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Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the second meeting this year of the Scottish Parliamentary Pension Scheme Committee. I remind members and others to switch off their mobile phones.
Good afternoon. Will Mr Dawtry clarify what the SPPA's principal role is and what its principal functions are in relation to public service pension schemes?
Our primary role is pensions administration for the national health service and teachers schemes. We also administer on behalf of the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly. Our policy remit is regulating the five main schemes in Scotland, not including the civil service scheme of course. We also have an appellant function on behalf of the Scottish ministers.
In carrying out those functions, does the SPPA draw on services, for example those of actuaries or legal advisers?
Yes. We use both of those kinds of services. There are three sources of advice for us. The committee might be aware that we draw largely on pensions policy that is developed down south. That is an historical fact. However, when we are taking forward policy developments in Scotland, we take legal advice from the Scottish Government's legal division and actuarial advice that is primarily from the Government Actuary's Department.
How can you be sure that legal advice from the Government is not influenced by Government policy and that it relates only to the judgments that you should be making about the pension schemes themselves?
The advice that we get from the Scottish Government is primarily very technical advice about the regulations.
Good afternoon. Will you outline for the benefit of the committee the main drivers for pension scheme administrators modifying their rules in recent years, in the way that is now being proposed in relation to the Parliament's scheme?
I will do my best. In 2000, there was a Treasury-led review of public pension schemes, which identified issues around increasing longevity and the need to reform schemes to ensure that they can be paid for in future. After the reforms started, the Finance Act 2004 introduced specific requirements to make changes—there was a lot of discretionary space in there, too. The main drivers are, in effect, longevity and affordability.
But there have not been governance-type issues, as separate from issues of affordability and the benefits package that the schemes provide.
That has been less of an issue for the public pension schemes, because, of the five schemes that we look after, four are unfunded and one is funded. The funded one is the local government scheme, which has its own governance arrangements.
Who are the trustees and governors of the local government scheme and how are they elected or selected for that purpose?
There are 11 funds in Scotland, which are administered by 11 administering authorities. I cannot say for certain how the trustees are selected.
They are regarded as quasi-trustees. The councillors of the scheme are responsible for the management and investment of the pension funds. They are not trustees in the normal sense of the word, in that the scheme is governed by the scheme regulations—which are imposed, if you will, upon councils—but the councillors have responsibility for the management of the funds.
I want to focus on recent changes in the law driving changes in the terms of schemes. On the discretions that have been conferred on or taken by trustees of schemes, what sort of things have others been adopting?
Under the Finance Act 2004 there are only a handful of requirements. As you say, the rest of the provisions are permissive options. The act introduces a lifetime allowance and an annual allowance. It increases the minimum pension age from 50 to 55 and pegs the children's pension at 23. Those are the requirements that the act brings in.
Do schemes maintain such restrictions to limit the reciprocal contribution that would come in from an employer?
That would be one reason for limiting contributions.
I will ask you specifically about the provisions in the schemes that you look after in relation to unmarried partners. What pension rights do unmarried partners of scheme members have? How do those rights compare with those of married partners or civil partners?
Unmarried partners will have the same rights as civil partners or married partners. That provision is being introduced into the new scheme.
Are the criteria for determining whether people are in an appropriate partnership for the purposes of securing pension benefits consistent across all the schemes?
Yes, I believe so.
Are they essentially self-certifying, or are any objective criteria applied—without the process being overly intrusive?
I think that people have to provide evidence that the relationship has existed for a period of time.
It is two years.
And that they are interdependent—perhaps that they have a joint bank account.
So one criterion is the length of the relationship. Let us suppose that people have formed such a relationship and are clearly, to all intents and purposes, committed to one another—they have perhaps bought a house together or have a joint bank account or whatever. If the scheme member died prematurely after they had been together for only six months, nine months, a year or something like that, do your schemes have discretion in relation to people in that situation, or is there an absolute rule that the relationship has to have subsisted for a minimum period of two or three years before the partner benefits?
The rule is based on Treasury guidance, and the period is two years.
So, as far as you are aware, there is no discretion for a shorter period to be sufficient in the circumstances that I have described.
Not that we are aware of, but we can check that for you.
That would be helpful, because of the issue about how many rules should be mandatory and how many should be discretionary.
I do not think that there is anything else major. The new Pensions Bill is introducing personal accounts, and we will have to take account of issues around autoenrolment, but I do not think that there is anything else major in the pipeline.
Finally, we want to consider systems for reviewing our scheme rules in future. How are changes in the rules of SPPA schemes made? What process is involved and who is involved in that process?
In most cases, the reforms have been taken forward on a tripartite basis, with the Scottish Government, employers and the staff side—the unions—being represented at the table. A feature of post-reform activity has been that that has engendered more interest from stakeholders, so we have on-going tripartite arrangements for the pension schemes for teachers, NHS workers and local government employees.
So there is a continuous review-type mechanism.
In effect, yes.
I am interested in early retirement under the scheme—though not personally, I should say—
That may be outwith your control.
