Inverness in particular—will enable us to build up patronage. I am sure that that will build the case for further interventions later.

We have also made a substantial set of changes in the timetable. The new timetable provides for the opening of a Laurencekirk station to the south of Aberdeen, which will provide services all the way through to Inverurie. We are making substantial changes in the operation of the railways: those changes start to flesh out the long-expressed desire for better commuter services into and out of Aberdeen.

Would it be fair to say, in that case, that there is scope for progress on local rail services around Aberdeen?

Yes.

To return to the A9, will the minister clarify the phasing of the proposed dualling of the road and the costs that are associated with each phase?

In the early stages, we will increase the amount of dualling at the southern end of the road. In phase 2, we aim to dual the road between Perth and Inverness.

The first phase will include grade-separated junctions from the Keir roundabout to south of the Broxden roundabout, completion of the dual carriageway between Perth and Blair Atholl, grade separation at the Inveralmond and Broxden roundabouts and—for safety reasons and to reduce driver frustration—a number of two-plus-one sections to create overtaking opportunities the length of the A9.

The A9's economic importance justifies the need to dual the road over the longer term. The road has local safety issues, on which we will continue to operate. Overall, the A9 is substantially safer—both on its dual carriageway and single carriageway sections—than the average trunk road in Scotland, but there is a strong economic case for dualling the road as well as a focused need to address safety issues at particular points.

I take it that some of those developments will be at the Inverness end of the A9, given that the safety of the road between, for example, Kingussie and Aviemore is also suspect.

Most of the safety issues are at junctions. For example, we are doing additional work at Slochd, which is a bit further north than the part of the road to which Rob Gibson just referred. We will also invest in the A96 to A9, which runs between the road from Inverness to Nairn and the road south from Inverness to Perth, because Inverness has one of the most rapidly growing economies in Scotland. A connected issue is the prospect of a new railway stations at Dalcross and support for the UHI Millennium Institute campus. At both ends of the A9, we are looking to make interventions relatively soon. In the longer term, we are honouring our commitment to dual the A9.

How confident are you that the full dualling of the A9 can be completed for a maximum of £4 billion, as reported in the STPR?

That is the best estimate that we can come up with at this stage—detailed design is still to be done. Ultimately, we will know what the final price is when a contractor signs a contract. We are in times when we can probably expect more effective pricing for some years to come because of diminution of demand in other sectors. That is a good basis for pricing the project.

In recent years—in both the previous Administration's time in office and ours—civil engineering contractors and the Governments that negotiate with them have been getting much closer to the mark on pricing. They have agreed effective fixed-price contracts, so the exposure of the public purse has been much diminished compared with what happened 10 or 20 years ago.

I will take a moment to discuss what is not in the STPR. In particular, a couple of projects in the north-east have been ditched—a grade-separated junction at Laurencekirk on the A90 and the dualling of the A90 north of Ellon to Peterhead.

On Laurencekirk, why did you not take the opportunity to respond to the concerns of road users in the area? Why is it proper to propose road safety improvements on the A9, about which we heard in your response to Mr Gibson, but not on the A90?

On the A90 north of Ellon, I remind you of your response to the previous Government's announcement on the dualling of the Balmedie to Tipperty part of the A90 a couple of years ago. On your website, you stated:

"it is extremely regrettable that the Scottish Government has not taken the opportunity to extend the dualling of the A90 north of Ellon as part of the same programme … It is high time that the Liberal-Labour Scottish Government provided a transport infrastructure to serve the North-east of Scotland."

When did you change your mind on that?

It is perhaps worth reminding the member that it is she who wishes to take £800 million a year out of our budget and it is the SNP Administration that is progressing the dualling of the road between Balmedie and Tipperty.

Let me say a little about the Laurencekirk junction on the A90—by the way, that road is included in the roads on which there will be safety interventions. On the basis of the available information, it appears that the problem might be at the relatively close St Cyrus junction, which is within three miles of the Laurencekirk junction, to the north.

