Official Report 545KB pdf
Under agenda item 3 the committee will take evidence in its inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the closure of the Forth road bridge.
I welcome Derek Mackay, Minister for Transport and Islands at the Scottish Government, and Roy Brannen, chief executive, Mike Baxter, director for finance and analytical services and Wayne Hindshaw, chief bridge engineer, all at Transport Scotland.
I invite the minister to make an opening statement.
I thank the committee for the opportunity to attend this important inquiry and set out the Scottish Government’s position on the matter.
I welcome the inquiry, as I have always encouraged transparency on the matter. I recognise fully the impact that the closure had on the travelling public, local and national business and, in particular, those in the haulage industry who were inconvenienced, and I remain grateful for their patience and support.
As indicated in my parliamentary statement on 8 December, the available evidence and expert opinion provided demonstrate that the truss end link defect could not have been foreseen. I hope that we can agree that the decision to close the bridge was appropriate, reflecting the paramount importance of safety. As the bridge experts agreed, the subsequent response has been “a remarkable achievement”.
As with other organisations with asset management responsibilities, the Forth Estuary Transport Authority’s use of a long-term programme allowed certain projects to be prioritised for funding, reflecting the urgency of the work required and how it would impact on the integrity of the structure.
FETA’s system of general and principal inspections was developed to reflect the Forth road bridge’s unique characteristics. Inspections were based on good industry practice, with an enhanced methodology developed by FETA using a risk-based approach, meaning a more rigorous inspection regime that exceeded Department for Transport guidelines.
Amey has continued to use the same well-tested FETA procedures, with the same experienced staff. The early identification of the defect was as a direct result of that competent regime and the familiarity that the staff had with the structure of the bridge and was a credit to those involved.
Prior to its dissolution, FETA had full responsibility for all operational and maintenance aspects of the Forth road bridge, including the prioritisation of its work programme. FETA’s governance was such that the work programmes were approved by its board.
When tolls were removed and FETA became reliant on Scottish Government funding, it was required to bid for funding through the spending review process. It is clear that FETA had to adapt to new ways of working. Notwithstanding, the Scottish Government ensured that funding was provided to meet FETA’s committed spend and that capital maintenance was delivered on a prioritised needs basis. Funding for safety-critical work was never refused by the Scottish Government and FETA considered issues such as the truss end links to be manageable.
FETA operated independently and employed its own hierarchy of risk. While the bridgemaster’s board papers referred generally to truss end links, the need for associated work was not considered a significant risk nor accorded a safety-critical or high priority.
The inquiry has also heard about Amey’s response. The strengths that the new operating company demonstrated are a direct outcome of Transport Scotland’s thorough assessment of the contract procurement process and the skills and experience of Amey and its partners, which the committee has had sight of and have proved extremely efficient.
The protections afforded to FETA staff and the ministerial commitment on staff pensions, welcomed unanimously by both the FETA board and management, and staff and trade unions, played an important part in providing continuity of experience during the crucial mobilisation period, ensuring that all FETA staff in post in May 2015, including the bridgemaster, transferred to Amey.
From 2007, FETA undertook major works including main cable investigation, cable band bolt replacement, anchorage investigation, viaduct bearing replacement, improvements to deck half-joints and the dehumidification system, and a number of other schemes. FETA deemed virtually all as being more pressing than the postponed and unrelated full replacement of the truss end links.
A total of £107.8 million has been spent on the bridge in that period, equating to more than £110 million, including reserves. That is not a record of underinvestment.
In summary, the evidence presented to the committee, often from witnesses with quite different perspectives, has demonstrated that the structure has been well maintained, using good industry practice, that the defect that resulted in the bridge closure was unforeseen and unforeseeable, and that ministers’ approval of Amey’s proposal to close the bridge for a short period to carry out essential repairs was appropriate and necessary.
Members will be aware that the bridge is fully operational. I would again like to pay tribute to all the staff involved for the swift and dedicated actions undertaken in often challenging circumstances. I welcome any questions from the committee.
Thank you very much, minister. I will hand over to David Stewart to kick off our questions.
Good morning, minister. On behalf of the committee, I would like to echo your words about the work of the staff. As you know, a number of committee members went to the bridge and we met some of the staff. Perhaps you could relay our comments to all the staff involved.
My first few questions are about the decision making around the bridge’s closure. As you will be aware, most of the closures outwith the current emergency are because of high winds. In the current regime, who makes the decision to close the bridge and what is the chain of command?
Are you asking about closures more generally and not this individual closure?
Yes, that is correct.
Decisions are based on forecasts and the information available. David Stewart will be well aware that more exposed structures, such as bridges, have specific monitoring equipment. That then informs about the weather and particularly high winds. If predetermined levels are hit, that leads to warnings and a hierarchy of closure and restrictions on different vehicles crossing the bridge. That is conveyed to the public through variable message signs, as well as through Twitter, Traffic Scotland and other broadcast media.
The process in place is almost automated, because of the criteria that are set. Ultimately, decisions are based on the local information—the data on the high winds experienced on the structure, as well as the wider weather warnings—through Transport Scotland.
Thank you for that useful answer. I suppose that I am trying to identify the specific individuals who make the decision. Is it the bridgemaster or the head of Transport Scotland? Is it you in your role as lead minister, the Cabinet Secretary for Infrastructure, Investment and Cities or the First Minister? Who is ultimately responsible for a closure in a high-wind scenario?
Roy Brannen can answer that.
I will just add to what the minister said. Ultimately, it is the organisation that is responsible for the bridge. In the case of our other long-span bridges, that would be the operating company. In the case of the Forth bridge, before the dissolution of FETA, it would have been FETA and Barry Colford; after 1 June 2015, it was Amey. FETA’s procedures were well documented. Those have followed through into the new Forth bridge operating contract and Amey triggers the thresholds based on the weather forecasts.
If, for example, there was high wind—70 mph and above—Amey’s head official on the bridge would be the person responsible for making a closure decision.
Correct.
Obviously, the Amey official would copy in the minister and—
A whole procedure is in place on what Amey must do when the threshold is reached. The individual would then make a number of calls, including to the Scottish Government and Wayne Hindshaw, the chief bridge engineer. Everybody is made aware at that point of what is happening. The key part is communicating all that to the public.
10:30
I appreciate that; it is helpful and clear.
Perhaps we can go back in history to clarify assumptions that I have that might be correct or incorrect. There were really two periods of FETA, were there not? In terms of decision making, there was FETA when we had tolls and FETA after tolls. Am I right in thinking, minister, that decisions to close the bridge when FETA was responsible during the tolling regime would have been taken by the bridgemaster and that only he would have had the power to close the bridge?
Yes.
That was my understanding, but I just wanted to clarify it. Obviously, there was a change post tolls. As you will know, we have had evidence from FETA about that. In the scenario of high winds or whatever, who was then responsible for closing the bridge? Was it FETA and the bridgemaster in conjunction with Transport Scotland? Or was it only FETA and the bridgemaster?
Perhaps I can respond. The decision would have been the bridgemaster’s alone. That decision was FETA’s responsibility up until the day FETA was dissolved. However, it worked closely with Traffic Scotland and Transport Scotland. There was a seamless interface to ensure that closure information was publicised and passed out. There are five wind thresholds—if the committee wants to know about them, it can—but the bridge is closed to all vehicles when the wind speed is 80 mph. If the bridge is closed, that information is shared with Transport Scotland. Our permission was not sought when the bridge was closed, nor was it necessary to seek it, but we were informed so that we could put into operation the standard incident diversion routes and publicise that.
Just to add to that, during the process of transfer, Barry Colford, his team and the board were particularly concerned about operational and maintenance issues—and, indeed, corporate governance—moving away from them to Transport Scotland. They sought assurance from the minister at the time about that and got it, so operational and maintenance issues and corporate governance remained with Barry Colford and the chief bridge engineer.
Can you also clarify, minister, whether I am correct in thinking that there was a period during the transfer from FETA when there was a change and the bridge was designated as a trunk road? Or was it always a designated trunk road in terms of transport regulations?
If I may, I will respond to that. The bridge was trunked on the day that FETA was dissolved; it was not a trunk road before that. It was under the FETA act, shall we say, as FETA was the road authority under the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984. Once the bridge was trunked at one minute past midnight on 1 June, it then became the responsibility of the Scottish Government.
My assumption was right, then: there was, in effect, a trunk road designation on 1 June last year. Is that correct?
Yes.
Thank you. It is useful to get these practical points confirmed.
I will move on to the current closure situation. Again, minister, I am talking about decision making. I will just run through this—and I do not know the answer to the question. The decision to close one carriageway of the Forth road bridge was made on 1 December. That followed discussion between Amey and Transport Scotland. The decision to close the bridge to all traffic from midnight on 3 December followed a recommendation by Amey at 4 pm that day. Can you confirm whether that is—
No. You were right to begin with, in that a fault was identified on 1 December. That led to a carriageway closure, as you described. There was further inspection and study of the issue and engagement of consultants in monitoring the failed link member—there were on-going meetings—leading to 3 December. Transport Scotland and Amey were obviously closely engaged. The point of decision was your only inaccuracy, Mr Stewart. There was a meeting of ministers in the evening of 3 December at about half-past 8 involving the First Minister, the Deputy First Minister, the cabinet secretary and me, and at that point information and a recommendation were presented to ministers for the first time. Within minutes of a ministerial agreement that the bridge should be closed, that was conveyed to the media. It is not the case that a decision was taken earlier in the afternoon and conveyed later; it was conveyed within minutes in the evening.
