Official Report 221KB pdf
Item 2 is an evidence session on the Climate Change (Scotland) Bill. This is the first of many evidence sessions. We will be hearing today from Scottish Government officials and the bill team. It is expected that we will continue to take evidence until some time in March, at which point we will hear from the minister. In addition, we have issued a call for written evidence. The deadline for submissions is 27 February.
The bill contains all the significant topics that are coming forward, but some topics, especially in part 5, will be subject to amendment at stage 2. Would you like a bit more detail?
That would be helpful.
There was a recent consultation on muirburn, in respect of which it is possible that, at stage 2, officials will seek to amend the bill slightly. As members will be aware, the forestry consultation ends next week. At the moment, the Government does not intend to introduce any significant amendments, but it is being informed by the results of the consultation, so it is possible that something will come forward from that.
Thank you. It is helpful to have a sense of the amendments that are being contemplated. Can we expect material on new topics or additional policy areas to be introduced into the bill?
No.
The consultation stated that one of the reasons for legislating in Scotland was
The forestry provisions in part 5 are new. There is the energy efficiency action plan provision in chapter 3 of part 5—the policy is not new, but the provision of primary legislation is new. The renewable heat provision is new. I have to be honest and say that I do not know whether the energy performance for non-domestic buildings provision is new: I am not completely familiar with the primary legislation in that area.
It is an extension of the regime that is currently in place.
You will be aware that there is currently a lot of legislation on waste management, but the provisions that we are looking to implement, such as the extra enabling powers, are new.
New powers will enable ministers to begin to take action in particular areas. I have asked this question repeatedly, and I will ask it once more. We have been told that the policy intention of securing average 3 per cent annual reductions in Scotland's emissions need not wait for a bill. Given that you did not specify that as a new area in the bill, is there still a policy intention to secure such a reduction in emissions?
It is reasonable to say that ministers' ambition to deliver 3 per cent annual emissions reductions remains absolutely unchanged. To deliver an overall 80 per cent reduction target by 2050, we will have to have delivered, on average, at least 3 per cent reductions each year, according to the 1990 baseline.
This is perhaps a question to ask ministers later, but is it the Government's position that work can begin now to put us on that trajectory before the bill is in place?
Ministers' commitment was also to take early action and not to await the outcome of the bill process. There is a multitude of policy measures at European Union, United Kingdom and Scotland levels to try to accelerate progress along the trajectory towards an 80 per cent reduction. We will probably touch on the shape of that trajectory later, but there is no let-up in the effort to come forward with measures to facilitate the reduction in emissions.
I am interested in how we know that we are achieving the targets. Are any monitoring systems in place to allow us to examine what is happening and when and how we can build on it?
The main means of monitoring is the greenhouse gas inventory, which, as you probably know, is prepared at UK level and is disaggregated to the four country levels. Scotland's emissions are, in effect, monitored through the disaggregated inventory of greenhouse gas emissions. The main issue is the delay in the production of that inventory, because it is produced about 20 months after the year in which the emissions occurred.
The policy memorandum and the Scottish Government statements that have supported the bill have said that the bill should be consistent with the principles of sustainable development. Could that be made clear in the bill as well as in the policy memorandum and in other statements on the policy behind the bill?
That was considered when the bill was being drafted. An awful lot of primary legislation has sustainable development as one of the main provisions, which is one reason why we did not put it in the bill. I am sure that ministers would be happy to have a dialogue about that if committee members want it to be in the bill.
In seeking advice from the Committee on Climate Change or other bodies, we have criteria that require to be taken into account, which include economic and social issues, as well as environmental issues. The principle of sustainable development is implicit, if not explicit, in the documentation.
Why did the technical note on emissions, which was promised to the committee in early December, not appear until January?
We sent the note to the committee on 18 December, but we found out after Christmas that the e-mail that was sent from the private office contained the letter from the minister, the technical note and the factual briefing document as one file. Your clerk found that the file size was 12Mb, and therefore completely undeliverable to members. We did not find out about that until after Christmas, otherwise we could have rectified the problem. That is the reason for the delay. We were intent on your having the information before Christmas, so that you had time to look at it over the Christmas recess, had you wished to do so. I apologise for that.
The greenhouse gas emissions track that is shown in chart 1 in the technical note seems to run counter to the view of the Tyndall centre for climate change research, which is that larger cuts must happen more quickly if cumulative emissions are to be kept to a level at which dangerous climate change will be avoided. Chart 1 shows a rapid increase in control over emissions from 2019, so you seem to be end-loading the changes that are needed. The Tyndall centre says that action is needed now if we are to avoid reaching a tipping point. Will you expand on that? You admit that cumulative emissions in the atmosphere are the important factor, so why does the bill provide for point-in-time targets?
We acknowledge that there is quite a body of scientific evidence and thought on climate change. We are conscious that around 50 per cent of Scottish emissions are likely to be covered by emissions trading schemes. Emissions reductions will be driven by the rules of schemes—initially, in particular.
However, on cumulative emissions, I am considering the area below the curve, which shows that you will achieve much less than you would achieve if you opted for early delivery of reductions. Do you accept that there are genuine concerns about that and, if so, will you review the situation?
A balance must be struck between deliverability, ambition and the science. The science acknowledges that early action is better than action in the longer term—Nicholas Stern made that point. However, as Fiona Page said, Scotland is reliant on EU action on some issues. For example, Scotland has only so many levers that it can pull to reduce transport emissions. You might respond that we should focus on areas in which the Scottish Government has policy levers, but doing so would probably put even greater pressure on the sectors concerned.
What plans are there to measure and report on cumulative emissions and emissions that are generated anywhere as a result of goods and services being used in Scotland, as well as on the statutory targets?
I assume that you are referring to the consumption-based approach.
Are you saying that the carbon footprint will be considered as a cumulative measure or as a point-in-time measure?
It will be considered on an annual basis. If we have the annual figures, I think that it will be relatively straightforward to establish the cumulative emissions.
Does that imply that the footprint measure will have the same time lag as the measure of Scotland's carbon emissions?
It has been suggested to me that the lag may be greater, but we can come back to the committee on that. A different methodology is used, and I am not sure when the information will become available, relative to the disaggregated inventory.
It might be helpful to explore that in writing.
