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Chamber and committees

Finance Committee,

Meeting date: Tuesday, May 16, 2000


Contents


Contingent Liability

The Convener:

Under item 1 on the agenda, we return to a matter that we considered last week—contingent liability, specifically in relation to the Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service. Members will recall that we asked for clarification of a number of matters. As a result, we have received an Executive note, which was circulated with members' papers. Alasdair McLeod, assistant director of finance at the Scottish Executive, Dr Aileen Keel, deputy chief medical officer, and Angus Macmillan Douglas, national director of the Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service, are here this morning to give evidence and assistance to the committee. I thank them for coming.

I understand that Mr Douglas will make an opening statement, following which I will open up the floor for questions.

Angus Macmillan Douglas (Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service):

Dr Keel and I will make a short opening statement to give some background to, and try to put in perspective, the papers that members have received.

We want to show that we have defined the risk and potential liability, put a probability on the liability occurring and the costs involved, tried to define a worst case and matched our insurance cover to that. We want also to show that our insurance cover has been benchmarked against best practice in the pharmaceutical industry and that we have a degree of extra cover which, I hope, will give assurance.

We also hope to convince the committee that we have not only a reasonable amount of cover, but that we have taken a professional management approach to assessing the cover, by using our lawyers, Dickson Minto, as advisers on entering into the contract, taking advice from Aon Risk Management Limited, our insurance brokers, on the amount of cover that we should have and having good internal procedures to examine all such contracts, which are subject to internal audit by Ernst & Young. I want to assure the committee that we have been through those management processes.

What activities are we talking about? Why is the Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service involved in this sort of thing at all? We try to make full use of public assets, in effect by entering into public-private partnerships. The potential contract with BIEM ilac in Turkey is an example of that.

Members will see in the papers reference to clinical trials, which is a different issue. I suggest that we come to that second.

What are the public-private partnerships? SNBTS has carried out a major modernisation over the past few years, which, I am glad to say, has been completed on time and on budget. One of the outcomes of the review was recognition of the need to make full use of all our assets, including intellectual property. We are very proud in Scotland to have very good intellectual property on blood issues. There are a number of examples of contracts into which we have entered which, we believe, make full use of our public assets.

We have a contract with DiaMed, a Swiss reagent company, which gives real benefits to patients in Scotland by providing products at cheaper prices. The paper refers to the Taiwanese contract that can bring £14 million into the health service in Scotland over the next 10 years. The BIEM ilac contract—the contingency liability of which we are considering today—is part of those contracts. The advantages of such contracts are: they provide assistance to the country with the developing blood transfusion service; they bring money back into the health service in Scotland; they help SNBTS become an integral part of the biotechnology industry; they promote the Scottish biotechnology industry and improve the morale of our staff, who see themselves as part of international development.

If we did not use such contracts, we would have a £3.5 million per year hole in our budget that would have to be met from elsewhere. The type of contract that we are considering is not new to SNBTS and we are not unique in using such contracts. Our sister organisation in England carries out similar development work, but on a larger scale. I hope that that puts the contract in context.

I will try to define the contingent liability. The risk to SNBTS and the contingent liability for the Exchequer is limited by the draft contract that we have entered into with BIEM ilac. The risk for SNBTS and the Exchequer is restricted to the manufacturing risk. The plasma from which the products are made is purchased from Germany and the United States, which have their own liability, should the plasma not be of the correct quality. Using our intellectual property, we manufacture products that are licensed by the Medicines Control Agency, which is world-renowned for its strictness. The products are also licensed by the Turkish licensing authority. When the product is passed to the Turkish distributor, it is liable for any problems that arise from storage there. The potential risk that we have is the manufacturing risk.

Two issues arise from the manufacturing risk. We could make a mistake in manufacturing or we could be sued for professional negligence in manufacturing. However, we are not aware of having been sued for any mistake or for professional negligence over the past 20 years. We can go into more detail on that if the committee so wishes. The contract has restricted the liability considerably and we are confident that we are competent to manage the exposure that we have.

My colleague, Dr Keel, will now say a few words on the probability of the risk occurring and the worst case scenario.