The SPPA administers a number of schemes and regulates others. What are the broad provisions on early retirement in the different schemes that the SPPA administers and advises on, and are they similar? Are they exactly the same in the schemes for teachers, local government employees and members of the Scottish Parliament? Can you give us a wee description of that?
The provisions are broadly similar, but they are not the same in all the schemes. Most schemes allow for voluntary early retirement, whereby members of the scheme can opt to take their benefits early. In some schemes that is possible from the age of 50, but in other schemes people must be 55. From 2010, the minimum age will be 55 for members of all schemes. Under early retirement, the benefits are actuarially reduced and that reduction is for life. There is a reduction of roughly 5 per cent for each year that is taken early.
Does roughly 5 per cent mean 5.1 or 4.8 per cent? Where does the figure lie, or does the level of reduction vary?
The reduction works out at roughly 5 per cent. In saying roughly, I am rounding up the figure. It might be about 4.7 or 4.9 per cent.
This is quite complex, so let me try to get the issue clear in my mind. If people voluntarily opt for early retirement because they have reached the point in their life—after 2010, they will need to be at least 55—where they just want to do something else with their life, such as travelling the world, they can take early retirement in the knowledge that their pension will be actuarially reduced by, on average, roughly 5 per cent per year for life. If, on the other hand, people are made redundant or if the local authority creates an incentive for them to retire early in order to reduce staff or teacher numbers, they can take early retirement without any actuarial reduction and possibly with an enhancement to their service.
Their pension would not be actuarially reduced—
Would there definitely be no actuarial reduction?
In the local government scheme, people who are made redundant have a right to their pension—
Provided that they have reached the age of 55.
Yes. In the teachers scheme, the matter is at the employer's discretion. For historical reasons, the teachers scheme seems to be the only one in which there is no such automatic right and it is up to the employer to agree. Because the employer must meet the cost of the early payment, the scheme member does not suffer any penalty. On top of that, the employer could award additional compensation.
So the employer might say, "You are 55, but we will give you five years' enhancement and calculate your pension on the basis that you are 60."
Yes. Obviously, there is a maximum amount that can be awarded.
When the decision to retire early is not wholly in the hands of the individual—because of redundancy, or because the employer desires to reduce the workforce and therefore offers an incentive to leave—the employer and not the employee would meet the cost of that.
Yes, that is correct.
Thank you. That is helpful.
To be eligible, the person has only to qualify for benefits. That happens after two years of service.
So, in 2010, provided a person has two years of service and is 55, they will be entitled to early retirement in the way that you describe.
Yes.
Are there no other criteria? Is that the only trigger—that a person be aged 55 and have two years of service?
Yes, as long as the person has qualified for benefits.
You have answered my questions so fully that you have probably covered most of the points that I wanted to raise.
In that hypothetical example, in which somebody has paid for two years and then retires and becomes entitled to their pension, they do not get that entitlement made up for another five or 10 years of service, do they?
That would be at the discretion of the employer, but there would be a maximum amount that they could receive as an enhancement.
Determined by what?
Determined by regulations in subordinate legislation, which would set out how much could be paid.
Are these special circumstances that affect certain schemes? Is local government affected?
Under the pensions regulations for local government, if somebody goes at age 50—or at age 55 in 2010—when the employer has requested and initiated the retirement, the person would get their accrued benefits, as Christine Marr said. In addition, the employer can, at its discretion, award additional years of service.
How often will additional years of service be awarded, as a proportion of the number of early retirements?
For teachers, most employers will award either one or two years. It is not normally more than that. However, I really do not know about the proportion.
Years ago, the tendency among local authorities was to award the maximum in all cases.
That could have been up to 10 years.
Yes. However, in recent years local authorities have become more conscious of the costs of making people redundant. The regulations now require each authority or each employer to publish its policy on discretions. The policy might be to award the maximum in all cases, or to award less than that—for example, 50 per cent.
Following up on the question that the convener asked a minute ago, would you be able to find out more, when you get back to your office, about the balance between those who volunteer to go early and those who, for one reason or another, are encouraged or required to go early?
We would not have that information to hand, so it would depend how long you were willing to wait.
If it were possible to find that information without colossal effort that would bring the organisation to a halt, it would be interesting to know.
We would have to gather information—
From the local authorities themselves.
Maybe we should discuss with the clerks after the meeting whether we need that information and get back to you about it.
I will start off and my colleagues will deal with the specific schemes. The Treasury review of ill health, which took place a few years ago, was concerned with ensuring that ill-health retirement is better targeted as well as with the introduction of better workplace management of ill health in general. It talked about having gateways to ill-health retirement and setting up two-tier arrangements. In the most severe cases, if someone could not do their own or any other job, they would get upper-tier arrangements, which would differ depending on which scheme they were in. In cases in which a person was unable to do the job that they had done previously but was capable of undertaking other paid employment, they would get lower-tier arrangements and a reduced amount of accrued benefits.