I do not necessarily disagree with you minister, but I did not quite finish my sentence earlier and the point that I was going to make is that the decision did not take effect until after the meeting with the First Minister.
I appreciate that it was an emergency situation rather than a standard high-wind closure. What I am asking, in line with my previous questions, is whether the decision to close the bridge was taken by the First Minister, the cabinet secretary, you or Amey. In that scenario, where did the buck stop?
The recommendation to ministers came from officials and the operating company, Amey, and we all agreed—it was a unanimous decision across the operating company, Transport Scotland, advisers and ministers—to close the bridge and embark on the next course of action. As you will appreciate—we may come on to this—we realised that it was not just a question of closing the bridge but that much more needed to be done on contingencies, conveying the message to the public, repairing the bridge and getting a full understanding of what had happened.
Thank you. You kindly invited the committee and officials to attend a technical briefing, which the convener, I and Mr Johnstone and officials attended. That was very helpful and useful. At that briefing, Mr Johnstone asked whether use of the bridge would be restricted or unrestricted when it reopened, and the answer—Mr Johnstone can clarify this—was that, when the bridge reopened, access would be unrestricted. Can you explain why in December access was going to be unrestricted, but was restricted when the bridge reopened? Why was there that confidence in December—I think that it was December—but not in January?
As the repairs were undertaken and there was further investigation, we gained a deeper understanding of what went wrong on the bridge. Further inspections and monitoring equipment on the bridge—monitoring equipment that was not there before, such as the strain gauges and tilt meters—informed our understanding of what went wrong. With all that equipment in place and that deeper understanding, we were able to make even better-informed decisions about what went wrong, how we could remedy it and what we should do next.
The bridge is now fully operational, as it was before the closure, and there are no restrictions. On 23 December, we returned about 90 to 91 per cent of general traffic, excluding heavy goods vehicles, to the bridge. The reason why HGVs could not go over the bridge was that, although they make up only about 9 per cent of the traffic, they account for 30 per cent or so of the weight load.
When the repairs were being carried out, there was further monitoring and examination, and we gained a deeper understanding through the use of the monitoring equipment. As I was able to outline at a technical briefing, it suggested that—as we all now know—the issue related to a pin that was not rotating, which put stress on the member. We inspected the other pins and found that two other pins were not rotating as we would have liked, which could have put stress on other members; therefore, it was a matter of precaution that we completed all the repairs before we could satisfactorily allow HGVs over the bridge.
There was an incremental return of traffic. The pressure was on to get all traffic over the bridge as quickly as possible while never compromising safety. However, as we learned more about the nature of the fault and the stress and pressures on the bridge, and when we found out that two further pins had not been rotating, we took that precautionary approach to ensure that no further damage was caused to the bridge. We ensured that traffic could cross safely and that HGVs could return in good time. It was a well-informed, precautionary approach that involved completing the repairs and strengthening the bridge to the point at which we were satisfied that no further damage would be caused.
We could go into even more detail of our understanding of the fault, based on the findings of the strain gauge, the acceptable parameters, the load testing and the model case scenarios. I would be happy to go into those details, and I am sure that Wayne Hindshaw would join me.
In essence, the answer to your question is that we understood more about what required to be done as we applied more technology to the bridge and gained a deeper understanding of the fault, which was unforeseen, and we did what was the right thing to do to protect the structural integrity of the bridge.
The bridge is now fully open to HGVs and, if my memory serves me correctly, the maximum weight of an HGV is around 44 tonnes. However, when we were given our technical briefing, we were told that abnormal loads—such as when a wind turbine is being moved—might be up to 150 tonnes. Have there been any discussions with your technical officials about whether there might be restrictions on abnormal loads that are above the HGV weight limit?
Mr Stewart raises a valid point. There is one example from the past few years of such an abnormal load crossing the bridge. Such things could be done by arrangement before the bridge closure, and that remains the case now.
In February 2015, the bridgemaster introduced a weight limit of 150 tonnes for abnormal loads. He would not permit vehicles over that weight to go over the bridge, because of concerns about the strength of the brackets and welds in the towers that support part of the truss end link mechanism. That relates to the works that FETA trialled, which Amey has completed. We are now back in the situation that we were in before 1 December, in that abnormal loads of up to 150 tonnes can apply to be moved across the Forth road bridge. Those are not an issue.
Periodically, abnormal loads go well beyond that into several hundreds of tonnes. The issue is not that the bridge may not be able to take them, but they may have to be specifically analysed and traffic arrangements might need to be put in place so that they are led across the bridge under what we call caution, which means that there would need to be no other traffic on the bridge, low winds and moderate temperatures.
Abnormal loads do not tend to follow the Forth valley passage; they tend to go via Stirling. To give you an idea of the usage of the Forth road bridge for such loads, the heaviest load that we have had recently was one of 140 tonnes, which was in 2013. Therefore, the impact on the heavy haulage industry is limited. However, the heavy haulage industry can apply to move loads and, if necessary, the bridge can be analysed to check whether it can accommodate them.
Just to be clear, is the limit still 150 tonnes?
It is 150 tonnes at the moment.
Mr Stewart, are you satisfied with the answer on why, after opening to more than 90 per cent of traffic at the end of December, there was a period during which we could not allow HGVs over?
It was useful to get clarification on that. You will appreciate that we were told that there was not going to be a restriction and then we suddenly found that there was.
I will expand further and put the point differently. The well-informed assumption was that the crack related to a pin that was not rotating in one part of the structure. When we identified that two further pins were not rotating, we wanted to ensure that the same precautionary works were carried out at those locations so that we were satisfied that there would be no further stress on the bridge. That is the reason for the difference. We have concluded all those works and we have strengthened the bridge so that we are satisfied that none of the elements will be overstressed. All of that was informed by the new technology on the bridge. Is that more helpful?
Thank you.
I have one final question on the weight issue. Obviously, we have had representations from the haulage industry and we welcome the fact that there are no restrictions on HGVs. Are there any restrictions on the number of HGVs going over at one time? The engineers have explained to us that that causes difficulties.
No, there are no restrictions of that nature. There were such restrictions during the temporary pilot period when I was phasing in the reintroduction of HGVs. That was for the reasons that I have given to do with acceptable parameters of stress levels on the bridge until the works were complete. However, there is now no such restriction and no requirement for any such restriction.
Will you clarify exactly where the phase 1 repairs—the splint repairs—have been installed?
The phase 1 splint repairs started on the broken member and were then carried out on the other members. As you will recall from the technical briefing, the splint essentially shoes in the crack and strengthens it. That was done first at the north-east tower and then at the other towers.
Was the phase 2 installation done at four locations?
To begin with, phase 2 was at the four main span locations, and there are a further four.
So phase 2 was at four locations, and that has all been completed.
The work on the four internal parts of the towers on the suspended span section has been done as phase 2. The work on the four external parts needs to be completed as well. However, that is not critical for traffic running on the bridge.
Just on a technical point—perhaps this is for Mr Brannen rather than the minister—is it accurate to say that, as we have been told, the pin in the north-west corner of the main span is operating correctly?
That is probably a question for Wayne Hindshaw. However, we can tell through the strain gauges that the pin is showing no signs of the stress that the other pins were showing, so, yes, that particular element is operating sufficiently well for no further work to be required on it.
Thank you—that is all my questions.
10:45
We are keen to get as much factual information as possible on the record to assist with our inquiry, minister, which is why David Stewart was taking a bit of time to try to establish some of the facts. There are a few additional points that I would like to get on the record—perhaps from the officials rather than from you.
Can you provide the committee with information on the additional problems with seized pins that were found and announced on 5 February and which further delayed the opening of the bridge to heavy goods vehicles beyond mid-February? When were they found, where were they located and what repairs to them have been carried out?
I preface the answer with the good news that, having identified that issue and undertaken the works, we know that the pins are now not the issue that they were at that point. We were undertaking the works anyway. I do not want you to have the impression that it is an on-going problem, because the repairs that have been undertaken have addressed that issue to the point where we are satisfied that we can allow all vehicles back across the bridge.
Before Christmas, we started installing structural monitoring equipment, data acquisition units, fibre optic cabling and electrical feeds. That was all in place at the north-east truss end link before load testing took place and informed us about the stresses and strains that were going on. We then decided that we would install that equipment at other locations, particularly in the main span, where we considered that, as we had one seized pin, there was a possibility that we could have problems elsewhere.
At that time, we had done further analysis that proved that whether or not the pins were seized was not an issue for the side spans. The splint-strengthened members could take the induced bending stress and, technically, could live with it, although that was not how they were originally designed to behave.
As a result, there was a lot of pressure to put the data analysis equipment—basically, the box computers—in the towers at the south-east and the south-west. We were able to rig the data acquisition unit in the north-east tower to monitor what was happening at the north-west link. The strain gauges and movement graphs showed that the pin was rotating and was not generating the stress in that link.