Dr Aileen Keel (Scottish Executive):

The simplest way of setting the context is to explain the current legal actions against SNBTS. Colleagues have examined the records back to 1995. In that time, 23 legal actions have been raised, all of which have been sisted—they are not currently proceeding. All the cases relate to hepatitis C transmission and many date back to the 1970s and 1980s—they are not recent incidents.

Whether any case goes ahead is a matter for the courts and the lawyers involved to decide. The amount of money attached to cases varies between £30,000 and £130,000. For its purposes, the central legal office has attached a putative figure of £50,000 to each case. Supposing that all cases sued successfully, we would be looking at a total of about £1.15 million for the hepatitis C-related cases dating back to the 1970s. When compared with the £20 million ceiling on the insurance that SNBTS is taking out to cover the Turkish contract, that is quite small.

The other thing that it might be helpful to mention is the worst-case scenario that we might be looking at. In the early 1990s, there was a bad scenario of HIV transmissions in blood products particularly to the haemophilia community. As a result of that, a compensation scheme was set up and £12 million was allocated on a UK basis—approximately £1.2 million to Scotland—which, at today's prices, would be somewhere around £1.5 million. Each of those cases received approximately £40,000 in compensation. That should be set against the £20 million insurance cover that SNBTS intends to take out. It is a reasonable sum to allocate against the contract.

Mr McLeod, would you like to add anything?

Alasdair McLeod (Scottish Executive):

No, I do not want to say anything.

The Convener:

Thank you very much. I would like some clarification in relation to the Executive note that has been supplied for today's meeting. The third paragraph begins:

"SNBTS believe that, taking into account . . . an estimated turnover of £2.6m on non-NHS activities . . . this cover is adequate."

I take it that that refers to the £20 million cover. How are your NHS activities affected?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

Our NHS activities are covered by the Exchequer. We do not take out separate insurance for that.

So the only cover you need is in relation to your non-NHS activities.

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

Yes. Except for the issue that is number 2 on the agenda: the clinical trials.

Could you expand on that point? Are those regarded as a non-NHS activity?

Dr Keel:

No. They are an NHS activity, but cover is required for the people who are conducting the trials, who may be exposing themselves to risk if something goes wrong.

But the trials have been carried out since 1993 and there have been no claims.

Dr Keel:

Yes.

The Convener:

Those opening remarks have been very helpful in dealing with some of the matters that were raised, as is the Executive note—particularly on the point of what is defined as an incident, which is clear. I have no further questions. Do other committee members have questions?

Mr David Davidson (North-East Scotland) (Con):

Good morning. I have a background in pharmacy and the pharmaceutical industry, so I have some understanding of the matter of litigation, particularly in respect of an exported product. Politics get involved, which tends to inflate the lawyers' fees, and the costs get bigger and bigger. A point was made in the papers about the gross income from this contract. What is its net value?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

The net value of this particular contract is £400,000. The net value of all our contracts of this type is £3.5 million.

Sorry, I have obviously misunderstood what was in the paper. Do you have sales of £400,000 or is the income £400,000?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

The income is £400,000.

Before costs?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

I am so sorry—you are right. The turnover is £400,000, and the profit, if you like, will be about £250,000.

Mr Davidson:

I welcome that, as it obviously helps the organisation's progress.

You said that formerly there was a centrally based indemnity with the Treasury. Has that always been a separate exercise or has the Scottish Office budget always provided cover?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

I can go back only three years. We have always taken commercial insurance for activities outside the NHS. For our activities in the NHS over the past three years, we have received our cover from the Scottish Office and the Scottish Executive. I am afraid that I cannot go back much before that.

Mr Davidson:

Fine.

My concern is that as our only support is the Scottish block grant, we must ensure that any arrangements cover the Scottish block grant, which includes the health service budget and so on. We are seeking an assurance that, in modern international commercial trading terms, you have adequate cover and protection that does not expose the Scottish block grant and budget to damage.

Although I have been very pleased with some of the comments that have been made, I am always concerned that any non-trading, non-commercially based organisation that gets into the trading world should have not just internal expertise but access to support and professional advice to ensure that it does not get into any difficulty. I think that some of us were concerned about that last week when we received a bald statement. I would be grateful for any information about how you intend to approach SNBTS' new commercial role in future.