Would it be normal for the other schemes of which you are aware to provide for the trustees of the scheme—whoever they are—clear discretion to review someone's case once they had retired, to see whether their condition had changed or become less severe than expected?
That tends not to be a feature of the schemes, primarily because of the administrative difficulties associated with that.
So, there tend to be set out in the scheme clear trigger points for making a decision.
Effectively, yes.
And once that decision is made, it tends not to be reviewed.
It tends not to be reviewed.
Are there circumstances in which it is? Is there any exception to that in the schemes?
It was not introduced for teachers, but we may introduce it in the future. The two-tier ill-health arrangements have been running only since 1 April 2007 but we will evaluate them after a year. The situation may well have to be reviewed.
Okay. In thinking about early retirement and ill-health retirement, is there any experience within the schemes of which you are aware that—how can I put this correctly, politely or properly? Is there any relationship that you think exists or might exist between the inability to take early retirement and the ability to take ill-health retirement? Does some relationship exist between the provisions for early retirement and the taking of ill-health retirement?
The quick answer is that we do not have any data on that specific point.
So in conversations that you have with other professionals about designing pension schemes, does no one say that if the early retirement provisions are too strict there tend to be more ill-health retirements?
For most of the schemes, the two-tier arrangements have only just kicked in and it might be too early to tell. Anecdotally, in the past there possibly has been a suggestion of that, but it would be hard to found that on evidence.
I am grateful for that answer. Clearly, ill-health retirement is significantly more expensive for a scheme than early retirement if the ill-health provisions tend to base someone's pension on earnings to the age of 65—is that correct?
Yes.
Do any of the schemes in which you are involved revisit people who have taken ill-health retirement but who have subsequently gone back into similar paid employment? For example, if a teacher who has retired on the ground of ill health were subsequently to return to a supply list, is there a ceiling on their earning capacity and does anyone monitor whether they earn more than they did as a result of taking ill-health retirement and then being available on the supply list?
Such a person would not be allowed to go back to teaching—or, rather, they could, but their pension would stop. If a person retired and was on the upper tier of the new two-tier system, their benefits would be enhanced. The criteria for the upper tier is that the person has to be 90 per cent incapacitated and unable to do any work. If that person felt that they had improved and they wanted to take work outwith teaching, they could see their general practitioner and provide us with a certificate. If the GP believed that they were still totally incapacitated, their pension would continue.
What would happen in the case of someone taking early retirement as opposed to ill-health retirement?
A person who takes early retirement can go back to teaching and we give them an earnings limit. Their pension and their earnings from employment must not exceed the salary that they were on with pensions increase added.
How is that monitored?
It is monitored by the SPPA, which writes to the teacher's employer and asks for details of what the teacher has earned.
I have reflected on what you said about the ill-health provisions. I was surprised to learn that comparatively little discretion is held or exercised by trustees when a person has retired. In your experience, is it possible fully to capture in the regulations for a scheme provisions that adequately cover all ill-health retirements? Is there any discussion between professionals about the need to allow trustees more discretion to judge whether a person's ill health continues or whether their health has improved or deteriorated?
We rely on our medical advisers, who follow the guidance for occupational health physicians. They would recommend to us whether the person satisfied the criteria for the lower or upper tier.
To be clear, are those medical advisers different from the advisers to the person who was seeking ill-health retirement? The advisers that you mentioned are independent and they advise you.
Yes. They are appointed by the SPPA.
So their job is to scrutinise the medical evidence from the GP, consultant or whatever.
They take a completely independent view of a case, without any bias. Again, that approach was a Treasury recommendation.
Once the medical advice has been agreed by both parties or the trustees have taken their decision on the basis of their own medical advice, that tends to be it. The decision is made once and for all.
That tends to be it. I return to the point that the Treasury review was keenly interested in better workplace management of ill health. The notion is that things should be managed before the trigger points are reached. That is the last stage, in effect. The process should be managed before somebody reaches the stage of being let go.
On the local government side, one of the factors that led to the Treasury's concern about the number of ill-health cases in the past was the fact that the criterion for getting ill-health benefits was simply that the person was permanently incapable of doing their own job. It did not take account of whether they were capable of doing other paid employment. They could walk into that other job the next day, but if they could not do their own job, they would access their pension.
You mentioned Treasury guidance in connection with ill-health retirement, and with unmarried partners. Would it be possible for us to have a copy of that guidance? We do not have it at the moment.
In respect of ill health, there is a review that we can give you, rather than guidance. The recommendations came out of that review, which we can certainly provide.
Okay. You also mentioned guidance in relation to unmarried partners.
That was to do with the two-year criterion.
If we could obtain the source document for that, that would be great.
There are four unfunded schemes.
Clearly, the unfunded ones do not get funded, but what about the funded ones?
The money still has to be found. There has to be long-term affordability and sustainability. The unfunded schemes have moved from an increase in the low pension age, which has effectively generated savings. Changes under the Finance Act 2004 have allowed people to commute up to 25 per cent of their lump sums. Actuarial assumptions may have been made based on how many people will take that up.
