Official Report 541KB pdf
Good morning and welcome to the European and External Relations Committee’s fourth meeting in 2015. I make the usual request for mobile phones to be switched off, please.
We have a very full agenda, so we will move swiftly to agenda item 1, which is the continuation of our inquiry on connecting Scotland and how the Scottish Government and its agencies engage internationally. I am delighted to welcome four excellent witnesses, who will give us evidence on how they do things in their countries and Governments.
I formally welcome Roger Albinyana i Saigí, Secretary for Foreign and European Affairs in the Government of Catalonia; from the Basque Government, María Ángeles Elorza Zubiría, General Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Mikel Antón Zarragoitia, European affairs director; and Lukas Van Damme, deputy general representative of the Government of Flanders in the United Kingdom. Good morning, one and all. I believe that you all have brief opening statements. For ease of purpose, we will use alphabetical order for each of you to speak. Roger is first.
Thank you very much, madam convener and honourable members. Allow me to express first my and my Government’s gratitude for the invitation to address this committee of the Scottish Parliament in this beautiful and marvellous building that was designed by a Catalan architect, Enric Miralles. I also introduce our delegate representative to the United Kingdom and Ireland, Mr Suàrez, who is based in London.
Honourable members, regardless of the political process that Catalonia is going through, the Catalan Government has developed foreign actions since the recovery of our democracy and before the approval of the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, which consolidated Catalonia’s foreign and European Union activity in a text that the Spanish Parliament approved.
For the Government of Catalonia, our foreign action is an instrument that should serve the needs of Catalonia as well as its citizens’ interests. The Catalan international strategy places us in the world. It is a policy that is capable of consolidating alliances and which puts Catalonia in direct contact with the European Union, other Governments and multilateral organisations, as well as with civil society and Catalan citizens and communities abroad.
The current political situation in Catalonia has led us to use our foreign action as a tool to raise awareness of the process that is going on in Catalonia. Our main goal is to help our allies and opinion makers in other countries to understand better that ours is a democratic process whose main goal is, in the first place, to let the Catalan people vote and decide on their political future. However, that is not the only goal of our foreign action.
I will now go through the main goals and tools. First, there is the internationalisation of the Catalan economy, which is a strategy of economic diplomacy that includes the promotion of exports, tourism and attracting foreign investment as key elements to compensate for the contraction that has been suffered in Catalonia, with the overall objective of overcoming that and boosting our economy.
For the record, Catalonia’s population represents 16 per cent of the Spanish population, and Catalonia is similar in size and population to Switzerland. Catalonia accounts for 19 per cent of the Spanish gross domestic product and its GDP is similar to that of Denmark. Catalonia also accounts for nearly 28 per cent of Spanish exports and foreign trade. Internationalisation is therefore 40 per cent of the Catalan GDP, and Catalonia received 17 million foreign tourists last year.
According to the Financial Times, we were first among continental regions for attracting foreign direct investment in 2013 and 2014. One of the instruments that we have at our disposal is an important network of external representation offices. For instance, we have seven Government delegations around the world in Brussels, London, Paris, Berlin, Washington and New York—the Washington delegation is for bilateral purposes, while that for New York follows the activity of the United Nations and its system—as well as Rome and Vienna to represent Catalonia’s political, business and cultural interests abroad. The Catalan Government plans to enlarge that network in the coming months.
We have more than 60 sectoral offices that are mostly devoted to trade issues but also address cultural and touristic issues. We have offices in, for instance, Beijing, Berlin, Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Casablanca, Copenhagen, Dubai, Cairo, Hong Kong, Istanbul, Johannesburg, London, Mexico City, Miami, Milan, Montreal, Moscow, Mumbai, New York, Paris, Prague, Santiago de Chile, São Paulo, Seoul, Sydney, silicon valley, Singapore, Stuttgart and Tokyo, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
The second issue that I will address is bilateral and multilateral relations. A main priority of Catalonia’s foreign strategy is to create, maintain and reinforce bilateral and multilateral alliances with other actors and organisations at the international level. For example, our president, Artur Mas, has held since 2013 about 200 bilateral meetings with governmental and multilateral representatives. We work with a scale that defines priority countries, which are mainly EU member states—particularly France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy—but also include Israel, Morocco, China, Japan, Korea, the United States and Mexico. We have developed enhanced co-operation and bilateral collaboration with some of those countries through what we call country plans, which involve their embassies and their consulate generals in Barcelona.
On priority regions, we focus mainly on the European Union and the Mediterranean region. The bilateral sectoral relations go beyond the commercial and trade interests and focus on sectors such as health, research and development and development co-operation.
In our work with international organisations, we have prioritised mainly the international and multilateral organisations that are in the United Nations system, especially the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Labour Organization and the World Health Organization, which has a regional office in Barcelona. We also work with the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe at the parliamentary assembly level; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which is based in Paris; the World Bank Group; and the Union for the Mediterranean, which has its secretariat in Barcelona. The Catalan Government has underlined its commitment to working with multilateral organisations by setting up a new directorate-general in the foreign affairs secretariat to deal with multilateral and European affairs.
The European Union is the third element that I will address. Catalonia has a strong pro-Europe vocation and orientation—so has Scotland, as we know. Catalonia has had a governmental presence in Brussels since 1986. We were—one of my colleagues from the Basque Government will correct me if I am mistaken—the first of all the autonomous Spanish communities to have an office there.