When one of Alison McInnes's political colleagues was Minister for Transport, he made an intervention at the Laurencekirk junction by changing its design in a relatively simple way, reducing the speed limit and introducing speed cameras. It is clear that that intervention has very substantially improved the safety record of that point on the A90, albeit that a number of other junctions quite close to the Laurencekirk junction have been the source of safety issues. However, I repeat that the A90 is on the radar for safety interventions.

You are right to say that there is concern about a series of junctions. As far as the community and I are concerned, the junctions remain extremely hazardous, particularly as they have crossing traffic rather than traffic turning on to the A90. I urge you to reconsider the matter and to bring forward improvements to those junctions as a matter of urgency.

I am extremely familiar with the Laurencekirk junction. I drove through it most recently on Sunday. I have made a point of leaving at the junction and then making the crossing—I do not usually do that—to ensure that I understand it as a driver. It is on the radar, but I repeat that we have to target our safety interventions where the need is greatest. Since 2005, the 50mph limit, the speed cameras and the warning signs that come up if people exceed the speed limit as they approach the junction have delivered a substantial step change in what happens there. Prior to that, there were certainly a number of serious and fatal accidents at that junction. It is not off the agenda; it is there to be looked at in respect of safety interventions, but when we prioritise our investments we need to consider a range of junctions where there is crossing traffic on the A90, which is a trunk road rather than a motorway.

Des McNulty and Alex Johnstone's supplementaries will have to be brief.

Do you see the fastlink scheme being part of the strategic review, or could it be brought forward in advance of the timescales for those projects? I know that your colleague the Cabinet Secretary for Health and Wellbeing is particularly keen on linking up the Southern general hospital with Glasgow city centre and I am keen on linking up the Golden Jubilee hospital.

My other question is on the A82. You said that interventions should be most speedy where safety need is greatest. Everyone would acknowledge that the A82 is probably the road with the highest proportion of serious accidents. Can you unpack the targeted programme of measures to improve the A82 between Glasgow and Oban and explain briefly why it has been treated differently from the A9?

The A82 is an early target for safety-related intervention. I return to the point that the case for the A9 is an economic one. Engineering must play a role in improving the quality of the road at some places on the A82, which I have also driven along. The carriageway is narrower than one would usually expect; if I remember correctly, it is less than 7.3m wide. On some sections of the road there is no opportunity for drivers to escape the road if they see a developing situation ahead, because there is rock on one side and railway on the other. On some stretches there is a loch on one side. Those sections create difficulties for competent drivers who are driving according to the conditions, because there is no verge if they want to go off the road—there is no such option. We clearly need to make engineering interventions.

By the way, in respect of safety, it is clear that the figures for people being killed and seriously injured on the A82 are substantially higher per kilometre than the Scottish average. We recognise that, which is why we are focusing on a range of safety interventions that will make a difference.

Can you address the timescale issues?

The work at Pulpit Rock and the Crianlarich bypass are not in the STPR because they are in advance of the STPR projects. We are also considering interventions further north.

What about the fastlink scheme?

Alex Johnstone has a supplementary.

Do you wish me to answer Des McNulty's question?

We are very tight for time, Des.

The minister can write to me about fastlink.

That is fine.

I have a brief follow-up to Alison McInnes's questions on the junction at Laurencekirk. I wrote to the minister some months ago to ask whether it would be possible to meet him and discuss the issues concerning that junction. He replied that at that time it was inopportune. Would the minister meet a delegation from Laurencekirk to explain needs in respect of the junction sometime in the new year?

I think Alex Johnstone knows my office's phone number. I would be happy to make the necessary arrangements.

I will take up that offer.

I can see that you have stretched the convener's tolerance.

Turning to climate change, can you explain how the CO2 reduction of between 100,000 tonnes and 150,000 tonnes resulting from the STPR projects was calculated?

The STPR runs to about 3,800 pages. The biggest part of that, which consists of three large documents that are four or five inches thick, is the strategic environmental assessment. You will find much of the answer in there.