Is that a benefit?
That is assumed to be a saving, because people buy that out at a rate of £1 for every £12-worth. On the assumption that people live longer than for 12 years after they retire, the scheme saves money. In the case of local government, one of the ways in which changes have been funded is through increasing employee contribution rates.
How have they changed?
They have gone up by 0.3 per cent.
That is 0.3 per cent from—
In fact, they have gone up by 0.4 per cent, from an average of 5.9 per cent. Under the current scheme, the figure is 6 per cent for most people, and 5 per cent for manual workers. A banded approach will be taken under the new scheme, but it will average out at 6.3 per cent. The average between those figures of 5 per cent and 6 per cent was 5.9 per cent. Hence, there is a 0.4 percentage point increase.
To what extent have those changes addressed the other funding issues, such as increased longevity and the poor performance of the stock market?
The stock market is an issue only in relation to local government and the funded scheme—I will return to that in a second—and the other schemes do not have to concern themselves with that so much. As each package of benefits has been agreed, it has been costed by actuaries, and is projected for 50 years. That is where the affordability and sustainability argument is made, and contribution rates are set in line with that. There are triennial or quadrennial valuations, which allow actuaries to check whether the assumptions that they made in the first instance, and the behaviours of people and of the schemes, have been as they expected.
So the schemes have a provision built into them for a review of employees' contributions, as a result of the valuations.
Teachers and national health service schemes have introduced potential cost-sharing mechanisms and employers' caps, and there is a commitment to develop a cost-sharing mechanism for the local government scheme. If the valuations show that costs are getting out of kilter, that means in effect that increases in payments for those benefits will be shared between employers and employees. The effect of employers' caps does not apply to local government. Employers' caps go so far—and only so far—for employers and taxpayers, and any additional amount is picked up by the employees themselves.
When you say that
That means that a mechanism has not been developed. One of the main reasons is that there are 11 funds in Scotland. The situation is not as straightforward as it would be for an unfunded scheme. The current aim is for that cost-sharing arrangement to be agreed by April 2010, and introduced with effect from April 2011.
Is that on the basis of sharing the costs equally between the two partners?
It is to be on the basis of an equitable sharing arrangement. The devil, of course, will be in the detail.
As the committee has no further questions, I thank the members of the Scottish Public Pensions Agency for their evidence, which has been helpful, and for coming along.
Our main duty is a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of our beneficiaries. We have a secondary duty to consult the scheme sponsor—which, in our case, is the Treasury—and take account of its concerns. In exercising those duties, we have to manage the finances as well as they can be managed, and ensure that the scheme is administered properly.
Does that fiduciary duty extend to getting as good a deal for your members as possible?
The duty is to ensure that the money is well invested and that the members get a decent return, although that is fixed in our case as a percentage of the retirement salary. However, we are also conscious of the fact that we are the custodians of public funds and therefore must ensure, if we can, that there is no wastage of the money that is used to provide the scheme benefits.
I concur with what Sir John has said. I add that we have to act within pensions law, which we take for granted, and ensure through appropriate training that each trustee understands their responsibilities, which Sir John has outlined, so that they can carry them out.
In carrying out those responsibilities, what support, advice and training has been available to you? How big a job is it for the trustees?
In our case, it is quite a large scheme. We look after what was nearly £400 million but which is now, with the changes in the stock market, probably nearer to £350 million. We have to ensure that those whom we employ and the trustees themselves manage that money professionally, so we have a policy, which we have had for some time, that trustees should undertake training and sit the examinations that the Pensions Management Institute sets. All our trustees go through a training programme when they are appointed and, once they have qualified, are expected to undertake continuing professional development by keeping up with legislation and other trends within the pensions world. They are expected to attend a number of pensions seminars of one sort or another, whether those are on the legal side, the investment side or relating to implementation of legislation. It is expected that all our trustees will have and use such areas of expertise.
I will come to Mr Cairns in a minute. It strikes me that the task of your trustees is quite onerous. Do the whips give you an easy time in relation to some of the other potential duties that you might have?
No, not particularly. It is a very onerous task, and has become much more so in recent years. The Government has been fairly prolific in its legislation on pensions, so we need to keep up to speed on the law. As legislators ourselves, we are conscious that if we do not set an example in scheme fund management, we are letting down Parliament as a whole.
Mr Cairns has a younger and smaller scheme. Are the issues relating to that scheme different, or just the same?
The issues are different, although the principles are the same, if that makes sense. For example, the latest estimate—which is some three months old—of the fund is that it is in the region of £10 million. Having been formed as a team of trustees in 1999, we had obligations, as we talked about in response to the earlier question. We took the decision that a pooled fund would be the most sensible way of investing. We needed actuarial advice—we considered the potential cost of going out to tender, and the Government actuary acted as a broad adviser on that. We deemed that at that time the Government actuaries would be best value, and could give us advice as we needed it. The formal advice that we get to date comes from the Government actuaries, who not only act as actuaries, but have given us broad guidance in relation to our plan and our strategy.