We have a permanent representative to the European Union in the Catalan Government’s delegation to the EU. Through them, we defend our interest. For example, we are focused very much on the European strategic investment plan—the Juncker plan—as well as the transatlantic trade and investment partnership negotiations and the multi-annual financial programme. We try to participate in the decision-making processes but, as the committee knows, sub-state Governments do not have a clear and decisive decision-making role in Brussels. We are trying to ensure that European funds are available to Catalan companies and the Catalan people at large.
The fourth element is the law on external action and EU relations, which is a pioneer law. We do not know of many sub-state Governments that come with a law as complete as that. The law was approved a couple of months ago by a large majority in the Catalan Parliament, with 100 out of 135 votes. I think that it was only the People’s Party of Catalonia and a smaller party that voted against the law, but we managed to grasp a broad consensus.
The law creates a set of new tools to promote, co-ordinate and give more coherence to the Government’s foreign action as a whole—not only internally but vis-à-vis the Parliament, other public institutions, local authorities and Governments. New elements that the law sets include the development of a strategic plan on external action and relations with the EU.
The four-year plan presents the priorities sectorally, geographically and institutionally. It establishes four strategic objectives. The first objective is promoting and defending Catalonia in Europe and the world by the internationalisation of the economy, culture and knowledge. Some examples of that are the agreements signed on research and development and on innovation issues with Israel and Massachusetts, as well as the one that our President will sign in the coming months in California.
The second objective is confirming our commitment to the European and Mediterranean projects and defending Catalonia’s interests in the EU and other European institutions.
09:15The third objective is contributing to the global objectives of peace, security, human rights, sustainable development and social cohesion. An example of that is participation in processes such as the COP21 summit in Paris or the discussion on visioning the sustainable development goals that will be decided in New York in September this year.
The fourth objective is practising modern and effective diplomacy by supporting, providing services to and assisting Catalans abroad and giving civil society a greater role.
Those are the four strategic objectives that are envisaged in the strategic plan. Apart from that, we have developed other instruments to co-ordinate and give coherence to the Catalan foreign policy, such as the—I am sorry for hesitating; I have the acronyms in Catalan—cross-department committee of external action and relations with the EU or the council of external action and relations with the EU, which gathers the President with a number of actors and stakeholders from civil society outside the public institutions.
I will underline two additional points. One is about public diplomacy. Especially during the past three years, we have developed a strong public diplomacy strategy. Three years ago, we created the public diplomacy council of Catalonia, which is a private-public institution that counts on representatives from the political, social, economic and academic arenas to influence the external perception of Catalonia through the organisation of visits by parliamentarians, individuals from the culture sector and professors, for example, and by binding relations with all those sectors. Basically, its role is to promote Catalonia as a trusted and leading southern European economy with its own differentiated language and culture.
Next to that public diplomacy strategy, we have been working on an internal communications strategy, which is quite important. It aims to establish permanent and fluid contacts with media from around the world, particularly in Europe—not only correspondents who are located in Madrid but those who are in their own countries—to ensure a continuous and close dialogue with international opinion leaders.
That is pretty much all. I thank you once more for the opportunity to address the committee and I hope that we will have a fruitful discussion.
Thank you very much.
Convener, members of the Parliament and colleagues from Catalonia and Flanders, good morning to all of you. It is a great pleasure to appear before the committee. I will briefly give you the key elements of the Basque Country’s strategic framework for internationalisation—a plan that we approved in April last year.
Traditionally, Basque society has had high-level contacts abroad at the institutional level and through its stakeholders. In recent times, when democracy was restored, the Basque Government reinstated that tradition.
In 1988, we set up a representative office in Brussels. That led the Spanish Government to appeal to the Constitutional Court, alleging that its competence in foreign relations had been breached. The court ruled in the Basque Government’s favour. Its ruling, which was a milestone, clarified that autonomous communities and therefore the Basque Country have the rights and the political autonomy to develop international relations in the sphere of their competences.
Nowadays, internationalisation is more than ever on our agenda, and we consider it to be a strategic goal and challenge for the whole country. The reasons for that are obvious. For a start, we live in a globalised context. We are part of the European Union; our society faces problems that are common to other societies; and such common problems require global responses.
One of the framework’s four elements is the will of our society to participate and be an actor in designing a global society. We do not want to be mere spectators. In short, our future is on the global stage. We cannot turn a blind eye to the reality that internationalisation is a tool for reactivating the economy, creating jobs and achieving sustainable human development.
How can we do this? In our opinion, we need to start with a global strategy—a road map that involves not only all the Basque Government’s ministries but society as a whole. After an intense participatory process, we have constructed the strategy framework. Our goal is to achieve a common vision based on the experiences and contributions of a broad number of actors that represent a large range of sectors. Our vision for the future is to become a global actor, position ourselves abroad, participate directly in the European Union and intensify our international presence.
To achieve that, we have defined four strategic objectives, whose function is to give coherence to the set of activities that are carried out not only by the Basque Government but by Basque actors abroad. The first objective is to showcase the Basque Country internationally. If we want to attract investors, tourists or talented people, we need to attain an appropriate international position.
To reach that position, we have committed ourselves to the Basque Country brand, which is the vehicle for communicating our strengths and what makes us distinctive and interesting. It concerns our language and culture, our shared values, a proven track record in self-government, and a very large industrial specialisation. We want the Basque Country brand to give us a competitive advantage. We are also committed to bringing to the Basque Country international events, and we are driving for Basque stakeholders to participate in events that are organised in other countries.
