Chamber and committees

Yes.

I will try to finish answering the first intervention before doing that.

There are alternative and more humane methods available to manage wild mammals and protect the environment, and, of course, the use of two dogs would continue to be allowed.

If members do not support the amendments to remove licensing, amendments 116 and 130, in my name, would allow NatureScot to require licence applicants to meet standards in the application process that could be drawn up in line with an ethical framework such as the international consensus principles for ethical wildlife control, which is an existing international example of such standards. The principles would bring significant animal welfare benefits if embedded in Scottish Government and societal practices. They would provide a framework to guide decisions on whether, when and how wildlife interventions should take place, and they would ensure that ethical reasoning is applied, evidence is consulted and animal welfare is prioritised. Perhaps most importantly, the principles invite a shift in mindset, recognising that each animal is sentient and deserves equal consideration, regardless of the category that humans have put them in. That is a key point.

My standpoint on this group is that I do not support the use of dogs below ground to control wild animals. The bill seeks to limit the number of dogs to one, with the unrealistic idea that the dog would be controlled. However, if it is cruel to use two dogs underground, it is clearly cruel to use any dog at all. I am not surprised, therefore, that the committee, in its stage 1 report, stated:

“It is not clear ... that the use of dogs at all below ground is compatible with the Bill’s pursuit of the highest possible animal welfare”.

In my view, it is not compatible, and I hope that amendment 13, in the name of Ariane Burgess, which seeks to remove that exception, and which I support, is successful, along with consequential amendments 1, 3, 5 and 7.

Amendment 117, in my name, which would be relevant only if that exception were not removed, seeks to deal with the fact that the exception in the bill for the use of dogs underground applies to a person using a dog below ground to “search for” or “flush” a wild animal

“with the intention of killing it”.

However, it does not specify how they should intend to kill the mammal.

Amendment 117 specifies that the intention should be to dispatch the animal “by shooting”. It seeks to require explicitly that there is no intention for the dog to kill the wild mammal, although by specifying that the intention is to dispatch the wild mammal by shooting, it ensures that a more humane method of killing than being killed by a dog is used should the wild mammal emerge from under the ground. It also avoids a possible cover story should a wild mammal be flushed from underground and then a dog be used to kill the wild mammal. Edward Mountain says that he believes that the wild mammal would be shot. The amendment seeks to state in the bill that it should be shot.

Amendment 117 therefore seeks to avoid not only the deliberate killing of wild animals by dogs but the creation of another unnecessary loophole. I therefore urge members to support amendment 117.

I believe that the amendment is already clear, and I would find it quite disturbing if we were arguing that somebody would carry out shooting in any circumstances in a way that was in any way dangerous to anyone. I am happy to listen to the debate, if members believe that my wording is not clear, but I personally believe that it is.

It is important to note that the amendment would be an addition to section 5(1), which refers to using a dog

“to flush a fox or a mink from below ground”.

That is the context for the proposed reference to killing the animal “immediately by shooting” should it emerge. The key point of the amendment is that the current wording of the bill simply states:

“with the intention of killing it for one or more of the purposes set out in subsection (2)”.

It does not specify how that animal should be killed, and my concern is that dogs could be used in those circumstances, which goes against the whole purpose of the bill.

It is interesting that Jim Fairlie raises that point when there is no definition in the licensing scheme of the example that he gives. That is one of the weaknesses of the licensing scheme: it is not clear about exactly when packs of dogs will or will not be allowed to be used.

I think that we accept that. I do not think that the bill suggests that we should not control predatory behaviour by animals—no one is proposing that. However, that does not mean that the animal is not sentient. I would have thought that every member recognises that all animals are living, breathing creatures that feel pain and suffer. I think that that is a basic thing that any human being would recognise.

I have heard it argued that we do not need this ethical approach, because the NatureScot position statement on wildlife welfare and the shared approach to wildlife management that NatureScot currently uses to guide its decision making in the area are sufficient. That is a bit of a red herring—it seems to be more of an excuse for not supporting my amendments rather than a credible explanation. If you compare the seven international consensus principles for ethical wildlife control with those two current policies, you will see that the latter are outdated and simply do not go far enough, and I think that the Government recognises that in its thinking on, for example, the coming changes to deer management.