You mentioned dealing with the recent changes. What sort of consultation do you undertake of your members—paying members and members who are receiving, or deferred members who might be receiving, pensions—when you make such changes?
At the outset in 1999, the make-up of the trustees was based on the principle of there being one trustee per party group, with the Deputy Presiding Officer. Members have moved on, changed roles, become ministers and so on, so the make-up of the trustees has moved away slightly from what it was. Until recently, the need to look after the interests of pensioner members was also met by members retiring and losing elections. Our governance has changed so that the rules are now agreed by the Assembly Commission rather than in an Assembly plenary session, and the commission has expressed a desire to go back to the original formal arrangements in which there was one trustee per party group plus the Deputy Presiding Officer. That is, of course, in order, but we must look after the interests of pensioner members. We have therefore drafted rule changes to allow for an election among pensioner members so that there is an additional trustee to look after their interests. I hope that those changes will be agreed shortly.
Is it assumed that people from a party group or pensioners will somehow undertake soundings on changes within the group that they represent?
Yes. That has generally been how we have worked. We should bear in mind that the changes relating to the Pensions Act 2004 tended to apply to newly elected Assembly members, rather than to existing members. We have not had to take difficult decisions that would mean that members could find themselves at risk of losing out on the potential benefits that were originally laid out.
We have not only serving members of Parliament on our board of trustees—we also have at least one pensioner trustee at any given time. Recently, we agreed to take a trustee from the recently formed association of former members of Parliament so that it would be represented, but we have made it clear to them that they are not meant to represent any one particular body of opinion; rather, they have a general overall fiduciary responsibility to the fund. People who come from a different perspective enhance our debates. Of course, the terms of the scheme have not changed—it provides the same benefits that it has always provided. Any major changes to our scheme would require statutory action by order under the Parliamentary and other Pensions Act 1987, by whose terms we are governed. We have had to amend that act from time to time—in fact, it needed to be amended following the passing of the Pensions Act 2004. We would go through that process and then proposals could be debated in the House of Commons.
What process is followed when the trustees decide that a change is required? Do you go to the Leader of the House of Commons and say, "Look, we need some time for this statutory instrument"?
Yes. Normally, we would consult the Leader of the House of Commons on changes that we think are necessary, and we would work on that through the Cabinet Office and with the Treasury, if necessary. On reaching agreement, our lawyers would then be involved with the Government's lawyers in producing an amendment to be put forward by way of an order.
Before the Government of Wales Act 2006, which separated the Executive from the Assembly, our pension trustees effectively decided on changes to the rules, based on consultation with each party grouping and supported by the House Committee. Any rule changes would then be presented to the full Assembly to be voted on. That gave the trustees significant autonomy to act as they thought fit. However, the request to change the membership of the trustees in order to look after the interests of pensioner trustees has come from the Assembly Commission. We would need to present our argument to the Assembly Commission, which would accept or reject it. In theory there is probably no difference, but in practice there is, because parties tend to be far more strongly represented on the commission than in the Assembly.
Is there any evidence so far that the change has influenced decisions relating to pensions?
I can give you only one example. There was a wish to amend the membership of the trustees to bring it more up to date and to ensure that the majority of trustees are current members of the Assembly. Arguably, that is unnecessary, but there will now be a minor rule change to accommodate the request.
For clarity, how many members of Parliament and Assembly members are trustees?
Our trustee board includes about eight members.
Four of our trustees are members.
Could you tell us in more detail how they were elected or appointed? Was that done within the party system or by an open ballot? How did they come to be there? Were they appointed?
We proceed through the usual channels. I put the names forward, although it is possible for members to lobby for someone else to be appointed. The Association of Former Members of Parliament lobbied hard to be allowed to put someone forward. We were happy with the name that it put forward and were pleased to accept its request. An order to that effect duly went through.
Until recently, the party groups decided who should be appointed. Broadly, that is still the case, although who the trustees should be is now agreed with the commission, on a cross-party basis.
You are responsible for schemes of different sizes and scales. What expenses do the trustees incur in managing the fund?
Ours are pretty significant, but they are reasonable as a proportion of the funds that we manage. We regularly make comparisons with external schemes to ensure both that we are not overspending and that we are not failing to cover matters that we should. For example, I have joined PensionChair, an organisation comprising the chairmen of trustees of most of the major pension funds in the United Kingdom. We meet regularly to discuss current topics and how we are dealing with them.
Is the cost incurred a matter of public record?
Yes. Everything is set out in our annual report and accounts.
Although I am not familiar with the detail of the parliamentary scheme, it is fair to say that our costs are significantly lower, because of the make-up of our scheme. I mentioned the two full-time equivalent staff in the fees office who are employed by the scheme. There are also the costs of our expert advisers. Whenever the Government actuary joins us to give us broad advice, the standard costs apply. Actuarial costs are significant in the scheme of things, because our general costs are quite low. Whenever actuaries provide a review or a service, the cost that is incurred is significant in comparison with our other costs. We also pay for legal advice from our lawyers. As a result, we tend to manage and to invite actuaries and lawyers only to trustee meetings at which they are needed. However, we have at least one meeting a year at which everyone is present, to ensure that any adviser who wants to can bring something to our attention.