The second objective is to promote our multilateral interests and to contribute to global challenges through inserting Basque socioeconomic actors into global value chains and networks. As a result, our external action will be focused on detecting opportunities, opening doors and setting up alliances with strategic partners to better promote common interests in the international arena.
In addition, we aim to reinforce our ties with international organisations. For example, we plan to enter into new partnership agreements with some of them; we already have such agreements with the Organization of American States, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations Development Programme and the secretariat for Latin America. We want to foster the insertion of Basque stakeholders into thematic networks and to exchange views and knowledge.
This strategic objective also includes a key element for us: our responsibility for and with third parties. If we really want to become a global player, we have to make our contribution to solving global problems. We have to channel the commitment of Basque society to the fight against the poverty conditions in which millions of people on this planet live.
The third objective relates to the European framework. We want to have a say in European projects. Our aim is for the Basque Country to have its own space in the European Union by means of active participation in European fora in which discussions that affect our self-government are made, such as in the economic and financial affairs—ECOFIN—council. We participate in the ECOFIN working groups, but we cannot participate in the meetings of ministers. We have our own Treasury and fiscal system, so we are fully competent in that area. We are also working to increase the participation of Basque stakeholders in European programmes and projects, and we are promoting interregional and cross-border co-operation, especially with Aquitaine.
The fourth and final objective is knowledge acquisition. The capacity to innovate and to manage new knowledge is key for our future social wellbeing and economic competitiveness, so we have to look for new inputs in all fields of activity. Nowadays, continuous improvement is required, and capturing knowledge is a key ingredient of that. We will consolidate relations with countries and regions that have innovative models in different areas. That proximity will enable us to discover the best practices and to adapt and improve our public policies.
The strategic framework that I have described marks a turning point. Internationalisation is becoming a new cross-cutting aspect in this new stage, so the whole Basque Government will be committed to it. I will give some examples. The Department of Justice and Public Administration is extending co-operation with international organisations on transparency and efficiency in public management. We are promoting our small and medium-sized enterprises’ access to foreign markets, but support will also be given to the international presence of Basque artists and culture. In the European framework, we will search for the best practices in social policy. In the meantime, we will encourage our people and companies to participate in the horizon 2020 programme. In the health arena, we are committed to exchanging knowledge of health system, single medical history and e-prescription models. Those are just some examples of the things that we are working on.
The strategy includes geographical priorities. We have identified the territories in which the majority of Basque interests are focused. I will not mention all of them, because time is short, but the European Union countries stand out in our strategy for obvious reasons. More precisely, the Scandinavian countries stand out because they are home to systems with high social welfare standards, and Germany, France and the United Kingdom stand out because they are our main commercial partners. We would also like to continue to work with other regions, federated states and nations. We already have agreements with Aquitaine and Bavaria. In a couple of months, we will sign an agreement with Flanders, and we would like to co-operate with Scotland in the future.
The general secretariat for foreign affairs, for which I am responsible, co-ordinates and fosters the implementation of the strategic framework. We rely on our international network, which consists of six delegations—in Brussels, New York, Mexico, Bogotá, Santiago de Chile and Buenos Aires. We have a representative office in Madrid and a commercial network that covers more than 70 countries.
That is what I wanted to say. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee. If members have any questions, I would be pleased to answer them.
Thank you very much. We move on to Flanders.
09:30
Thank you very much for the invitation and for your interest in Flemish foreign policy. I will give a short general outline of Flemish foreign policy and then move to the management summary of our recent policy note, with its five strategic objectives. Having listened to our colleagues from Catalonia and the Basque Country, I note that there are quite a few similarities.
As you might be aware, Belgium is a peculiar country with specific constitutional arrangements. One of those concerns foreign affairs. The main principle for us is the in foro interno, in foro externo principle, which means that state entities in Belgium, such as Flanders, are responsible for all external aspects of their internal competences. For instance, in the Bologna process on higher education, it is Flanders and our Francophone colleagues that will be signing a treaty, not our Belgian federal ministers.
Belgian sub-state entities have treaty-making powers, although they are within the framework of general Belgian foreign policy. There are many bilateral treaties. This year, we are celebrating 20 years of a cultural treaty with the Netherlands—which we have for the obvious reason that we share the Dutch language—although there is a recent trend of moving from formal treaties to memoranda of understanding.
There are a lot of multilateral treaties. In the case of EU treaties and UN conventions, when Flemish competences are concerned the Flemish Parliament also has to approve the international treaty before it can be ratified by Belgium.
We are competent to set up our own representation offices abroad—again, within the framework of broader Belgian foreign policy. That means that many of those offices are embedded in Belgian embassies and they have diplomatic status. As regards our network of offices abroad, we do not have one integrated network; rather, we have three interdependent networks of offices, each reporting to their home office. We have 11 general representation offices—I work for the UK one in London. In addition, there are two development co-operation offices—one in Malawi, where Scotland is active as well, and one in Mozambique. We also have about 70 economic offices that report to the Flanders Investment and Trade agency, and we have about 15 tourism offices that report to the Flanders tourism agency. Whenever possible, however, if all those services are in one city, we combine them in one Flanders House, as is the case in The Hague, Paris, New York and London.
