Subordinate Legislation
Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 (Privative Jurisdiction and Summary Cause) Order 2007 (draft)
I welcome Kenny MacAskill, the Cabinet Secretary for Justice, who is a frequent visitor to the committee; Paul Cackette, who is head of the civil justice, law reform and international division in the Scottish Government; Hamish Goodall, who is the policy manager for civil procedure and law reform in the Scottish Government; and John St Clair, from legal and parliamentary services in the Scottish Government.
I refer members to paper 1 from the clerk, and paper 2, which is the submission from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers.
I invite the cabinet secretary to speak to the order but not to move the motion yet, to allow officials to answer questions directly if required.
The Government is committed to improving access to justice for all, so I am delighted to be here today to discuss the order. It is 19 years since the jurisdiction limits were last increased, so the time has come to set more realistic limits.
There are three procedures for dealing with sheriff court civil actions: small claims actions; summary cause actions; and ordinary cause actions. Where cases relate to recovery of a sum of money, that sum determines which procedure the case should follow. Our proposal is that a small claim will be a claim with a value of £3,000 or less. Summary cause procedure will apply for actions for more than £3,000 but less than £5,000, and ordinary cause actions will deal with cases with a value of more than £5,000.
Hard-working Scots who have perfectly valid claims are currently being denied accessible justice due to the existence of an artificially low small claims limit. A new small claims limit of £3,000 will mean that many more people will be able to make use of the less complicated small claims system within the sheriff court to resolve such claims. People who in the past were prevented from pursuing a claim against a business or individual will now be able to do so without having to employ a lawyer, with all the extra expense that that entails. I am sure that, like me, many members will have received inquiries from people who have incurred bank charges and who have been deterred from raising actions because the repayment that they sought exceeded the small claims limit. Raising the limit will improve access to justice for people in that situation.
As part of the package of new measures announced today, I have decided to remove all personal injury actions from the small claims procedure. Such actions are different in their potentially technical nature and in the fact that legal representation and the availability of legal aid may be important. Personal injury cases are often complex and, in addition to legal representation, may require expert witness evidence and attendance.
There is a choice for litigants as to whether they litigate in the sheriff court or in the Court of Session. In order not to have too many low-value claims in the Court of Session, there is a limit below which that choice does not exist and it is necessary to raise actions in the sheriff court. That is known as the sheriff court privative limit, which we propose to raise to £5,000. The Court of Session is the highest civil court in Scotland. I firmly believe that run-of-the-mill cases below such a reasonable value as £5,000 ought at first instance to be raised in the local sheriff court. The raising of one limit cannot sensibly be considered in isolation from the others, as they are interdependent and impact on one another.
The proposed new levels balance the right to access to justice and its cost to the litigant with the efficient and effective use of court resources. The proposed limits represent an inflation-based increase with a build-in for future anticipated inflation, plus an additional element to signal my belief that an increase is due in principle. They also bridge the gap until Lord Gill reports in 2009, following his review of the civil courts. My expectation is that, as part of his review, Lord Gill will consider jurisdictional issues, including the financial jurisdiction limits.
In conclusion, the order means that, from next January, many more Scots will have better and cheaper access to justice.
Thank you, cabinet secretary.
I am not opposed in principle to raising the limits, but I have a number of concerns and questions with regard to the order. The cabinet secretary received a letter dated 16 October 2007 from John Quigley, the general secretary of Unite, in which Mr Quigley makes it plain that the union is disappointed that there has been no consultation. He refers to the
"significant impact upon the legal services which we can offer our members"
with regard to the issue of civil court limits.
He raises a reasonable point when he says:
"I have no doubt that this would have a significantly negative impact upon access to justice and health and safety. Unite believe that a Statutory Instrument with such far reaching implications should not be introduced lightly and should only be introduced after extensive consultation."
The cabinet secretary might wish to respond to the concerns that Mr Quigley raises in his letter.
More generally, it is my information that a similar change to the limits was withdrawn in the previous diet of the Parliament in order that consultation could take place with interested parties, and with stakeholders such as trade unions. Why has there been no consultation? Would the cabinet secretary consider withdrawing the order, consulting and then returning to the committee having had the benefit of such a consultation?