To answer the specific question, we got the data acquisition unit on the south-east tower in early January—the second weekend in. In layman’s language, we jury-rigged the unit to measure the south-west as well, before we got the acquisition unit from Germany that gave us the information that we would rather have not had. Both the pins on the main span, at the south-west and the south-east link, were displaying high levels of friction, if not higher levels of friction than that which had been displaced at the north-east pin. At the time, we realised that we were going to have to implement phase 2 repairs to those links.
That is helpful.
The bridge reopened fully to HGVs on 20 February, which is earlier than the anticipated date of mid-March that had previously been advised, which was announced on 5 February. What were the factors that allowed for an earlier opening?
There were severe weather impacts, with one storm after another. Incidentally, those weather impacts led to restrictions on other bridges. The weather impacted on the repairs programme—on the works—because we cannot have staff working on the bridge in dangerous conditions. When it is particularly windy, staff may have to come off the bridge in a safe fashion.
However, staff teams were programmed to be on the bridge as much as possible to carry out the works in those quite challenging circumstances. It was a 24/7 operation to get the bridge repaired, and the programme was accelerated as much as possible.
As it happens, after we set the new timescale, the weather improved. I said publicly at the press conference and in the press release that contingency time was built in, although we would not have wanted to identify any new faults. The better, more favourable weather impacted positively on the programme after the completion date was amended to mid-March.
There was 24/7 working and real dedication to getting the job done as quickly as possible with confidence. There were also different ways of working. Amey was putting pressure on the suppliers to get supplies as quickly as possible, and work was carried out in the workshops rather than on site at the bridge in order to accelerate the programme. The programme was reordered with some of that in mind in order to accelerate everything. We were all pleasantly surprised that the repair work came in ahead of the publicly stated timescale of mid-March.
To recap, there were three key elements. There was dedication—staff did not down tools other than because of the weather; the weather was more favourable; and there was pressure on suppliers and work going on in workshops. That degree of re-engineering, as it has been described, allowed for a far more effective execution of the repair work.
That is helpful.
I will move on to the costs of permanently repairing the bridge. When Transport Scotland officials appeared before the committee on 20 January, they offered to provide additional information on the cost of the Forth road bridge’s structural monitoring system, the cost of the phase 2 repairs and the cost of replacing all the linkages. We have received that information, and the figure for permanently repairing the bridge is approximately £19.7 million. I want to give you the opportunity to place on record the various phases of the proposed repair work and the associated costs for each of those.
I am happy to do that, but once again I add the caveat that not all the costs are settled and there may be other variables in play. I can give you the figure that I have at present, which remains the same. I will set out the detail as you have requested.
My understanding is that, for the phase 1 splint repairs, the cost is up to £3 million. For the phase 2 repairs, the cost is £2.65 million for the four that I have mentioned, with a further four—which David Stewart asked about—at a further cost of £2.65 million. The phase 3 works are still to be worked up and fully designed before implementation, so I will give more detail later. The cost of the four main spans is £5.7 million, and the cost of the side-spans work is of a similar order. That takes us—you are right, convener—to the figure of £19.7 million. The cost of the strain gauge and the structural health monitoring system is around £1 million to £1.5 million. Those are the figures that we have shared, but I attach the caveat that they are not settled.
Thank you—that anticipates my next question. It is clear that you do not consider that to be the final definitive cost of the repair work. Do you think that it could be less—or more?
I am hoping that the cost will be in that region, but you are right: it is not settled.
Thank you. I will leave it at that and pass over to Clare Adamson.
As part of the spending review in 2011, how did Transport Scotland assess the indicative capital plan prepared by FETA and determine the level of capital grant that was to be provided for 2012-13 to 2014-15?
There would have been a two-way exchange between FETA and Transport Scotland in view of the UK spending review, which had a significant impact on the Scottish Government’s budget. I assure members that it would have been expressed to FETA at the time that there should be a degree of prioritisation and that committed projects would be seen through. Anything that was critical for the health of the bridge would have been funded, and reprioritisation would have been undertaken in that light. The Scottish Government, through Transport Scotland, would have expected a tiered approach, beginning with actions that did not diminish the structural integrity of the bridge and including the work that was necessary to maintain the bridge’s structural integrity and its on-going maintenance and operation. The decision would therefore have been taken in that light.
There were financial pressures, but everyone in public life faces those. On-going careful management of the bridge would have been expected and there would have been on-going dialogue between Transport Scotland and FETA.
I have seen the evidence—I think that you have seen it, too—and I think we all appreciate that, if the need for any critical repairs had been identified, they would have been funded.
We were told in evidence that revenue from the tolls was critical to the capital programme for the bridge, but FETA accumulated quite high reserves over the years when the tolls were in operation. At one point, the reserves sat at £18.6 million. What do you think about those levels of reserves? How close are they to the budgets for bridges in Scotland?
If I may, I will relate that back to the capital plan. As members will be aware from their knowledge of local government and other parts of the public sector, capital plans can list a number of things and they are not always completed in one year. They can be long term and they can relate to other things.
The capital plan for the Forth road bridge through FETA was not all about the structural maintenance of the bridge or critical repairs. To give you an idea of the nature of the capital plan, I reference the £1.4 million for tower painting, the £40,000 for landscaping works and the £70,000 for vehicle replacement. The plan appears to have come in isolation from, initially, the indicative capital plan from the spending review process, and then the resources that were available. I say that without criticism.
You are right about the toll income for FETA, which was £11.99 million in 2006-07, £10.299 million in 2007-08 and £10.1 million in 2008-09. Substantial surpluses were held in reserve, and those moneys would have served both revenue and capital. I am not here to criticise FETA’s spending decisions, but to put the matter in context, I note that it replaced the toll collection equipment in 2005-06 at a cost of £8.5 million. On the abolition of tolls in 2008, the cost of remodelling the plaza area to allow free-flowing traffic was £2 million. That should help to inform your understanding of the capital plan.
I gave you figures for the toll income ranging from £12 million to £10 million. The figure for Government grant for 2012-13, for example, was £11.38 million—£5.1 million in revenue and £6.28 million in capital. There was also use of FETA reserves. I would challenge any suggestion that the bridge was underfunded.
Thank you for that clarification.
On the decisions that were taken, the indicative capital plan had been in place for a number of years, with the truss end link replacement being part of that. What difference did the decision to build the Forth crossing have on decisions about taking another look at the capital plan?
My understanding from FETA is that it considered the prospect of the Forth replacement crossing and would have reordered and reprofiled works as a result, considering what was required earlier and what could be deferred until later in view of potential disruption—that is always an issue with bridge maintenance and potential bridge closures. It would have considered that along with the available resources and what could take place once the new Queensferry crossing had been built. I think that FETA understood that and reordered some of its work.
Incidentally, the reprioritisation of FETA’s capital programme was a matter for that independent organisation. The dialogue between the Scottish Government, through Transport Scotland, and FETA was around finance, with a clear understanding that FETA should do nothing that would undermine the structural integrity of the bridge and should approach the Government if any critical repairs were required. It did that, and I can give you an example. In 2012, there was a request for more resources for cable band bolts. That request was accepted by Transport Scotland and I think around £2 million was paid out.
11:00I have heard suggestions that some in FETA were frightened to ask the Scottish Government for money, because the answer would have been no. I have to say that that is not normal in Scottish public life; folk are not normally frightened to ask for more resources, if they are required. The instance that I have highlighted is a clear example—a £2 million example—of identified works of a more critical nature that were not already part of the Scottish Government’s programme but which were brought to the Government and then delivered with the Government’s agreement. If we were asked—and the case was made—the request was granted. The committee should be aware of that, because it contradicts some of the unsubstantiated evidence that you have been presented with.
A FETA board paper dated 20 February 2009 says:
“the announcement of a firm commitment by the Scottish Government to a definite programme for the construction of the Forth Replacement Crossing has allowed for a review of the Authority’s maintenance programme to be carried out.”
One of the schemes that were reviewed at the time related to the main expansion joints on the bridge. Barry Colford and the team had proposed a very innovative and creative scheme to replace those joints, which would have required temporary ramps to take traffic up above the bridge deck and then down again. That would have allowed traffic to continue to use the bridge, but the ramps were valued at £6 million. When there was certainty with the new bridge, Barry Colford looked at the matter again and proposed another innovative and creative scheme for managing the joints, and that scheme is still in place today. A saving was therefore made to the public purse by taking a close look at what could be deferred as a result of guarantees about and the programming of the new replacement crossing.
What is the value of the replacement crossing project?
If by “value” you mean the estimated cost, I think that it is an eye-watering but well worthwhile £1.4 billion.
The current range for the total is £1.325 billion to £1.35 billion.
I would call that a considerable investment in infrastructure.
Some people have asked me what the contingency is for the Forth road bridge in the future. If well maintained, the bridge could continue to our satisfaction, but we will have a rather substantial contingency right next door to it in the shape of the Queensferry crossing. The bridges will act as contingencies for each other, and that approach will give us more flexibility and options if any works are required on either bridge.
I should put it on the record, convener, that all the evidence from the experts suggests that getting the existing bridge back up and running within the timescales has been an astounding achievement that is to be commended.
You speak on behalf of the whole committee when you say that.