The current policies are commendable statements of intent, but they are not a proper framework that will act as a guide for decision making in any application process. In contrast, the seven principles can easily be converted into seven questions in any licence application process, literally providing a step-by-step protocol to follow when a potential problem is identified and a decision on how to approach it must be made.

Crucially, NatureScot’s definition of wildlife welfare is outdated. It contains no recognition of sentience. Although I think that it would be perfectly logical—this would be my preference—to say specifically that the ethical principles should be the international consensus principles for ethical wildlife control, my amendment 116 does not do that; it simply says that ethical principles should be used. I believe that such ethical principles could be drawn up by NatureScot, working with those involved in wildlife management, animal welfare charities and others when developing the licensing scheme.

One criticism of the bill is that there is a lack of detail about what would guide the licence application process, and my amendments would help to overcome that by setting a clear direction of travel. Anyone who is considering an application under a licensing scheme that follows ethical principles has nothing to be concerned about because, frankly, if they cannot justify the licence on ethical grounds, they should not have a licence in the first place.

I have outlined exactly—

I will not confuse the two, because we are dealing specifically with the bill. My reference was to the fact that, in the Government’s proposals for upcoming changes to deer management, it recognises that it needs to go beyond existing policy.

I think that I have covered all the points that have been made. As I said, one criticism of the bill is that there is a lack of detail. My amendments 116 and 130 would set a direction of travel for the discussions on that lack of detail. I have been very clear that the amendments are quite tight. They do not specify all seven of the ethical principles—I gave an example of one that could be incorporated—but they set a direction of travel that ethical principles should direct any licence application process.

I would be happy to work with any member on the practicalities of that, if the amendments are not agreed to. However, I urge members first to support amendments to remove the licensing scheme from the bill; failing that, I urge them to support amendments to include the ethical principles for wildlife management to ensure that the licensing scheme is as robust as possible.

Amendments 111, 119 and 127, in my name, seek to ensure that the use of dogs in hunting is a last resort. They would require a person using dogs, if asked, to be able to show evidence that the use of dogs meets the purpose of preventing damage, not simply reducing the number of a certain species—the two are not necessarily linked—and that they had considered more humane methods and had reasonable grounds to believe that those would not be as effective. The amendments would not prevent the use of dogs; they would merely require a justification for their use, which introduces accountability that is currently lacking in the bill.

Amendments 112, 118, 144, 145 and 147 would introduce a close season for the use of dogs, which is a basic animal welfare and conservation measure that would reduce the perceived need to send dogs underground to relieve the suffering of a dependent fox or mink, which is currently permitted under section 5(2)(d). Amendment 118 is consequential to amendment 112. If amendment 112 is agreed to, amendment 118 would be required to provide a close season for wild mammals during their breeding seasons and obviate the supposed need to use dogs below ground to dispatch orphaned fox cubs that would otherwise die of dehydration or starvation. Not killing animals with young is a basic animal welfare and conservation measure. Section 5 allows for the use of dogs underground, so the two are linked.

Amendment 122 seeks to remove subsection (4), which states:

“In this section, ‘dependent’ means that the mother of a fox or mink is dead and it is too young to survive on its own.”

Amendment 122 is consequential, and if amendment 118 is agreed to, amendment 122 is no longer needed, as there is no other reference to dependent animals in section 5.

I urge members to support my amendments to ensure that using dogs to kill wild mammals is a last resort and that we do not create loopholes in a bill that is designed to close loopholes.

It would be necessary to prove that the exception existed. If there was an email from those who carried out the hunt that contained information about their belief that there was a high level of predation of lambs—that is the example that I gave—that would certainly be an argument to be considered with regard to whether the exception applied. An email that simply said, “We were hunting on your land,” would obviously not prove that an exception applied. The evidence would have to relate to the specific exception that the person argued was applicable. I presume that the individual would have to argue that under the bill as drafted. The only difference in what I am suggesting is that there would be some evidence to back up the claim.