If that is not acceptable, would the cabinet secretary assure the committee that if the order is passed, notwithstanding what Lord Gill recommends in his civil justice review, there will be no attempt to come back to the committee in a year or 18 months' time seeking to raise the level of the summary cause limit yet again? The committee requires assurances from the cabinet secretary to satisfy it that it will not face a further order to raise the limit again. I would be grateful for the cabinet secretary's response to that concern.
Although, in principle, I am not against raising the limits, without such a cast-iron assurance on the question of Lord Gill's civil justice review, I would have to reserve my position with regard to the order.
As I see it, that is four questions. I ask the cabinet secretary to respond.
I will do my best to answer all four—the convener can chivvy me if I have not done so.
To put matters in context, I should say that I ceased practising in the legal profession when I was elected to the Parliament in 1999. Before I ceased practice, the limits of summary cause and small claims were a matter of debate, not simply within the legal profession but in Scotland generally. That debate has continued since then. As I said, it is 19 years since we had a review, so inflation alone means that the matter must be addressed.
You asked why there has been no specific consultation. Consultation was taking place back in 1998—I remember on-going debate then. The previous Administration brought matters to the Parliament for consideration in the early part of the 21st century, so there was on-going discussion and debate then, although the matters were subsequently withdrawn. My predecessors who held ministerial office in the Scottish Executive Justice Department took it on themselves informally to consult unions and relevant legal officials from the Law Society of Scotland and elsewhere, and letters were sent to numerous firms, asking for comments and assistance.
Discussions also took place between ministers and Opposition spokesmen. Hugh Henry consulted me when he was Deputy Minister for Justice—I do not know whether he consulted spokespeople from other parties. I have spoken to relevant interests among personal injury lawyers and trade union lawyers, who sometimes take a different approach. Therefore, it appears to us that the matter has been under regular and on-going review, although you were quite correct when you said that there has been no specific consultation on the draft order. It seems to us that after 19 years, given inflation and an array of other matters, the time has come when we have to take a decision.
I assure Bill Butler that our approach is not meant to provide for interim limits that will then be levered up. We are acting on the basis that we must drive matters forward, to allow greater access to justice for ordinary people in Scotland. I cannot give a blanket assurance that there will be no further statutory instruments, because I am advised that European Union directives on small claims will require to be transposed. However, I give an assurance that the draft order is meant to provide a holding position until Lord Gill concludes his more substantive review, in which he is considering not just the financial limits but the courts and procedures through which actions should be raised.
I think that I have answered the question about consultation. There is no intention to return to the issue—apart from action on procedural matters that might be required as a result of EU directives—until Lord Gill has given his necessary and full update on the position. I am not sure whether I have answered four questions—I might have answered only two. If Bill Butler tells me what I missed I will happily respond.
I do not know whether I asked four questions. The convener counted for me, while I was carried away by the exuberance of my own verbosity.
As you said, it is 19 years since the limits were increased and inflation must be taken into account. Nobody would gainsay that we must consider the issue. However, trade union representatives made the point that, given that the most recent consultation on the issue took place before the Scottish Parliament was established, there has been no formal consultation in the context of Holyrood's devolved powers. You said that letters were sent to firms. Were letters also sent to trade unions, which have a relevant interest in the matter?
I took comfort from your comment that you are not providing for
"interim limits that will then be levered up",
but you went on to say that the order provides "a holding position" until Lord Gill reports. Are you saying that, whatever Lord Gill says, you are not predisposed to return to the committee with an order that levers up the limits?
That is absolutely right, subject to the caveat that I made about EU directives. There is no intention to increase the limits further until we know what Lord Gill suggests.
I am reasonably content with, but not ecstatic about, that response.
I agree with Bill Butler in that I support the approach in principle but want to investigate the procedure that has been followed.
Cabinet secretary, you acknowledged that there has been no refresh of the consultation process. Why was there no consultation? Unite raised that issue. Has a precedent been set for the approach to such legislation in future? What prevented you from undertaking consultation?