We have received expert evidence from a range of witnesses, including the former chief bridgemaster Barry Colford, who told the committee:
“As I said, FETA was in a position whereby we had the governance but not the funding ... We prepared the capital programme, the board approved the capital programme or plan and then we had to ensure that we got the money for that capital programme or plan. That involved negotiation and discussion with Transport Scotland.”—[Official Report, Infrastructure and Capital Investment Committee, 27 January 2016; c 17-18.]
You have given us a bit of insight into the process of negotiation and discussion, but do you want to say anything else about that?
I will simply complete what Barry Colford said, because he also pointed out that he enjoyed a good relationship with the Scottish Government through Transport Scotland. That was a mature relationship in which issues were identified and then there was dialogue, with a technical and financial understanding, to address any issues that needed to be addressed. I have given the committee one example in which, even after the financial agreement was reached, further funds were allowed—in that case, for cable band bolts in 2012. The relationship and the process were both important.
Even if FETA had continued, it would have had to rely on toll income. I have already told the committee about the Scottish Government grant income, the use of surpluses and the funding provided by the tolls. Even in the days pre-toll abolition, FETA could spend only what it could raise.
I simply make the point that it was never the case that capital plans could always be delivered immediately in full; that was a matter of financial availability. The dialogue between FETA and the Scottish Government ensured that we enjoyed a mature relationship. Prioritisation was a matter for FETA, independent of the Scottish Government. However, anything that would have been critical certainly would have been funded, and there was a strong awareness of that.
You said that capital spending was on a needs-prioritised basis and you have just repeated your view that, if any critical repairs had been needed, they would have been funded. However, surely the point about prioritisation of projects is that FETA’s prioritisation happened only after the budget had been confirmed in 2011.
The indicative programme covered a number of matters. I gave examples of what would go in an indicative capital programme, including painting and other aspects. Within that, FETA would have prioritised its works on the advice of its experts and the bridgemaster. There was the understanding that all actions would be undertaken in a way that did not affect negatively the bridge’s structural integrity.
The Government’s expectation during the spending review and beyond was that there would be a tiered approach. The capital programme would be worked out on the basis of what was required to protect and maintain the bridge’s structural integrity. Other elements—things that would be nice to do or good additions—were clearly not priorities.
My point is that the reprioritisation of projects in the capital programme happened only after the budget was confirmed in 2011. Is that the case?
Yes, but the prioritisation was in the light of the spending review. There was the indicative capital plan and then financial dialogue that led to what FETA was able to proceed with. It was—rightly—a matter for FETA to prioritise.
The question that the public are interested in is whether, if the budget had not been reprofiled—to use that term—in the way that it had been, the larger piece of work to replace the truss end links could have taken place.
We are conflating two things: the specific decision on that work and, separate from that, how a capital plan relates to the available resource. I see that Mike Baxter is desperate to come in.
Another point is about timing. In 2011-12, the brakes were coming on in terms of available capital. At that time, Transport Scotland used flexibility to protect FETA’s capital spending. It is a matter of record from the annual accounts that £1.4 million was advanced into 2010-11 to support FETA’s programme and £3.2 million was advanced into 2011-12. In effect, that gave FETA the benefit of increasing the reserves that were available for spending in future years.
When we took evidence, we heard that in the capital programme there was a piece of work to replace the truss end links at an estimated cost of £10 million to £15 million. Are you saying that the money was there to do that?
No, that is not what I am saying.
I refer you to the FETA review of capital projects of 16 December 2011. Table 2 ranked the priority of the truss end links scheme as number 5 out of 13 reported schemes, and it was not noted as being safety critical. Paragraph 3.9 said:
“given the cost and difficulty in replacing these elements and the potential disruption to bridge users, further examination of the probability of certain combinations of load occurring and further structural analysis has been carried out ... As a result of this work there is now the potential to upgrade the existing links rather than carry out a full replacement.”
The matter is for FETA to explain and it is right that you are probing it. FETA began with the view that it should look at the whole truss end links assembly—the whole section. There were concerns about the truss end, but not about the part where the unforeseen fault occurred. FETA was more concerned about the bracket at the top. People say that you get the wrong end of the stick; in this case, some people got the wrong end of the truss. The pressure was at the weld at the top of the bracket. The concern was about that, rather than the unforeseen fault that occurred at the bottom.
As I understand it, there was an early concept of replacing the whole truss end assembly. For the reasons that I have given, FETA concluded that it could rescope the works so that there might be less disruption. That is what FETA progressed with—it rescoped the works and addressed where the problem was. That stayed in the capital programme.
We have to get this right: what FETA did not proceed with was not a commission to do all the detailed works, because there was no design to replace the whole truss end assembly. All that it did was tender for a consultant to look at the potential of that piece of work. That is all that it tendered for, and that is what it did not proceed with. The truss end link work at the top, not the bottom, stayed in the capital programme, with a lesser priority. Incidentally, that is what Amey inherited following the pilot work in May last year, and that is what it was proceeding with. My officials are agreeing that that is accurate.
In 2008, the indicative capital plan identified the cost of truss end link work at £500,000 in 2010 and 2011. In the indicative capital plan in February 2011, the figures moved to £1.5 million in 2013-14 and £1.5 million in 2014-15. I cannot find an indicative capital plan that shows that £10 million to £15 million was in the forward programme. The indicative capital plan from February 2011 showed £1.5 million in 2013-14 and £1.5 million in 2014-15.
In evidence, we heard that the replacement of the truss end links would have cost in the region of £10 million to £15 million.
That is correct.
We had an extensive discussion about that.
That brings us back to the point that a costed scheme was not sitting there. A range of estimates was probably put in the capital plan and considered more generally when the truss end links were talked about.
Dave Stewart is anxious to come in.
Minister, you will recall from the evidence that I put a question to representatives of the former FETA about advertising for consultants. As you know, that is normal. As I am sure that your officials will testify, in normal events the engineering consultant goes away to prepare a report and comes back with an action plan for the work that will be carried out.
I could be wrong but, in my experience, it is unusual to advertise for consultants then pull the advert. FETA’s advert went out, but then the process was ceased. We do not know who the consultants would have been or what they would have said.
In one sense, we are looking into our crystal ball to predict what a consultant would have recommended, because they would have gone away and done detailed works on the bridge and then come back to say to FETA, “This is what I want to carry out, and this will be the budget range.” As the convener said, an estimate of £10 million to £15 million was given, but the advert was pulled. That is factual, is it not? The advert went out for consultants—
Yes—FETA made that decision. That is correct.
The key question is: why was the advert pulled?
I have given you the explanation that FETA understood that the concern with the truss end link related to the top of the member, rather than to the bottom. It was suspected that there was a problem with overstressing at the bracket and the weld. FETA looked at that, and we are speculating on what it decided. It had a cost estimate with a broad range of between £10 million and £15 million for replacing the links, but it was just a cost estimate. There was no design, no work ready to go and no comprehensive capital plan design function ready to go.
FETA’s submission refers to “disruption to bridge users”, rescoping the scheme, cost and affordability, and all the other factors. It could maintain the bridge’s structure and address the area of concern by doing a different piece of work, which is what it proceeded to do. It is clear from FETA’s actions that even that was not top priority, because it stayed in the capital programme that Amey inherited and is undertaking. The rescoping of the work was a matter for FETA.
If FETA had wanted to proceed with appointing consultants—as you have helpfully described, Mr Stewart—it could have done so; the resources were there to do that, so it could have proceeded. We are speculating, but a consultant might have come along and said, “Why are you proposing to replace the whole truss end assembly when the problem that you have identified is in one part?” Of course, it turned out that that was separate from where the fault actually occurred.
I do not know whether that was more helpful.
11:15
You will recall that I asked this very question of the previous bridgemaster. The basic point that he came back with was that he had the governance but not the capital. It was suggested that FETA went to Transport Scotland and that the budget to go ahead was not given the green light.
The budget for what?
The budget to employ consultants, who could have looked at the issue in more detail.
That is not correct. The decision to proceed—or not to proceed—with tendering for consultants for the work was a matter for FETA. It is not the case that the Scottish Government said that FETA should not proceed with that appointment.
Do you agree that FETA had the governance but not the capital? It was not the master of its own destiny.
As I have said, the Scottish Government, through Transport Scotland, had dialogue with FETA about the resources that would be available. I repeat that, if a piece of work had been determined to be critical, it would have been funded. I gave an example of how that would have been the case and of how the capital programme would generally have been delivered. I add that the capital programme that was devised by FETA and inherited by the Scottish Government is being delivered.
Barry Colford said that the repair was unforeseen and unforeseeable. I do not think that we should lose sight of that. He did not anticipate the fault occurring; he was not proposing to fix it because it had not been identified at that point.
I go back to the point that we do not know what the consultants would have come up with, because they were not appointed. I am interested in the decision-making process for that. Did Transport Scotland have any role in that? FETA had advertised for the consultants, so why was there a late change? Was there a unanimous decision of the FETA board to go ahead and advertise? We were told that there was.
Yes.
So it was.
The value of the consultancy tender was £150,000 to £500,000, which FETA could have funded from its own funds. If it had wished to proceed with that consultancy, it could have done so. Transport Scotland was not involved in that piece of consultancy work being withdrawn.