I move on to trustees' responsibilities. What decisions do trustees make about investment policy? Are those decisions founded entirely on the professional advice that is given, or are trustees at liberty to put that to one side if they do not want to go down that road?
We have professional investment advisers in addition to fund managers. They advise us on the level of funding that is required, although we use the Government Actuary's Department too, by statute. We do not slavishly follow the advice that is given. For example, as a fund becomes more mature—when it has more pensioner members than active members—it is normal for the character of the investment portfolio to change. If members are predominantly active, a fund probably invests more in equities or property. As a scheme becomes more mature, the proportion of bonds and more secure investments gradually increases.
Obviously, when our scheme was formed, it started with a zero balance, so a pooled fund was the most effective and efficient form of investment. Now that we have reached £10 million, many more options are available. The pooled fund that we used is one reason why our costs were low—that relates to the previous question.
Thank you.
Mr Cairns, you indicated that you depend on the Government actuaries. I am less clear about the system in London, Sir John. Am I right that, although you take advice from Government actuaries, you also have your own completely independent actuaries? If so, why have you taken that approach?
We have not. By statute, our only actuary is the Government Actuary's Department. Some of our investment advisers also have in-house actuarial expertise, which they may draw on in the investment advice that they give, but actuarial approval has to come from the Government actuary.
This is perhaps a hardball question: of the major issues that you have faced in carrying out your responsibilities as trustees, what has been the one that has come out of left field and caused unanticipated difficulty?
I cannot think of one, although we have recently had to deal with all sorts of changes. For example, the introduction of civil partnerships has required rule changes and adaptation, which have involved additional costs and will do so on an on-going basis. For example, death-in-service benefits now apply to civil partners whereas they previously applied only to spouses.
I think that it was the Auditor General for Wales who recommended early that we follow the parliamentary scheme as closely as possible, for administrative purposes and for simplicity. Since then, we have largely been pragmatic; when there has been a need for changes in the pension rules we have made them.
New pensions legislation has driven a number of rule changes in recent years, some of which related to governance and some to a desire to liberalise or simplify the complex rules that govern pension schemes, tax relief and so on. To what extent have funding and affordability issues driven change? Sir John Butterfill talked about changes to ill-health retirement benefits, which I presume are being driven less by the rules than by questions about affordability. Have other benefits in your scheme given rise to similar concern about affordability or justifiability?
Yes. Trustees have been conscious of their duty to the public in the administration of funds. We have considered at our own instigation early retirement and the public sector transfer club, which was imposing a heavy burden on our scheme, because people could transfer in from, for example, modestly paid local authority employment and get the years that they had worked expressed as payments into our scheme. The cost to the scheme was considerable.
The rule changes that we made as the result of the most recent pensions legislation were broadly cost neutral. For example, the enhancement of the death-in-service benefit, which was because of a rule change, was financed by drawbacks or withdrawal of enhancements elsewhere. To the taxpayer, those changes were broadly neutral.
Can members elect either to go on to a fortieths funding basis or to remain on a fiftieths basis?
Yes.
In your scheme, that change was fully funded by members by their electing to pay higher contributions.
Yes.
So there was no additional cost to the public purse; the cost was borne by contributing members. Was that the same at the House of Commons, Sir John?
Yes. Initially, the Government actuary calculated that it might cost a little more than a 10 per cent contribution from members in total, but his view now is that the cost is more than covered. The reason for the element of uncertainty was that we did not know how many members would opt for the higher contribution level and the improved accrual rate. We also did not know how many would be affected by retained benefits and would therefore be unable to benefit from a higher accrual rate because they were already up against the limits imposed by the retained benefits regime. Indeed, it is important that you are aware, as far as you can be, of the extent to which your members have retained benefits, otherwise they might contribute to a scheme from which they are unable to benefit, and they might seek to sue you.
Do you have a panel of advisers as an information service?
No, and you must not. If you do, you influence the advice that members are given. You can give them the address of the Association of Independent Financial Advisers and say that it can recommend someone who might be suitable for their case.
The change was far more manageable in our scheme. With only 60 Assembly members—although there were some changes because of elections—it was easy to contact each individual member, make available the figures that would allow for a calculation to be made, and suggest that they seek independent advice.
Is there an official member of staff in the Assembly, as Sir John has in the House of Commons, who is a pensions adviser to the trustees and who liaises with members, extracts information and explains what happens?
Yes. Someone works in the fees office full time on pension matters. He has come from the industry, and he advises the trustees. He is also a sounding board for members should they have factual questions on the transfer in, the processes and so on.
So he does not provide advice about the desirability of courses of action; he provides clear information and explains how the system works, perhaps relative to what people had in previous employment.