Has the Government considered using the UK Committee on Climate Change to help us to achieve a suitable curve? The levers, for example for transport, are not really in our hands—they are in Britain's or Europe's hands. Has any thought been given to increasing the number of miles to the gallon that vehicles achieve? That could be part of the approach, and would be a practical example of the value of having the UK CCC.
There are EU measures, UK measures and Scottish measures. At UK level, there is general advice from the Committee on Climate Change, which contains a devolved Administrations chapter that says a bit more about what the advice means for Scotland. In relation to the bill, we will seek that committee's advice specifically on Scottish issues.
I recognise the complexities. Procurement is an area that Scotland could take action on. We will be looking for practical examples as we go through the bill.
I want to go back to the issue of targets. In the absence of the promised annual targets, an interim target may be a useful milestone, but the 2030 target is not on the trajectory that would be achieved with at least 3 per cent annual emissions reductions from the start. You said that we really need to achieve 3 per cent year on year. Why is the trajectory much less ambitious than the original manifesto commitment? Why is the target for 2030 instead of 2020, which would be more in line with international, European and UK commitments?
I will take your second question first, because that might set the scene. An overwhelming number of responses to ministers in the 2008 consultation on the bill asked for an interim target. You are right—we considered quite a few permutations. Indeed, 2020 was one of my starting points. Obviously, we have a lot of synergies with EU targets and other targets around the world. I felt that if we had only 2020 as the interim target, we would still have 30 years left to deliver the end target, which is a long time for identifying certainty in primary legislation. I did not feel that having only 2020 as an interim target—in the true spirit of an interim target—would be enough. That automatically led me to wonder whether we should have two interim targets—2020 and perhaps 2030. In some ways, that is the next logical step. However, I felt that by having annual targets, 2020 and 2030, we would probably be obliged to have a 2040 target, because it would be as if we were having decade targets as well as the end target. If we had a model with three interim targets, a 2050 target, and annual targets on top of that, it would be a little top heavy for targets. As a result, I went back to the original idea of having just one interim target and felt that, as the bill had to cover 41 years, 2030 struck a better balance. Of course, there will be a target in 2020, but it will be an annual target.
It is obviously up to the committee to make recommendations on what the interim target should be. If we decided that 2020 should be the interim target, at what level would your current projection suggest that the target would have to be set?
On which scenario? We have outlined a number of them. We would also have to consider further advice from the UK Committee on Climate Change before we could say what a 2020 target would be. The bill identifies constraints. We and ministers want the target from 2020 onwards to be 3 per cent less than the previous year's target, which is the reason for its inclusion in the first set of annual targets.
My understanding is that, if you calculate the 2020 target using the assumptions on which the 2030 target has been based, only the 2019-20 target will be 3 per cent, with different targets up to 2019. I suppose that I am asking you to revise your projections. What are you projecting for, say, 2020 and is it the best that we can do?
Perhaps I should address that question in a slightly more general way by referring to the UK Climate Change Act 2008—which, I point out, is also our act. The original UK bill set out a range of targets: the reduction was to be not less than 26 per cent by 2020, with an upper limit of 32 per cent. The upper limit, however, was removed. In any case, it was seen not as a limit but as a range. Although the 2008 act specifies a reduction of 26 per cent, the UK Committee on Climate Change has said that if the European Union stays with a 20 per cent emissions reduction, the recommended target for the UK will be 34 per cent, which is 8 per cent more than is set out in the 2008 act. If the EU moves to a 30 per cent emissions reduction, our target will have to be 42 per cent.
Just to wrap up this section—
Convener, Ms Page has answered only the second part of my question. She has not dealt with the suggestion that the 2030 target does not put us on the right trajectory for a 3 per cent year-on-year reduction.
The target is definitely in the right region. When we did the numbers, the initial number that I was given was 51.5 per cent. However, I was uncomfortable with putting that figure into primary legislation, which is why we decided that the aim in the bill should be "at least 50%". When the annual targets are set, it will be up to ministers to decide the actual target for a particular year. However, it will have to be set relative to a reduction of at least 50 per cent in carbon dioxide equivalent—it could very well be higher.
Just to tie up the question of the interim target, I believe that you said that there was a process for considering whether there should be a 2020 target, a 2030 target, a 2020 and a 2030 target, a decade target, three decade targets, and so on. Given that you have agreed—and that the Government has acknowledged—that the trajectory is most clearly defined by early action, I am still slightly unclear why the 2020 target was ruled out. I understand the policy reasons for arguing that 2030 is closer to the mid-point, but the trajectory is important, and the fact is that the early target defines that more clearly.
Yes, but from June 2010—in 18 months' time—we will set the first batches of annual targets. From then on, we will establish annual targets, covering the period up to and beyond 2020. We will have a set of targets then.
However, the bill that the Parliament is being asked to pass does not specify those targets. The Parliament is being asked to agree to an interim target being placed at a point that will be less capable of defining the trajectory.
The annual targets will be set in regulations, which will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, so the Parliament will have a chance to scrutinise them as they come forward.
Would meeting a 30 per cent target by 2020 be significantly more challenging than meeting a 50 per cent target by 2030?
Delivering such a target would be more challenging—even if we set the numbers to one side—because we would have less time in which to do so. Short-term targets are more challenging, simply because they are so much closer. A 2030 target gives us that bit longer to move energy and transport systems in the direction of a low-carbon economy.
Would 25 per cent by 2020 be a more challenging target?
Probably not, given that the UK's target is a 26 per cent reduction in emissions by 2020.
That is interesting. If we are to make a success of the policy we must involve the public in various ways. The bill contains provisions that acknowledge that reality and move in that direction, but there is no target on public engagement, and public engagement is not explicitly made a priority. Did you consider including such a target when the bill was being drafted? If an amendment was lodged to introduce process targets on public engagement on climate change, to sit alongside the scientific targets on emissions reduction, would you regard it as a positive addition to the bill?
Are you talking about the framework that will be set by the bill or the delivery of emissions reduction?
I think that I am talking about the framework, but I suppose that implementation mechanisms might be part of the delivery process. I am thinking about the issue in the context of section 1, in relation to the framework—
Fiona Page can talk about the framework and Cameron Maxwell can talk about delivery. Andrew Henderson wants to comment, too.