I am just trying to be clear in my mind that I have got this correct. Am I correct in saying that it was a unanimous decision by FETA to go ahead and advertise for the consultants?
Convener, David Stewart is asking us whether a vote at a board at which we did not have a vote was unanimous—
Through you, convener—
Is that not a question for FETA?
Excuse me—I am chairing this meeting. If Mr Stewart wants to ask a question, he is entitled to ask it. You can answer it in any way you see fit.
I am answering by saying that you can ask FETA whether a vote at a FETA meeting was unanimous.
Thank you, minister. In fairness, you have been quite good at quoting FETA minutes back to me. I was merely asking whether you were aware of the position. The answer to the question is, “Yes—it was unanimous.” We have that in evidence that is in front of us.
There was a unanimous decision to go ahead and advertise. We do not know what the consultants would have come up with. The consultants’ report might well have led to further works—we do not know about that. Are you saying that Transport Scotland had no role in FETA not proceeding with the work of the consultants?
I have said repeatedly that FETA was an independent organisation. If it had wanted to proceed with the appointment of consultants, that would have been a matter for it.
Did Transport Scotland have any role through emails, telephone conversations or memos in suggesting to FETA that it should not proceed because the capital programme funding—the £10 million to £15 million—was not going to be available?
Is that not proceeding with the tendering for and appointment of consultants?
Yes. Is there any evidence?
I have reviewed the papers and I find no evidence of my former colleagues interfering in what was a matter for FETA. As Roy Brannen said, FETA could have afforded to go ahead with the consultancy and could have got the answer to the question that I think that we would all like to have seen.
Depending on the value of the works going out, the bridgemaster had his own fiscal limits for works that he could place with consultants. He followed that and carried on doing work with Fairhurst and AECOM thereafter. All that I can tell you is that, in so far as the evidence that I have seen and reviewed goes, there is no evidence that I or my former colleagues interfered with or influenced FETA’s decision making on the matter.
The matter was for FETA alone. It could have taken forward the consultancy contract or pursued the work in another manner, which is what it did with Fairhurst on a slightly smaller scale.
It should not be presumed that a more extensive and less cost-effective scheme would have been pursued. A consultant probably would have looked at providing best value for money as part of any optioneering. The design that came out of the workshop was conceptual and was not finalised. What has happened since has been evidenced by FETA’s downsizing of the scheme. It is oversimplifying the case to consider that a full replacement would have taken place.
The last supplementary report from Fairhurst in 2014 focused entirely on the tower brackets and welds and not on the truss end link post and pin joints, which were noted as not being overstressed. In the evolution of the process over many reports, Fairhurst arrived at a position in providing advice to the FETA board on the work that needed to be done.
It will be interesting to compare and contrast what you have just said with what Mr Colford said in evidence.
A deeper understanding is needed. Some members need to look at the detail of the piece of work that is being talked about and the particular contractual obligation involved.
Revenue and capital budgets are important as well. I described how the overall settlement was reached and how there was an expectation that FETA would take a tiered approach to its capital programme. To take an example, I imagine that funding to appoint consultants would have come from revenue rather than capital. Representatives of the former FETA would be able to explain that from the records at the time.
I have checked through FETA’s records and the first date that I can find for Barry Colford reporting to the board that there was a reduced scheme is in December 2011. I cannot find a record of him reporting to the board that the tender for the consultancy had been withdrawn. It might be there, as we might not have a complete set of records, but our present finding is that December 2011 was the first date when the refocused scheme was brought to the board.
The committee has attempted to obtain from Transport Scotland and from former FETA officials any documentation that might show the process of dialogue between the two bodies about FETA’s indicative capital plan and the allocation of funding by the Scottish Government following the 2011 spending review. Minister, can you say whether such documentation exists and, if so, whether it is the intention to provide it to the committee?
We can provide more information, and I will do that this afternoon.
Thank you.
Who is responsible now for preparing the capital plan that sets out necessary future work on the bridge?
That is a matter between the operating company and Transport Scotland. The process identifies works that are required, the available resources and the priorities—what will ensure the on-going operation of the bridge to our satisfaction and avoid undermining its structural integrity. That requires on-going dialogue.
I ask Mike Baxter to explain the mechanism a bit more.
With the abolition of FETA in 2015-16, we in effect inherited a capital plan, and the draft budget that is before Parliament for 2016-17 reflects its content. There is £9.1 million in capital—
Did you largely adopt FETA’s capital plan when you inherited it?
Yes.
Having been responsible for the plan for more than half a year, have you made any changes to it?
The overall quantum of the plan has not changed but, as with any capital plan, there is a constant reassessment of priority for the maintenance of any asset. If we leave aside the issues that have been the subject of spend since December, Amey goes through a constant review process in conjunction with colleagues in Transport Scotland.
The interface with the budget process is about ensuring that the on-going review of what makes up the plan, with an understanding of the priorities, is fed through into the spending review process. That is an on-going process that involves all our business in Transport Scotland and not just this matter.
I am interested in how you prioritise issues within the process.
I could help on that one. The 2011 to 2016 FETA capital programme was reviewed and adopted during the six-month mobilisation. It was a contract obligation of Amey, our new provider, and FETA was part of the mobilisation process. During that period, the programme was reviewed in detail and there were some slight changes and additions to it. You must understand that the new Forth bridges unit now includes a short length of trunk road motorway that was previously part of another unit. Therefore, as part of our plan, we have some pavement work, safety barrier upgrades and all the other things that go with maintaining a section of motorway. However, the bulk of the structural work for the Forth road bridge remains as programmed and prioritised by FETA.
On how that programme came about, FETA inspected and ranked the defects in accordance with the Forth road bridge engineering manual, which was originally written by the designers but has been developed over a number of years to reflect best practice. The ranking system in the manual is similar to the one that we use in national standards across the rest of the trunk road network. It ranks defects according to ratings, with safety-critical ones being ranked 4 or 5, and less critical ones being ranked 3, 2 and 1 on the FETA system, and 3, 2 and 1 on the “Design Manual for Roads and Bridges” system for national standards—the systems align quite closely. That will advise you with regard to the different workstreams that you are taking forward, because not everything will fall into a structural ranking—you might be doing some work on a building as well, and that must be considered. All that has to sit within a programme.
Above that, we have introduced as part of our system an arrangement that we have put in place for the rest of the trunk road network, including the Kessock bridge, which Mr Stewart has an interest in, and the Erskine bridge. It involves a value management tool that flows out of work that has been done by the London Bridges Engineering Group and was adopted and developed by the Highways Agency before being adopted and revised by us for use in Scotland some years ago. I will not describe it as a sausage machine, where you pour everything into the top, turn the handle and force it out the other end. Instead, I will say that it is more like a risk management tool that enables us to take on economic and other sensitivities that might influence where things sit in our programmes that are not simply related to structural safety or structural integrity. As part of that process, we come up with our own indicative capital programmes. Under the Forth bridges unit contract, that function will fall to Amey, but it will be closely scrutinised by my staff.
At that critical point, is the level of capital grant for repairs determined by the needs of the capital plan, or are the works determined by the level of funding that is available?
It is fair to say that it is a two-way process, but there is a principle that what you are committing to financially must not undermine the structural integrity of the bridge. It could be said that, in 2016-17, although the Government is hardly flush with cash, there is an increase for the Forth road bridge. The budget that we will vote on for 2016-17 includes a £5.1 million revenue budget and a £9 million capital maintenance budget, which is an increase from £4 million last year. That is an example of the fact that the funding reflects not normal trends and available resource but what is necessary, as Wayne Hindshaw has described. That is an example of budget impact.
There has been more capital spend on the bridge than was anticipated, as a result of the closure. You could argue that the £1.5 million for the structural monitoring equipment is spend on the bridge, in addition to the already-approved capital programme. In no sense will the works that we have undertaken as a consequence of the closure impact on the capital plan. That is not compromised. This is additional resource.
11:30
I will add a couple of points. How the budget for the Forth bridge is calculated is no different from how the budget for any other part of Transport Scotland is calculated. We have a long-term financial plan that is developed using a bottom-up approach. The needs are identified and then aggregated in an overall financial plan. As has been described, there is then a discussion on relative priorities and what needs to go ahead using the available resource. It is built up from a base. We do not simply say, “Here’s an amount of money—what can you do with it?”
Because of the nature of asset management and capital planning generally, we do not tend to have flat or straight lines of spend on assets. The spend depends on the maintenance regime or programme and it can fluctuate quite a bit. That is all part of the financial planning process that we apply in Transport Scotland generally.
Is it the case that, if something is near the top of the list of priorities, it has an impact on capital funding decisions whereas, if something is low on the list, it is less likely to have an impact on those decisions?
Yes, that is fair.
So, as the priority of individual projects is determined, their priority in budgeting is the same. What I am trying to say is that not all things are treated equally.
No. Wayne Hindshaw might add to this, but what I have tried to say is that, as part of an asset management approach, we do not look at everything in the same light. We have a ranking and we take a risk-based approach to what we need to spend our money on. That is done as a matter of course. Regardless of whether we had £5 million, £10 million, £15 million or £20 million, we would still look at the priority in terms of delivering value for money and spending on the right things.
