Justice Committee

Meeting date: Tuesday, February 27, 2018

Official Report 630KB pdf

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Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Repeal) (Scotland) Bill: Stage 2

Agenda item 5 is consideration of the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Repeal) (Scotland) Bill at stage 2. Members should refer to their copy of the bill, the marshalled list of amendments and the groupings.

I welcome back to the meeting Annabelle Ewing, Minister for Community Safety and Legal Affairs, and her officials. I also welcome James Kelly, the member in charge of the bill, and his supporters.

Section 1—Repeal of the 2012 act

Section 1 agreed to.

Section 2—Offences

The first group of amendments is on effect of repeal on offences occurring before repeal. Amendment 1, in the name of the minister, is grouped with amendments 2, 3 and 5 to 8.

Amendments 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 adjust sections 2 and 3 to deal with human rights issues in the current drafting of the bill. The amendments in group 1 are intended to ensure that persons cannot be convicted of or punished for an offence under the 2012 act after it has been repealed. This is to ensure that the bill respects the principle of lex mitior, which is guaranteed by article 7 of the European convention on human rights. Lex mitior is the principle that a person should benefit from the application of the more lenient law where the law has changed before a final judgment has been reached in criminal proceedings. Ministers are of the view that the principle applies in the context of repeal of the offences in the 2012 act.

Section 2(3) of the bill as it stands provides that, after repeal of the 2012 act, a person can still be convicted of an offence under the act where there is an appeal against acquittal. Section 3(2) of the bill as it stands provides that the 2012 act continues to have effect after repeal for the purposes of imposing a penalty on a person and for the purposes of an appeal or a petition to the nobile officium. The fact that a person can still be convicted and punished under the 2012 act after its repeal goes against the principle of lex mitior and therefore raises human rights issues. Amendments 1 to 3 and 5 to 8 deal with those issues by removing sections 2(3), 2(4), 3(2) and 3(3) of the bill.

Amendment 1 amends the bill to remove the reference to section 2(3) in section 2(1).

Amendments 2 and 3 make amendments to section 2 so that it states that:

“Despite section 17 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010”,

on or after the repeal date

“no person can be convicted of or found to have committed a relevant offence”

and

“no penalty may be imposed on a person in respect of a relevant offence of which that person was convicted prior to the relevant date”.

Section 17 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 would otherwise allow a conviction and a penalty to be imposed after the repeal; these amendments oust that possibility.

Amendment 5 amends the bill so as to remove sections 2(3) and 2(4), which means that a person cannot

“be convicted of or found to have committed a relevant offence”

on appeal against acquittal.

Amendment 6 amends section 3(1) so as to clarify that a person who has had a penalty imposed on them prior to the date of repeal for a relevant offence is still liable for that penalty.

Amendment 7 amends section 3(1) so as to remove reference to section 2(3).

Amendment 8 removes sections 3(2) and 3(3) of the bill, with the result that the 2012 act would not have effect after its repeal for the purposes of imposing a penalty on a person in respect of a relevant offence of which that person was convicted prior to repeal, or for the purposes of an appeal or a petition to the nobile officium.

In light of the amendments, there is no longer any need for section 3(3).

I move amendment 1.

I call Liam Kerr—[Interruption.] Sorry, I call Liam McArthur. I am looking at Liam McArthur but saying Liam Kerr.

You are throwing your voice again, convener.

On the basis that I might be critical of the Government’s approach in later amendments, it is probably appropriate to acknowledge and welcome the approach that has been taken in this group of amendments. The minister has set out very clearly why they are necessary. We are all conscious of the need to retain compliance with the European convention on human rights, and therefore I think that the amendments in this group are to be welcomed.

I support all the amendments in this group. As the minister has outlined, they seek to address any potential human rights issue by taking the relevant provisions out of the bill. The amendments are helpful, and I thank the minister for bringing them forward today.

I welcome the support that has been expressed thus far. The overarching consideration with this group of amendments was to ensure that the bill is compliant with the European convention on human rights, and the various amendments that we propose seek to ensure that very thing.

Amendment 1 agreed to.

Amendments 2 and 3 moved—[Annabelle Ewing]—and agreed to.

Group 2 is on on-going proceedings: conviction for alternative statutory offence. Amendment 4, in the name of the minister, is the only amendment in the group.

