Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds Inquiry
We will now take evidence for our inquiry into the future of structural funds post-2006. I welcome Philippe Cichowlaz to the meeting and thank him for travelling so far to join us.
Bienvenue en Ecosse. Nous avons attendu avec impatience votre visite et l'avis de la CRPM sur ce sujet important. Dans quelques instants je vais vous donner la parole.
Je vais continuer en anglais pour mes collègues.
The CPMR is well known throughout Europe and the committee wishes to have not only a Scottish perspective on structural funds, but a pan-European view. I am sure that Philippe Cichowlaz will be able to give an overview of how other regions in Europe are tackling the question of structural funding post-2006.
I understand that Philippe Cichowlaz will give an overview of the CPMR as an organisation and will talk a little about regional development and how that debate is unfolding throughout Europe. Stephen Imrie has a few instructions on how to use the machines that relay the interpretation. The committee seems to be extending information technology to its limits with our videoconferencing and simultaneous interpretation.
Members should have the necessary equipment for listening to the interpretation. If you are an English speaker, you should listen to channel 2. If you are a French speaker, you should listen to channel 3. If you have any problems with the equipment, please indicate that to a clerk, who will try to resolve the problem for you.
I assume that everything is working okay and that Philippe Cichowlaz can hear the interpretation in French. Philippe has the floor.
Philippe Cichowlaz (Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe):
I thank the committee for its kind invitation. I am sorry, but I will speak later in French, to ensure that what I say is clear, because the subject is difficult.
I am a director in the CPMR's general secretariat and I have been in charge of regional policy for five years. I will present a résumé of the position that our political bureau and our general assembly took at our most recent general assembly, which was in 2001. That proposal was presented to Commissioner Barnier, other commissioners and states around Europe. Afterwards, if members agree, I can give some information about the negotiations. I will do my best to answer all your questions on the subject.
The witness continued in French (simultaneous interpretation). In the debate on the future of regional policy, the European Commission has often insisted on the requirement to think about the European Union's needs before one broaches budgetary elements or methodologies. When we made our second proposal on the reform of regional policy, we organised it into four strands. First, what are the foreseeable needs for the social, economic and territorial cohesion of Europe at the horizon of 2007? What policy could we promote to meet the needs and challenges? What budget is necessary to meet those needs? What kind of governance of the European Union is needed to guarantee the success of the political project?
When the gross domestic products of the regions of the EU 27 are analysed, they show five stages of regional convergence, broadly speaking. One category of regions had GDPs in 1999 that were an average of 40 per cent below the Community average. Those regions are mainly the outermost areas that will be covered by enlargement, such as the Baltic states, Hungary, Bulgaria and the most northern areas of Poland and Slovakia. It will take at least two generations for those regions to achieve a reasonable and acceptable state of development and to catch up. They lag behind.
There is a second category of regions whose GDP is between 40 per cent and 75 per cent of the EU average. Those regions, such as the east of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, are mostly in central Europe and will be part of the EU after enlargement. However, some current regions of the EU will remain eligible, including a few Greek regions, some regions in southern Italy, some in Spain and Portugal and some of the ultra-peripheral regions. It will take one or two generations for the economic performance of those regions to catch up.
The third category of regions in the EU 27 comprises those regions that are at the third stage of development and whose GDP is 75 per cent to 100 per cent of the Community average. Again, there is a great disparity of situations among those regions. The majority will be peripheral regions, some of which will be only mechanically or statistically above 75 per cent of the EU average. A large part of Scotland will fall within that category.
Each of those regions will have its own specificities. In the south of Europe, many such regions will depend on a mono-industry, which will mainly be tourism or activities that are linked to agriculture or rural development. Some mono-industrial regions that have not completed their reconversion will be part of that category as well. There will be some regions with accentuated peripherality, especially in northern Europe. One can imagine that those regions will take at least one generation to reach a level of competitiveness that is equivalent to European standards.
Another category of regions includes those whose GDP is between 100 per cent and 130 per cent of the Community average. Again, those regions contain a large diversity of situations. For example, the capital cities of the peripheral regions, such as Madrid and Porto in the south of Europe, fall within that category, but so do some northern European cities. Some central and intermediary regions with an industrial tradition have great poverty but are not remote regions in their respective countries.
Conversely, the wealthiest regions in Europe are those whose GDP is above 130 per cent of the Community average. Those regions are the most competitive in Europe but some of them are confronted with environmental problems, transport congestion and difficult social situations in the city centres. Solving those problems will be part of the rebalancing of areas in Europe.