The more obvious question is this: why will the STPR make a positive contribution to the reduction of CO2 emissions? The answer, of course, is that it will do so because of our significant focus on rail and other public transport interventions. A number of the road interventions will also have positive CO2 benefits. I have made it clear from the outset that against a backdrop of projected increases in motor traffic of one sort or another, the STPR had to produce a carbon benefit. It is not, however, the only source on which we will need to rely to reduce CO2 emissions and carbon dioxide equivalent gases from transport; we will also need interventions that are outwith the STPR.

We have discussed with the Cabinet Secretary for Finance and Sustainable Growth the use of the carbon accounting tool. Has a prototype of that tool been applied to the CO2 calculation?

We are the first country in the world to start to develop such a tool. The prototype will probably not be available until the middle of next year. We have not used it, but we have considered the nature of the proposed interventions. Carbon accounting is a much broader and more all-encompassing process that will, in its full form, examine secondary and tertiary effects—not just primary ones. In the STPR, we have considered primarily the primary effects.

I know that some people's eyes glaze over during discussion of such detail, but we are talking about an issue that is of far greater magnitude than money, because interventions that we make now will make a big difference in the future, if we can get them right. Can you give us any inkling of the key assumptions behind the calculation that the STPR will result in a reduction of between 100,000 and 150,000 tonnes in CO2 emissions? Over what timescale are those savings expected?

Mr Anderson will deal with that, if he can find the answer.

I am sorry that I have not had time to read the large documents yet; I hope that someone has.

Happy Christmas.

I and my colleagues have read it, I am afraid.

Rob Gibson's point about the assessment and the figure of 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes is related to the transport model for Scotland and our use of the best tool that we have, which is a mechanism for calculating CO2 emissions and carbon dioxide equivalents. We have used the best model that one can use. One of the challenges when using that model is that, notwithstanding that some of the interventions are extremely big, they make a remarkably small difference at national level in terms of CO2 emissions. We have used the best available tool to come up with the aggregation.

The second question was about timescales. The aggregation assumes that all 29 schemes will be fully implemented. Quite honestly, if one were to do the calculation on any other basis, one would be starting to play so many different tunes that it would become meaningless.

So we are talking about an overall figure, the timescale for which extends until the end of the STPR.

Correct.

What impact will the expansion of Glasgow and Edinburgh airports, which the national planning framework identifies as national developments, have on the predicted reductions in Scotland's transport greenhouse gas emissions?

The national planning framework—which is, of course, a different document—focuses on improving the surface transport connections to Edinburgh and Glasgow airports. It is interesting that while Edinburgh airport has among the highest proportions of passengers arriving at an airport by public transport, is also one of the fastest-growing airports, which justifies our belief that the provision of good public transport as the preferred mode of travel to airports need not inhibit airports' economic success.

Will the airports expand over the national planning framework period to 2030? We must protect their ability to do so. The next subject that the committee will discuss—high-speed rail—will fundamentally change the structure, nature and volume of flying from Scotland's central belt airports. However, in planning terms, we cannot afford not to protect the possibility of additional runways at Edinburgh and Glasgow even though the character of flying will change significantly.

I understand that. Basically, from what Mr Anderson said, you are telling us that the improvement of the roads to the airports was taken into account in calculating the 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes.

That is correct.

We had been given to understand that the strategic transport projects review would be put through some embryonic form of the carbon assessment tool.

Yes, it shall be.

The answer that you gave a few moments ago did not give much detail about that.

As the tool becomes available, we will seek to create a balance sheet of all our interventions across all policy areas. That will take a significant amount of time. It is a prototype tool and, at the early stages, we will need to assess rigorously whether it gives us the kind of information that will inform policy making adequately. I suspect that it will continue to be refined over quite a long time, but other jurisdictions are showing considerable interest in what we are doing. That interest will be welcome, particularly if those other jurisdictions start to pick up some of our early work, because what they do will inform us and help us continue to refine our balance sheet. The review is a major set of interventions for the Government and I expect the carbon assessment tool to be used to refine our understanding of the impact of what we propose.

So the carbon balance sheet for transport will consider the projects or interventions in the STPR and may, presumably, come up with a figure that is different from 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes.

