Agenda item 2 is the next stage of our private bills inquiry. We will take evidence from two panels of witnesses this morning. I welcome our first panel, representing the Society of Parliamentary Agents: Alison Gorlov is a partner with John Kennedy & Co and Ian McCulloch is a partner with Bircham Dyson Bell. I ask the witnesses to make a few opening remarks, after which members will ask questions.
Thank you for inviting us to give evidence to the committee. We realise that the committee's inquiry into private bill procedure has led it to examine in particular so-called works bills and to consider whether works that must currently be authorised by private bills should be authorised in some other way. We know that the committee is considering the Transport and Works Act 1992, which operates in England and Wales, as a possible model.
Thank you for those opening remarks.
The Transport and Works Act 1992 requires parliamentary approval for measures of national significance. As I understand it, the report in 2002 by MVA consultancy and others recommended that such parliamentary approval be widened to include all proposals, whether or not they are of national or regional significance. Is it not possible to have a process that maintains a role for the Parliament in taking decisions but removes from the Parliament the burden of consideration of the evidence and to move to the model contained in the Transport and Works Act 1992? Is the situation as clear cut as you describe it? Does the function have to be carried out by either Parliament or ministers?
If English practice is anything to go by, it is not as clear cut as that. The fact is that it looks on paper as if it is, but the proof of the pudding is in the eating. In England, only one debate has been held under section 9 of the Transport and Works Act 1992. That is not because there have not been schemes of national importance, but because the schemes that are deemed to fall within the scope of the act are very limited. It is also doubtful whether the provisions in the 1992 act give Parliament much of a handle on the process itself; it does not provide for the sort of policy debate that could result in having close involvement in the process. Of course, that is the position specifically under the Transport and Works Act 1992 and I am sure that it is possible to devise a remit for the Parliament that would bring it closer to the policy behind a given bill.
The main consideration for me is the burden on the Parliament and, in particular, on parliamentarians. It is not possible for the whole Parliament to have the detailed discussion, because, under the current system, that is done by committees of only five parliamentarians. From the testimonies of members of private bill committees, it appears that the burden on parliamentarians is so onerous that it detracts from the other, potentially more important, representational aspects of their work. What is your opinion on that issue and how would you reduce the burden on parliamentarians?
We understand that members must not be overburdened, and we hope that our written submission might assist in suggesting how that burden might be relieved. I see a huge advantage in having MSPs directly involved in the process. That is born of experience of parliamentary committees at Westminster and of trained inspectors' inquiries. The down-to-earth involvement of a layman who knows nothing about transport or little about the detailed subject matter of a railways bill, for example, can have huge advantages for all concerned, provided that the layman is given the technical information. The greater advantage is for the objectors, and it is certainly something that objectors appreciate.
In your written submission, you suggest that primary legislation would not be required to introduce the changes that you propose, but I am not clear where in the legislation under which the Parliament is set up we can find the power to allow us to go for the approach that you suggest of an external inquiry that reports to the private bill committee. As far as I am aware, the Parliament does not have the powers to set up such inquiries.
We did not consider that as setting up a public inquiry, which is one of the reasons why we suggested that it should be done bill by bill; it would be a case of a private bill committee delegating to an official the function of gathering certain detail and producing a digest of written evidence. The committee would not relinquish the role of considering the evidence; however, just as the clerks digest what is before the committee and make recommendations but the committee still has to do the work and consider what it is reporting on, we see the evidence-gathering role being devolved to an official. The committee would still perform its function but by doing no more than considering the report of the official.
I would like to make a few comments in response to Mark Ballard's earlier question. We quite understand that there is a genuine issue about relieving the burden on MSPs, but policy questions and questions of expediency arise in that regard. To relieve the burden on MSPs, the most expedient solution would be to pass something like the Transport and Works Act 1992, and so pass the whole responsibility to Scottish ministers and have nothing more to do with it in the Scottish Parliament except, possibly, in cases of national or regional significance, when the Parliament might want to have some involvement. However, that might be expediency at the expense of policy. The policy might be that Parliament should retain a more active involvement in whether legislation should be authorised. In the evidence that you have already heard, I read that there is a desire to have a degree of transparency and democracy in the authorisation process. In that case, you could find that you have chosen an expedient solution that does not conform with current aspirations on policy.
I would like to ask about your practical experience of the operation of the Transport and Works Act 1992 south of the border.