According to which rules should all that be balanced? The proposal that we are working on is to pursue the policy of objective 1 for regions in the first and second categories—in other words, those whose GDP is below 75 per cent of the EU average. For the regions in the third, fourth and fifth categories, we aim to reinvent the policy for objective 2. The new policy would be widely different from today's policy. I shall return to that point later.
On the maintenance of a single set of criteria to determine which regions are covered by objective 1, it seems important that we have one set of criteria for the whole of the European territory. We should not have separate criteria for the candidate countries.
However, we need to take into account the regions that, statistically, will no longer be eligible for structural funding. We know that eligibility for the post-2006 period will be calculated on the basis of a Europe of 25 member states and will not include Bulgaria and one other region. However, we also know that about 15 regions will no longer be eligible because of the mechanics of enlargement. In other words, those regions will be ineligible not because of improved economic performance but because of the statistical effects of enlargement.
A second question that relates to objective 1 regions concerns the relevance of maintaining a 4 per cent ceiling of Community aid. That question is more important than it seems as it has repercussions for the amounts that will be given to regions with objective 1 and objective 2 status. The capacity to co-finance those regions is so low that expenditure per inhabitant will be much lower than it was for regions of previous accession countries—the figure might have been more than €300 for the regions of the south of Europe, but there might be only €150 in the new regions. In other words, aid per capita will be much lower than it currently is. A central question is whether there should be a cohesion fund for the poorest enlargement countries, even if there is 100 per cent co-funding for structure and transport, for example, to maintain European cohesion. Should we maintain that ceiling, which was suitable but which will perhaps no longer be suited to the new situation? That debate is on-going.
We are trying to promote a new objective 2 policy for territorial cohesion or regional competitiveness. Aside from the enlargement regions and the few regions that will remain eligible, there are still problems relating to competitiveness at European level that need to be resolved. An objective 2 policy that is more structured and European than it currently is would be more sustainable than a phasing-out solution, which would lead in 2013 to a total end of regional policies under objective 1. The policy should take into account regional handicaps. European regions are not equally competitive. We think that a new objective 2 status should apply particularly to low-density areas, islands and areas with altitude or relief problems. Some studies are being carried out in that respect at European Commission level. We are inclining in the direction of a specific instrument or perhaps a bonus for regional policy.
How can a new objective 2 policy be better linked with present Community initiatives that involve trans-border, transregional and interregional co-operation, for example? A new objective 2 policy must be simplified—that is necessary for its survival. The zoning system must be simpler and there must be simpler criteria. Everybody should agree to leave aside intraregional zoning and leave the regions with the opportunity of organising their territorial policies. Projects should be simpler. Currently, there is a criticism that administration costs are greater than the amounts that are involved in projects, so should there be a limitation on the number of projects? Should projects have a maximum size? Perhaps we should limit the number of projects that cost from €10,000 to €20,000 and perhaps the new objective 2 policy should be more structured.
The third simplification should be to ease the implementation of objective 2 by giving greater powers to the final beneficiaries, in particular to the regions that would be charged with implementation under the Commission's control. For new objective 2 funding to be more efficient than before, it should be linked to stronger sectoral policies on transport, competitiveness, research and development, innovation, restructuring and the economy.
There are still some question marks over objective 3 funding. As education and training policies are a major feature of regional competitiveness, perhaps objective 3 should be territorialised and merged with objective 2. Indeed, the Commission is studying that possibility. The other question is how we can integrate objective 3 into objectives 1 and 2 and still enable the regions to implement programmes in co-ordination with national policies.
Three prerequisites must be met in such a scenario, the first of which is the progressiveness of Community aid to ensure that a concentration of regions is eligible for stages 1 and 2 of objective 1 funding. There must be variation in the intensity of Community aid in accordance with simple criteria of regional competitiveness. Such criteria have not been used before and could include accessibility, innovation and research and development potential. However, we have a year in which to define those criteria within the European Spatial Planning Observation Network programme, and the Commission has launched a couple of studies to find out whether new territorial criteria should be used within the future regional policy framework.
Some work on the issue has already been carried out in the sixth interim report on the situation of the regions. I have produced a colour-coded map that shows the main competitive weaknesses of the European regions, which should give members an idea of the priority that could be given to some of those regions. As members will notice, Scotland features prominently in that map.
Greater knowledge of the regional situation is another prerequisite for the scenario that I have outlined. In addition to the ESPON work programme, the development of the European spatial development perspective and the capitalisation of Community initiatives, we must improve our knowledge of the polycentric scenarios that the ESDP favours for more balanced territorial development in Europe.