The matter has been under constant review and discussion and has been the subject of interaction between previous Governments, trade unions and the legal profession since 1998. It seemed to us that the matter has been on-going. The trade unions have been in direct communication with the Government and have communicated indirectly through agents. There comes a time when we simply must make a decision.
The matter that we are considering has been the subject of vigorous debate, as you rightly said. Are you unwilling to give the committee an assurance that you will consult on such important issues in future? Are you saying that if an issue has been debated extensively, you will not refresh the consultation process? Is a precedent being set for the approach to other instruments?
I assure you that if I kicked off legislation in 2007, I would hope that it would be delivered by 2016. We are considering an exceptional matter, which has been on-going since 1998. When we are talking about introducing legislation, such as a criminal justice bill—there is a proposal for next autumn in that regard—there will be appropriate consultation. We are talking about a matter that has been the subject of discussion and debate in the broader body politic and in civic life in Scotland since 1998. It is our responsibility as a Government to deliver, so that hard-pressed Scots can gain access to justice.
You represent a new, minority Government. I accept that there has been robust debate about the issue, but the new Government had a responsibility to refresh the consultation. What prevented your officials from suggesting that a consultation exercise be undertaken? John Quigley asked about that in his letter.
Perhaps the clerk can confirm this. I understand that it is good practice to carry out a consultation exercise before an instrument is brought before a parliamentary committee—the consultation should have been undertaken recently, not 19 years ago. I have read guidelines on the issue, which has arisen in the past. What prevented the minister from proposing a refreshed consultation exercise?
I inherit the obligations and actions of my predecessors. As I said, Hugh Henry consulted widely with relevant spokespeople, including me, which was appropriate. We do not have to restart the clock every time a Government changes. I am happy to progress the action that has been taken since 1998.
I regret the approach that you are taking. I received a letter from your colleague Duncan McNeil, who said that he was pleased to note the increase in the limits. His only complaint seemed to be that the new limit for small claims actions would be only £3,000. Your colleague did not want us to discuss further; he wanted us to go further. You might want to raise that with him—I can provide the letter if you want it.
Can we have clarity on good practice? I understand that there should have been a consultation process.
Nothing in standing orders requires that. Consultation is an essential part of the parliamentary and committee process. We are arguing about whether the consultation that took place in the past was contemporary, which is a matter for the minister.
I have two questions: one about the financial limits and one about the concerns that the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers expressed. On the limits, not for the first time I have a certain sympathy with Duncan McNeil's point of view. You mentioned the impact of inflation and I welcome the raising of the limit for small claims from a level that most members have accepted for many years is too low. Is the change proposed only because of inflation, or is there a policy on what sorts of people with which claims in which situations should be able to access justice through the small claims route rather than through any of the more difficult routes?
You are correct that the proposal is not simply about the limit; it comes back to the points pushed by your colleagues Bill Butler and Paul Martin. Our view is that the proposal is a temporary measure rather than a piecemeal approach and that it will allow Lord Gill to carry out his review. I inherited that review, which was instructed by my predecessors. I welcome it because the situation requires to be looked at. Lord Gill will consider a variety of factors. Margaret Smith is correct that the matter is about more than simply the level at which we set the limit; that is why we decided that we needed to strike a balance.
It seemed to us that there were arguments for following the route taken in England, where the limits, if I remember correctly, are £5,000 and £10,000. The reason for not proceeding in that way was that England reached those limits by two or three increases over several years, with the first increase in 1996. There would be a considerable jump if we were to match the English levels in one fell swoop.
Where our measure leaves us in relation to Lord Gill's final position is a matter that will be commented on either by me or by my successors. However, our proposal strikes a balance to sort out a current situation that is unacceptable. The level at which we have set the limit might or might not be changed.
We have considered the effects of particular types of action, the major example of which is personal injury, which we recognise is an extremely complex area. Personal injury actions do not simply cover health and safety but deal with medical evidence, which can be particularly complex. That is why we have ruled those actions out of the order.