I think that all members have had a chance to consider the consultation, which ran at the beginning of last year and garnered more than 21,000 responses. Many responses were the result of campaigns by several non-governmental organisations, which was helpful to us in our policy considerations. We received more substantive, weightier and longer responses from more than 300 organisations and individuals, who addressed the questions in the consultation paper. The process very much informed policy making and we tried to reflect that in the analysis report and the Scottish Government response to the consultation, which was published in October.
Your answer highlights the problem that I see with the bill, which is not necessarily anybody's fault. The Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005 had a profound impact on people's behaviour. Perhaps that is the most significant example of legislation having a direct effect. My concern is that climate change is taken extremely seriously by members of environmental organisations, who are interested in the issues, but not necessarily by the broader population, whose interest is necessary if the bill is to be effective. Could we add targets for public engagement and buy-in to the process? That is every bit as much a task for ministers as achieving the scientifically set targets.
If you have any specific ideas of the kind of things that you are after, we would be interested in exploring them with you. I am sure that ministers would be happy to enter into dialogue about that.
I ask Cameron Maxwell to cover delivery, which will involve public engagement.
Public engagement would be useful on climate change because emissions cover so many things. A huge section of Scotland's emissions comes from domestic households, so there is value in considering what is being done on energy efficiency advice, such as the advice that the Energy Saving Trust provides through energy efficiency centres. A lot of new stuff has come in this year. There is also value in considering transport, transport planning and the measures that go out to citizens in relation to that.
That is helpful.
We have already covered some of what I want to cover, but I will try to take a slightly different angle. Why does the Government not have more ambitious targets for reductions before 2019?
I feel like a record stuck in a groove. This is about deliverability. Many things have come together over the past year or so: the passage of the 2008 act through Westminster; the EU climate change and energy package, which was agreed only in December; and the establishment, initially in shadow form a year ago, of the Committee on Climate Change, which reported only in December. Many things were going on outside the Scottish Government but we were party and privy to much of the information that was part of that work.
Is it fair to say that the controlling logic behind that decision is to do with achievability?
That is certainly in there, but it is matched by ambition. We need ambition to stretch what we are prepared to try to achieve.
Is that the reason why the 3 per cent annual targets do not appear in the bill?
Those will apply in the period after 2019.
But not prior to that.
No—not in the first period.
We talked about interim targets. The UK Climate Change Act 2008 has an interim target for 2020. Given that other aspects of the bill are designed to be in step with the UK act, did the Government ever consider the logic of being in step with the UK act on the interim target?
No. We have moved significantly away from the UK act by adopting annual targets. The five-year carbon budget approach in the UK act gives the UK Government—and us, as part of the process—a great deal more flexibility. Annual targets are a lot more demanding than a carbon budget. With a carbon budget, if you fail in one year for whatever reason, you can make that up in subsequent years. With annual targets, if you fail, you fail, and there is little flexibility. However, the annual targets will, in effect, be a subdivision of the five-year carbon budgets. We are reliant on UK policy measures. Reports will come out at the UK level that will say how the UK Government plans to address or deliver carbon reductions in the coming three sets of five years. We will take that information into consideration in designing—and offering to the Parliament through instruments under the affirmative procedure—the annual target trajectory through to 2019.
It might be more appropriate for me to put my next question to the minister, but I will ask it carefully and for no purpose other than that it might allow the minister to be prepared when I put it to him. Is the bill in step with the UK act in relation to its overall objective and the pace at which that is likely to be achieved? Are the two pieces of legislation comparable in their ambition and the likely achievement of that ambition?
As officials, we can probably answer that to an extent. I do not immediately see a political dimension to the question, but one might be there.
My final question, which is on general targets, looks well into the future. Given that scientific analysis and knowledge tend to change, might the Scottish Government consider a more ambitious 2050 target?
The targets in the bill are expressed intentionally as reductions of "at least" a certain amount. For example, when ministers set the annual targets to reach the 2030 and 2050 targets, they will definitely be able to make the targets go above the level in the bill if they want to. We might reduce emissions at a higher rate than anticipated, so the level at which the targets are set might be found subsequently to be no longer meaningful—I am optimistic that that may happen at some stage. In those circumstances, there is provision to allow the annual targets that have been set to be revisited. The provision will be available to ministers to go back and change the targets.
So the bill gives us scope to aim higher if we are doing well.
Potentially. That is why, in setting the annual targets, the constraint from 2020 was made "at least 3%"; the 2030 target was made
Fiona Page quite rightly referred to our current set of ministers and our current Administration but, with a 2050 target, future Administrations are involved, too. The provisions are there for them to be equally ambitious. The Committee on Climate Change is charged with taking account of scientific advice and the latest scientific evidence when it offers its own advice. The facilities will be there for this and future Administrations.
You mentioned the publication of the report of the Committee on Climate Change in December 2008. Forgive me if I misquote you, but I think that you described it as the first "definitive advice" that had been received. If it had been available a year ago, rather than in December, it might have informed some different decisions in the drafting of the Climate Change (Scotland) Bill. If that is the case, are there aspects of the bill that the Government is open minded about changing? Might it consider changes that the committee proposes, given that we will all share a few months of analysing the position of the Committee on Climate Change? I am happy to hear an answer from the optimist or from the pessimist.
We do not reflect pessimism. [Laughter.] Your question principally concerns the targets in the bill. I spoke about the December report offering the first "definitive advice", but I should properly have said that it was the first definitive statutory advice. There is no shortage of evidence in the area of climate change, but it has now been packaged up as advice for the UK Government and the devolved Administrations. The report of the Committee on Climate Change is the first such package to which we have had access. As we have said in previous responses, that committee's advice will be taken into account in prescribing the trajectory, as defined by the annual targets. Yes, there are spot figures in the bill, but there will be an opportunity in the future for the Parliament to have a say in defining the trajectory, based on the advice of the Committee on Climate Change. That is covered in the bill.
The bill contains no sectoral targets. How will the Scottish Government and Parliament be kept informed on how different sectors of the economy are delivering on emissions cuts?
We could respond to that in different ways. The greenhouse gas inventories are based on sectors, so we can examine performance in each one. The difficulty is that, although there is a lot of information, it is split in different sectoral ways. Land use and agriculture are defined in one inventory, but different aspects are treated differently in other inventories. Cameron Maxwell might be able to say something about the approach that we have been adopting in considering abatement potential in different sectors.