To be honest, I do not fully understand the negative comments made about the ability of objectors to participate in procedures relating to private bills or the Transport and Works Act 1992. I readily accept that there are ways in which objecting to a measure could be made easier and less intimidating for people. I know that the committee has discussed whether people should have to pay a fee before they are allowed even to submit an objection. I know that members have also considered the issue of legal representation for parties. I would not say that it is more or less difficult overall for an objector to participate in a Transport and Works Act 1992 order inquiry than in a private bill inquiry, a roads inquiry, a harbour inquiry or many of the other procedures that are available.
For individual objectors, there is no difference from a procedural point of view: they are required to submit an objection on a specific day and are faced with an inquiry. However, it is easier for an unrepresented individual objector here in the Scottish Parliament than it is in almost any other proceeding that I have come across. There are a number of reasons for that. As I understand it—I have no first-hand experience of the procedure—when an objector submits his objection, the private bills unit is exceedingly helpful, in ways that it is not possible for an inquiry officer to be. At the outset, the objector—who is understandably lost in all the procedures—is guided in ways that are not available elsewhere.
Do you bring experience from the process that was used at Westminster prior to the passage of the 1992 act?
Yes. Some worthwhile changes have been made for the Scottish Parliament bill procedure, not least the ability to hold the committee meeting at which objectors are heard in the locality to which the proposal relates. Under the Westminster procedure, people would come from all corners of the country to the Palace of Westminster to appear before a parliamentary committee. The process was intimidating for many people. Under the Scottish private bill procedure, the committee goes to them.
Under the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984, major motorway and trunk road developments are usually dealt with by a public local inquiry that is held in the locality concerned. Does that happen with inquiries that are held under the Transport and Works Act 1992?
Yes, it does; the inquiry would be held locally. Indeed, for one Transport and Works Act 1992 order not long ago—for the west coast main line, I think—the inquiry was held at different times and in different places according to the locality affected by the subject matter that was being considered at the time.
I will be interested to hear from Mr Adam about his experiences of being an objector. It is a mountain to climb, especially in an adversarial context, when objectors are up against all the resources of the promoters, including a QC. I was a member of the Stirling-Alloa-Kincardine Railway and Linked Improvements Bill Committee. The process requires a big commitment from the Parliament—that is fine; I have no problem with that. However, to justify its being a parliamentary procedure, the process must enable objectors to make their case better than they could through other procedures—in an easier and more accessible way—and must aid scrutiny of the proposal.
I will deal with your question and then return to another issue, if I may. The decisions on Transport and Works Act 1992 orders are made by ministers. One supposes that, if a similar procedure were introduced in Scotland, the ultimate decision would be made by ministers on the recommendation of a reporter. The reporter's job would be to analyse the technical detail and to sift out recommendations, which the minister might or might not follow. The minister would act on advice and would not be an expert. I would hazard a guess that the minister would be no more expert, at bottom, than MSPs are when they first sit on a private bill committee.
The question that we have posed in our evidence is whether the reporter, panel or other investigator—whoever it might be—should report to Scottish ministers or to the Parliament.
That is a good point. Ministers making a decision are accountable to Parliament as well. If Parliament objected to a decision, there would be some scrutiny of ministers at that point.
The perception is not that there is more scrutiny, but that the scrutiny is slightly different.
Is it better?
I suppose one might say that that would depend on the quality of the committee. However, a planning inquiry also depends on the quality of the inspector, and individuals are individuals.
Although ministers are accountable to Parliament in a very general sense, it is not at all clear how a minister who makes an order under the Transport and Works Act 1992 is accountable to Parliament for any of his decisions. In practice, he is not accountable; it is his decision whether to make the order, and he is not brought to Parliament to account for it in any particularly meaningful way.
But there are various ways in which he could be brought to account by Parliament.
Yes, but there is little comfort in that for an objector to an order made under the 1992 act who is dissatisfied with the decision.
I am sure that, given the decision on the line, objectors to the Stirling-Alloa-Kincardine railway do not feel that they are as empowered as they might wish to be.
From our Westminster experience, it is clear that even if some objectors feel that the decision of a parliamentary committee is a slightly rougher form of justice than that of a trained inspector who trawls over every technical aspect and detail of a project, they accept it more readily. When we promoted bills instead of orders, we had the sense that objectors felt that the decision was being made by elected politicians, not by bureaucrats.
Given that response, I should perhaps refer Mr McCulloch to the evidence that we received at our previous meeting from John Dick of the Kincardine railway concern group.