There are other instances in which cases can be remitted and further instances that it is suggested should be dealt with differently. That brings me back to the point that I made at the outset—we are proposing a holding measure until such time as Lord Gill can give us a fuller view on which Parliament and the committee can reflect. We believe that the measure strikes the right balance in terms of the level at which the limit is set and it offers the right protection, especially with regard to personal injury, where there was considerable cause for concern. We seek to protect people in such situations.
Given that we are waiting for Lord Gill to report and given that there have been incremental increases to the limit in England, the position that you put to us today should not necessarily be seen as the end point in the process.
No, it is a matter for Lord Gill; I will not cut across his bow. It is important that we look at the nature of how we structure and deliver civil law and access to justice in Scotland. Lord Gill and his team are considering the situation at present but, as I said to Bill Butler, I assure the committee that I do not plan to increase the limit next year; I would prefer to wait until Lord Gill reaches a conclusion that we will review as a Parliament.
I pick up on the point about the submission that we received from the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers. I do not wish to go over ground covered by my colleagues, but your argument against consultation would have been stronger if we had not received such a submission from APIL.
As you said, personal injury is a technical and complex area, and I am a layperson. However, the association raises issues that will give us ground for concern if you do not have reasonable responses to them. APIL has serious concerns about the decision to make all personal injury claims up to the value of £5,000 summary causes in the sheriff court. APIL is concerned that that is likely to add to the amount of judicial time required. APIL also refers in its submission to the voluntary pre-action protocol under which, although offers may be slightly higher than they would be if the claim were decided in court, legal fees are cut out and people do not have to go to court. Under your proposals, APIL feels that insurers are more likely not to make their best offer before actions are raised. Although those issues are technical, they are still areas of concern. Will you put our minds at rest on them?
No matter where we set the limit, there will always be an argument. For example, the trade union lawyers make a different argument vis-à-vis sheriff court versus the Court of Session. No matter where we set the limit, there will always be some argument; for example, there will be arguments about claims of £2,900 if the limit is set at £3,000. If, as some, including Duncan McNeil, would like, the limit is set at £5,000, there will be a problem. There will always be a cut-off point, as there is currently for summary cause actions of over £750 and up to £1,500. The new measure strikes a reasonable balance and offers the protection that we need to provide. As I said, personal injury cases will be dealt with under summary cause actions as opposed to ordinary cause rules. Personal injury cases are complex and we have separated them from the order because of lobbying by APIL, the trade unions and the trade union legal firms.
Fees are for negotiation between agents and insurance companies. A balance has to be struck and we think that we have proposed a reasonable one. Will there be instances in which people feel they lose out under the new rules? The answer is probably yes. Equally, a great number of people lose out with the current threshold, including those who legitimately want to pursue the level of interest that banks have charged them. It is a matter of striking a balance that acts according to utilitarian principles. We have always discussed matters with the Law Society, and personal injury lawyers are obviously members of the Law Society.
I seek a final assurance. Will the specific points raised by APIL be kept under review so that when we return to the matter, we have information about the impact of the change to the small claims limit, if it goes ahead?
I am more than happy to ensure that Lord Gill is made aware of the representations and views from unions, APIL, the committee or whoever. It is appropriate that Lord Gill and his team should come back with what we hope will be a blueprint for civil procedure in Scotland that will serve us for many a year. I am happy to give you an undertaking that if Lord Gill is not already aware of such concerns—although I am sure that he is—he will be made aware of them.
Before going to Cathie Craigie, we go back to Bill Butler on that point.
It is not exactly on that point. I asked a question earlier and I do not think that the cabinet secretary responded, so I ask him to respond directly to this question. He said in response to me that letters had been sent out by his officials to law firms and so on. I then asked him why no letters were sent to trade unions. What prevented that correspondence with trade unions that have a genuine interest in the matter?
The major trade union law firms were written to. In my experience, such firms have, if not a stranglehold, a significant input. Certain firms, which I will not name, were in consultation and communication with the Government.
I accept what you are saying. You were wise not to employ the word stranglehold—I commend you for that.
Leaving strangling aside, we will move on to Cathie Craigie.