In a sense, the prioritised indicative capital programmes that we have for all our operating companies and for the Forth bridges unit have utopian budget requirements, because they often look many years ahead. Richard Fish, one of the independent experts the committee heard from, said that, when he was managing the Tamar bridge, he lived in the real world as well as in the engineer’s world. I do, too. I have close working relationships with Mike Baxter and my asset management colleagues to identify the high-priority schemes that need to be taken forward. That informs the level of budget that is to be allocated against a broad basket of other cross-disciplinary functions in Transport Scotland.
To answer your original question, it is, as the minister said, a two-way process. We do our best to satisfy the works priorities within the budget availability and we seek additional budget when it becomes available by having schemes that we can deliver rapidly. As the committee will know, Transport Scotland has a good record of having shovel-ready schemes and delivering them. That is part of our remit. Within that indicative capital programme, below the red line on the page that indicates what the budget will cover, you always need to keep a list of schemes ready to deliver should for some reason additional budget become available and we can deliver those priorities ahead of schedule.
The economic impact of the closure has been considerable. Prior to December last year, when the Scottish Government assessed the priorities, did it take into account any broader economic impact that might result from significant closures such as the one that we are discussing?
To clarify, do you mean in relation to closure or before closure?
I mean in more general terms, but the closure last year is an extremely good example that we can use. The broad economic impact was significant. Was that kind of cost taken into account by the Government in prioritising work on the bridge prior to the closure last year?
Of course it is. That is why we are building a £1.3 billion replacement crossing immediately beside the Forth road bridge while continuing to invest in that bridge. That is an example of how we consider economic impact in our capital spend. We are maintaining what we have got and we are building the replacement crossing because of its criticality to the transport network and the impact in the area. Of course economic consideration plays a part when our objective is to ensure the structural integrity of the bridge. We are doing that not just to ensure that the structure is there but to ensure that it is fit for purpose, and its purpose is to allow transport to go over it, so of course that is part of the mix. There has been political consideration of what our priorities are, and the Queensferry crossing is a capital priority.
The second part of your question was about the closure, which was necessary because safety is paramount. In recognition of the impact of that on the community, we enacted a very comprehensive travel action plan and ensured—by working with our partners—that more buses and trains, and more information, were provided, in addition to working towards the key priority of getting the bridge reopened as quickly as possible. We could have spent less money and taken more time. It would have been possible for us not to have commissioned people to put in the effort that they put in to get the bridge reopened as quickly as possible, but precisely because of the impact of the closure on the area, on people’s lives, on businesses and on local communities, we made it our number 1 priority to reopen the bridge, with confidence, as quickly and safely as possible and we committed the resources that the committee has heard about to doing that.
Therefore, economic impact is a factor in capital spend decisions and how we respond.
I would like to make a point about the generality of how Transport Scotland looks after its assets. On structural road maintenance schemes, there is an asset management hierarchy across the whole trunk road network, which takes into account socioeconomic impacts, safety and functionality. That is used in the value management process of prioritising structural road maintenance schemes on a yearly basis.
The experience of December last year and the period since then has had a substantial impact, and it has been difficult for the Government to have to deal with that. Has it taught you anything? Has it changed the way in which you will react to similar incidents in future?
I think that it is fair to say that what happened was unforeseen. There are various incident and contingency plans in place in the event of disruption, but the nature of the fault that made the closure necessary was such that it was unforeseen. All the contingency plans were scaled up to meet the circumstance that we faced, whether that involved diversion routes, traffic management, bridge control, policing or engagement with local authorities.
There are always lessons that can be learned in how we deal with partners and the public, and I think that we acted very quickly. Before they were praised for getting the bridge open so quickly, Transport Scotland and all our stakeholders and partners were quite rightly praised for the travel action plan that was put in place. Within hours of the decision to close the bridge, preparations were made for people going back to work on the Monday. That involved bringing in extra rail rolling stock and buses, as well as a great deal of co-ordination. Therefore, another lesson that was learned was on the need for everyone to keep working in partnership in the event of a major incident such as the closure of the Forth bridge, which was critical to the country’s transport system.
Smaller lessons were learned, such as on how to engineer works. I gave the example of how we were able to accelerate the repair works. Our operating companies have learned that it can be productive—because of the weather factor—to do more work in workshops rather than on site. A number of different lessons have been learned on how to operate in response to incidents.
From a political perspective, I think that being transparent has been the right thing to do—I am referring to the statement that I made to Parliament and the technical briefings that were offered to members, which many took the opportunity to attend. I think that that degree of transparency has been very healthy.
The response was to focus on getting the bridge fully reopened as quickly as possible, and that is what our energies were centred on.
I have been involved in leading transport resilience since the Glasgow airport attack, and we have dealt with many incidents across the network, whether they have involved pandemic flu, flooding, volcanic ash or landslides. We learn on every occasion, and we will do the same in relation to the closure of the Forth bridge. Wayne Hindshaw has already set in motion a series of debriefs with a range of individuals and stakeholders to make sure that we improve our resilience in the future.
We have already touched on the estimated total cost of the repairs in phases 1 to 3 following the recent closure. It is clear that that cost, which stands at £19.7 million, is not insignificant. The enforced closure also caused significant and on-going travel and economic disruption, which we have talked about. With the benefit of hindsight, might it have been preferable for FETA to have taken forward its truss end link replacement proposals, as set out in the 2010 capital plan, in a planned and managed way, thus avoiding the high repair costs and unplanned disruption that, as you rightly said, could not have been foreseen? I accept that that was FETA’s decision, not yours, but do you want to comment?
It is fair to say that we just do not know. I have been asked to speculate about the decision of another organisation and the factors that were in play at the time, but the fundamental point is that the fault was unforeseen and unforeseeable—there is a great deal of consensus around that.
It is hard to answer the what-if questions. What if FETA had proceeded with using consultants? What would a consultant have recommended? What resources would have been available at the time? When could the work have been profiled? Would the pins have seized up before that? There are so many unknowns that it would be unfair of me to make a judgment on whether FETA got it right.
I say again that this was an unforeseeable fault. We all have to bear in mind that the pressure point that existed was identified and was being pursued and repaired, but that was not what caused the fault and current closure—I said “current”, but it is a historical closure; there is now no closure on the Forth road bridge.
We heard in evidence that the nature of the fault was unforeseen and unforeseeable, as you said. The committee understands that, but I think that the public wants to know whether the closure could have been avoided if FETA had taken the decision to replace the truss end links as part of the 2010 capital plan. Could the closure have been avoided?
We genuinely do not know, and FETA would not have known what its commission would have led to, in what timescale and with what conclusion. As Wayne Hindshaw helpfully said, a consultant who was worth their salary might have asked, “What’s the problem? What are you trying to fix?” and concluded that there was no need to replace the full truss end assembly for the whole section. They might have said that it would be more cost effective to identify the points that were being overstressed and fix them, which is ultimately what FETA embarked on doing, based on the information that it had at the time. We do not know what would have happened if FETA had proceeded differently.
There is a lot of political noise on the issue. I was asked in a radio interview whether full replacement of the whole assembly, had it gone ahead, would have captured the bit that was broken by chance. It might have done, but this is all ifs, and we do not know. If FETA had decided to replace the whole assembly, then by chance the bit that became the fault might have been replaced, but that would have happened by chance rather than because the element was identified. FETA did not embark on that programme anyway.
To be fair to FETA, what it did was proportionate, in view of the advice and assessments that it had at the time. It rescoped its work in light of what I described. Does that help, convener?
It all helps.
May I add to what the minister said? I think that Scott Lees said that, in an earlier evidence session, the convener asked all the witnesses whether FETA had made the right decision. Barry Colford and the team took the right decision when they took forward the reduced scheme and looked at the area that was actually impacted, because they just did not know about any other fault in the truss end link assembly.
May I add to what Roy Brannen said? There seems to be an implication that FETA did nothing and withdrew. It did not; it carried on—
That was not the implication in the committee’s questions.
I want to make it clear to the committee that FETA carried on a close working relationship with a consultant and looked at different options. If the reports are read sequentially, you will see that there is a good technical trailing, which shows where things were leading to and where FETA arrived at in 2014.
Have those reports been passed to the committee?
Yes, they were part of the evidence pack that was submitted before we came—
I just want to be clear, because further information will be forthcoming.
You have those reports. I do not expect everyone to read the reports as bedtime reading, but a logical thought trail runs through them that says, “Here’s where we got to at a workshop and here’s where we got to in 2014.” We were asked by you. I thought that what was done was proportionate. As a former consulting engineer with over 21 years in the private sector—I worked for the original designer of the bridge—I thought that it was a proportionate way to take the matter forward.
11:45
Convener, your question was also about whether, if FETA had taken a certain decision to do a certain thing and see that through, there would have been cost and disruption. Yes, of course there would have been. In executing the works, there would also have been disruption and cost that would not have been fully quantified—
My question was whether that work would have been done in a planned and managed way that could have minimised the disruption, with the work done at weekends, for example.
I am not an engineer, but I imagine that it would be hard to replace the full assembly without some disruption and significant cost. However, because the works were never fully designed, never fully costed and never put out to tender for the full assembly replacement, the honest answer is that I do not know. We are being as helpful as we can be, convener.