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

I can certainly answer that question. I and my colleagues in the SNBTS are very concerned that we do not run before we walk. The organisation has acquired some expertise on international relations and business. We also get tremendous support from Scottish Enterprise, the Foreign Office and trade organisations. We use the best professional advisers to ensure that we do not run into difficulties. We have particularly relied on Aon Risk Management, which has one of the best reputations for risk management in the pharmaceutical business. Before we entered into the amount of insurance involved, Aon carried out a benchmarking exercise across the pharmaceutical sector to find out what a commercial company would take as insurance cover for various turnovers of similar types of pharmaceutical business. For a turnover of £5 million, a sample of seven of the major international pharmaceutical companies had insurance limited to £5 million. Companies do not go up to £20 million until their turnover is more than £20 million.

We then considered factors such as comparability of product and safeguarding the block grant. As we do not have a balance sheet or limited liability, we finally come back to the taxpayer, whom we are trying to assist—not the reverse. As a result, we secured roughly four times more cover than a pharmaceutical company would normally seek; however, we reach a point where we start to waste public money by paying out too much in premiums. That is how we struck the balance.

Excuse my ignorance, but can you explain, in layman's terms, what is meant by surplus by-products of the protein fractionation process? My line of questioning will be clear in a moment.

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

Absolutely. Plasma is spun off from any blood that is donated. We are referring to products that are derived from plasma—that is a manufacturing process. We have a factory, built with public money, which tries to match the demand for plasma products in Scotland with our capacity to make them. Of course, demand changes through the years, so it can never be matched exactly. Therefore, potentially, we always have some surplus capacity. There will always be surplus parts of the product, because the demand will never meet exactly the way the product is split up through fractionation. We therefore use our surplus capacity and our by-products for those processes; we do not buy especially for those processes.

How far back do the surplus by-products go? How old are the products we are talking about?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

The plasma and the intermediate products will not be old at all—it will be a matter of months. It was a real concern to us that if we could not enter into a contract such as this one, with the Turkish company, we would have to destroy the product, which would mean destroying a gift.

I do not know about such matters, but I am asking how far back it goes because I am concerned about hepatitis C, in particular, having anything to do with the product.

Dr Keel:

You are absolutely right: transmission of hepatitis C by blood and blood products has been a real issue in the recent past. The plasma we are talking about, from which these products are manufactured, is tested by state-of-the-art technology—something called polymerase chain reaction, which is a very sensitive test. We no longer rely on antibody tests to the virus, which can take a few weeks or months to develop. Plasma from Bavaria or the US is tested there using PCR, which shows up any positive donations.

You say it is state-of-the-art technology. So it is foolproof?

Dr Keel:

I would not say that any technology is foolproof, but it is as foolproof as it can be today, given our knowledge.

Mr Raffan:

But you are aware of the wide incidence of hepatitis C in Scotland now? Hepatitis C is a time bomb under health boards throughout Scotland—for example Fife Health Board. The Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health estimates the figure to be 7,000 or 8,000; the footnote says that that could be an underestimate and that the figure could be several times higher. That is my concern.

Dr Keel:

The hepatitis C epidemic that we think is under way in Scotland is mainly due to drug abuse and needle sharing. We are talking about non-UK plasma, so that is—

But it is mixed with surplus by-products from here, is it not?

Dr Keel:

No. We no longer use UK plasma to manufacture blood products because of the theoretical risk of new-variant CJD.

The imported plasma is from countries—I think you mentioned the United States and Germany—where the prevalence of hepatitis C is similar.

Dr Keel:

There are not vast differences. The centres from which the Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service purchases plasma are accredited. They were inspected by the Medicines Control Agency in the UK before the blood transfusion services were allowed to import. However, the prevalence of hepatitis C is not markedly different from what it is in this country.

Dr Richard Simpson (Ochil) (Lab):

I apologise for my late arrival.

We are not trying to make matters difficult—members welcome the fact that the blood transfusion service is trying to maximise income from its products.

