Chamber and committees

This question is much more technical—I apologise for that—but it is important. You set out in your letter the methodology that has been used to measure the areas that you believe are most in need. That methodology is also on the UK Government website and is largely based on the indices that the Office for National Statistics produced.

When the Scottish Government makes an assessment of the areas that it thinks are most in need, it uses the formal Scottish Fiscal Commission budget analysis and estimates, with some based on ONS input and others not. I want to check that the UK Government’s assessment of the areas that are most in need—that is, the methodology that you use—does not use data that is different from the data that is used when it comes to the Scottish economy. If there was different data, there could be different interpretations.

A conclusion from our budget report was that the Scottish economy sometimes suffers from the Scottish Fiscal Commission and the Office for Budget Responsibility having different timescales. Are you confident that the methodology that is being used to decide which areas are most in need uses a formula agreed by both Governments?

That is very helpful. Is it your understanding that that would be done on an independent basis for all spending across the UK?

I reference the fact that the co-operation on deals such as the Tay cities deal was absolutely first class, because everybody was on the same page. The UK Government, the Scottish Government, local authorities and local interest groups were on the same page with regard to what the ambitions were for the Tay cities project, and I think that that was true of the other city deals, too.

If there was a slight difference between the Scottish Government’s priorities through the national performance framework and those of the UK Government, how would that be resolved to the satisfaction of both Governments?

That is very helpful.

In your helpful letter to the committee of 21 February, you spoke about engagement with the devolved nations on the three new funds. Could you expand on that? As the convener hinted in relation to investment, concerns have been expressed that the UK Government was choosing to engage much more with local authorities and stakeholders in local communities than with the Scottish Government.

I would like to know about the process. The Scottish Government develops many of its policy ambitions through what is called the national performance framework. If the process is to work, there must be some articulation between the aims and objectives of the UK Government and the aims and objectives of the Scottish Government. Could you expand on how you see that engagement taking place, especially in relation to the aims and objectives of the Scottish Government?

Secretary of state, you will be aware that the committee has recently published its report on the budget for 2022-23. It was a unanimous report. Not only does it flag up quite a lot of concerns about the Scottish economy, it raises concerns about the budget process. One of the conclusions in that report is that there is not sufficient transparency between the UK Government and the Scottish Government about where the income streams come from and, just as important, where they are being spent. Those points were also raised by people who gave evidence to the committee during our scrutiny of the budget.

On the three new funds that we are discussing, are you confident that both Governments are absolutely clear about the amounts of money that are available and what the timescales are?

Times like this make us think carefully about what this place stands for. Members have stood together this afternoon to condemn what is happening in Ukraine at the hands of Vladimir Putin. The absence of any amendments to the motion for debate shows how strong the unity across the chamber is. We may have very strong party-political differences, but the principles of democracy matter far more. It is those principles of democracy that are currently at stake in Ukraine and across the world.

Like several other members, I woke this morning to the sound of air raid sirens and shelling on Nick Robinson’s BBC broadcast from Kyiv. Those were not the air raid sirens and shells to which we have become accustomed in history documentaries: the sirens and shelling were for real. The BBC’s report was chilling, as has been the case throughout today’s media broadcasts.

Hearing BBC reporters describe buildings in the centre of Kyiv made me recall my only visit to the city, back in 1991. That followed several visits that I had made to Leningrad and Moscow in the late 1980s, as a young teacher interested in Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost. Like other Soviet states that declared their independence in 1991, Ukraine was emerging from 70 years of totalitarianism, having suffered civil war in the Bolshevik revolution, famine in the 1930s, brutal Nazi occupation in the second world war and then purges and economic stagnation. Our guide told us that there was a strong reawakening of Ukrainian identity. That was evident from the talk of democracy in cafes and bars and from the flying of the Ukrainian flag, with its sharp blue and yellow denoting the sky above the golden prairies, in places where it would previously have been banned.