I put on record my support for the comments that have been made about consultation. I am disappointed that there has been no formal consultation on the issue since 1999. Can the minister tell us how the statutory instrument differs from the one that was put before the justice committee in the previous session of Parliament and subsequently withdrawn?
My understanding is that it is, if not on all squares as lawyers might say, to all intents and purposes much the same.
The previous justice committee obviously had concerns. What has the justice department done to address them?
My recollection is that consultations took place. To his credit, Hugh Henry held significant investigations and had cross-party discussions. I do not know why matters were not proceeded with prior to May 2007, so I cannot comment. All that I can say is that it appears that efforts were made, and we take the view that the time has now come to drive the matter forward. It is not as if the instrument to which you refer was introduced in the previous session of Parliament—it was the one before that. There has been a significant passage of time—19 years have passed. If the provisions are exactly the same as those that were put before the previous committee, that shows that I am more than happy to accept my predecessors' proposals. The argument is further strengthened because time has marched on and we must ensure that our court system is fit for the 21st century. It is 2007, and people want to have easy and relatively cheap access to justice.
Are we about to be given further information?
No. I am just being advised that other changes have been made while there have been no changes to the summary cause and ordinary fees limits, so the limits are out of kilter.
I do not disagree with the principle of the order, but I have concerns about the timing. Lord Gill is currently conducting a review. The minister says that the order is a temporary measure and that it strikes the right balance, but that if Lord Gill takes a different view he will consider it. Minister, given that, as you say, the matter has been discussed since 1998 and Lord Gill is expected to report to ministers and the Parliament later this year—or perhaps February next year—why should you press ahead with this measure when there is clearly so much concern? As Margaret Smith indicated, the APIL has serious concerns. Why should we not take the time, while Lord Gill is examining the issue, to speak to the trade unions and the lawyers and practitioners who represent a large number of people who bring actions?
There are two issues. Lord Gill will not report until 2009. Clearly, the Government would have to consider and, no doubt, consult upon the report, and legislation would follow thereafter. The likelihood is that we would not be able to address the issue until 2010 or 2011, which would further increase the delay—it would not be 25 years in total, but it would not be far off it. Lord Gill is due to make an interim report, which will indicate the direction of travel, but his more full report is not anticipated until 2009. Action would probably be taken the following year.
On why we are making progress pending the publication of Lord Gill's report, it is not as if he is about to report, and it would be several years before we could implement his recommendations. You are correct to say that trade unions and the APIL have been making representations, but other voices—in the consumer lobby and elsewhere—are saying, "Do it now," or, like Duncan McNeil, "Well done, but you should have gone further." With all respect to Duncan McNeil—Cathie Craigie knows him better than I do—he has a track record of standing up for and fighting for trade union interests, especially in relation to those who have suffered personal injury in the workplace on the upper and lower Clyde. I tend to take his comments on the issue seriously, and I commend his letter to you.
The cabinet secretary refers to a letter from Duncan McNeil—who is not present, and whose correspondence I always welcome—that we do not have. Will the cabinet secretary provide all committee members with that correspondence? For transparency's sake, I would like to linger over Duncan McNeil's words and see what he has to say.
Absolutely.
Duncan McNeil has every right to make his views on the matter known to the cabinet secretary, and I welcome the opportunity to see a copy of his letter.
I understood that Lord Gill would make his interim report next year. Is that not an opportunity for the Scottish Executive to examine the issue more fully, consider the points that have been raised with members by the trade unions and by the lawyers body, and come back to us with answers? Serious concerns have been raised with the committee, and we have not had time this morning to get full answers to them. I assume that the minister and the justice department have seen copies of the correspondence from Amicus and the APIL. Before I can confidently support the order, I want answers to the points that have been raised, because our court system—particularly the sheriff court system—could be blocked and slowed down.
I do not envisage the sheriff court system being blocked or slowed down. You could argue that a substantial number of people will lose out on access to justice at an affordable rate if we do not take action. The difficulty in relation to Lord Gill's report is twofold. First, we do not know what he is likely to say in his interim report. Furthermore, although we know that the report is coming next year, the timescale is still fairly flexible. Secondly, Lord Gill could genuflect towards an integrated package that would require substantial change—the level of fees or the level at which actions are taken would be only one part of the package, because views would be taken on which courts do what and how matters are handled.