One of the important things to consider when it comes to significant emissions reductions over long periods is the fact that different sectors will play different roles at different times. The Committee on Climate Change suggests a heavy focus on decarbonising the power supply in the period to 2030—by that point, it should be largely decarbonised. There are further issues around transport technology, which might allow for some reductions in the period to 2020, with improved petrol and advanced diesel engines. During that period, there will also be a switch to plug-in hybrids, and then to electric vehicles.
Will that be made explicit in annual reporting?
There are different aspects to annual reporting—one is our performance and the other is the policies and measures that we plan to put in place. There will be a sectoral dimension to that. In a way that is similar to the approach taken in the report of the Committee on Climate Change, our reporting looks at the sectors in different ways because, as Cameron Maxwell said, they will respond differently and at different times.
I do not suggest that we can compare one year with the next if the policy is different by sector, but there will be some information in the reporting that gives us a handle on how each sector is performing.
I refer back to Cameron Maxwell's response about the different times at which abatement potential occurs. The strategic transport projects review was published around the same time as the report of the Committee on Climate Change, in which issues were raised about the move towards electric vehicles, for example. That was not factored into the STPR, because it was built on a factual evidence base and stated, "Here's where we stand on transport infrastructure and here are the possible interventions over the next umpty-ump years."
Transport is a very interesting area because some aspects are held at UK or EU level. We spoke about vehicle standards, which must be driven from an EU level, but we benefit from that as electric cars and so on penetrate our ownership. Transport emissions will have to fall, and in our conversations with transport colleagues about how we will deliver the targets, we have discussed projections that are either level with the current situation or show an upwards trend. Ultimately, it is not a question of maintaining the current level, because emissions have to drop. That will happen partly through demand management and partly through technology, and it will happen over time.
There are a couple of supplementary questions on transport before we move on.
It is a paradox—I expect that the convener might use the same example—that we are building a road-only bridge at the same time as we are focusing on climate change.
I will answer that with regard to the Scottish Government's contribution. You know about the commitment to assess the carbon implications of the Government's £30 billion-plus of expenditure. We do not know what the carbon impact of that expenditure is; we are trying to get a handle on it. That will be a means to an end—the end being to use that information to turn the screw on emissions that are associated with the Government's expenditure.
In effect, you are saying that the carbon assessment mechanism will allow you to measure those things better than you have been able to in the past.
Not so much measure as assess. It is not an absolute science, but the mechanism will give us estimates of the carbon impact. I cannot go into the detail; it is extremely complex.
Will any enforcement be linked to the carbon assessment tool? The Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change Committee and the Finance Committee are interested in the way in which budgets are brought forward. Do you think that the carbon assessment tool will be a mechanism that can inform budget setting, both annually and perhaps over a programme period?
The safest answer is to refer you to Mr Swinney's response to a similar question that he was asked when he came before the committee. The carbon assessment tool will provide additional information in relation to the budget, but Mr Swinney's reply was that, because the budget seeks to address so many other outcomes, it may be difficult to focus on only carbon assessment.
Rob Gibson mentioned the STPR. If I may paraphrase, it has been stated that transport will not pull its weight. You said that there is perhaps less comfort around the idea of sectoral targets, but there must be a clear expectation of what transport will do in respect of emissions if the statement about transport not pulling its weight can be made. Can the Government say what the expectation is for the transport emissions trajectory and how much by way of additional emissions reduction will be required from the rest of the economy?
I again refer back to the report of the Committee on Climate Change, which assesses the abatement potential in each sector. We can work with the information from that report and we will also have access to our own report, which will say what the abatement potential is in each sector. That will inform the Government's response. The Committee on Climate Change will have identified potential in the transport sector, and the Government can look to ensure that it delivers that. The Government will look across the piece and say, "If we go with the Committee on Climate Change's advice, we need to bring about these reductions in each area; if we do not achieve the reduction in transport emissions, we will have to compensate in another area." That would be the Government's call, but the Committee on Climate Change will give us the information to allow the decision to be made.
In arriving at the position that allows the Government to state that, on present trends, transport will not contribute to the reduction targets, did it assess the role that demand management could play now if it was put in place, the role that land use planning could play now if a different approach was taken, and the role that a re-evaluation of infrastructure projects that are already in the pipeline could play? Did the Government go through such a process?
To the extent that it was possible to do so, carbon was taken into account. For example, the STPR attempted to assess the emissions implications of 100,000 to 150,000 tonnes of carbon. The modelling will, over time, result in a different figure because there will be a different fuel mix for transport. What is coming through on electric vehicles will influence the implications of infrastructure projects. If those interventions do not happen until 2020, there will be a different fuel mix, so the remodelling will probably produce a different figure. That is in the transport sector. Other sectors have also sought to identify carbon issues.
On that issue, I am concerned about the rather circular argument in the—understandably—cautious and slightly tentative approach that has been taken. The changes in technology that we all want to see will not necessarily happen unless we break into that circle by providing some certainty about the investment that is needed in new technology. Rather than going back round that argument again, if we included a provision in the bill to require all sectors to deliver, and to start delivering as soon as possible—however it is decided that that should be packaged up—the bill would surely encourage that investment, and attention would be paid to those issues. The danger is that we let people off the hook if nothing is firm and everyone thinks that the issue is for someone else.
I apologise if our approach comes over as in any way cautious. The facts are complex, so we need to dip into those areas if we are to get a real handle on them. If we move away from transport and consider the energy sector, we see drivers for technology development such as the 51 per cent renewable energy target and the saltire prize. Initiatives in individual sectors—for example, the smarter choices, smarter places project in the transport sector—will encourage carbon reduction. Initiatives are being taken to help encourage innovation within the different sectors. Measures will also be put in place at UK level to meet UK ambitions and at EU level, if the EU moves to a 30 per cent target. We will rely on technology being driven at those different levels in achieving our target.
I want to return to the issue of international credits. The UK act places a duty on the secretary of state in London to set a limit on international credits that is based on advice from the UK Committee on Climate Change. Why does the Scottish Government not intend to prescribe such a limit?
Ministers are anxious to ensure that the bill sets annual targets. They intend to meet the targets and do not favour the use of credits. In particular, they would prefer to focus Scottish resources on delivering emissions reductions in Scotland. That is why no upper cap or limit on the use of carbon credits has been included in the bill. Equally, I think that ministers would probably be happy to enter into dialogue with committee members if the Parliament felt that the bill should include such a limit.