I should point out that, in the evidence that I have read, concern was expressed mostly by people who were understandably disappointed when they objected on grounds that were ruled out of order further down the line. Many of these problems could be overcome if the rules were clarified. At the moment, they are logical but operate rather confusingly. The concept of the split between general principles and detail is clear enough, but it is exceedingly difficult to apply that in practice. There is a risk of repetition or having to rule people out of order. In the event, we had both outcomes, and neither was desirable.
Is the problem that private bills for railways and tramlines are a hybrid form of legislation that not only address the public policy issue of whether a particular project should go ahead but cover planning aspects such as the details of the route and objections? Is there not a slight problem in that such private bills try to deal with two things at once but neither gets satisfactory treatment because of the way in which the system operates and the fact that in the private bill procedure there is not really an opportunity to object properly to a line or railway?
I do not think that there is such a problem—or at least there does not need to be. On the philosophical concept, there is a distinction to draw between the overall policy and the detailed application. However, in a great many cases, the two interact to such a degree that it is an artificial distinction to draw. I do not think that the process is the cause of the problem. After all, one has to deal with those policy-versus-detail issues whether one is in front of a committee of Parliament or an inspector at an inquiry.
Often the policy decisions that a parliamentary committee has to take are not based simply on whether the work should be authorised but arise from a detailed examination of the proposals, such as whether the compulsory purchase of a home, office or factory is justifiable in the context of the scheme and whether the scheme should be permitted as it stands or should be changed in some way. Those are the sort of policy issues that can arise from an examination of the detail. As Alison Gorlov has said, we believe that in most cases it is somewhat artificial and unhelpful to draw a distinction between the principle of the bill—sometimes I struggle to understand what that means—and the detail. I believe I am right in thinking that even if the principle of the bill is approved, it can still be defeated if examination proves the detail to be sufficiently unsatisfactory. We advocate the consideration of the principle and the detail of the bill at the same forum, not in two separate stages.
You have sort of answered my question. I sat on the Robin Rigg Offshore Wind Farm (Navigation and Fishing) (Scotland) Bill Committee. The bill was not about an offshore wind farm but two points of law relating to navigation and fishing rights within the area of the proposed wind farm. A good many of the objectors objected simply to the possibility of a wind farm being erected in the Solway firth. It seemed difficult to get across to them the fact that the bill had nothing to do with whether the wind farm should be there in the first place but dealt with smaller legal matters. One objector asked me, "Why are they discussing that when they should be discussing whether the project should go ahead first?" When you said that the forum should discuss both aspects at the same time, is that what you meant?
Not necessarily. It would be wrong for me to comment on that bill. Your question raises the issue of scope. What is the scope of a bill and what is the scope of the consideration of a bill? To what extent do other factors that bear on the issue become relevant or irrelevant to the consideration of the bill? It would be desirable for the scope to be made clear early on in the proceedings so that objectors, as well as promoters, understand fully the scope of the tribunal that we are talking about. Objectors would then understand that any of their concerns that did not fall within that scope would need to be raised elsewhere, such as in an objection to the planning application for the wind farm or in some other process. It would be desirable for the scope to be made clear at the start of the process, as happens in other tribunals. The terms of reference need to be made clear.
Who determines the scope of a bill in those circumstances? Obviously, the promoter will want the scope to be as narrowly defined as possible to minimise objections. However, the committee that is considering the bill will not want to be proscribed from considering the wider issues that arise as a result of its considerations. Who determines the scope and terms of reference?
Ultimately, it is a legal issue. The scope of the bill is a legal matter on which the committee's legal adviser and the promoter's legal adviser will have a view. It is to be hoped that the views of the two will coincide or be made to coincide at some point. Otherwise, it will be for the committee that is in charge of the bill to determine, on legal advice, the proper scope of its inquiry. A committee might want to examine issues that are beyond the legal scope of the bill but which it considers to be material to its inquiry. I have no doubt that a committee's lawyers would advise that it would be proper for the committee to consider those issues. It must be for the bill committee to retain control of its bill, but one hopes that it would do so in discussion with other parties' lawyers.
I entirely agree with that. One frustration for us was that the scope of our bill had been made quite plain to us but it did not appear to have been made clear to the objectors. A great many objectors turned up, but they went away disappointed and frustrated because they felt, whether rightly or wrongly, that they had been shoved to one side on an issue that was very important to them.