There is the expression, “Put your money where your mouth is.” I will outline our budget to give you an idea of the situation. The overall budget of the Government of Flanders amounts to about €40 billion for 2015—about £30 billion. About half a percent of that budget is for the foreign policy domain, which is about €185 million or £136 million, although a big chunk of that—€85 million—is for tourism purposes, including international promotion and leisure investments in Flanders itself.
That amount excludes investment and expenditure by other departments—the education department gives contributions to UNESCO, for instance, and the agriculture department is deeply involved in the common agricultural policy at the European level. However, just to give you an idea, we are investing about £130 million in foreign policy. I do not have recent figures for the cost of our network abroad but in 2012 it cost about £23 million, so a big chunk of the budget goes to our network of economic offices. That is an introduction to where we are, more or less.
The strategic objectives have been identified recently. Since June last year, we have had a new Government of Flanders. In the autumn, the Government drafted a new policy paper on foreign affairs for the next five years.
At the core of the first strategic objective—as with any foreign policy—is the duty to defend our interests internationally, and you will not be surprised to hear that the most important lever that is identified to that end is the European Union. Flanders wants a strong and performing EU that takes into account Flemish interests. There is direct involvement of the Flemish Administration, and Flemish ministers sit round the table in European ministerial meetings when our policies are at stake and are concerned. As Belgian regions and communities, we make Belgian positions within the EU. When we read the Smith commission proposals, we see that they hint towards that approach for Scotland, and I hope that it can be further developed for you as well.
The EU is important, and so are bilateral relations with countries and partners inside and outside the EU, although there is a priority on the neighbouring countries. Thanks to the channel tunnel and the direct trains that we now have, we consider the UK as a neighbouring country as well. The UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands are the main partners.
We also want to continue our involvement with the international organisations that our Spanish colleagues mentioned, including the OECD and UNESCO.
The second objective is to enhance the reputation of Flanders abroad. That plays an important role in public diplomacy and, as the witnesses from the Basque Country mentioned, showcasing oneself. International promotion of Flanders is important to make our region more attractive to a series of target groups including students, researchers, cultural visitors, fashionistas, investors—they are quite important—and tourists. That also involves linking with expatriate communities. There are quite a few of those in Belgium, including in Brussels, and we also take them to heart. We have a special eye for international guests in our visitors programme, and that also comes within the second objective or goal.
The third objective concerns the internationalisation of the Flemish economy. That subject was also mentioned earlier in relation to Catalonia. It is important that Flemish companies realise that the key to sustainable growth for their businesses as well as for the Flemish economy as a whole is to go global, and we want to support that by strengthening our network of economic posts abroad, as well as by having one co-ordinated strategy. With public authorities, civil society and companies working together, we will develop a multi-annual strategy on that.
Attention is being paid to the need for more free trade, as well as fair trade, worldwide. That brings me to the fourth objective, which is to contribute to the international fight against poverty. Flanders is not obliged to give any development aid, but as an affluent region we feel that we have a moral responsibility to contribute, so we look forward to the new, post-2015 UN global framework for sustainable development and poverty reduction. Specifically, Flanders will look at focusing and limiting our investments or contributions to one sector per partner country. I mentioned Malawi and Mozambique, and we have also worked with South Africa in the past, although that is under review. We consider that South Africa will remain an important bilateral partner, but perhaps not in the framework of development co-operation.
The fifth objective—I am going quickly—is the commitment to a more democratic and just society worldwide. The Flemish Government has always promoted human rights, good governance, democracy and sustainable and responsible entrepreneurship. For example, in trade agreements, we always insist on social and environmental standards. That is important to us. In addition, Flanders is responsible for licensing policy for international trade in strategic goods and weapons, and we want to do that work responsibly with an eye on—in the end—world peace. It is important to do that in a careful way.
Last but not least is peace promotion. Quite a lot of world war one commemorations have been going on and we believe that it is important that we approach them from the angle of peace promotion.
I will leave it at that. If members have any more questions on practicalities in relation to how things are done in the UK and Scotland, I would be happy to come back to that subject.
Thank you. You have raised many subjects that we would like to explore, and I will open the discussion to my colleagues.
To help maintain a free flow of communication, I remind members that us Scots sometimes talk too quickly for other people, so please be mindful of how quickly you speak.
I am always accused of speaking too slowly. [Laughter.]
I am very aware of the historic significance of the Basque peoples, especially their contribution to the fishing industry. It is quite possible that they took advantage of the cod industry in Newfoundland long before other European nations.
My question is about the geographic range of sub-state Government overseas offices, the number of offices and how they are funded. On overseas sub-state offices, Professor Michael Keating told us:
“Every few years, a new Government closes most of them down, because they are the first thing that go in a crisis. Then another Government comes in and opens them up again.”—[Official Report, European and External Relations Committee, 5 February 2015; c 22.]
Is that your experience? I know that Catalonia wants to open another 53 overseas offices. How will those be funded, given the current economic crisis?
I can start by explaining how we do it in the Basque Country. As I said before, we have six delegations, which represent the Basque Government in the countries where they are located. They are part of the Government structure and are funded by the Government. They come under my budget and I have an amount for each of the delegations—they are directly funded by Government.
None of our delegations has been closed. Although it is true that at a certain moment the Socialist Party announced their closure, that did not happen. The issue was that in some of those offices at the time there were no delegates. The Socialist Party decided that some delegations would, rather than act in a single country, act in that country and some neighbouring countries. We have changed the structure and we now have delegates in each office. It is important to have delegates because it keeps the priorities and pushes the presence of the offices.