Amendment 4 inserts new subsections (2A) and (2B) into section 2 of the bill. It expressly provides that, in proceedings for an offence under the 2012 act that have not been determined by the date of repeal, the court has the power to convict the accused of a different statutory offence, where the facts that are proved in the proceedings amount to that different offence.

That means that a person who is charged under the 2012 act can still be convicted of a serious offence after repeal where the facts that are proved in the trial amount to that offence.

Under the current law, prosecutors can amend the libel so as to substitute an alternative common-law or statutory charge for a charge under the 2012 act. The court can also convict a person of a common-law offence where the facts that are established amount to that common-law offence. However, the court does not have the power to convict a person of an alternative statutory offence unless the charge that was made against them has been amended to libel that statutory offence.

Amendment 4 gives the court a narrow power, which it currently does not have, to convict a person of an alternative statutory offence, on top of the existing power that it has to convict a person of an alternative common-law offence.

I move amendment 4.

I would imagine, minister, that a finite number of cases would be affected by that change. There will only be so many cases in the pipeline, many of which will not be affected, and at some point in time all those cases will cease to be.

Yes.

That seems to be a sensible approach.

I take it that, if amendment 4 is not agreed to, there is nothing to prevent the authorities from bringing forward revised charges.

No. The substance of the amendment is to reflect circumstances in which it might not be possible to amend the libel. After all, if there was the time to do that, we could deal with the issue. We are talking about circumstances in which that is no longer possible for various technical reasons, and amendment 4 gives the court the option in what, as the convener has highlighted, will be narrow circumstances.

Just following up on Daniel Johnson’s question, I assume that there will be a gap between the bill getting through stage 3, either next month or slightly later than that, and royal assent being given. If the number of cases is going to be fairly limited, what might impede the amendment of libels in that interim period? As I have said, the number of cases that would fall within that and which would not be captured by the court under common-law provisions is likely to be relatively small.

I will ask my officials to deal with that very technical point—

I am afraid that your officials cannot comment at this stage.

That is why they are looking at me askance, then.

I imagine that the member is correct to say that the number of cases will be limited, but amendment 4 seeks to ensure that an option is available in circumstances in which, for whatever reason—and there could be a number of such reasons—it has not been possible to amend the libel. It also seeks to ensure that, ultimately, people who have committed a serious offence do not escape punishment. I am sure that we would all wish to support that objective.

I should say, minister, that you can confer with your officials, if that would be helpful, but we cannot ask them to comment directly.

I see that my official agrees with what I said, so that is fine.

It is helpful to know that you can confer with officials, minister.

As I have said, there will be a number of months between now, royal assent and the bill’s implementation. Given that the Parliament’s direction of travel has at least been signalled, to what extent is amendment 4 addressing a problem that does not exist? I know that the precautionary principle should generally be adopted in such circumstances, but I wonder whether we are dealing with a problem that has already been addressed by people who have anticipated such an issue and have, as a result, taken steps to avoid it.

The fact that the court already has the power of substitution with regard to common-law offences suggests that there will always be circumstances in which the exercise of the power for such offences will be required as an option. In the same vein and using the same logic, therefore, there could well be circumstances in which it is necessary to substitute a statutory offence. I take the member’s points into account, but surely we would want to ensure that people who have committed serious offences are brought to justice and do not escape punishment. Amendment 4 will allow the court to take a belt-and-braces approach; indeed, if we did not have such a provision, the court might in specific circumstances—albeit in a time-limited period—be unable to do the necessary. The amendment provides a belt-and-braces approach to ensure that the court has the options that it needs. Moreover, after a certain period, it will not be an issue with regard to offences under the 2012 act—assuming, of course, that the Parliament votes to repeal it.

I am not convinced by the arguments in favour of amendment 4. The minister is seeking to enshrine in law a power that, as has transpired in this discussion, she does not actually require.

We also need to be careful that we have a consistent approach in the bill. The previous group of amendments tidied up the appeal provisions, because of a potential inconsistency between what could be dealt with after repeal and what can be dealt with currently. Amendment 4 seems to be going back on that. The minister is seeking a power to amend charges after the bill has been passed.

I also point out that prosecutors should continue to adopt a pragmatic approach in relation to potential prosecutions under the 2012 act. As far back as November 2016, Parliament signalled that it was supportive of full repeal, so prosecutors should have been aware of that and should have taken that pragmatic approach.

I oppose the adoption of amendment 4.

10:30  

I have listened to the comments that have been made and will deal first with Mr Kelly’s points.