It would be highly desirable if there were a point at which closure could be reached on matters of compliance and procedure, whether that were established through procedural directions or as part of a revised process. We refer to the matter in our paper. Under the current procedure, issues of compliance, such as whether the promoter has adequately served notices on people or lodged documentation that is satisfactory for the purposes of the inquiry, run on for a considerable time—indeed, we know from experience that they can run on for 11 months without being resolved. That is not in the interests of the promoter or the objectors. Matters of compliance could be dealt with more quickly and without burdening committees, so that for better or for worse, according to one's point of view, a decision could be taken on whether the right procedural steps had been taken up to a certain stage. If a bill was allowed to proceed, one would move on to consider the merits of the project.
If someone who objects to a project sees that a committee is considering legislation to facilitate the project, they will be bound to object at any stage.
Yes. I do not suggest that someone's right and freedom to object should in any way be curtailed. However, there should be early and clear determination of whether an objection can be admitted and heard, so that objectors know where they stand. Similarly, it would be desirable for promoters, who must deposit a range of documentation, serve notices and publish advertisements about the project in accordance with rules, to know that it is possible to conclude that aspect of the process after a reasonable period of time, subject to allowing for challenge if others do not agree that they have proceeded correctly.
I have a couple of final questions. First, you mentioned the different legislation that applies to different types of works, such as the Harbours Act 1964 and the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984. Is there any logic to the fact that railway and light rail works are subject to a different type of procedure than that which applies to major road construction? Would it be more logical if there were a single process that dealt with all major public works?
There would be a logic to that. This is quite interesting if one is an historian: the various procedures all spring from the same source, because they were all originally dealt with by the United Kingdom Parliament. At various stages, Parliament devolved the procedures in different ways. The system grew like Topsy: when it was expedient Parliament would fling off one set of procedures and then another, until the next time it got fed up with a set of procedures. That is how the current procedures developed. If the Scottish Parliament were to pass an equivalent of the Transport and Works Act 1992, it would simply be following an old tradition.
Finally, objectors raised concerns that the battle is unequal: the promoters of bills have access to all the technical information and to QCs for legal advice, whereas objectors tend to do the work on their own and fund it themselves. Should objectors have access to support for technical and legal representation at inquiries, whether they are public or committee inquiries?
Ian McCulloch and I both represent promoters and from time to time we represent objectors. Self-evidently, some of the objectors whom we represent are people who have access to much the same sort of resources as promoters do. The playing field is not level, but it is impossible to make it level in the real world. However, one strives to assist as much as one can. The ill-informed objector does not help anyone: himself or the promoter. It would be to everybody's advantage if objectors were assisted as far as possible. Patently, a promoter cannot give an objector advice, but if the Parliament thought that it was right to provide independent advice to objectors, any sensible promoter would welcome that. One would not have to agree with the advice, but at least that would mean that objectors were given a steer that they might find helpful.
It is obviously desirable for people to have access to professional advice when they feel that they need it. The problem is not confined to the Scottish Parliament; the same point arises for people who have issues with the Inland Revenue or issues about legal aid in the courts—legal aid is denied to many people who feel that they ought to have it. Planning inquiries and bills that are before the Parliament are other areas in which it would be desirable for more parties to have access to professional advice if they needed it. We would not resist a move in that direction, if such a move were possible.
I thank the witnesses for their evidence, which has been helpful.
Meeting suspended.
On resuming—
The next witness is Tom Adam, who is a representative of the Clackmannan railway concern group, which was an objector to the Stirling-Alloa-Kincardine Railway and Linked Improvements Bill. I thank him for coming. Before I ask Mr Adam to make his opening remarks, I remind him that we cannot rerun any of the issues to do with the railway scheme; we are considering the processes of how the bill was dealt with, not the arguments for or against it. I am sure that the clerks have briefed him on that point.
Thank you for allowing me to speak. I will try my best not to encroach on the merits of the Stirling-Alloa-Kincardine Railway and Linked Improvements Bill, although it is difficult to divide them from the process. However, I am sure that the convener will keep me right. I appreciate that the purpose of the meeting is not to rehearse the arguments that were presented at the consideration stage of that private bill, but it would be helpful to the committee if members were aware of the circumstances behind the objection that we lodged, as that will indicate the nature of the thinking behind my evidence. My evidence relates only to the Clackmannan section of the Stirling-Alloa-Kincardine railway project.
Given that you have a lot of experience with local authorities and with local initiatives in your area, do you have any opinions on the effectiveness of scrutiny in local planning inquiries compared to that in the parliamentary procedure? Were objectors given a greater and more effective role in the parliamentary procedure compared to what happens in a local planning inquiry?
I do not have much experience in planning matters. My experience is merely in the issue that is before us. I do not think that I could add anything that would be of great help.
Thank you for that clarification.