We have a representative office in Madrid, which is very helpful in maintaining contact, especially with diplomatic bodies based in Madrid. We have a close relationship with many of the foreign embassies located in Madrid.
As I said, we have an institutional network and a commercial network. You asked how it is financed. The commercial network is not linked to the Government but to a public agency. We have a development agency—SPRI, or the Society for the Promotion of Industry—which depends on the Ministry of Economic Development; SPRI finances the network of offices.
The nature of the offices differs from country to country. In several countries we have offices that are 100 per cent ours alone. We have many companies operating in that market, so there is a lot to be done and we need someone to work for us 100 per cent of their time.
09:45In other countries, rather than having an office, we have freelancers. We select them but we do not have enough critical mass to have people working just for us. We start like that in many countries and, if we start to receive demands from companies to assist them, we move from the freelancer scheme to an office.
Nowadays we have 14 commercial offices. Some of those 14 are located within the delegations because, when there is a delegation, it covers everything. Our others are located in places such as Beijing, Singapore, Mumbai, the Czech Republic, Bologna and Turkey—I do not remember the others right now. They are more or less in the markets that we are selling to or investing in. Because our companies are not producing final products but components, they have to follow their customers throughout the world. They are investing and opening plants in many of those countries and we help to support them.
I do not know whether that answers your question.
Yes, that sounds very good. I would like you to talk about the different sorts of office. How do you prioritise whether they are cultural or financial or both in the different areas?
I mentioned two types of office—the institutional and the commercial ones, and the commercial ones being open 100 per cent of the time, depending on the amount of money we have.
When do we move from one scheme to the other? To be honest, the commercial network grew much more quickly than the institutional one, for obvious reasons. In the past year, our companies have invested a lot abroad, which meant that the network grew up very quickly. It also grew quickly because it is less complicated to open a commercial office of a development agency than it is to open an official delegation of a Government, which is perceived differently. It is true that, once we are in a country, having a delegation is not the same as having a commercial office. Having a delegation opens doors, whereas having a commercial office opens smaller doors.
I mentioned delegations earlier and, if the budgetary situation was different, we would open more delegations because they are a really important tool that are necessary for the internationalisation process. People work with our delegations. The delegations work for the Government but they are open to support any international projects that come from any actor, whether it be a cultural or economic project or whether it be people who want to contact the universities of the country or to reach some kind of agreement. The areas covered are very wide.
Nowadays we have what we have. That is the picture. In the future, once the budgetary situation improves, we should open delegations in Europe and Asia to complete the picture.
Does any of the other witnesses have anything to add?
I do not have much to add to what my Basque colleague has already said because we work similarly. Catalonia probably has a few more delegations and offices. They are also financed directly by our Government’s budget.
One of the things that our Flemish colleague referred to is particularly important and we have asked the Spanish Government for it on different occasions. We are looking at the possibility of having diplomatic status for our personnel abroad. That would simplify many of the tasks that our delegations have to carry out. For various reasons that I am not going to mention, the Spanish Government has always denied such a possibility.
Going back to your question about the number of institutional and representational delegations that we envisage creating in the future, we are talking about fewer than 50 new offices because we already have seven. That is part of a plan to expand our foreign service; it is not that, in the next two months, we are going to open 30 new delegations.
We have conducted a study that shows that, in the mid to long term, we will be able to provide accurate service to our companies and our citizens abroad, as well as to represent the Government for institutional reasons, if we can get established in around 43 countries across the world. Countries of a similar size to Catalonia normally have even more institutional embassies abroad. For example, if you compare that figure with the number of embassies that countries such as Denmark and Finland or even relatively newborn countries such as the Slovak Republic have, you will see that they have significantly more. We envisage a step-by-step process of building on our foreign service.
With the passing of the law on foreign nationals to which I referred, we are now developing a decree to regulate the personnel in our delegations abroad. This is not an immediate process—we opened an office in 1986, we opened more offices in 2008 and we are now opening more offices—and we have learned that we must harmonise working conditions and salaries. Given that all those offices are also extending their personnel, it is important to harmonise all those aspects, and that is one of the things that we are now mandated to do.
Part of my question that you have not really answered was about how you finance those offices, especially in a financial crisis.
By prioritising. Perhaps our delegate to the United Kingdom and Ireland could better explain that. We normally rent buildings or offices that are not expensive. Especially in London, the rental costs are surprisingly low. We also concentrate all the units and all the sectoral offices within the same building. If you go to Paris, you will notice that the Kingdom of Spain has seven different buildings, including the official residence of the bilateral ambassador and two more embassies that are located in different buildings. That multiplies the cost, whereas we restrict the number of personnel and do not have big offices. We also use interns, who are a useful and profitable source of human power. We try to save as much as we can.
Mr Van Damme, do you have anything to add?
Reference has been made to offices opening and closing. From what I know, Flanders has closed some offices, but that has been compensated for by the opening of others. The one in Washington has closed, but one has opened in New York. One in Japan has closed, but one has opened in Spain and another has opened in Poland. There is a bit of reprioritising, rather than a tidal wave of coming and going.
On the issue of opening posts in certain cities or not opening them in certain countries, it is also good to add that our most important and largest network of economic offices report to Flanders Investment and Trade, which has a governing board that includes not only Government representatives but private sector representatives. Private sector industry co-decides where posts will be opened, according to its needs. The process is really market-driven.