The order deals with only one factor in the court process—the level at which small claims and summary cause actions are set. It is possible to envisage a scenario in which some matters are dealt with by different courts. Whatever the approach might be, some matters may be dealt with in a different way. It is difficult to predict what Lord Gill will say.
I come back to the assurance that I gave Bill Butler, which is that we await with interest what Lord Gill says in his report. However, we cannot continue to do nothing until such time as it is before us, because 19 years would become 20, 21 and more. We have made the order on the basis that it provides immediate relief and a benefit by making the courts more accessible for ordinary people in Scotland. The committee has our assurance that we hope that the order will be part of a broader package that the Parliament will be able to reflect upon at some point post-2009. Given the nature of the legislative machinery, we are looking at 2010 or later.
I am delighted that the limits are to be increased. The change is long overdue, but I think that we all know that by now.
Given that it is hoped that people will now feel that it is worth litigating for small claims—after all, that is the whole point—do we have an estimate of how many cases will finish up in court? Have the implications for court business been considered? Of course, the great benefit is not that people will litigate but that they will have the opportunity to do so. The threat that people might litigate will then keep business straight. However, I am interested to know the estimate for the change in court business.
It has been pointed out to me that in 1993, 72,714 small claims were initiated, but that by 2002 that number had more than halved to 32,256. That decrease occurred despite the fact that people arguably had more money and more consumer goods and other things on which they could litigate. Clearly, the number of small claims was on a downward spiral. However, it is difficult to predict where the number will go to. We hope that the trend will bottom out once we allow people to exercise their right to action.
As a caveat, I ceased practice in 1999, but I recall that the level at which the limit is set is not the only factor—that ties in with the need for Lord Gill's reforms. There is also the hassle factor in going to court, such as the time that people need to take off work and the bureaucracy that is involved. The order is an interim measure to try to improve people's access to justice, but the Government recognises that wider matters affect people's ability to act.
However, given that the number of small claims has reduced by more than 50 per cent when, given the nature of the world in which we live, the trend should arguably have gone in the other direction, there is clearly a problem. I do not know what the precise numbers will be after the limits have been increased, but I have no doubt that contingency plans are being made by the Scottish Court Service. To some extent, we will just need to see what happens hereafter.
We really must move on, unless members have any pressing issues that they wish to raise. The cabinet secretary has answered our questions comprehensively. I now ask him to wind up his remarks and to move motion S3M-482.
I am happy to have had the opportunity to engage with members today. I give the assurance that we do not mean to deal with the matter on a piecemeal basis. The order is an interim measure until such time as Lord Gill provides a basis for what we hope will be a vastly improved system that is fit for the 21st century.
I move,
That the Justice Committee recommends that the draft Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 (Private Jurisdiction and Summary Cause) Order 2007 be approved.
Motion agreed to.
Small Claims (Scotland) Amendment Order 2007 (draft)
We move to the next agenda item. I invite the cabinet secretary to move motion S3M-479. Basically, this order raises the same issues as the previous one.
Motion moved,
That the Justice Committee recommends that the draft Small Claims (Scotland) Amendment Order 2007 be approved.—[Kenny MacAskill.]
Motion agreed to.
Before we move on to agenda item 4, I suspend the meeting briefly to allow the cabinet secretary's team of officials to change.
Meeting suspended.
On resuming—
Licensed Premises Gaming Machine Permits (Scotland) Regulations 2007 (draft)
I welcome Ken McKenna and Jim Wilson from the Scottish Government's local government and licensing division, who have joined the cabinet secretary. I refer members to the clerk's paper J/S3/07/6/4, which relates to this agenda item. I invite the cabinet secretary to speak to and move motion S3M-481.
I welcome the opportunity to say a few words on the draft Licensed Premises Gaming Machine Permits (Scotland) Regulations 2007; my comments also apply to the draft Club Gaming and Club Machine Permits (Scotland) Regulations 2007. The regulations will implement the Scottish provisions of the Gambling Act 2005 that affect pubs and clubs.