Given that in previous evidence today it has been suggested that the emission trading scheme will cover about half of our CO2 emissions, should the bill not spell out the areas where the effect is likely to fall?
When we consider carbon credits, we are thinking of additional carbon credits that might be purchased if targets are not met. The EU emission trading scheme is pretty much a closed loop that works on an allocation basis, so companies that emit beyond their allocations must purchase additional allocations. As part of the net Scottish emissions account that is established in the bill—which, in many ways, is an attempt to develop an accounting scheme—we will take account of those allocations. However, when I refer to carbon credits, I am thinking more along the lines of the possibility of purchasing additional units if we failed to meet a target. That is a little bit different from the allocations scheme that we are involved in through the EU emission trading scheme.
If there is no such limit, how exactly can the Scottish Government ensure that domestic effort accounts for the lion's share of the emission reductions?
Again, the fact that the EU ETS covers about 50 per cent of our emissions suggests that the balance is less than 50 per cent. Other measures at EU level, such as product standards, will also influence the achievement of our targets. As things stand, UK fiscal measures will also impact on the delivery of our targets. We are trying to identify the contribution that each of those will make, and the contribution that Scottish policies will have to make as well.
Can you share with us any particular example of that?
It might be useful if Cameron Maxwell explained our strategic overview.
One of the interesting aspects of how the emission trading scheme works is that, because it captures the principal industrial installations and generators, it catches around 50 per cent of emissions and has a set trajectory.
Similarly, power stations, which are one of our major sources of emissions, will change over time either because there will be a different mix of electricity generation or because of carbon capture technology and so on.
Yes.
Section 18 of the bill deals with carbon units and carbon counting and allows for the establishment of a trading scheme in carbon units. Could you give us more information about the aim of that section and what it would establish?
We talk a lot about frameworks, and section 18 deals with a framework within the framework. Should the Scottish Government be purchasing carbon units on the international market, we will need a mechanism that will enable us to keep track of what we are doing. There is a possibility that units could be purchased and not used or surrendered in the same calendar year. The provisions in section 18 will enable us to hold and transfer units that might be purchased from different sources and used in different ways. They will also enable us to keep track of that.
The cabinet secretary made a commitment that the Scottish climate change legislation would include international aviation and shipping. Can you explain why those elements have been included in the bill in the way that they have? Is there any way in which the bill could be strengthened in that regard?
Scottish ministers have committed to including Scotland's share of international aviation and shipping emissions in the targets, and that remains the case. Section 14 is, obviously, the key provision in this context. The reason why we are suggesting that we bring those areas into the targets through regulations is simply to provide us with a flexible mechanism to adapt to international agreement in the future. Scottish ministers are obviously keen for other countries to follow their lead and take on board the need to tackle emissions from international aviation and shipping. We need a mechanism that we can use in the short term until we have an internationally agreed protocol.
I appreciate that there is a need for flexibility and that the use of regulations will help with the necessary calculations. Can we take it that there is an absolute commitment that emissions from shipping and aviation will be included in the targets?
Absolutely. They will be included, beginning with the first set of targets from 2010 onwards. The order will probably come forward in tandem with or even, if possible, in advance of the annual target regulations. I am certain that Scottish ministers would be happy to make that commitment.
The timing of the order will be based on the timing of the annual targets—that is when we will get the information.
That is possible, but we have not pinned down whether we will lay the order six months after the bill is passed—as we hope it will be—by the Parliament. It must be in force by the time we set the annual targets, so it might come forward in tandem with or in advance of the targets.
Okay.
We have identified a methodology that we think represents a reasonable compromise and which allows us to capture a proportion of the relevant emissions such that they can be included in our future targets. We recognise that, until we get international agreement, the solution that we have proposed is temporary.
Can you confirm that there will be continuous liaison with the UK Committee on Climate Change about the targets that are set in that area?
Absolutely. I am sorry—before I explained how we would do the calculations, I should have said that, under section 14, ministers will be obliged to seek the advice of the UK Committee on Climate Change or a future advisory body, if a different arrangement is adopted, on how best to proceed. The proposal in the bill is our initial idea of how we can tackle the issue in the short term but, before we lay the regulations, we will seek the UK committee's advice on whether our proposal represents the best interim solution. We will take time to have some dialogue with the UK committee on the proposal, but there will be no change in ministers' decision to proceed with it. We will include Scotland's share of the emissions from international aviation and shipping in a target. We will just seek the UK committee's views on our suggested way of proceeding in the absence of an internationally agreed solution.
Back in October, when the shadow committee on climate change suggested a revision to the UK target, it made specific reference to international aviation and shipping. It accepted the complexity of including emissions from those sectors in the target, but asked the UK and Scottish Governments to consider that as part of the policy response. The issue will be addressed at the UK level. The other new kid on the block is that aviation will be part of the emission trading scheme from 2013, so we have to factor the implications of that into the process by which we account for aviation emissions, although that does not apply to shipping emissions.
I want to check up on one last detail, which is about the stated intention to introduce an order to include aviation and shipping emissions in the first batch of targets. Is it intended to include aviation and shipping emissions fully in all the targets in the first batch, rather than to phase them in?
Yes. We do not plan on making a distinction. When we introduce the annual targets, they will apply to Scotland's emissions, which will include Scotland's share of international aviation and shipping emissions. So, absolutely, the first targets will include those emissions.
What criteria will be used to assess whether a body other than the UK Committee on Climate Change is required to provide advice to the Scottish ministers, and how would such an evaluation take place?
Ultimately, it will be down to the Scottish ministers to decide whether they are happy with the advice from the UK Committee on Climate Change. At present, the advice is of very high quality. The committee is a new one that is full of some of the best experts from throughout the UK and we are tied into it. I am confident that, in the short term, the Scottish ministers will be happy to use the UK committee. However, as members know, the bill will cover a long period—more than 40 years—and many Administrations, so we want to ensure that it is future-proofed in respect of advice to ministers.
So there are no criteria—the matter will be left to the political judgment of future ministers.
Yes. We do not want to tie down future ministers in legislation on how to judge on the issue. It will come down to a personal decision of the Administration at the time. Future Administrations will need to be confident that they are getting the best possible advice. I hope that they can get that from the UK Committee on Climate Change, but we want to provide flexibility in the bill to allow alternative mechanisms if that does not happen.