On cost-effectiveness, there is quite a variety of posts that are open. We have offices with one or two members of local staff and others that involve an ex-pat Flemish representative living abroad, which are a bit more costly. In the UK, Flanders Investment and Trade has a large office with five people, and it also has one in Edinburgh. In order to strengthen our network, we can co-operate with our Walloon and Brussels colleagues. Our Walloon colleagues can use our office in Edinburgh and we can use their one in Birmingham. Further, being in the same building with other services is useful in terms of cutting costs. We hire premises in the Belgium embassy, which is cost-effective.
How have your constitutional powers to act internationally developed over time? Have they been increasing or have they been confined?
The general principle is that whatever you are responsible for at home you are responsible for in your external relations. Our powers are increasing as more devolution takes place in Belgium. In the recent state reform, we received more welfare powers, so we will be taking care of more welfare programmes. Later this year—probably in September—a mission will visit the Scottish NHS to see how Scotland deals with retirement homes and so on, because that is a new competence that we have. However, there has been no big constitutional change with regard to foreign policy powers, and that has been the case since the early 1990s.
I will try to describe what is more or less the situation. Under the constitution, the state has exclusive competence in international relations. However, according to the Constitutional Court, the term “international relations” must be understood in a restrictive way. When we speak of international relations that are exclusive to the state, we are talking about powers to enter into treaties, open diplomatic missions abroad, recognise states or create obligations that bind Spain. That is the sense of the exclusive competence.
On the other hand, under the various statutes, the autonomous communities have a number of competences. In our case, that number is large, and we are competent not only to act inside our autonomous community but to exercise those competences abroad. That is what the Constitutional Court ruled in 1994 with regard to the application that the Spanish Government made after we opened our office in Brussels.
It is a complex system that involves two powers. The state has exclusive competence in external relations, which are understood in a restrictive way, while we have the political autonomy to act abroad within our own competences. The system requires trade-offs as well as mutual loyalty. The fact that, in our case, external relations are not the monopoly of the state creates on-going tensions. The state tries to control and limit things, while autonomous communities such as ours demand that our political autonomy be respected.
10:00In the most recent chapter of this issue, the Spanish Government has, as Roger Albinyana i Saigí has mentioned, approved a new law for state external action. We announced that we would apply to the Constitutional Court, because it was our understanding that the law was an expression of a will to control and limit our capacity to act internationally. In the end, we came to an agreement with the Government on how the law should be interpreted, and that agreement comes back to the ruling of the Constitutional Court. All of us accept that external relations, as strictly understood, lie in the hands of the state, but for those who have the political capacity to act, not all activity abroad can be called external relations.
You are saying that you have the powers to act internationally to further the competences devolved to you, but does that extend to representation on key international decision-making bodies instead of having to go through the state representatives on those bodies?
There is no easy answer to that question—it all depends. We do not have membership of international organisations such as the UN and UNESCO; in such cases, the state is the member. To be honest, the situation at European level is a funny one. For example, in 2004, we asked to participate in the sectoral meetings of the European Council of Ministers in which matters affecting our self-government were discussed and because of the will on our side, an agreement was reached between the Spanish Government and all the autonomous communities. Nowadays, we can participate in four sectoral meetings, three of which are agriculture and fisheries, environment and employment. I cannot remember what the other one is—I think that it is youth.
It is health.
Indeed—it is health.
Under the system, one autonomous community represents the rest of the autonomous communities with that particular competence at a meeting of ministers as a member of the Spanish delegation. However, although that is an important step, it is not enough, as there are other matters in which we are fully competent. Ministers are discussing issues that affect us and we are not present at those meetings. For example, there is the economic and financial affairs council or what is known as ECOFIN. The fact is that fiscal policy in the Basque Country—the tax regime—is decided by the Basque institution, and we have our own legal tax system, which is different.
And you would like your powers to be extended to that area to allow a minister in your Government to play a leading role in the Council of Ministers, particularly on matters that have been devolved to the Basque Country.
Yes. In December, our minister of culture attended the Council of Ministers, together with a Spanish minister, and our minister for employment participates in discussions on employment matters. However, the tricky thing is that we have stopped with participation in just four sectoral meetings, and it is purely a question of will to ensure that we open the door to the rest. After all, the logic is the same. Given that the powers are in our hands and the discussions affect our self-government, we are asking the ministry to change its position.
It is difficult for bilateral fora to be recalled. We have a bilateral commission on European affairs—a bilateral forum involving the state and the Basque Country—and, last year, we asked for it to be recalled and even proposed an agenda for it. However, we are still waiting for that to happen. We will keep demanding that, because we have not only the right to do it but a huge interest in it. These are very important matters.
That sounds familiar to us in Scotland. Does anyone else want to comment on those matters?
In Belgium, the federal state and the regions and communities have had an internal co-ordination agreement specifically for the EU since the early 1990s. When it is comes within our competence, Flemish civil servants participate in EU Council working parties on, for instance, fisheries, culture, youth, sports, the environment or agriculture. Also, when EU Council meetings relate purely to our competences, Flemish ministers will attend without any federal ministers.
Because of the lack of sea in Wallonia, a Flemish minister will go to every fisheries council. With environment councils, the role changes; it will be the Brussels minister one year, the Walloon minister the next and the Flemish minister the year after that. However, the Belgian point of view that those ministers communicate will have been co-ordinated beforehand with everybody involved so that one minister speaks for the whole of Belgium.
