Chamber and committees

I understand the position that the minister takes. However, that notwithstanding, if the minister did not move her amendment 30, on a single-member panel discharging a referral, that would be an indication of good faith, and I am quite confident that if it was felt to be necessary, it could be put back in at stage 3.

I am not questioning the good faith of the minister in any way, but that would allow a discussion to happen in an area where the minister wants to make amendments that we can maybe get behind when we have more understanding of them. If the minister was able, as a matter of good faith, not to move the amendments, I would certainly be more than satisfied not to move any of my amendments in this group to allow that discussion to happen.

I think that “disagreement” is far too strong a word; we have too much in common.

I welcome the minister’s contribution. There is a different understanding regarding the term “presumption” and the discussions that take place so that a child has understanding. However, given what the minister has said and the discussions that will be happening, I will be more than happy to make this issue part of those discussions, if that assists.

At a simple level, we can all point to those who have provided suggestions and advice, including the children’s commissioner, on amendments that have not been agreed by the Government. One of the roles of Parliament is to debate what may be two extreme points—by “extreme” I mean where the stance is that it is one thing or the other. Part of our role as elected members is to take such decisions on behalf of those in our wider communities who elect us here. That can be based only on the evidence, the debate that is heard and the conversations that happen.

I go back to my point that an opt-out model is not an imposition on the child; it is an imposition on the system. There have been cases, to which the minister has referred, of individuals who choose to do exactly that—to opt out. We also have a huge amount of both subjective and objective evidence that the challenge of dissent and misunderstanding is greatly reduced when advocates are involved.

The minister has talked about the costs, and she is absolutely right to do so, but she has also talked about her desire to develop advocacy in an iterative way, presumably to the point where every young person has an advocate, albeit that that point would be reached at a different pace compared with the jump that the opt-out model would give.

In essence, we all seem to be talking about the same goal that we wish to achieve, which is that the children are rightly represented by an advocate where the child wants to have one. I think that the opt-out model allows for a sensible discussion, and it allows relationships to be built at a much earlier stage.

The minister also raised the question of the potential tension with the rights of a young person under the general data protection regulation.

The flipside of that is the right to a fair trial and representation, and to be heard. We have ways of balancing challenges where human rights are brought into the context. In this case, the adults who surround the young person are perfectly able to adjudicate as to when GDPR should take precedence over the right to an advocate and the right to have a fair trial or, indeed, when it should be the other way. Some of the assertions that are being made against the opt-out model are unfairly based. In the amendments before us, we have, in essence, two different ways of achieving that. I compliment both Ross Greer and Nicola Sturgeon on managing to do it in a much shorter way than I did. It absolutely needs to be looked at.

With regard to amendment 80 from Jeremy Balfour, I know that the minister pushed back on the fact that it would, in essence, be a backstop. However, I can imagine scenarios where a chair or a panel are confronted with a subject in relation to which they would feel much safer if the young person had an advocate who was separate and distinct from others who had been involved. It might, indeed, be a sign of a disappointment if a case had got that far without the young person having their own advocate. To forgo the last opportunity for that would go against both the professionalism of the chair and the expertise of the panel.

I think that we have disagreement among the lodgers of a number of these amendments in relation to the purpose behind them. I am not sure whether the discussion will draw that together. We will see where it goes. I look forward to the minister’s summing-up.

This is a short group that might re-rehearse some of the earlier discussions that we had about timeframes. In no way do I assume that the Government will take the same stance with regard to timeframes appearing in primary legislation, but I am also open to having a discussion about the appropriate venue to enable it to happen. I am happy to conclude my submission at this stage and will not seek to move amendment 190, if the minister can intervene.

There are two amendments in my name in the group.

The first, amendment 195, is on the level of skills and training that infant safeguarders should have to ensure that they are the appropriate people to deal with the matter.

The second, amendment 199, builds on what we have heard about babies and infants and about whether a safe baby hearing pilot scheme should be undertaken by the Government to ensure that the baby hearing experience and environment are built on data and on an understanding of the—sometimes subtly and other times obviously—different nature of those hearings, and that the voice of the baby or infant is represented.

We have discussed, when debating previous amendments, whether the appropriate age should be five or three—the age that appears in the other amendments in the group. Given importance of infant safeguarding and the unusual nature of baby hearings, the Government needs to seriously consider such matters in the bill.

Does the Scottish Government agree that the role of safeguarder does not necessarily always need to be a separate and distinct role and that others can fulfil it in the system?

I am grateful to the minister for taking a third intervention. Indeed, the provision as described in the statute is that, if the young person leaves when they are under 16, they are, in effect, entitled to assistance, whereas if they leave after 16, it is assistance and more. The challenge is that, unless they fight hard and stay until they are 16, they have fewer rights, and that in turn will potentially lead to a United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child claim that a differential approach is being applied to those young people.

Will Willie Rennie give way?

The title of this group sums up succinctly what we are looking at, which is care services for young people, continuing care and, most appropriately, return to care and housing. This group of amendments deals with the realistic and, unfortunately, all too common situation in transition, in which our young people—and not so young people—have challenges in their right to return to care.

I will speak to amendments 129 and 130 in particular. Interestingly, amendment 129 is based on Office for National Statistics data. The ONS analysed young people across the UK and found that the average age at which they leave home is 24, so the current age of 21 as the upper threshold for care provision makes little sense. Sadly, care-experienced adults are twice as likely to experience homelessness, and one and a half times more likely to have financial issues. As we heard from Roz McCall in relation to earlier amendments, the idea of home is as important to our cared-for community as it is to others. We cannot take their home away too early.

Amendment 129 would extend the upper age limit for continuing care to 26. In consultation with the sector and others, it was agreed that, when aged under 26, individuals may suffer events that would cause those who are not in the care sector to return home. However, those in the care sector do not have that opportunity.

Amendment 130, which is an important element in this group, is on the right to return to care. I am sure that many individuals, including me, have experienced that strange time when their children suddenly and unexpectedly return to their doorstep. We do what every parent and carer wants to do, which is to open the door and welcome them back in. The Promise says:

“Young adults for whom Scotland has taken on parenting responsibility must have a right to return to care and have access to services and supportive people to nurture them.”

In essence, that encompasses what all parents undertake to do, to the best of their ability, when their offspring return.

John Mason picks up on an element that is frequently discussed, not only by young people but by those who work in the sector. We need to remember that the care sector is much wider than just care homes. That is not to take away the point about staff changes. I have seen young people who are two years into high school return to their primary school, only to discover that there are no faces that they know left there.

It also speaks to something that the Promise encapsulated. My understanding is that, possibly for the first time anywhere in the world, there needs to be a genuine concept of love underlying the approach. If a young person returns to a care home in which there are no familiar faces, they should still expect the door to be opened and for them to be brought in, because the world of corporate parenting is not about individuals—although individuals are very important in young people’s lives—but about the moral drive that sits behind it. That is a challenge, and it might be a greater challenge with those children than it is in more usual family situations, unless a child returns home to discover that their parents have moved, as I have been tempted to do on a number of occasions.

It is about trying to encapsulate—I emphasise the word “trying”—and to achieve what has sat behind the Promise since it was made all those years ago: allowing those who support our cared-for community to offer the sort of support that other people get in their family home. I absolutely admit that that is a challenge—there could be challenges in how we might define, teach and assess that support—but, if an individual’s last resort is to go back to a foster family that they have not seen in a while or to go back to a care home that might have moved, the Parliament can send an important signal that that door should open when that individual knocks on it.