Agenda item 4 is about the reappointment of Crown appointees and related issues. The Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body requested that we consider how the Parliament handles Crown appointments—which, essentially, are made on a recommendation of the Parliament—when it is recommended that the existing office-holder continues for a second term in office or, exceptionally, for a third. Are members content with the recommendations in the report? It all seems fairly straightforward. Do members have any questions?
The paper asks us only to take a preliminary view anyway.
I would like further information on the circumstances in which it is envisaged that people would be reappointed for a third term. The paper states:
The question is whether standing orders could define special circumstances. That would not necessarily be appropriate. If the legislation that set up the post does not define what special circumstances are, why should we do so in standing orders?
The recommendation in paragraph 33(c) invites members to
I was going to come on to that in a moment.
Of course, our preliminary view could change after evidence has been led.
Absolutely. Do members have any other comments on the reappointment of Crown appointees before we take evidence?
Out of interest, are there issues other than the removal of Crown appointees on which statutory provision requires the agreement of a certain number of members? Is that true of anything else in the Scottish Parliament? I was surprised to see that such motions must be agreed to by two thirds of the total number of MSPs.
That applies to particular posts, such as that of the Scottish information commissioner. The provisions are there to protect those appointees' independence and to prevent political interference. That is why there is such a high threshold. I am not sure whether any other appointees are covered by that.
There are a number of statutory provisions, as well as provisions in standing orders that are not backed up by statutory provisions, where a specific threshold is required, rather than just a simple majority—either an absolute majority or a higher threshold of the sort that is described in the paper. However, the default position for most decisions that are taken by the Parliament is a simple majority.
The provisions are designed to prevent a party with a majority in the Parliament from controlling who holds all the relevant posts.
Those issues will be clarified when we consider the matter in more detail at subsequent meetings.
As I said earlier, we are taking a preliminary view, presumably subject to what comes up in the oral evidence. I am not quite sure what that preliminary view does, but I presume that we will take a decision to hear some evidence and have a short inquiry, which will firm up—or otherwise—members' views. I do not think that it is necessarily helpful to deliberate on what our preliminary view is, however.
Recommendation (c) is for members to
It is sensible to take evidence from the ombudsman in relation to her report and the practicalities for her and her office, but it would be totally inappropriate to take evidence from the commissioners, given that we are talking about their terms of employment. We must consider the matter in an impartial way.
Do any members feel that we should be taking evidence from anyone else on the reappointments issue?
I am not sure how we get extra evidence on that. I understand Karen Gillon's point, but I am not sure about what the other options would be. There are potential vested interests to consider.
There might be some similar postings at Westminster. It could be useful to find out how the situation has been handled in other jurisdictions.
What about ex-Crown appointees?
We do not have any yet in Scotland.
Or from anywhere.
We could try out the removal procedures.
It might be worth checking whether there are any similar provisions relating to the equivalent appointments in the other jurisdiction. That could be sought in written or, perhaps, oral evidence. Are members content with that?
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