There has been a bit of a quarrel about whether we should be more involved in other councils such as ECOFIN. We are in the process of reviewing the Belgian co-operation agreement and adapting it to the recent state reform to enlarge the transport element a bit more and see whether the federal Government’s lead on that can be overturned.
As for other international organisations, it depends a bit on their nature. For instance, as UNESCO purely concerns community matters—culture, science and education—the Flemish and French-speaking communities do the bulk of the work and ministers are able to participate in those meetings as well.
That sounds a bit more collegiate than elsewhere.
It sometimes depends on political tensions. Sometimes it is less collegiate. [Laughter.]
Jolly good. Thank you.
I welcome the witnesses and thank them for their presentations. How do you measure some of the good work that has been happening? Can you give us some examples of how you measure the effectiveness of the international engagement work that your Governments do and the less tangible aspects, such as cultural diplomacy?
The offices that deal with more clear-cut matters such as the economy and tourism have clear targets for, say, the number of meetings, the amount of turnover and the number of visitors. For general representations, things are obviously less clear cut. The yearly programme has to be approved and we have to implement it but, given that it is highly political on some issues, it all depends on many different factors and on how things go. The situation is less concrete and clear cut than it is for economic matters.
Unfortunately, when it comes to culture, we try to do our utmost but a lot depends on how much funding is available. Obviously we do it within the means that are available.
Your question is very relevant, and it is not normally asked in many established countries that have their own foreign services. We all assume that a country counts on having a large network of embassies and consulate generals, but some countries are starting to review the number of representative offices that they have abroad, because in some places there has been too much expansion.
I tend to agree with my Flemish colleague. On issues of trade, economic development and the representation of business interests abroad, there is some clear measurement aside from the general statistics. As every trade office normally charges a symbolic fee for the services that it delivers to companies, you can see how its activity develops.
It is more difficult to measure tourism and, especially, culture. As I have said, Catalonia is a world-leading destination. Last year, we welcomed 17 million foreign tourists. They came mainly from Europe but also from Russia—although the number of tourists from Russia is going down due to the present situation—and we also welcomed tourists from Asia and the US. All our 11 sectoral tourism offices provide reports, and through their engagement and agreements with tour operators, we can control the activity that those offices perform.
Things are more difficult with culture, although we can measure the amount of impact that it is having. For instance, through the Institut Ramon Llull office in London, which works mainly in the territory of the United Kingdom, we know exactly how many festivals there are, how many Catalan artists and Catalan novelists come here and what kind of presence Catalonia has at international book fairs. We are very much present at such events.
Our strategic plan is continuously evaluated, year after year, and that evaluation is given to Parliament. The Government is accountable to the Parliament and in that specific area the Parliament exercises its specific function of controlling not only expenditure but activities. All the sectors related to our foreign service also undergo a long process of scrutiny.
It is a complicated question, because many times the things we do in not only external relations but public policies do not create immediate results. The connection between what is done and the result is not always clear, because many other factors intervene. However, I will try to answer Anne McTaggart’s question.
As I said, in our commercial offices we deal with enterprises, through our delegations, and we help companies to go international. In those cases it is very easy. We know the number of companies that we are in touch with every year. Some of those companies, many of which are small to medium-sized enterprises, come because they are looking for commercial representatives. Others come because they want to set up a commercial office in the country and they do not know how to do it. We help them with procedures and give them advice until their office is open. We assist the companies when they are investing in a country. That might be an industrial investment. All the contacts, the links and the relations that we maintain with public authorities help us to obtain the best conditions for our companies. That is one example, but it happens in many countries.
10:15I mentioned the European Union. As I said, we are not a state. We do not sit in the Council of Ministers as a state; rather, we sit as part of the Spanish delegation. However, we have spent a long time—it has been more than 25 years—working in Brussels with that delegation. We have created a very nice link with many people in the Commission. We have the capacity to influence and to talk to many people. We try to approach them not only to look for money for our projects, but to let them know what we are doing and to make proposals that touch on the Government’s practical experience.
Sometimes we share our successes; sometimes we share our problems. However, we always try to propose something. That gives us the possibility of having access to a lot of contacts and information. All that is of great value to us when a new regulation is prepared or a new programme is being defined. Being there and knowing what happens gives us an advantage. That then helps our companies, research centres and cultural actors to have better access to the European programmes, for example.
I have other examples. We have an office in New York. We are invited to many UN and side events. We are not invited as members of the public, but to be speakers and to share with others our expertise in many fields. For example, we have been invited to talk about transparency and how to make people participate in the definition of public policies. We are sharing with the UN our expertise in the field of equality between women and men. Our experience of that is long. Although we still have many things to do, we have had some small successes that we are sharing.
We are regularly invited to participate in different fora. For example, we also have close and very good ties with the United Nation’s programme for development, through our agency, the Basque Corporation, which was started 25 years ago. We still maintain the corporation even though we are in crisis. Last year, we launched calls for €48 million. Last year, the UNDP organised a conference in Addis Ababa when states were invited to talk about post 2015. We were the only agent at sub-state level that was invited. That is a result of many years of work and because, when we approach other agents, we not only ask for money but we bring proposals.