I—like Keith Raffan—am concerned that in the early and mid-1980s modelling of the risks from hepatitis C was not being done. There is, possibly, more than a theoretical risk that there is infectivity that is not recognised or tested for in the imported plasma. We are effectively dealing with unlimited liability. I give the example of the trouble into which the French Government got in respect of AIDS. That Government chose, for various reasons, not to test blood appropriately for AIDS and was, in the end, judged by the courts to have been negligent. Ministers in France have had to pay a heavy price for that.

I appreciate that you are insured to deal with theoretical risks, but I am concerned about the limitation on such insurance. If the risk is theoretical, the company should be able to offer the transfusion service unlimited liability. I am concerned that the Scottish block grant might be jeopardised if another virus was discovered that might cause a risk of infection in another country, which could then sue.

Can you reassure me that those fears are unfounded? If you can, I will be happy.

Dr Keel:

Prior to Dr Simpson's arrival, I tried to set the context by referring to legal actions that are pending in Scotland regarding the hepatitis C virus and to what one might call the HIV worst-case scenario of the early 1990s. The sums that would attach to both those scenarios would amount to much less than £20 million. If all the hepatitis C cases were successful, the total amount payable would be between £1 million and £1.5 million.

The French Government was criticised for the problems that it ran into because it did not deploy state-of-the-art technology. It did not test plasma to the requisite level, which it could have done. As long as SNBTS can assure those with whom it contracts that it is testing plasma using whatever methods are considered by manufacturers around the world to be the state of the art, I cannot see how any criticism could be levelled if another virus emerged tomorrow that we do not know about and cannot test for today.

So if it were proved to the courts that all reasonable precautions had been taken, SNBTS would not be liable.

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

That is right. It is not clear how consumer legislation covers blood products, but even if it covers them fully, the point that you have just made is correct. There is a clause in the Consumer Protection Act 1987 that says that one cannot be held responsible for something that typical professional producers of a product could not know about.

I hope that that has dealt with unknown viruses, but I would like to mention hepatitis C. We purchase the plasma from organisations that take it from volunteer donors in Germany and the United States. Any liability would be at least partly shared with that supplier—we would, in fact, argue that that supplier should be wholly responsible for such liability.

SNBTS is in the vanguard of introducing the polymerase chain reaction test in Europe, thanks to support from the management executive, and we believe that our testing is very good. Not only the testing but the manufacturing process is designed to kill the viruses. There is extra cover there. On hepatitis C, we believe that we have taken all the necessary steps. Unknown viruses are a real issue, but I hope that my answer has given some comfort.

That is very helpful.

I think that your last point was pretty important. It would have been helpful if it had found its way into the briefing paper. What was the logic for increasing the indemnity limit per incident from £15 million to £20 million?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

One might argue that it was unnecessary. We did it because, after working through the sort of arguments that we have just rehearsed, taking advice from Aon Risk Management Limited, our insurance brokers, and examining the pharmaceutical company comparators, we found that the pharmaceutical companies would have insured for £5 million. Our indemnity was at £15 million, and we thought that we would give ourselves some more headroom. We like to think that this is good for Scotland's reputation: it is about using our public assets more effectively. The last thing that we want to do is to produce a liability for the taxpayer. That is why we increased our insurance.

Those points are well taken. However, I do not understand how the risk per incident could have risen by £5 million because of your involvement in the Turkish market. Where is the logic in that?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

You are quite right. There is no empirical link between the contract in Turkey and £5 million. We examined the insurance that we had before, saw the Turkish contract coming along, hoped to have other contracts similar to the Turkish contract and, as we were doing an annual review of our insurance, raised the indemnity limit to £20 million.

So this is part of a general review.

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

Exactly.

By how much does it increase your premiums?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

I cannot answer that. I know that if we were to increase our indemnity limit by another £5 million our premium would increase by about £15,000 a year.

So there is an incentive for your insurers to advise you to do this. How much of the income that you receive does the SNBTS get to retain internally? How much is passed on to the NHS as a whole?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

I would like to return to the point about Aon Risk Management. Of course the insurance brokers have an incentive to sell us more, and I appreciate that what they recommend must be only one consideration. However, in fairness, the insurance company recommended a lower liability. It was we who chose to increase the premium. It was a difficult judgment to make, but we were trying to err on the side of safety.