Will you summarise the advice that the Scottish Government has sought thus far from the UK Committee on Climate Change?
To date, we have made no formal request to the UK committee but, because we are co-sponsors of it, we are closely engaged with it. There have been various working groups both on the UK bill process and on the implementation of the UK act. There is contact through those fora and we also have direct informal contact with the committee secretariat. Lord Adair Turner and David Kennedy, the chief executive, have been up to Scotland on two occasions to engage with the Scottish stakeholders, and I think that David Kennedy will be here again next week. We have a good level of contact with the UK committee.
So you pick their brains without making it too obvious or formal.
It is not a case of picking their brains—
Maybe they pick your brains.
They might well do in some cases. I should add that we have a secondee to the Committee on Climate Change to help it to understand the Scottish issues to which Fiona Page referred. We are trying to be helpful in both directions.
Has the Scottish Government considered in detail any advisory models other than the UK Committee on Climate Change?
It is my strong recommendation that ministers use the UK committee initially. It is a new body that has not yet been given a chance to prove itself. It is made up of experts from across the UK, we fund it jointly, Scottish ministers are involved in any decision to appoint people to it and, as Philip Wright explained, a key member of our staff—an economist—is seconded to it to work on devolved Administration work. I am very hopeful that the new body will deliver great things and it useful for us to work closely with it on the Scottish bill as well as on the UK act.
Thank you; you have convinced me.
I add a supplement to that. Cameron Maxwell has just reminded me that, in my earlier response, I was thinking of direct contact with the UK committee officials, but we have also contributed our thoughts on its work programme—a package of activities that the UK committee is asked to address from 2009 to 2012. We have let the committee know at what points we are likely to seek advice.
So you are in on the ground floor—
Yes, but through the UK process rather than through direct contact.
We are very aware that we will go to the UK committee with a formal request for advice on the annual targets. It also knows about our aviation and shipping considerations. Discussion has taken place at an official level, but the formal approach will come when the UK committee's work plan, with which we are involved, is developed.
If, at any point in the future, a political judgment is made, for whatever reason, that a Scottish advisory body should be established, we will want ministers at that time to work with an act that makes it possible to establish such a body in the best way. Has the Government considered creating a body that is accountable to the Parliament, rather than the Government? The Scottish equivalents of some UK bodies that are accountable to the Government at a UK level are accountable to the Scottish Parliament at a Scottish level. Does the bill make that possible? Has that been considered? I note that SEPA is a body that carries out functions on behalf of the Government, whereas we are looking for a body that is able to critique the Government sometimes and even offer a challenge to the Government.
The UK Committee on Climate Change was set up as a non-departmental public body, and it is principally an advisory body to the UK Government and the devolved Administrations. We saw it as a model for a Scottish climate change committee, because the primary function of such a body would be to provide advice to ministers. Equally, however, there is a provision in the bill that would require it to independently report to the Scottish Parliament each year on how Scottish ministers are delivering on meeting the targets, as the Government brings forward its annual reports.
If ministers were to take a different view on that matter when setting up such a body, would the provisions in the bill enable them to make that body accountable to the Parliament rather than the Government?
That is an interesting question. Schedule 1 contains most of the detail on the matter, and it provides for the body to be an NDPB, rather than to be something under a commissioner, which would be an unusual step. I think that the legislation would need to be amended to enable that to happen.
The bill provides for Scottish ministers to produce a plan to compensate in future years, should annual targets not be met. Can you explain how that is substantively different from the approach that is taken in the UK act, which involves banking and borrowing from five-yearly budgets?
Banking and borrowing was a key option when Scottish ministers were considering emissions budgets because, clearly, there is a high degree of flexibility in the emissions budgets period. We considered using the banking and borrowing approach when we were moving to an annual-target model, but we felt that it was not compatible with it—either we meet an annual target or we do not, and it is quite difficult to see how we can bank and borrow in that regard.
Banking and borrowing is a mechanism that is specific to carbon or emissions budgets, where one has a set quantity of emissions that should be permitted within a certain period—five years, in the case of the UK act. Within the framework of the UK act, the idea is that, for example, if one overemits by a quantity of 50 megatonnes in period 1, one can—rather than purchasing emissions units to offset that overemission—reduce the level of the next budget so that it is 50 megatonnes lower than it otherwise would have been.
That was helpful, thank you.
One reason for including electricity figures is that we have robust statistics on electricity production and consumption which have already been published. We believe that it made sense to draw them into what is being reported annually regarding emissions more widely. We can read across those statistics to see whether we could have a greener fuel mix in our electricity generation sector. There is not necessarily always an immediate read-across to reductions in emissions—although there might be a lot more green electricity generation from renewable sources, there will still be the same quantity of carbon emissions unless the fossil fuel parts of the generation mix are being decarbonised or brought off-stream. The inclusion of the electricity generation statistics in annual reporting is an attempt to illustrate better the advances that have been made in renewable and sustainable electricity.
That returns us to an earlier point in the discussion. We do not have the information, but we perhaps need to encourage the gathering of information. The question is whether the bill can serve as a lever to bring that about.
Reporting to Parliament is quite a robust measure. It is possibly more for ministers to consider the question, but I do not think that it would be practical for ministers to consider, for example, imposing financial penalties on themselves, or any other such mechanisms. It is difficult for us to see what further censure there might be. The requirement for robust reporting to the Scottish Parliament is a strong measure.
Part of good scrutiny is ensuring that there is enough information available for Parliament to make a considered judgment. Does the Government believe that there is enough information around for that to happen? Will there be enough information annually?
I will offer a supplementary point to Fiona Page's response. Through the proposed reporting mechanism, plus the meetings with committee conveners, a certain onus is placed on Parliament. There is almost a cascade effect: because information will be made available to Parliament and committee conveners, they can challenge Government on the sectoral approach that Mr Gibson spoke about earlier. When the budget is presented, the Finance Committee may challenge the Government, this committee may challenge our transport colleagues, and so on. The bill will have that effect; the information that is made available to Parliament will allow Parliament as a whole to challenge the various parts of Government.
There are quite a lot of reporting provisions in the bill. I do not know whether you wish to explore the matter further, but I am happy to talk you through the different levels. Would that be helpful?