A final example is China. Around seven or eight years ago, one of our main industrial groups, the Mondragon Corporation, which is a co-operative group, opened an industrial park in the Guangzhou province. It is a big park where many companies have located their plants. The Government—at the time it was the social party—signed a general agreement with the Guangzhou province. We consider that to be a good agreement, which we are trying to implement. Nowadays we are working with the University of Nanjing, thanks to the general framework, in order to open a Confucius institute in the Basque Country.
Those are specific examples of the things that we do and the outcomes that they achieve.
Mr Saigí mentioned TTIP in his opening remarks. What is each of your Government’s policy on whether TTIP should allow access to health services in your territory? What will happen if the Belgian and Spanish Governments agree to access health services through TTIP?
Unlike Flanders or other sub-state Governments, such as in Canada—or even in Germany, where the Bundesrat has to give a green light to international trade treaties—we do not have a power to block or even influence such a decision. We can influence that kind of policy through lobbying. We can lobby the European Commission. Last week, María and I had a chance to talk to Commissioner Malmström during her visit to the plenary session of the Committee of the Regions. Our President has regular contact with the Belgian commissioner—previously that was Karel De Gucht and it is now Cecilia Malmström—but we do not have an official way in which to influence that kind of policy.
However, our Government’s position on TTIP—it is not necessarily the position that is shared by all the political groups in the Catalan Parliament—is rather prudent; it is cautious but positive. As we are a pro-free-trade Government, we acknowledge the improvements that such framework agreements will bring to European society and the United States. At the same time we are prudent, because we are carefully trying to monitor the eight negotiation rounds and their, shall we say, achievements.
It is not a matter of downgrading the social and environmental standards. It is clear that our social and environmental standards in Europe are higher than those in the United States. It is a matter of working in those standards that are similarly positioned; we will advance into free liberalisation when the standards are at the same level.
Transparency is another issue for concern. We have been rather critical of the level of transparency that the negotiation—-
I am sorry to interrupt, but I was asking about health services only. I know that there are many wider issues about TTIP.
I do not have a specific answer that I can make on behalf of the Government.
Perhaps I can ask your colleagues for their views. What is the policy on TTIP access to health services in your territory?
Again, I am not a specialist on the transatlantic treaty and health services. In general, the Flemish Government is pro the agreement. Flanders is a big trading region—about 80 per cent of Belgian exports come from Flanders—so that is quite important to us.
As I mentioned earlier, it has always been important to Flanders, and Belgium in general, that there is due respect for social services and protection of culture. I cannot give you details on the specific health agreement but the broad indication is pro the general agreement, paying care and attention to social services and environmental issues.
My comments are more or less similar to those that have been made. In general terms, we see a commercial opportunity and an opportunity for investment, but we must be prudent in the negotiations and ensure that, as Roger Albinyana i Saigí has said, we do not downgrade the European standards.
We will follow the negotiations, but we cannot oblige the state not to sign the agreement. The discussion will be had in the Parliament in Madrid, but we need to find a balance between commercial interests and maintaining the high standards of protection that I believe we have in Europe.
Rod Campbell has a very quick question.
I will try to be brief, convener.
Following on from some of the themes that my colleague Mr Ingram highlighted, what lessons can Scotland learn about engaging on the international stage? Are they to do with constitutions or relationships? Should we have a kind of Belgian co-operation agreement?
Who am I to give you advice, but in all humility, I think that what is important to Scotland is its involvement in influencing EU policy making. Given that many laws made in Brussels—for example, those that relate to fisheries—are quite important to and have a direct impact on Scotland, it is important to take the Smith commission proposals and put in place really good internal co-ordination mechanisms within the UK to ensure that a Scottish voice can be heard on Scottish matters. I know that there is a lot of discussion going on, but such a move would be quite important and, obviously, helpful for Scotland.
It would not be prudent of me to make any recommendations or tell you how you should act, but I can say that the way in which Spanish co-operation mechanisms function with regard to the external action of the autonomous communities does not provide a good example. Indeed, I recommend that you stay away from that. My colleague María Ángeles Elorza Zubiría has very clearly highlighted our difficulties in having an official presence on EU decision-making bodies or on international multilateral organisations. You will find in Canada, Belgium and even Germany much better examples of how co-operation between sub-state Governments and central or federal Governments can function.
Perhaps I can make a couple of comments about what we have seen in the Basque Country—and if they help you, that is perfect. I do not think that it is my task to tell you what Scotland should do; that task is yours.
From our experience, I would say that it is very important to make very clear the role of each of the Administrations and which competences are in the hands of the state and which are in the hands of—in our case—the Basque Country. In your case, of course, it would be Westminster and Scotland. You must then put in place mechanisms to guarantee that those roles are respected and ensure that there is mutual loyalty and collaboration. That is very important when two levels have to co-exist and find trade-offs and balances.
Secondly, you have a set of competences that allow you to act at an international level. In my opinion, it is very important to have a strategy and to get people involved in its creation to ensure that it is as close as possible to the interests of Scotland’s different stakeholders. Otherwise, you could be doing your best and working and moving everywhere and still not be doing what the people—your stakeholders—need. Such an approach gives external action an incredible legitimacy.
Thank you.
That was a superb question to finish with. I am sure that we will learn lots of lessons from how things are done in the regions and states that we are speaking to.
I thank the witnesses very much for their very open, frank and extremely helpful exchanges with us. I believe that the committee is looking forward to continuing some of those conversations over lunch.
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