Chamber and committees

Again—I am looking at Maggie Chapman here—that is not something that the corporate body has discussed, but I have to say that the idea that you articulate is a very interesting one. It would create the advocacy opportunity that you have identified, but perhaps with a beginning, a middle and an end in terms of clear accountability through the committee structure. You have presented a very interesting alternative way of considering how the advocacy functions might be taken forward.

In the previous session of Parliament, we did everything that we could to rationalise costs by bringing together as many of the commissioners as possible. From memory, we saved about £0.5 million through that work.

I know that additional space has become available and that there is the possibility of consolidating. That would work, because it would allow the commissioners to share some back-office functions, which would certainly save money. One or two other commissioners are located in places with quite long leases attached to them, so it will be longer before those can be looked at again.

We are pretty rigorous. The corporate body does not roll over and say, “You asked for another £1 million, how about £2 million?” We are more inclined to say, “Hang on a minute: you asked for another £1 million but can you explain why?”, and we have declined some requests.

It is also the case that some commissioners have had additional responsibilities placed on them that come with a consequent requirement for additional staff so that those can be fulfilled. I come back to the fact that it is the corporate body’s responsibility to ensure that office-holders who have been established by the will of Parliament are adequately resourced to undertake their functions. It would be difficult to apply a fixed budget, given that, even as we speak, additional responsibilities are being attached to the commissioners that we currently have and that those responsibilities will bring additional burdens with which they will have to cope.

I would hope not. There is a characteristic history of legacy reports from one parliamentary session to the next, with those legacy reports forming the basis of understanding as to how Parliament will proceed. I do not think that there is any political ill will on that point, but nobody has actually thought about it. The control that there was previously, with the Government being very reluctant to facilitate the establishment of such bodies, has changed. Therefore, if there was an agreed architecture, most MSPs in a future Parliament would be quite happy to operate within whatever that architecture was. That is my own view.

The first thing to say is that there is my personal view and there is the view of the corporate body. The corporate body does not have an executive function in this regard. We are there to implement the will of Parliament as expressed. I noticed a suggestion from the Deputy First Minister that the corporate body could have a series of tests by which the establishment of a commissioner would be judged. That is not our responsibility. We in the corporate body do not have a party-political function. It is the will of Parliament to express whether it wants a commissioner and our responsibility is to facilitate that commissioner.

Professor Alan Page made a point about the complete volte face of the Government that is directly relevant to what you say. In 2008, I served on the committee that was established at the Government’s instigation to rationalise the number of commissioners that we had. That was difficult because, once the recommendations that we made to rationalise commissioners—with all the support of colleagues as we did it—became public, the people who saw that their commissioner might be rationalised away started campaigns with MSPs, who then got cold feet about the idea of rationalising commissioners. The problem is that, once the commissioners are there, they are difficult to walk back from.

The Scottish Government now seems keen on the establishment of commissioners as an instrument of policy. Whatever has changed, the Parliament has never had an architecture by which it and MSPs independently judge whether the establishment of a commissioner is a good thing. It is simply a proposal—for example, in a member’s bill—that goes through the relevant committee without more general and rounded consideration of whether it adds to or hinders the overall architecture. If the Government is going to be keener on that, rather than unenthusiastic, Parliament has to consider whether it should set up the architecture by which such proposals are judged, before it even gets to the discussion in committee of what the individual’s particular powers might or might not be.

In that sense, we have to be a bit keener on saying no to some things. David McGill always tells me that I am in danger of exaggerating these things but, wearing my finance hat, I think that it is about 12 per cent of our budget now.

That would not necessarily follow. There is some sympathy for the suggestion that you raise from within the current architecture of commissioners, who are concerned that clear lines of responsibility and authority are potentially being diluted by having additional advocacy commissioners. Where does the human rights commissioner sit within that structure? Could the approach that you suggest have been a better way forward?

I go back to my earlier point about architecture and how these things are established. That comes about because an organisation engages the support of an MSP, who makes a proposal for a bill to create a commissioner, but any suggestion that that commissioner might fit within an existing structure is not really something that you can create a bill for—it does not fit our current structural arrangements.

Parliament has to get that right first, and then judge how to go forward. We may well go from royal commission, to summit, conference, tsar and commissioner and end up with all of us wanting a rapporteur for our particular cause. I do not know what will happen, but it would be reassuring if the architecture around that were more robust.