The story of Ukraine since then is largely the story of its attempts to define a new future for itself in Europe and of Russia’s attempts to disrupt that new direction at every turn. That obstruction has now become unprovoked military aggression and a flagrant disregard for international law. Vladimir Putin’s illegal actions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions violate the Minsk protocol and this morning’s military manoeuvres elsewhere are final proof—if any were needed—that the Russian Government is intent on expanding its sphere of influence westwards, no doubt with the aid of Belarus.

The invasion has happened because the Ukrainian people have had the guts to stand up to Russian influence and to declare that they have no wish to be held hostage by Putin. Like us, they wish to guard their precious democracy.

Russia’s actions are repugnant, not only because of the likely killing of thousands of innocent people or because of the humanitarian disaster that will inevitably follow, but because of the fear that Russia could use its recent so-called recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as an excuse for the future annexation of other former Soviet states. As the First Minister said, it may also encourage other dictatorships to do the same.

Where are we right now? First, the combined intelligence of the United States, Britain and NATO in recent weeks has proven to be entirely accurate, despite some scepticism in various quarters that that was not the case. To some extent, that accuracy is reassuring, and it perhaps helps us to understand better exactly what is happening on the ground, which can better inform the strategy of what has now become a wholly unified west.

We know that the Ukrainian army, although it is not able to take on the military might of Russia, is much bigger and better prepared than it was eight years ago. We know, too, that the recent lessons of history in Afghanistan send a very strong warning signal to Putin that any invasion, which could be long and bloody, against a country of such size as Ukraine does not end well for the aggressor. This is not Georgia or Chechnya—bad as those situations were—but something much bigger.

There is something else in the equation, and that is the response of the Russian people themselves, who have little appetite for the war or for Putin’s aggression. They know that the war would bring death not only to a vast number of Ukrainian citizens but to Russian citizens, too. The image of Russian body bags at the door of the Kremlin would not sit well with Russian public opinion and might have much greater influence on Putin himself than will the economic sanctions imposed by the west. We should make no mistake about it: those sanctions have to happen as part of the punishment of Putin, but we should not be fooled into thinking that they are the only factor that will drive Putin’s reactions.

The sanctions that are imposed to further curtail the activities of the Russian state and the economy have to happen in conjunction with the agreement of our G7 allies. That joint action is vital, as nothing would be better received by Putin than disunity among the west. It will inevitably mean that difficult decisions need to be taken, such as restricting the imports of Russian gas that have, for nations such as Germany in particular, been so crucial.

What is critical about the past 24 hours is the fact that Putin has actually succeeded in uniting the west at a time when there had been tensions and some division. Sanctions are now agreed—there are more coming—as is the need for them to be focused on Putin’s oligarchs and his financial backers, including those who have sought to harbour their wealth in the UK.

However, it is also important that we increase support to our NATO allies. The UK Government has already doubled the size of its deployment in Estonia, where the British Army leads NATO’s battle groups, including tanks and armoured vehicles. As the Prime Minister said, we have to be supportive of the Baltic states. We must honour those commitments.

The current actions by Russia are a very serious threat to world peace, and they threaten to bring about a geopolitical realignment that is unprecedented since the end of the cold war. Vladimir Putin is guilty of so many falsehoods to justify his actions—a trademark of dictatorship. There is no doubt that his actions, should they be allowed to continue, will be catastrophic for his own people, as well as for Ukrainian citizens. We cannot—indeed, we must not—stand by and watch, because if we do, we will witness the resurgence of authoritarian regimes across the world, whose attacks against democracies will only be emboldened.

Will the member give way?

I have heard Mr Harvie several times in the past say that one element that could improve Parliament is better post-legislative scrutiny. Does he accept that we are debating a situation in which many councils are choosing not to take up the legislation from 2019 because of the detrimental impact that it will have on so many people who use their cars?

The cabinet secretary will recall that, on 7 December 2021, he said that 22 bills are planned for the justice and veterans portfolio. However, it is clear from freedom of information responses that the Scottish Government has no plans to go down the legislative route for veterans. Does that mean that the Government is now saying that it is not willing to use the devolved powers at its disposal to create a new top-up benefit for veteran households that are in receipt of universal credit?

Will the member take an intervention?