Yes.
A helpful note has just been handed to me—but I know the provisions well enough.
They are all in one place.
After annual targets have been set, the first thing that ministers must do is to produce a report to Parliament to explain how they will deliver and meet the annual targets. That is the starting point. Scottish ministers will also need to produce an annual report to Parliament to confirm how they have delivered and met the targets for the year concerned. If they have not met the targets, they will have to explain what their actions will be to deliver them in the future.
Ministers must, in turn, respond to that independent report. Included within the annual reporting cycle are reporting of emissions achievement statistics, with detail on what has been happening in respect of emissions and the linked reporting; scrutiny by the Committee on Climate Change; and ministers' response to that scrutiny. That is all done publicly.
The proposal for ministers to meet the conveners of parliamentary committees took a few people by surprise. It reminded me of the proposal by the First Minister in 2007 to answer questions by the Conveners Group, as a more in-depth version of First Minister's question time. At the time, that was not felt to be an appropriate use of the Conveners Group. How was that proposal developed? How much dialogue took place with the Conveners Group, or with the Presiding Officer, to determine whether that would be a useful or, indeed, appropriate mechanism?
The proposal came from ministers' idea. We did not pursue specific engagement with Parliament on it. It was a decision by Scottish ministers: they wanted to go further than happens in normal reporting because they recognised the importance of the bill, in particular its long-term nature and how it will affect future Administrations over the next 40 years. They wanted to offer more than an annual report to Parliament. We adopted the first stage—an annual statement to Parliament, which provides members with a clear opportunity to debate the annual report and to challenge and question ministers on it—but ministers wanted to go one step further and to help the committees. Ministers recognise the cross-cutting nature of climate change, and so wanted the committees to be fully involved and engaged in the process.
I appreciate the intention to go further than standard reporting mechanisms and I am by no means hostile to the idea of finding the right way to do that but, for clarity, was there no dialogue with the Conveners Group about whether it felt that this was an appropriate mechanism?
I cannot answer on behalf of Scottish ministers, but I can say from the official side that we did not have any dialogue. That would have been quite a difficult dialogue for us to have; the matter probably should have been taken forward, if it was felt necessary, through dialogue at political level.
We can perhaps explore with the minister at a future meeting whether there is an on-the-record forum within which such dialogue could happen rather than its taking place in an off-the-record forum.
Absolutely.
Given Philip Wright's comments, information that is provided at the additional meeting must be available to the whole Parliament if it is to be fully used.
I have a point that is relevant to what the convener has just said. Several subsections of section 34 use the words
We had to make it clear in the bill that we are not placing any obligations on Parliament or applying a duty that ministers could not meet, which is why section 34 is phrased as it is. I am certain that ministers are completely open to dialogue on the issue, if members feel that there is a better way to proceed. The spirit is clear: ministers want to be held accountable, to be open and to offer Parliament every opportunity to scrutinise and question them on these matters. Please, by all means, ask the minister to consider the issue further.
I will pick up on that issue before I move on to the matter that I want to explore.
The carbon assessment project is one example of that. It is a cross-cutting mechanism that will be available to ministers and will engage other departments.
It might be useful to flag up some of the work that I am heavily involved in, which involves mainstreaming the issue across the offices. We are working on a strategic overview and are trying to map out a pathway of emissions reductions for Scotland between now and 2050 for short-term changes, and focusing in particular on the medium-term and long-term changes that will have to take place. That involves my spending a lot of time talking to my energy, renewable energy and energy efficiency colleagues about their plans, and flagging up the type of emissions reductions that we need and what the Committee on Climate Change report recommends. We are trying to put together a document that will demonstrate that there is a pathway from where we are now to where we want to be in 2050. Areas that are important in that regard include energy efficiency, housing and transport.
That is an area that we should keep an eye on, convener.
At the moment, Scottish ministers have not earmarked a number of duties because we have been trying to future proof the bill and the ability of all the Administrations to deliver on the targets.
It does not. I am concerned about the fact that we are talking about "hope". My experience in equalities is that it took 20 years for local authorities to make progress in that regard, and, even then, it happened only through legislation. It was hoped that progress would be made on equalities, and a department in each local authority had responsibility for equalities, but that work was not mainstreamed. I am concerned, therefore, that there does not seem to be a duty on public bodies and local authorities to work on the issues that are covered in the bill, such as conservation and biodiversity. Those bodies need to be given targets if they are to make progress. Frankly, "hope" is not enough. We all hope that things will happen, but unless legislation is in place, we might be hoping forever.
If you have particular suggestions as to how the bill can be enhanced in that respect—
I have.
I am sure that ministers will be happy to have a dialogue.
I am really shocked.
Fiona Page was describing the bill, but a plethora of other measures will bear down on public bodies. For example, the carbon reduction commitment will bear down on local authorities, which will be obliged to participate in the scheme subject to their meeting a certain energy threshold—as a good number of authorities will. Other policy measures will also bear directly on public sector bodies. The bill represents a fall-back position; if the measures to which I have referred and other measures in specific policy areas that may come along in the future do not work, we can resort to the general provisions of the bill to apply the duty.
So, there is no way of auditing what is happening. You just "hope" that it will happen.
No. There is no "hope" behind the likes of the CRC—it is a statutory process with which authorities will be required to comply. There will be other examples of that in other policy areas.
Is that all right for the moment? Save some questions for the minister.
Just for the moment.
I share Cathy Peattie's concerns. You have said that the bill is the "last resort". Is not there an in-built time lag in the system, in that if the voluntary approach is not successful we will have to go through a process in imposing a duty? A co-operative effort is required. I do not criticise local authorities at all—some of the best examples of action to tackle climate change have been at local level—but it should be made clear in the bill that we are all in this together from the start. That would allow local authorities and other public bodies to plan. Why have you not been prepared to do that?
I am not sure what duty or specific example you would like us to include in the bill.
You might want to consider including a provision for annual reporting, as is required of the Government, at local level. Such reporting could deal with issues such as the state of local authority estates.
Would it cover emissions reductions, action on energy efficiency or other issues?
It could cover any of those issues. Did you not consider such matters?
We were conscious that measures to address such issues are already in place or are planned. The carbon reduction commitment will require local authorities to report on their energy use and associated emissions. That will capture a large chunk of the public sector.