Such a structure would allow us to envisage a European project for all the territories. Even if the funding is more symbolic than anything else, it is important that all European citizens benefit from it. Moreover, we must reinforce the role of the regions in implementing policies to ensure greater legibility of the added value of the Community. Another virtue of such an architecture would be the spatial visions for better governance, particularly in relation to sectoral policies.
On the budget, we made calculations at the beginning, but things are moving all the time. If we do not respect the 4 per cent ceiling that I mentioned, enlargement should cost about €35 billion a year over the next period. The cost of objective 1 for the EU 15 is about €10 billion, with €3 billion for phasing out. The cost of objective 2 funding should be between €13 million and €25 million, according to the importance of the project.
Given those assumptions, the maintenance of a budget of 0.45 per cent would not allow us to fulfil those needs. However, the Commission claims that, if there were reduced aid for the candidate countries, it would be possible to stay within the threshold of 4 per cent. Nevertheless, it seems to us that that the budget might realistically increase to 0.55 per cent, which would meet the needs of enlargement and of the current regions of the EU and would allow us to deal with a greater number of problems than we do at present. With less money, we cannot see how we could deal with more problems in a much larger territory.
Discussions on the budget cannot be dissociated completely from discussions on the future of the common agricultural policy, which might give us more margin for manoeuvre. Similarly, the discussions cannot be separated from the discussion of Community credit, for which the Berlin Council ensured a ceiling of 1.27 per cent of EU GDP for the budgets. The difference between providing 0.55 per cent of GDP and providing 0.45 per cent for objective 1 and 2 would allow us to fulfil an ambitious regional policy. Similarly, the issue cannot be separated from the general debate on widening European integration, which will be mentioned at the next intergovernmental conference. The debate is political and goes way beyond the problems of regional policies.
A lot of progress is still to be made on governance in relation to sectoral and regional policies, both by the Commission and by member states. Sometimes, the impact of Community policies goes against the impact of territorial coherence. That applies, for example, to research and development and transport policies. We do a lot of work on transport and we believe that the trans-European network is not very ambitious because it does not favour the outermost regions. Other policies that have an impact are those on competition and taxation—it would take too long to discuss them, but future zoning will be extremely important in the new negotiations. Other examples are the policies on education and training—we saw the effect of objective 3—and the environment.
We hope that the white paper on governance in the European Union will ensure some virtuous principles for the governance of the European and national frameworks. Two measures are required for that. First, we must improve the programming links between European, state and regional levels. In that regard, we are considering tripartite contracts, by which, in a given territory, each of the main partners would agree a negotiated objective. To improve efficiency, Europe should capitalise on national experiences of involving territorial authorities. There should be greater co-ordination between the various tiers of government on the framework of policies with a territorial impact.
Subsidiarity and solidarity are indissociable concepts, which, although they sometimes seem to be in conflict, should not be separated. There is often a strong debate about the German position. The Germans advocate more subsidiarity, but without emphasising solidarity, whereas it seems to us that the two go hand in hand.
In conclusion—if you will allow me a further minute—I draw your attention to a specific point on objective 1. Discussions on objective 1 are mainly of a financial nature, but we find a common voice at European level on the need to make an increasing effort for the candidate countries. The main question mark is over the future of objective 2, which is directly of interest to the committee. There are five types of regions, which are more or less clear, according to the various positions that have been taken by the national Governments.
Some net contributors no longer want objective 2—Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, for example. That is the stated position of the national Governments of those countries, but it is not necessarily the position of their regions. The eastern Länder support the maintenance of objective 2, because they could be beneficiaries if objective 2 remains. The northern and central regions of Sweden are also of that opinion. In the Netherlands, the situation is more difficult. Most of the territorial actors are keen on territorial policies and have great knowledge of the programmes, but the views of the territorial authorities and those of the Ministry of Finance do not necessarily coincide.
Some contributor countries—Belgium and Finland—are in favour of pursuing objective 2. We do not know what the position of the countries that receive cohesion funding will be. They will defend objective 1 for sure, but do they want objective 2 to be phased out—we are thinking of Spain in particular in that category—or do they want a longer-term objective 2? The situation is not clear.
The enlargement countries have a lot to do with objective 1, but they have not taken a position. Three borderline countries—the UK, France and Italy—will be important in the negotiations. They are rich countries, but have diverse regional situations and have no official position. We hope that the new Prime Minister of France will pursue the path that he chose when he was a member of the CPMR. Italy seems to be mainly in favour of pursuing objective 2. At the moment, the British Government does not seem to be in favour of pursuing objective 2.