Yes.
You both mentioned changes to your schemes based on the establishment of civil partnerships. What rules do you have on informal partnerships—unmarried partners, whether they are heterosexual or homosexual? What benefits does an unmarried partner have, how do they qualify for them, and how is that verified or established?
Partners do not qualify unless they are in a civil partnership. Once they are in a civil partnership, they qualify.
Our rules are different. This was one of the early rule changes that the trustees brought about as a result of requests from members. It was felt that people in same-sex partnerships were disadvantaged because of how the rules were originally written, so amendments were made. I cannot remember the exact wording, but I can arrange for it to be forwarded to the clerk. It was the best stab that we could make, based on industry practice for people in relationships.
Whether they were same-sex relationships or heterosexual relationships.
Yes.
For clarification, Sir John, can you confirm that to benefit from the House of Commons scheme a person must be married or in a civil partnership?
I will double check whether there is any way in which any part of the benefits can accrue to a partner in an informal relationship. I do not think that there is, but I will come back to the committee on that. The great difficulty is establishing criteria for such relationships.
I explored with the previous witnesses the objectivity that applies in determining the criteria in such cases. It would help us if you could come back to the committee on that.
I will do so.
The issue brings us back to my point about the trustees having significant discretion to make judgments, according to the criteria that have been set.
Further to David McLetchie's questions, does the option of paying a higher contribution in order to go to a one fortieth accrual rate endure for members throughout their life in the scheme, or do you end the option of having a one fiftieth accrual rate? Do members continue to have a choice?
On joining, our members must elect. Their election is irrevocable.
Do they continue to have the right to elect in future sessions of Parliament?
No, they make a once-and-for-all election. They cannot change.
I understand. If I were to join the Westminster scheme in 10 years' time—I am not planning to do so—would I be allowed to elect for fortieths or fiftieths?
You would.
The situation for members of our scheme is similar to the situation in Westminster. There is a one-off decision. However, if someone made a decision when all the facts were not available, I am sure that the trustees would have discretion to consider their case. For administrative purposes, as well as for every other purpose, and to maintain low running costs of the scheme, it was deemed that there should be a one-off decision.
Thank you. I will move on.
No, I do not think that there is any suggestion of our making any changes. Indeed, we have toughened up our scheme. One of the ways in which we have made savings comes into effect from next year. We have made it that, if somebody takes early retirement, before the age of 65, they will suffer a diminution in their pension. Previously, provided that they could satisfy the 15-year rule and the rule of 80, people could retire without penalty at the age of 60. To reduce the costs of the scheme and to make it fairer in relation to what most people outside the public sector are having to put up with, members will now suffer a diminution if they go before the age of 65. We have done that by creating a gradient. People will not suddenly fall off the edge as from next year: the change will be phased in over a certain period. I cannot remember how long it is, but I think that the phase-in of the new arrangements will take five or six years. There will certainly be a diminution of some sort if people retire before 65, as from next year.
If there is going to be a diminution of that kind, particularly if it is eventually to be actuarially based, is there any reason to have a requirement for a minimum number of years' service? Effectively, people will get only what they and their employers have paid for during their period of service.
No, that is not quite right. There will still be an element of benefit, certainly during the transitional period.
But once the transitional period is over, and the diminution is actuarially based, will the argument for the 15-year period fall away somewhat?
We might consider that when we are faced with that situation but, at the moment, we are not inclined to do so.
When you reviewed your scheme in Wales, Mr Cairns, were there similar considerations to those that Sir John has outlined?
It is fair to say that the 15-year rule is under consideration. The broad principle that we try to apply with this sort of change is that there should be as much flexibility as possible for members, but at no disadvantage or cost to the taxpayer. If something can be justified actuarially, with absolutely no cost to the fund, as trustees we generally support it in principle. Clearly, however, it must come under the pensions acts and regulations.
Some members may choose to change their lifestyle and opt for early retirement, but are most cases of early retirement at Westminster and in the Welsh Assembly due to boundary changes, the loss of seats or deselection by one's party? Can both of you give me a feel for that balance? What gives rise to most early retirement requests?
I think that it is about 50:50. We do not have a list system, so members do not face the same risk of being deselected by their party, unless they do something extremely naughty. [Laughter.]
We will not ask you to go into that.
We will not ask for examples.
We move on quickly to Mr Cairns.
Bearing in mind the fact that we have had only three elections, the general reason why people take early retirement is that they have lost their seat. However, some members have taken early retirement because the experience has not quite lived up to their expectations, or they have had something else more interesting to do.
I will move on to the subject of ill-health retirement. Sir John, you referred to the difficulties around this area, and you have said that you are seeking to review the arrangements. Could you expand on your thinking, and on what gives rise to it? Ill health is a difficult area to make judgments on.