Thank you. Once the Queensferry crossing has opened, later this year, the traffic on the Forth road bridge will reduce significantly. What works will then be carried out that have been delayed so as not to disrupt traffic across the bridge?
What works do you have the impression are being delayed?
Well, the priority has been to reopen the bridge.
I am not sure how that relates to the Queensferry crossing. As far as I am aware, there has been no impact on the Queensferry crossing from the works on the Forth road bridge. The Queensferry crossing works are progressing as they were. As well as repairing the Forth road bridge, we have taken the opportunity to accelerate other works rather than delay them. I am not sure why there is any perception of delay.
In that case, we will move on.
I have some questions about the arrangements for inspection of the bridge. How is the contract to inspect the Forth road bridge managed and paid for? For example, is there a lump sum payment to carry out a predefined series of inspections? We are not quite clear about the current inspection regime.
I will say one thing about the inspection regime and will then ask Wayne Hindshaw to give you more detail.
The current inspection regime is very much what was inherited from FETA, and it is informed by the very construction of the Forth road bridge as well as learning over the years and international learning. The level of inspection was inherited, and the bridge manual is a live document—it is the on-going history of the bridge. The inspection regime was inherited and we know how the fault was identified on inspection—I am sure that that has been explained to you.
However, it is fair to say that our further understanding of the bridge and the new monitoring equipment will add to the inspection regime. It is even more robust with the new technology that we have on the bridge and our deeper understanding. That should give you confidence around the inspection regime. The fault occurred and was identified within weeks, and we moved ahead with the remedial work and repairs as well as with more forensic inspection.
It is important for the committee to know that we have taken the opportunity, during the bridge closure, to carry out a painstaking and thorough investigation of the bridge, and there are no new substantial defects or faults, although there are some small issues that have been picked up and addressed as a matter of course. We took the opportunity of the bridge closure to carry out that more comprehensive inspection in addition to the inspections that were already programmed.
Wayne Hindshaw can say a bit more about the payment regime between the operating company and the Government.
Just to put it into context, the bridge inspections have continued under Amey using the same staff and procedures that were developed, tried and tested by FETA. Under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations arrangements, everyone went over. I understand that one of the inspectors has retired in the natural course of things but, apart from that, the staff are the same.
The Forth road bridge inspections are undertaken in accordance with the Forth road bridge engineering manual, which I touched on earlier. The manual has been updated and developed over the years to reflect best practice. It has been described before, so I will not do so again. It is a live document and the process is kept under constant review to ensure that it aligns with best practice.
To put the committee in the picture, during the development of the Forth bridges unit contract, the people that developed the contract for us—a company that is now called CH2M but was called CH2M Hill, or Halcrow, which the committee may have heard of—engaged one of the country’s foremost bridge specialists, Flint & Neill Ltd. Neil McFadyen, one of its senior staff, reviewed the Forth road bridge engineering manual to give us the confidence, as the Scottish Government—and as Transport Scotland, representing the Scottish Government—that what was in the manual reflected best practice. The committee will have heard of a number of high-level consultants, but Flint & Neill—for which one of your independent experts, John Evans, was the former senior partner—is recognised as a world leader in the area and has experience on a number of these types of bridges around the world. That is mainly the Severn bridge but also the West Gate bridge in Melbourne.
To put it simply, very few changes were made, but that process brought to the attention of my staff what needed to be done. I will not talk any more about the generalities of inspection manuals, but the very simple answer is that, in line with our other operating companies, those predefined inspections that are well specified, well defined and well laid down for the Forth bridges operating company are paid for through a series of monthly lump sums. Any additional or special inspections that arise out of that are paid for separately, usually at what we call professional service rates or, if we need to bring in an outside expert, at the costs associated with bringing in that outside expert.
If we find something during the inspections, we do not expect Amey to absorb those costs within that lump sum. If we need to go out and do weld testing or to bring in a company such as Strainstall or whatever to assist, as we did, that is paid for in addition. Part of our budget is set aside to do that. We tend always to have an on-going series of what I will call special investigations that arise out of the principal and general inspection programme to tackle issues that occur. I hope that that is helpful.
You mentioned that best practice is constantly evolving, and presumably standards reflect that. I think that somebody mentioned earlier that all over the world people will now be looking at pins in their suspension bridges. How are all those developments, as they happen, incorporated in the inspection regime going forward?
The manual is a live document, and there are also opportunities to introduce changes through the contract change mechanism. If anything substantial were to come forward that we felt needed to be introduced today or tomorrow, that would be done. However, as I have explained, as part of the development of the contract, a full review has taken place. In a couple of years’ time, as part of the development of the next phase of the contract, the same process will be gone through.
So it is a periodic approach.
It is, formally and contractually, but that is not strictly true. FETA, as a roads authority at the time, was responsible for setting its own inspection standards. Clearly, it reflected the best practice that was developed over the years by the Department for Transport for its long-span structures around Britain. FETA sat on a number of national, international and UK forums. I and my immediate colleagues below me in Transport Scotland sit on a number of UK forums to review, share, disseminate and collaborate on developments of best practice. FETA sat on those groups, and I know Barry Colford very well from that. Roy Brannen sat on the UK roads liaison group for a number of years; it is now Donald Morrison who does that.
I sit on the bridge owners forum, the UK bridges board and the Society of Chief Officers of Transportation in Scotland bridges group. I am a member of the International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering, and part of my task is to review, absorb, determine and discuss with Roy Brannen and other senior managers things that arise in the industry that we need to take cognisance of and to build into our contracts. We also now sit on the long-span bridges group, a UK forum of which Barry Colford was a member, which includes the Severn, Humber, Tamar and Dartford crossings.
You must understand that Transport Scotland is the authority that oversees organisation for all structural standards and design approvals on all trunk roads in the whole of Scotland. Given that that is a key part of our work, a key part of my section’s work is to keep up to date on what is going on in those UK organisations. It can be a bit of a Sisyphean task, pushing the stone up the hill all the time, but it is a key part of what we do. Individual engineers in my section have individual portfolios for which they are responsible and for which they are the point of contact, whether that is the bridge strike prevention group or the concrete bridge development group, which Dr Hazel McDonald sits on.
There has been recent on-going work on building information modelling, or BIM, which is a Department for Transport initiative to take us all forward, and you have seen the flowering results of that through some of Amey’s beautiful schematics and computer-generated graphics. Another key area that we are working on is deterioration modelling. Another, after some tunnel collapses, is safety-critical fixings, and the key one that is being implemented this year is the new bridge inspector competency course, to train for future bridge inspections. We have a role at the heart of those organisations. That does not necessarily make us experts, but it means that we are better informed than most.
Could I add to that, with your indulgence, convener? All the expertise and understanding about the bridge was seamlessly transferred over from FETA to Amey. We have had that expertise in Government and in Transport Scotland and we also relied on Amey’s international connections to enable us to execute the repairs as we have done. Amey is a big organisation and is part of a bigger organisation, so that resilience and shared understanding have helped. As far as I am concerned, we had some of the best people in the world informing our thinking on the repair and the modelling.
The committee can also rest assured that the understanding is documented. It is not just with individuals; it is there on record so that we can understand the behaviour—as it is described—of the bridge. Comparisons are made with bridges around the world, and we are not aware of any similar fault with the mechanism that could have alerted us to that happening on the Forth road bridge.
It is a matter of interest that Barry Colford, in his latest venture, is working on a structure called the Walt Whitman bridge in America, which has a truss end link system. I am not aware that there are any problems with it. Truss end link systems are not common, because the systems vary according to the bridge type, but they are not unknown.
I hope that that was comprehensive enough for you, convener.
I am not sure that we have finished yet.
I am reassured that Transport Scotland is on the ball, but we have heard throughout the inquiry about structural health monitoring and various bits of kit that can be used nowadays for on-going monitoring of the performance of elements of the bridge. If I heard you correctly, we have spent £1 million to £1.5 million on monitoring the eight pin joints. Is that correct?
Yes.
Yes.
Is there any other information that you can provide on that? Do you intend to install any more equipment on the bridge, or is that sufficient?
12:00
We now have more technology on the bridge than ever before, and some of it is the latest technology, designed for the issues identified on the Forth road bridge. What has been installed includes sensors, strain gauges, tilt metres, temperature gauges, fibre-optic lines, electrical feeds and data-acquisition units to ensure that we have the best information. The stress limits on the bridge are being tested, and that testing informed the decisions on what traffic we could allow over the bridge.
There was modelling of what was happening on the bridge and then there was live load testing when we ran gritters over the bridge. So, we can do modelling and then live testing. Through the monitoring equipment and other indicators, we can see the traffic’s impact on the behaviour of the bridge. Humans are quite important in the process, too, in terms of inspections. The process involves not only high technology but visual inspections and listening to noise. We will continue to use the range of different methods to inspect the bridge, but the increased technology on the bridge gives us a deeper understanding of its behaviour.
The new equipment has been helpful and has given us the confidence to assess what can be allowed over the bridge, which is now fully operational. We can know in good time what the stresses are on individual members. Metallurgists have suggested that the fault, or crack, was down to metal fatigue. The stress on the member can now be assessed by the new equipment, which is information that we did not have previously. The fault was unforeseeable, but we now know the history of what happened and have more technology. We have made precautionary repairs and have strengthened the bridge in the way that we would be expected to.