I have served on the local authority and I have a lot of experience of how politicians work. The system, if not the procedure, was faulty from the beginning. The scheme was handed down to the local authority on the basis that it was of great historic importance. One can imagine local councillors preening themselves and thinking that they were going to get their place in history. There is no doubt that that affected their approach.
So, the parliamentary procedure was not the be-all and end-all of democratic scrutiny. Some of the local issues were just as pertinent.
That is correct. That is how it was.
I know that you have said to Richard Baker that you are not an expert in the local planning processes, but would it have been better if the bill had come through a local planning process whereby objectors would have had the right to put forward their objections and possible solutions to those objections and to encourage the applicant, as it were, to amend the plans? Would that have been a better way in which to proceed? I know that, in the parliamentary process, witnesses were either for the bill or against it—there was no way to amend the proposal. You appear to be suggesting that you were not against the railway but just wanted a different route.
That is correct. I do not think that it would have made any difference. The procedure that we experienced was an excellent one—it was democracy on our doorstep and I could not find any fault with it whatsoever.
In your written evidence, you suggest that the committee perhaps had a vested interest in passing the bill and that an independent review might be a better way forward. Is it still your view that some independent element needs to be introduced into the system with the parliamentary process?
Yes. At the end of the process, once the evidence has been heard by the committee in the normal way, the final decision should not be left totally to the committee. Some independent body should review the evidence and come to a conclusion that could be passed back to the committee, if that were necessary, or passed to the Executive. That is what should happen.
I can assure you that I make no claim to have a superior intellect.
You will have heard from earlier evidence that one of the advantages of the private bills system is that the final decision is taken by the Parliament as a whole rather than by Scottish ministers. You made the point that because your constituency MSP was the Presiding Officer, you were denied representation in the final stage—in other words, the stage after the consideration stage, when the motion to pass the bill was debated in the Parliament. You have just talked about representation by MSPs. Do you think that your regional list MSPs played an effective role in representing you? Do you feel that they had an effect on the final stage debate?
No. We were assured that, in the final stage of the bill procedure, which is the stage that we are talking about, we would have the right to lobby our MSPs. That is how things should work. I attempted to do that—in fact, I e-mailed every member of the Mid Scotland and Fife group of MSPs. I received a reply from Bruce Crawford telling me that he was injured and would not be able to attend the debate, but received no reply from any other MSP. I even e-mailed Jack McConnell. I got a reply from his office a fortnight after the bill was passed saying that if I had any complaints I should raise them with my local authority. That was the total response that I got.
By the time a bill is lodged, much of the background has been sorted out. You mentioned accompanying documents, such as environmental statements. In that respect, were there sufficient opportunities for you to exert influence before the bill reached the final stages? Should there have been more early consultation with affected communities such as your own, before it got to the stage of drawing up the preferred route?
Yes, there should have been more consultation. When the promoter realised that there were serious objections—236 objectors is a lot of people—it should have come back to the community and reassured us that the problem could be resolved, but it never attempted to do that.
I have one final question that we have been asking most of the witnesses. It is about the availability of professional, technical and legal advice to objectors. Do you believe that you had enough access to such advice or should more be provided to objectors to enable them to make their case to any inquiry, whether it is done by a committee or whether it is a public inquiry?
Of course, we had no legal advice at all. We paid £20 for the pleasure and privilege of raising an objection. We do not know where that money goes. It certainly did not buy us anything that we required. We were very conscious of the thought that we, as taxpayers, had paid for everything. We even paid for a Queen's counsel to act against us and there is something fundamentally wrong with the way in which that works. The only people who really had to dip into their own pockets were the objectors.
One suggestion might be that there should be an independent panel of experts from which any objector could get technical advice about how to present their objections. The panel would not present the objectors' case for them; it would just be available to give technical advice. Would that sort of thing be useful?
That might be helpful because some objectors obviously felt that they were left out on a limb when they had to raise their objections. It might be comforting to think that if they had any difficulties, they could go to such a panel and have them resolved.
You mentioned the £20 fee for lodging an objection. Do you think that it is reasonable that there should be a fee for lodging an objection?
It does not make any sense to me that an objector should have to pay to raise an objection. I understand that triviality must be filtered out of the system, but the people who had to pay £20 so that their objection would be considered to be non-frivolous are the same people who vote for MPs and MSPs. They are not considered to be frivolous at that stage; they are considered to be very discerning and responsible then.
Thank you for that final remark and for giving evidence to the committee today. The points that you have made have been very helpful and we look forward to considering them when we draft our report in due course.
Meeting suspended.
On resuming—
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