At the moment, the trustees are bound by a rule that says that, if somebody can show that they are no longer well enough in whatever way to continue as a member of Parliament and that they are not likely to have much earning potential outside, they can receive a full pension up to what they would receive if they stayed an MP until they were 65. I would not say that there has been substantial abuse, but we think that the scheme has been extremely generous in some cases in which medical advisers have been unduly lenient in interpreting the rules.
Are you seeking to gain for the trustees discretion to allocate people to the different categories, based on medical advice and in a defensible way?
The criteria would have to be defensible.
Indeed, but we are discussing essentially a discretion that the trustees would exercise on a case-by-case basis, subject to medical advice.
That is correct.
Mr Cairns, will you outline the situation in Wales?
We have our own medical advisers, whom we commission to conduct assessments. They advise us on the criterion of ill health and whether somebody is sufficiently ill not to be able to do their job as an Assembly member—that is the definition that we use. Our advisers usually come back with a suggestion of a review in three years, five years and then five or 10 years thereafter, and we have always followed their suggestions. In one case, when the advice was that there was no need for a review, the decision was taken still to have a review in three years and then five years. We have been through some reviews, and each has come back stating that the person involved was not sufficiently well to do their job as an Assembly member.
I want to develop the point further. Sir John, you referred earlier to the degree of leniency or toughness of the medical advice that you receive. It is clearly of greater cost to the pension scheme when somebody retires on the ground of ill health than when they opt for early retirement. However, is there any relationship between those two factors? This might be a spurious contention but, depending on how tough the early retirement provision is, might you see a greater incidence of more lenient medical advice?
No, I do not think so. We have our own advisers and have indicated to them that the rules should be interpreted firmly. With medics, there is always a danger that they are sympathetic to the person who comes to see them, and that is not what they are being asked to do.
If it is one's own GP, that is fair enough, but I take the point that you make.
We make it clear to them that they are being asked to exercise their professional judgment. For example, if there was a three-tier system, we would ask them into which tier they would allocate the person concerned. It is easier for us to defend the decision in the event of a challenge if we can say that the category into which the people fall and, therefore, the level of support that they will get are determined by independent medical advice that we have taken. The decision must be defensible.
Do you have any thoughts on those points, Mr Cairns?
No. The trustees have discussed the matter, but have not yet decided on any clear way forward if we want to bring about any changes. We are reasonably satisfied with the system that is in place at the moment, but it is always subject to potential review.
Thank you. That covers my points well.
We will move on to the senior salaries review body's recommendations. The previous witnesses talked about cost sharing. What discussions have the witnesses had on that and how might it work out in future?
We have not had any formal discussions with the Government yet, but the SSRB suggested that we might consider alternatives to the present arrangements and determine how they could work.
I have not looked at the SSRB report in detail, although in the next few days an independent commission is due to report on Assembly members' salaries, as a result of the change in powers that we inherited last May. The commission has not sought evidence from me, as the chairman of the trustees, although I hoped that it would if it intended to report on the Assembly members' pension scheme. Obviously, I will look with interest at what comments—if any—the commission comes out with.
The final thing that I want to cover, since we are dealing with it as well, is the resettlement grant. The SSRB made certain recommendations for changes to that for members who stand down at elections. Do you think that the proposals are fair, sensible and workable?
I do not think that the Government is likely to implement them, but I am not sure.
Is that because they probably would not work or because they are not fair?
I think that the Government thinks the uncertainties that exist in the profession in which we are engaged are bad enough to warrant some form of resettlement grant.
What is the position in Wales, Mr Cairns?
The position in Wales is similar to the position in the House of Commons. There is a scale for the size of the resettlement grant—it depends on how long someone has been a member. There have been no changes thus far on that issue, although the independent commission may well comment on it. The commission is conducting a two-stage review. The first stage is looking at the responsibilities of an Assembly member vis-à-vis the role of a member of the Westminster Parliament. We are currently paid 76 or 76.5 per cent of what a member of the Westminster Parliament is paid. Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly are paid 82 per cent of the Westminster salary, and there have been reports that that might go up to 84 per cent.
Sir John, you talked about the nominal 20 per cent that the Treasury was or was not paying. Is the nominal figure based on the actuarial valuation of what should be paid, or is that just a historical figure?
The figure was somewhat under 18 per cent, which was what the Government actuary recommended as being the appropriate contribution for the sponsor. At each revaluation, the Government actuary says what he thinks the contributions ought to be. However, the fact is that successive Governments did not make those contributions, partly because the scheme was initially overfunded, but also because tax legislation at the time—although we are not, strictly speaking, affected by it—did not allow for the overfunding of schemes. Therefore, employers had to stop making contributions once schemes reached a certain level, which I think was 105 per cent.
Thank you. My colleagues have no further questions, so I thank Sir John Butterfill and Alun Cairns for giving evidence. Their evidence was succinct and will be very helpful to us in our deliberations. I hope that they have enjoyed their brief trip up to Scotland and that we will see them again.
Thank you, convener—it was too brief.
We agreed at our previous meeting to take in private our consideration of the evidence.
Meeting continued in private until 17:09.