The issue that will arise—and I am thinking of Scotland—is that it is important to know how the discussions will take place around the abandonment or otherwise of objective 2 regions. Some people advocate a rationalisation of policies. If policies are abandoned, there will be a necessary national transfer of budgets for the same amount. There is no guarantee that there will be the same solidarity at the national level. The debate will take place around those questions. Thank you for your attention.
That was a comprehensive and informative presentation, with a great deal of information. Many of the ideas, thoughts and suggestions were new to us, although other witnesses have come before us to give us their ideas. Please forgive us if in the questioning we go over some of the things that you talked about, but there is a lot to deal with.
One idea that you did not mention—it is being discussed in some regions in Europe and it was certainly discussed at the last round of structural fund negotiations—is that of a policy instrument or a structural fund instrument to deal with asymmetric shocks to regional economies. Have you come across that idea? Is there any support for that? As you are aware, policy instruments and structural fund instruments tend to be inflexible.
For example, we have had experience of major flooding in Scotland. Some regions in Finland were affected by the collapse of the economies in the Soviet Union, which led to high unemployment. Those things happened to regional and local economies. Have you come across any arguments on the idea of an instrument to deal with such policy issues?
(simultaneous interpretation) You are absolutely right. The idea of such an instrument falls within the discussion of the future of objective 2. There are three scenarios. One is purely and simply that objective 2 be abandoned. Another scenario is that we support a toolbox that would consist of seven or eight different initiatives—such as an urban initiative, an initiative for the islands and an initiative for innovation—which would be offered to the regions or states. They would be able to choose from the toolbox according to the national criteria for eligibility or the type of action required. There would perhaps be some benchmarking among the various regions and that would be the end. We are calling for something more structural and—as the word "structural" implies—long term.
You refer to an instrument for use in reaction to sudden catastrophes and crises. That could be imagined under either of the first two scenarios. Some people are thinking about that. Under the first or second scenario, one could imagine a structural intervention in the case of a crisis or catastrophe. The only difficulty is that nobody has taken a position on the instrument because there is a big difficulty determining the indicators that should be taken into account to define a structural crisis. How should it be managed with the national budgets? Will the political negotiation be compatible with leaving the European Commission, which would give aid to crises on a case-by-case basis, large room for manoeuvre?
There are two types of argument. Some say that we can always keep a small instrument for such intervention. Those who are against it think that it is better to prepare for the future than to keep the money to answer the problems of the past. That is probably not a good way of ensuring that the regions can act as the fire brigade in a crisis situation. It is a delicate matter.
We are having a little interference on our headphones, although we can still hear the interpretation. Perhaps the technicians could look into that while we discuss further questions. Before I open the questioning to my colleagues, I welcome to the committee the ambassador of Luxembourg to the United Kingdom, His Excellency Joseph Weyland. We are very pleased to have him with us and appreciate the interest that he is taking in our committee.
I found your presentation interesting. You showed on the slides a predicted amount of money that would be required to run an effective regional policy and a predicted amount of money that would be required to run a really good regional policy. Will you tease out the distinctions between the levels of effectiveness of regional policy? You also made a connected point about the common agricultural policy. Did I read you correctly by thinking that you were floating the idea that there might be scope for reallocating funds at the European level, which might involve the CAP? If so, how realistic is that, given the different member states' interests in the CAP?
(simultaneous interpretation) A reallocation involving the CAP is a delicate subject. It will depend not so much on Community negotiations as on negotiations within the World Trade Organisation. If it is decided to reduce progressively support for prices, as was discussed in previous rounds of WTO discussions, particularly those that took place in Doha, the Europeans will have to do the same. Support for prices is the main pillar of the CAP and represents its main expenditure.
Within the agriculture directorate-general, many people are talking of a switch between the first and second pillars of the CAP—in other words, a switch from price support to direct aid to farms. A general feeling exists that the future of the rural sector depends not just on agriculture but on other activities. Members perhaps remember objective 5b from a few years ago in the context of regional policy. That objective will disappear from regional policy and many people believe that a new objective 5b should increasingly become part of the common agricultural policy. The regional policy of competitiveness will be focused on strong, mainly urban elements and the CAP will support the development of territories.
All those developments are being discussed and little skirmishes are taking place between the regional policy directorate-general and the agriculture directorate-general about which directorate-general should be in charge of the policy. Each directorate-general is claiming that the policy is within its remit.