If we required something further, would we be duplicating the carbon reduction commitment?
Any provision that we included in the bill would be duplicating the carbon reduction commitment. The UK Climate Change Act 2008 includes a reference to the commitment and to the need for provision of information. That was a preliminary move simply to get information to flow in and to provide a basis for the allowances that are made to the bodies that are covered by the carbon reduction commitment. The carbon reduction regulations will not be introduced until later, but they will cover many of the areas about which members have concerns.
Did not the consultation responses to the bill indicate clearly that public sector bodies such as local authorities support the introduction of a statutory duty?
Some public bodies indicated that that they are keen for a statutory duty to be imposed, but many others support our approach. COSLA was more than happy for us to include in the bill an enabling measure that might need to be used if we were not getting anywhere under the current concordat and the new arrangements that the Scottish Government has built up with local authorities through single outcome agreements and so on. The loudest message that came through was that we need to give those arrangements a chance to work before we impose specific obligations.
I asked about the time lag. If the voluntary approach is not working and you feel the need to impose a duty, what will be the timescale for the secondary legislation and how long will it take before we see action?
If we consider the profile of sources of emissions, we see that the public sector does not make such a large contribution to emissions. Therefore, failure to deliver in that area will not have as significant an impact as it would have in the energy, transport or agriculture sectors, where the large emissions come from. The main reason why we want to focus on public sector organisations is that they have a key role as exemplars: they have a role in reducing emissions in their estates and through their procurement activities, although their direct emissions are relatively small in the overall scheme of things. That gives us breathing space to address the issue over time.
Does the Government have a view on the timescale within which a duty would be implemented if ministers decided to make use of the provision? For example, would it be appropriate to impose a duty on the public sector within a spending review period? A public sector duty would have an impact on the finances of the bodies that were subject to it. Would it be appropriate for ministers to consider that in the run-up to the 2010 part of the cycle?
I will think out loud. Fiona Page and I have mentioned the carbon assessment project. A large percentage of the Government's expenditure—£11 billion-plus—goes directly to local authorities. The Government can try to do what it can, but once the money goes into local authorities, we lose it, to an extent. From our knowledge of how the carbon assessment project works, we might want to extend any commitment to undertake such an assessment into local authorities. However, it is a brave new area, so we are not sure how it will work. It may be the trigger for promoting action such as the convener suggests. We might not have to go to the extent of imposing a duty. There could be encouragement or demonstration.
It could be argued that the promotion of a duty in association with a spending review might be more compatible with the concordat approach, rather than with a return to ring fencing. Has the Government considered that or discussed it with local authorities?
I will have to pass on that. I have heard nothing about a return to ring fencing.
We realise that other committees will deal with part 5 issues, but we are keen to talk about adaptation. Will the Scottish Government publish climate change adaptation documents before those are required statutorily under the bill?
In parallel with the bill process, we are developing an adaptation framework. We consulted last year on the principles and definitions. That was a generic approach to building up Scotland's resilience to the impacts of climate change. We will issue a second consultation in the spring, which will build on the earlier consultation and reflect something of the responses. That will be about development of the Government's adaptation strategy, with a view to engaging with various sectors of the economy. It is a non-statutory approach to climate proofing Scotland and facilitating that process.
Can you share with us any outstanding ideas that emerged from the first consultation, and which you will include in the second consultation?
I had a look at the draft last week. The document is in preparation and will be consulted on in the office because it is cross-cutting and touches on a number of policy areas. It would be premature to suggest how we will reflect people's views; you will find out in due course.
On the Scottish adaptation strategy, the bill will rely on a UK impacts report. What guarantees have you been given that the report will address Scotland's unique opportunities and challenges? What role will Scottish organisations have in developing the report?
I do not know the scientific detail, but there will in essence be a scientific assessment of the risk to the UK. Because the science does not acknowledge administrative boundaries, the UK will be considered as a whole. I expect the report to be relatively neutral in relation to administrative arrangements, so we should get as good a picture of Scotland as we get of the other countries in the UK. There will be a separate response from each of the four countries, because we will quickly drop into devolved matters. We are on the steering group, so we are closely engaged in the process. We are also engaged in the UK's CIP programme.
It is strange to mention this at the end of our discussion, but why is there no reference in the bill's long title to the need to avoid dangerous climate change? Was such a reference considered? Its inclusion would allow the advice from the Committee on Climate Change or subsequent advisory bodies to be geared towards avoiding dangerous climate change rather than towards a specific target to reduce emissions by 80 per cent.
Such a reference was called for during the passage of the UK Climate Change Bill. The UK's responsibility in that regard is an issue, and such a high-level objective seemed inappropriate. The bill will inform the trajectory, as we discussed, but it is not in the gift of the UK Government or the Scottish ministers to prevent dangerous climate change—
They might not be able to do so unilaterally. However, was another form of words considered? For example, there could be an acknowledgement of the need to contribute to international efforts to avoid dangerous climate change.
That is the bill's implied objective, but whether ministers would be prepared to make explicit such an objective is a matter for further consideration.
As the convener knows, Parliament has the final say on the bill's short and long titles. Ministers wanted to introduce a climate change bill, so that was our starting point. As additional provisions to help us to achieve the policy aims were identified, we captured the spirit of them in the long title, but we did not go much beyond that.
I talked about moving targets. It has been suggested that dangerous climate change might be avoided if temperatures do not rise by more than 2°C, but there are different views on that, just as there are different views on the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases that is associated with a 2°C rise. We must steer clear of words that attach themselves to anything too specific. A conference took place in Exeter two years ago simply to discuss what "dangerous climate change" means. The convener's suggestion might take us into a tricky area in legislating.
No doubt the science will continue to develop on the danger of a 2°C rise and on parts per million. I understand why you would not want to include "2°C" in the long title. Does that not reinforce the argument for making the title less specific and more conceptual, for example by referring to the need to contribute to efforts to avoid dangerous climate change?
We will take your proposal away and think about it. Perhaps you can ask the minister about it when he gives evidence to the committee.
Thank you.
In the consultation, we explored in detail and asked about the possibility of using emissions budgets as a model for the reduction of emissions and the shaping of the trajectory to 2050.
I thank the witnesses for answering our questions. We will no doubt be well informed by your answers as we continue our scrutiny of the bill.