SNBTS retains £2.5 million out of our total commercial income of £3.5 million—that is because, in restructuring our organisation as part of modernisation, we took out a loan from the management executive and we are now repaying that loan. As I understand it, all that money goes into the NHS in Scotland.

Is it possible to buy unlimited protection?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

No, it is not, as all insurance companies are limited liability companies. However, it is true that for comparatively modest increases in premium we could increase our cover substantially. We have to judge whether that is a good use of public money.

People can grasp a figure of £20 million. If you were to increase the cover to £100 million or £1 billion, which is a more theoretical figure, what increase in your premiums would that entail?

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

I cannot give you a precise figure, but I think that, to take the cover to £100 million, we would be talking in terms of about a £50,000 or £60,000 per annum increase in premium. I must admit that I have never tried to find out what the premium increase would be for £1 billion.

Mr Macintosh:

It is a theoretical concept; you would have to deal with a company that would be able to pay out. I am just trying to get an idea of where you draw the line. Obviously, that must be a difficult decision for you, when the whole country is drawing the line for you above that. I wanted to know what offers you had had from insurance companies and how much more increased cover would cost, given that it would be extra money for the Exchequer if you decided not to take it.

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

If we went to £100 million, we would be talking about a premium of around £60,000 more than we pay at present. That is a jump of five times and is 20 times what the industry would insure for, which shows what a low risk the insurance industry puts on this.

Mr Davidson:

My little knowledge of the background may assist my colleagues. You are basing your risk on the advice that you are given and you are sharing risk at different stages of the processing, handling and distribution. The question that arises from that is whether you have had sufficient assurance from the other people in the chain of supply that their insurance is in place and that you are not having to take their risk as well.

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

That is something that we specifically require of our suppliers in the United States and in Germany—we required it before this contract. We require that assurance for the protection of patients treated in Scotland. You make an extremely fair point. I am told by my adviser that we have checked with our Turkish suppliers. We insist on that insurance and on being able to review it and get proof that they have it.

The Convener:

I have a question for Mr McLeod about the contingent liability of the Scottish Executive. What effect will that additional liability have on the total spend of the Scottish Executive in insuring the various risks across all the departments for which it has responsibility? I imagine that it will have a fairly small effect, but can you tell me what impact it will have?

Alasdair McLeod:

The effect will be very little in some ways and very big in others. In general, we do not insure against risks of any kind. This case is exceptional, as the risk is one that arises because of the use of a foreign supplier and foreign patients. We would not consider it right for the Scottish taxpayer to run that risk, but as a general policy we do not insure, simply because the cost of insurance would outweigh the benefits over the Executive as a whole.

The Convener:

I know that when a department of the Executive proposes to undertake a contingent liability for which there is no specific statutory authority, it is appropriate to report the circumstances to the Parliament. How many incidents are there of departments undertaking contingent liability without specific statutory authority? This is the first one that this committee has received. Does that mean that it is the only one so far?

Alasdair McLeod:

It rarely happens. I can think of one case in my time in finance—12 or 13 years—that we had to take to the Westminster Parliament. That had to do with an indemnity that we gave to Lord Cullen in relation to the Dunblane inquiry. We make an annual report to Parliament, which we could let you have.

I think that the information that you have given has answered my question.

Alasdair McLeod:

I should stress that I was talking about the unusual liabilities. All sorts of contingent liabilities are taken on in the action of carrying out the work that Parliament has authorised us to do. We would not expect to go to Parliament with each of those.

The Convener:

I appreciate that.

It goes without saying that we hope that neither the public liability insurance of SNBTS or indeed the Executive's contingent liability will ever be called upon. I ask you to remain a few minutes longer as the committee must now decide whether to accept the minute from the Scottish Executive or to amend it in some way. Does the committee approve the contents of the minute that was submitted to us last week?

Members indicated agreement.

Angus Macmillan Douglas:

There is also a minute about clinical trials. I do not know whether your comment took account of that as well or whether you wish to leave that for another occasion.

The Convener:

We have been asked only to endorse the minute that was sent to us last week. Point 2 in the note that was sent to us for today's meeting states that no action by the committee is required in relation to the minute that you mention. We might be asked to make a decision on the matter at a later point, but we are not in a position to do so today.