Assessing the carbon balance of transport involves a great deal more than simply considering the STPR. We need to look at the current state of transport's contribution to CO2 equivalent gases and consider what the projections are, separate from the STPR, for the growth or otherwise in various kinds of traffic on our roads, such as goods traffic and private car traffic. All of that has to be part of the carbon balance sheet, as well as the change that is effected by projects that we initiate. Even if we did nothing that is in the STPR, transport would remain one of the significant emitters of carbon dioxide equivalent gases, and we need to understand and measure the effects of that so that we can formulate policies that can deal with it.

I am just trying to understand the methodology—which we may be able to get at page 2,400 and whatever—that has been used to derive the 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes. In comparison with the methodology that is being developed, which we have not yet seen, that figure must be a rule of thumb.

It is actually a small number—

Yes, 100,000 tonnes is a small number.

I point you to page 18 of report 4. The figure is arrived at using the best tool that we have at present—the methodology that we and the DFT use to calculate carbon emissions. That very much forms the basis of our work, and we try to use it at a national level, which is the challenge. Coming up with carbon benefits and carbon accounting on individual schemes is slightly more straightforward than aggregating it up to a national benefit.

To state the obvious, what drives our seeking to develop a new way of accounting is a recognition of the need to have a better-founded understanding.

Understood. On the figure of 100,000 tonnes, it was reported by at least one media source that that had been stated as a 100,000 tonnes cut per year. Are you saying that it is a cut of 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes over the lifetime of the STPR?

No. It is per year, but that rate of reduction will be achieved only after the completion of all 29 interventions. In other words, it is not every year between now and the end of the STPR. Clearly, we need to complete the projects to get the benefit, but when all the interventions that we have described are complete, the estimate we currently have is 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes per year at that point.

Right. So it is a reduction of 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes on the annual carbon emissions account rather than 100,000 down one year, another 100,000 down the next year and another 100,000 down the following year.

Correct. I would be cautious about using the word "account", because of the way in which it is used in the Climate Change (Scotland) Bill.

Okay; so if all the projects and interventions are put in place, we are talking about something like 1 per cent of the transport emissions for Scotland.

Correct.

Which is pretty much in line with the 1 per cent a year reduction in recent years, apart from last year.

This is an additional reduction over any other interventions. The convener is correct to point to the scale. That is precisely why I made the point that we cannot rely on the STPR for all the reductions that we require in transport. We will require other interventions.

Do you think that those out there in wider civic Scotland who are excited by the idea of an ambitious programme on climate change might have expected the STPR to make a more substantial contribution?

My clear instruction to those who have been working on the STPR was that it must make a positive contribution to the climate change agenda. While that has resulted in what is not, in percentage terms, for transport, a huge contribution, it is probably one of the first of such programmes that makes a contribution on anything like this scale. I am pleased that we have this 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes per year reduction.

Does that express the urgency that is required on climate change?

I return to what I said earlier. We have to have other interventions that are not STPR driven. Those interventions will be of importance to the climate change agenda.

We look forward to those.

How and when does the Scottish Government intend to respond to the Audit Scotland report on the ScotRail franchise, which was debated in the chamber last week?

I shall be appearing in front of the Public Audit Committee, to which the report was sent, and will spell out the details of our response. Although there are issues for action for the Government, we have been told that the franchise is performing extremely well and that the extension of the franchise has delivered a significant benefit to public transport in Scotland. I am delighted that Audit Scotland has come to that view.

Has the Government learned any lessons from the process by which the extension decision was reached? Given the public and political response to the process, if there were another round of letting a franchise extension, would the Government do things differently?

The public response has been largely supportive. People see the benefits. The political response might be otherwise. We will take account of the motion that was passed by Parliament last week that suggests that the previous Administration was probably incorrect in 2004 in failing to incorporate criteria by which any extension should be granted. I am sure that that will be one of the key issues that we will take account of in the refranchising next time, and the contract that will flow from it. In that respect, Audit Scotland has identified issues that we should take account of in the new agreement, after refranchising.

I thank the minister and his officials for taking the time to answer questions on the STPR. We will take a five-minute break.

Meeting suspended.

On resuming—