To put matters into context, it might help if I make a few general points first. The Gambling Act 2005 establishes new controls on gambling to ensure that controls are not undermined by new technology. The act also provides new powers to protect children, to crack down on illegal gambling and to eliminate socially irresponsible practices. Although gambling is primarily a reserved matter, in January 2005 the Scottish Parliament agreed that the Scottish ministers should be given certain powers under the 2005 act. Section 285 of that act enables the Scottish ministers to make provisions equivalent to the procedures for certain permits in England and Wales, relating to club gaming, club machines and licensed premises gaming machines. That is what the regulations will do.
It is worth restating the licensing objectives of the Gambling Act 2005, which are: to prevent gambling being a source of crime or disorder, being associated with crime or disorder or being used to support crime; to ensure that gambling is conducted in a fair and open way; and to protect children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by gambling. Those objectives fit well with the Scottish Government's safer and stronger strategic objective. Within that overall policy framework, the policy objective for the regulations is to have appropriate procedures for clubs and pubs to obtain the relevant gaming permits.
Basically, clubs are allowed up to three gaming machines and, in certain circumstances, can offer some other gaming facilities. Pubs and some other alcohol-licensed premises are allowed up to two gaming machines and can apply to licensing authorities to increase that number. Local licensing boards are the appropriate authorities in Scotland.
The regulations set out the administrative procedures for obtaining club gaming and club machine permits and licensed premises gaming machine permits. They also set the associated fee levels. The aim is to have consistent, light-touch and user-friendly procedures. At the same time, we do not wish to place unnecessary burdens on businesses, licensing boards or the Gambling Commission, which is the United Kingdom-wide regulatory body.
The draft regulations were consulted on during the summer. Respondents were generally content with the provisions, but some minor modifications were made following the consultation exercise.
The regulations seek to take a balanced approach to modernising the regulation of small-scale gambling within the clubs and pubs sector. On one hand, there is a need to be prescriptive and to provide consistency and clarity to licensing boards, enforcement agencies, the gambling industry and the public. On the other hand, those same groups require flexibility and proportionate regulation. We consider that the right balance has been struck.
I think that I have said enough by way of introductory remarks on the regulations, but I am happy to answer any queries that the committee might have.
The issues appear to be fairly straightforward. Do members have any questions?
I refer the cabinet secretary to paragraph 18 of the regulatory impact assessment. I note that licensing boards will be responsible for administering and issuing permits. Paragraph 18 states:
"The fees payable to Licensing Boards are intended to cover the whole cost of the administrative work associated with permits".
I also note that the fee level was the subject of consultation. Was the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities of the view that the fee level that has been set will be sufficient to cover the administrative costs?
Ken McKenna (Scottish Government Criminal Justice Directorate):
COSLA did not actually respond—
Sorry Mr McKenna, but I am afraid that you have no locus here.
My understanding is that COSLA did not respond to the consultation, but informal discussions suggest that there is no reason for alarm. I am happy to assure the member that, if there are problems, we will be happy to examine them—as we have examined other matters that genuflect towards licensing. The regulations set an interim level of fees and establish parity with what is happening south of the border. We will see how it works out.
Members have no further questions. I remind the cabinet secretary that he has not moved the motion. I assume that he does not need to wind up.
Motion moved,
That the Justice Committee recommends that the draft Licensed Premises Gaming Machine Permits (Scotland) Regulations 2007 be approved.—[Kenny MacAskill.]
Motion agreed to.
Club Gaming and Club Machine Permits (Scotland) Regulations 2007 (draft)
I refer members to paper J/S3/07/6/5 on the regulations. I invite the cabinet secretary to move motion S3M-480.
Motion moved,
That the Justice Committee recommends that the draft Club Gaming and Club Machine Permits (Scotland) Regulations 2007 be approved.—[Kenny MacAskill.]
Motion agreed to.
I suspend the meeting briefly so that the cabinet secretary and his officials may leave and the new set of witnesses may come in.
Meeting suspended.
On resuming—