There are no plans for further equipment. Each piece of equipment is appropriate for the issue and circumstances. I recall an answer to a parliamentary question on the dehumidification system and the acoustic monitoring, which happened because of concern at the time about the cables. That shows that we respond to each issue as it occurs. Of course, we will try to predict what might happen, but I am not Mystic Meg: I do not have a crystal ball and I do not know what the unforeseen is. However, we will certainly do what we can to predict and prepare, and we have contingencies in place—there has been substantial investment in that regard.
On the wider lessons learned and new technology, which Mr Ingram and Mr Johnstone are interested in, we can now reasonably consider what level of equipment to have on the Queensferry crossing in order to understand the behaviour of that bridge. It is helpful for us now to have established expertise for that, and we commit to using it for the Queensferry crossing.
Just to add to the minister’s point about the Queensferry crossing, it will be the first bridge in Britain to have SHM built in from scratch. The bridge will be heavily instrumented and a new control room will be built into the offices to allow remote monitoring.
I apologise if I am labouring the point, because the minister gave Mr Ingram a good answer to his question on what we will do in the future, but I have asked for a feasibility study to review, assess and give advice on future locations on the bridge where, depending on funding and what the structural health monitoring tells us, we can install strain gauges and tilt metres. The expansion joints and the viaduct movement joints might be included in future remote monitoring locations so that we can get an accurate record of what exactly they are doing during the day and at night.
We have quite a lot of structural health monitoring already on the bridge. As others have said, we have acoustic monitoring of the cables, dehumidification and geospatial sensors, which are monitored remotely from the University of Nottingham and which tell us that the bridge is moving 4.5m up and down and 7.5m laterally. That came as a surprise to some of us, but that is what it is doing and the plots are very interesting.
Barry Colford previously made a valuable point. Although he did not say that visual inspection and the ability to put a fingernail into a crack and get up close and personal remain our primary method of inspecting things, he said that we have to be careful with structural health monitoring. It is a very new thing and we do not want to end up with data overload whereby we have a great deal of information coming at us but no idea what to do with it. We will therefore be in learning mode for quite a while.
Right. That was a fairly comprehensive answer to my question. The minister, then, is no Donald Rumsfeld with his known unknowns and unknown unknowns and all the rest of it—no doubt he is relieved by that. I will pass now, convener.
Thank you. Michael.
Oh, is it me?
You are not under any obligation to ask questions if you would rather not.
Most people do not refer to me as Michael but as Mike, as per my name plate.
Before we leave this fascinating discussion, can I ask the minister whether any consideration was given to structural health monitoring for the truss end link or any other part of the bridge before the failure in December?
I am not aware of any discussion to that effect. The concerns were about other parts of the bridge, such as the cables, where we did the acoustic monitoring, as I have said. A problem was identified at the bracket and there was a programme of works for that. I am not aware of any previous discussion on installing the structural health monitoring mechanisms.
It should be borne in mind that some of the technology has been made to measure for the Forth road bridge in light of incidents, and that is appropriate.
Thank you. I think that we have covered that subject pretty exhaustively.
Mr Colford explained to the committee that, when he was the bridgemaster, he was a member of the International Cable Supported Bridge Operators Association and he was able to learn from good practice across the world. Is there any continuing arrangement whereby that good practice can be tapped into?
As Wayne Hindshaw described at length, we are still involved in the local, regional, national and international forums for intelligence on bridge structures. We are still getting that deep understanding.
Incidentally and for the sake of completeness, I should say that bridgemasters still talk to each other to share their expertise, which is also helpful.
During our inquiry, we heard that the Humber bridge’s maintenance regime is based on a 60-year plan. There will be a reduction in the amount of traffic using the Forth road bridge when the new bridge opens, so what is its projected lifespan?
It is on-going. Strong maintenance of the bridge could see it continuing to be used for as long as we want. The advice that I have been given is that as long as we keep investing in and maintaining it and replacing components as required, the bridge can continue for whatever time we want. Previous estimates of lifespans have been between 50 and 70 years, but they are all estimates.
I will move on to a slightly different subject. During the inquiry, we heard a lot about the disruptive effect of the bridge closure. Has there been any upside to the closure in terms of commuter behaviour or whatever?
We want to see modal shift from the car on to public transport. As transport minister, I particularly want to encourage that. During the closure, our travel plan saw a clear and welcome shift on to public transport. People went more to rail than to bus, even though there was a bus priority lane as well as a goods priority lane. There was certainly far more use of public transport, which was welcome. Extra rolling stock was provided to the area and staffing was enhanced at public transport points.
One of the advantages was the earlier train that was put on in the morning, and ScotRail has maintained that service because there has turned out to be on-going demand for it. That is a public transport benefit, which is welcome. The situation encouraged a lot of people to use public transport who perhaps were not using it before. If we want to achieve modal shift, people need to get out of their cars and on to public transport.
I appreciated the forbearance and patience of the public and businesses in the local area during the period of disruption. There were public transport benefits, such as the improved rail timetable and more people got used to using public transport.
We are undertaking an evaluation exercise—which I do not think will be ready in time for this committee to consider, but which in any event is not central to your inquiry—to come to an understanding of how people responded to disruption, how they got to work, the use of public transport and so on. I will be happy to share the results of that exercise if the committee is interested, but I can tell members that it shows a significant shift during the period and that there are on-going benefits.
That sounds interesting.
This will be my final question, convener. When we heard from the panel of independent experts, they lavished praise on the whole bridge team and everyone involved in the process for identifying the problem and undertaking remedial action very quickly indeed. I think that you yourself have had very hands-on involvement in the process. You have already touched on the initial decision, but can you describe for the committee your involvement as this story has unfolded and come to its happy conclusion?
It is fair to say that the experience of transport ministers during the winter is a very particular one. The situation, though unforeseen, was quite intense. When we looked back at the record, we found that there were more than 20 ministerial calls and engagements, some of which, of course, included cabinet secretaries, the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, who have lead responsibility for resilience. There were also a number of site visits, as well as very frequent reports to ensure that we were on top of the issue. I was left under no illusion that the priority was not only to ensure public safety but to get the bridge reopened as quickly as possible, and that is where we have directed all our energies.
We have also taken advantage of the Forth road bridge closure—and this is why I was thrown by the earlier question about delay—to support works to the Queensferry crossing that have, as a result, been able to take place with less disruption. We have also tried to do as many as possible of the works associated with the Forth road bridge, such as those relating to the carriageways and those that might have led to future disruption, during its closure and, indeed, while we were fixing it. I remember the repeated calls to let pedestrians and cyclists go across the bridge during the closure but, as much as we would have liked to have done that, we could not compromise public safety. After all, it was a live work site, and there were the other issues that I am sure you understand with regard to the fault on the bridge itself.
There are positives; indeed, there are always lessons to be learned. We upscaled the contingency plans; public transport was strengthened; there is now more monitoring equipment on the Forth road bridge that will give us an even better understanding of its behaviour; and there has been a degree of vindication of our view that building the new Queensferry crossing was the right thing to do. It will act as a substantial contingency for the Forth road bridge—and vice versa.
There are choices for the future with regard to the role of the Forth road bridge. Its use has been set out in the legislation, but a future Government might well have some thoughts about the role that it should play. The Queensferry crossing was to be a replacement bridge, but there might be other options for the future of the Forth road bridge, if it is well maintained.
I am happy to write to the committee about the extra works that we were able to undertake, which will give members a sense of what we were able to do during the closure. It will make my point by giving details about carriageway improvements, landscaping works, structural matters—
That is what I was alluding to earlier. Resurfacing was one of the issues that were raised.
Absolutely. The closure in no sense caused delay; in fact, it accelerated works and led to their being much better timed, which has reduced the need for further disruption, closure or anything else. We thought that it was fit and appropriate to do that work while we were repairing the bridge, which was clearly our number 1 priority.
I thank Mike MacKenzie for his praise, but the people who deserve that praise are, of course, the staff who worked in all weathers to repair the bridge. They knew that it was a priority not just for the Scottish Government but for Scotland. Again, I thank them all.
Thank you. We have had a very comprehensive evidence-taking session, minister. I see that members have no final questions, but I wonder whether you wish to say anything else in conclusion.
I think that I have covered everything as fully as I possibly can. We will send the information on engagement this afternoon, and if you require anything else, please raise it with me. I said throughout the closure of the bridge that, when the engineers and experts were exposed to the Parliament, everyone would be filled with confidence that the Government and our agencies were making interventions that were right, proportionate and appropriate, that put public safety first and which sought to repair the bridge as quickly as possible. As a result, we have been left in a much stronger position.
On behalf of the committee, minister, I thank you for your commitment, your very comprehensive evidence this morning and your willingness to engage in a constructive and positive way. I also thank Transport Scotland officials for making their experience and expertise available to the committee, not just today, but throughout the inquiry.
On that note of thanks, I suspend the meeting briefly to allow the witnesses to leave the room.
12:15 Meeting suspended.Previous
Subordinate Legislation