All that will depend on the discussions that will take place between the United States and Europe on the evolution and the future of price support within the WTO. The United States has recently taken a new position of support for its agriculture sector. No one knows whether it will maintain that position or whether it is for the next few months only. The trend at European level is towards a reduction in the importance of price support and an increase in support to farms. That is essential in relation to the budget.
By 1999, following the Edinburgh agreements of 1992, we had reached a level of Community aid of 0.46 per cent of Community gross domestic product. At the Berlin summit, a reduction in Community aid for the EU 15 from 0.46 per cent of GDP in 1999 to 0.31 per cent in 2006 was agreed. We are maintaining a level of aid of 0.45 per cent because we are integrating within Community aid the instruments for pre-accession of the eastern European countries. The budget that served the EU 15 in 1999 will serve the EU 27 from 2006—we will maintain a budget level of 0.46 per cent of GDP when we move to an EU of 27 members and more after 2006.
It will be difficult to answer greater needs with a budget that is not increasing even slightly. Commissioner Barnier has fixed the level at 0.45 per cent, but some states have asked for it to be lower. The budgetary discussion will take place at the end of next year.
I am interested that some states have asked for a level that is lower than 0.46 per cent. Which member states are interested in lowering the budget?
(simultaneous interpretation) The main state that is interested in lowering the budget is Germany, although it has not quite made that position official. Germany has some budgetary problems, but it is not the only country to experience them. Some countries, such as Germany, are fed up with paying the greater part of the European budget. Germany is therefore interested in reducing regional aid and the budget in general so that it can solve its own problems.
Sweden is also against increasing the percentage. I do not know what the other countries' positions are. For the most part, the others have not really taken an official position. However, today the trend is towards making savings rather than towards having the political will to pursue European integration as much as in the past. Perhaps that is contradictory, given the challenge of enlargement and the momentum of history, but budgetary requirements are coming to the fore.
You have spoken about the member states having more control within the context of subsidiarity. Some of the evidence that we have taken in the past has dealt with the argument about renationalisation and giving priorities back to the member state. How will that argument develop across Europe?
In your presentation, you spoke about the three tiers working together. There seems to be an underlying argument that member states should take back some of the regional policy powers. They should get a block of money and prioritise that for their regions. How is that debate developing across Europe? There are differing views on that in the United Kingdom.
(simultaneous interpretation) The CPMR is totally against renationalisation of policies. Whatever criticisms can be laid at the door of regional policy, it has brought a lot to local and regional Parliaments. Whatever differences there have been, there have also been great strides forward in methods of programming and in the evaluation of public policies. All those elements have been quickly and neatly forgotten, but 10 years ago they did not exist. In the field of efficiency, Europe has helped the local territories and regions make a lot of progress beyond the budgetary discussion. Those are some of the important elements that have happened thanks to that policy.
The people and arguments that advocate renationalisation of regional policies do not do so for political reasons. They base their arguments on economic and budgetary reasons. It seems to me that there is a strong contradiction between the pursuing of regional policies and renationalisation. At the moment, the gap between territories and regions is infra-national. Europe therefore has a role to play in co-ordinating the member states.
When we try to protect the better co-ordination between the three tiers, it is to prevent a situation in which one tier pulls the action towards one end when another is pulling it towards another and then nothing happens. It is important to balance and to follow a common path in order to ensure greater efficiency. That seems to us to be at the centre of the debate.
Within the Commission and particularly within DG regio—apart from a few people—the majority of people are against renationalisation at the moment. They are in favour of pursuing objective 2. However, there is always a dichotomy between political prospects and budgetary constraints. Renationalisation means more policies.
In your presentation, you spoke about handicaps. You will be aware that, particularly in the north of Scotland, we face a number of handicaps. We have mountainous regions and a sparse population and those factors cause difficulties with matters such as transportation. Those problems are different from GDP but probably affect it. How confident are you that such issues will be taken into consideration when structural fund reforms are being reviewed?
(simultaneous interpretation) There are two on-going studies. One study, on the islands, was launched by the European Commission a few months ago. We are following the progress of that study and we are awaiting results. I do not yet know the content of the study or the findings.
However, as far as the islands are concerned, things are quite simple. We know what an island is and we know what type of problem an island confronts. The mountains are more difficult. A call to tender has been made and the first bids have been submitted. The final date has been postponed because of problems with methodology. It is difficult to establish criteria for the mountainous areas.