It is important to say that the budget for that commissioner at inception was £640,000. In my eight years of experience on the corporate body, no commissioner has ever come to me and said, “I think I could cut my budget in half.” They have always said that the demand is such that they need to expand, and I can see the patient safety commissioner being a case in point. What they effectively mean by that is additional staff, and it is very easy to see how such budgets can multiply quickly.

PE2030, which was lodged by Denise Hooper, calls on the Scottish Parliament to urge the Scottish Government to review the cultural funding that it provides to the Scotland + Venice project and ensure that Scottish artists can contribute to the Venice biennale in 2024. When we previously considered the petition at our meeting on 20 September 2023, we agreed to write to the Scottish Government and Creative Scotland, largely because the material responses that we had received did not really explain anything at all, unless I am missing something.

I am pleased to say that we have now received responses from both the Scottish Government and Creative Scotland. They confirm that the Scotland + Venice project was paused in order for a review to be carried out of the relevance and impact of the project. The response from Creative Scotland notes:

“The review will present and evaluate options for change, underpinned by a clear financing strategy. It will support the future planning of Scotland’s participation at the Venice Biennale from 2026.”

I might suggest that Creative Scotland investigates some of its other funding at the same time, but that is a separate matter.

In response to the information provided by the Scottish Government and Creative Scotland, the petitioner has expressed concern that it may, therefore, be 2027 before Scotland is represented at the Venice biennale again. The petitioner highlights comments from the then First Minister Humza Yousaf that investment in Scotland’s arts and culture will be more than doubled over the next five years, which the petitioner believes should allow greater flexibility for Scotland’s participation.

The committee has also received two submissions from the Cabinet Secretary for Constitution, External Affairs and Culture, updating us at various stages on progress on developing and publishing the international culture strategy. That strategy was published on 28 March 2024 and it was subsequently debated in the chamber.

In light of the explanation that we have received, such as it is, and the resolve and determination that there appears to be that there will not be any participation in 2024 nor in 2025, it would seem, do colleagues have any suggestions for action?

Good morning, and welcome to the ninth meeting in 2024 of the Citizen Participation and Public Petitions Committee. The first item on our agenda is, customarily, a decision on taking business in private. Are members content to take item 4 in private?

Members indicated agreement.

That brings us to the consideration of new petitions. As always, I say to people who are tuning into our proceedings because we are about to consider their petition that, in the first instance, as a matter of course, we contact the Parliament’s independent research body—the Scottish Parliament information centre—and also seek the preliminary views of the Scottish Government. We do that because, historically, those have been the first two things that the committee has agreed to do, and it simply avoids us building further delay into our informed consideration of new petitions.

PE2081, on making chronic kidney disease a key clinical priority, which was lodged by Professor Jeremy Hughes, on behalf of Kidney Research UK in Scotland, calls on us to do exactly what it says on the tin, which is to urge the Scottish Government to make chronic kidney disease a key clinical priority.

The SPICe briefing notes that chronic kidney disease is a term that can be used to cover a range of kidney impairments, from a small loss of kidney performance with no symptoms to a life-threatening condition that requires regular dialysis or a kidney transplant.

In responding to the petition, the Scottish Government states that the relevant cabinet secretary and minister have previously corresponded with the petitioner to advise that Scottish Government does not intend to increase the number of health strategies for individual conditions at this time. It is noted that the Government’s approach to clinical conditions policy is kept under regular review. The Government response also notes work to support people with kidney disease, including the launch of a national policy on the reimbursement of electricity costs for home dialysis for patients.

We have also received a submission from the petitioner, who is concerned that the Scottish Government’s criteria for choosing what will and will not be designated a clinical priority remains unclear. The petitioner poses two specific questions: why is chronic kidney disease not already a clinical priority, and why has the Scottish Government taken the decision not to increase the number of health strategies for individual conditions or to assign the status of clinical priority, and the civil service support that goes with it, to any additional conditions. The petitioner also highlights the potential benefits to patients and the clinical community where a condition affecting them has been designated a clinical priority: for example, bringing clarity on who within the Scottish Government has day-to-day responsibility for developing condition-specific strategies and action plans.

Do any members have any comments or suggestions for action?