Technically, there are mountains in the alpine valleys that are extremely rich and have a high density of population. Should we go below the level of NUTS 3 to NUTS 4 or NUTS 5, which are more comparable with the level set by the EC? Should we compare the altitude with the population density to form a criterion?
Great strides forward have been made with some of the permanent problems, but it would be difficult to distribute money on the basis of that. Should there be a specific instrument for such low-density regions as the islands or mountains? Alternatively, should we say that regions that contain a certain percentage of either islands or mountains and that have a certain level of GDP and a low-density population could have a bonus of 10, 20 or 30 per cent according to their GDP? That is what we have to think about.
The concept of bonuses would be more favourable than that of a specific instrument, because we could take, say, 1 per cent of the structural fund to give to insular or mountainous regions. However, that would not be very useful in the end. Whatever the type of instrument, it would be important to know what amount of money will be available to allow us to have efficient policies in those regions. I think that the ambitious scenario is better than the toolbox scenario, which I fear could be a device with very low budgetary endowment.
As there are no other questions from members, I thank you for that interesting and informative presentation. We are drafting a report on these issues and the evidence that you have given us today will be helpful. I hope that we continue to have dialogue with the CPMR in the months ahead. I am sure that that pan-European view and analysis of how the negotiations are going is helpful to us.
I suggest that we take a two-minute break to allow us to deal with the IT and for M Cichowlaz to leave.
Thank you.
I also thank the interpreter. She has been interpreting for an hour.
Meeting suspended.
On resuming—
Since our last meeting we have received two written submissions, one from Clackmannanshire Council and another from Campbell Christie and Andrew Scott. Campbell Christie is a member of the Economic and Social Committee of the European Union and I know that he is rapporteur for an opinion on economic and social cohesion. He made the written submission to the committee as part of the drawing together of information for his opinion. We had intended that today would be the last meeting at which we took evidence, but I am open to suggestions. Does the committee wish to invite Campbell Christie to the next meeting or are members satisfied to take his written evidence into account?
Given the fact that the submission is fairly detailed and that our next meeting is our last meeting before the summer recess, we should perhaps draw the evidence taking to a close. That would enable us to consider the draft report at our next meeting and to bring the inquiry to a close before the summer. The written evidence is reasoned and properly set out and there is no need to extend the timetable to take oral evidence.
Okay. If there are no other views on that, we will incorporate the written evidence into our report and ask the clerks to produce a draft summary of all the evidence for the next meeting. I appreciate that the next meeting will be our last before the recess, so it would be helpful if we could pull together the draft report.
There is another matter on which we have not agreed. The employment inquiry is a very big piece of work and we must decide whether we want an adviser; it will mean a huge amount of work for the clerks if we do not. We have the facility in the budget to do so, particularly for such a large inquiry. Appointment of an adviser might expedite the gathering of evidence and would certainly lift some of the burden from the clerks.
If members think that it would be useful to appoint an adviser we could invite interested people to submit CVs. We could consider the matter at our next meeting and select someone who could consider the evidence over the recess. The call for evidence is open until September.
That seems to be quite sensible and would give us some space. Given the weight of the day-to-day work that the committee is dealing with, extra assistance would be helpful in addressing the employment strategy. I note that we will begin to get more Council information during the summer, which will really kick in by the autumn. It is difficult to predict how much more energy that will require, but I suspect that it will take more committee time than is currently devoted to monitoring and scrutiny. It is a good idea to suggest potential advisers in time for the next meeting.
We would be happy to suggest some names and speak to our colleagues in the Scottish Parliament information centre, which holds a database of people who have expressed interest in being committee advisers. I should advise the committee that there is another necessary step, which is to ask the Parliamentary Bureau for approval to appoint an adviser. I am not aware of an occasion on which such a request has been declined. I would be happy to do that on behalf of the committee.
Okay.
On rounding up the inquiry into the cohesion policy, there are two significant points that have not come out previously. First, following discussion around the yet-to-be ratified Treaty of Nice, the next round of the European budget must be finalised before enlargement happens. Therefore, the people who sit round the table deciding the new budget will not necessarily gain from it. That was a concession to Spain in the Nice treaty negotiations. In drawing together the final report, I hope that we can reflect on what came out of Nice. Given that Spain is the country that is most likely to lose out, it is interesting that it has gained that concession, which means that the new countries will not be part of the debate.
That sounds reasonable. We will ask the clerks to bring together information on that as background to the report. What is the second point?
It is on fishing, but I will not raise it as time is running out. Perhaps I could write to you.