The 2012 act still remains on the statute book. Parliament is still to vote on whether to repeal it, and we have to deal with the laws that we have.

The Government has no jurisdiction over the Crown in terms of charges brought—that is a matter for the independent Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, as I am sure that Mr Kelly is aware.

As I have said, it is essential to ensure that those who have committed a crime do not escape punishment just because the 2012 act is repealed. We need to ensure that the courts have adequate powers to achieve that and that, in proceedings for an offence under the 2012 act that have not been determined by the date of repeal, the court has the power to convict the accused of a different statutory offence where appropriate, in the way that it currently has in terms of substituting a common-law offence.

I believe that this is simply about ensuring that justice can continue to be served if the 2012 act is indeed repealed.

The question is, that amendment 4 be agreed to. Are we agreed?

Members: No.

There will be a division.

For

Adam, George (Paisley) (SNP)
Corry, Maurice (West Scotland) (Con)
Gougeon, Mairi (Angus North and Mearns) (SNP)
Kerr, Liam (North East Scotland) (Con)
MacGregor, Fulton (Coatbridge and Chryston) (SNP)
Mackay, Rona (Strathkelvin and Bearsden) (SNP)
Macpherson, Ben (Edinburgh Northern and Leith) (SNP)
Mitchell, Margaret (Central Scotland) (Con)

Against

Finnie, John (Highlands and Islands) (Green)
Johnson, Daniel (Edinburgh Southern) (Lab)
McArthur, Liam (Orkney Islands) (LD)

The result of the division is: For 8, Against 3, Abstentions 0.

Amendment 4 agreed to.

Amendment 5 moved—[Annabelle Ewing]—and agreed to.

Section 2, as amended, agreed to.

Section 3—Transitional and saving provisions

Amendments 6 to 8 moved—[Annabelle Ewing]—and agreed to.

Section 3, as amended, agreed to.

Section 4 agreed to.

Section 5—Interpretation

Group 3 is entitled “Commencement: repeal of section 6 offence postponed for 12 months from Royal Assent”. Amendment 9, in the name of the minister, is grouped with amendments 10 and 12.

Amendments 9, 10 and 12 adjust sections 5 and 6, which deal with the date of commencement for the bill.

The bill currently provides that repeal of the 2012 act will come into force on the day after royal assent. The effect of amendments 9, 10 and 12 is to delay the commencement of the repeal of the section 6 offence by 12 months from royal assent. When combined with amendment 11 in group 4, which we will come to shortly, the amendments also delay the commencement of the repeal of the section 1 offence by two months. That 12-month delay for the section 6 offence would allow the Scottish Government to respond to the concerns of organisations representing minority communities by preparing a new bill to reinstate the provisions of the section 6 offence of sending threatening communications, in order to maintain the protection that those provisions offer, and also to consider what improvements could be made to the offence, such as expanding the range of groups that are covered by incitement to hatred and considering whether the threshold for convictions is too high.

Amendment 9 amends the definition of the relevant date in section 5 so that it takes account of the different commencement dates for the section 1 and the section 6 offences that would result from the amendments, if agreed to.

Amendment 10 amends section 6 of the bill to confine the existing default commencement provision so that it applies only to the repeal of the section 1 offence. Currently, the default commencement provision in the bill is for it to come into force on the day after royal assent. If agreed, our amendment 12, which we will come to shortly, will change that so that the default commencement is two months after royal assent.

Amendment 12 provides that the bill, so far as repealing the rest of the 2012 act—that is, the section 6 offence of sending threatening communications—comes into force at the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the date of royal assent.

I move amendment 9.

This is where I start to get a bit grumpy. First, let me say that, as far as I am aware, the email to committee members indicating that the Government’s response to our stage 1 committee report had been made available via the website was received yesterday afternoon at 4.30. In terms of custom and practice, that sort of turnaround time is inappropriate and far too short.

The minister will recall that at stage 1 I acknowledged—as I think that we all did—that section 6 of the 2012 act presented a very different set of circumstances from sections 1 to 5, in that section 6 at least had the benefit of being cast across the entire population rather than targeted at a single group—football supporters. Nevertheless, despite that fact and despite assurances that the minister’s door was always open, we are presented now with an explanation of these amendments. There was no attempt between stages 1 and 2 to come and discuss with Opposition members the Government’s intention, which appears to be to hold on for 12 months until it can reinstate the same powers.

I do not accept that a gap would be created in the law. The Government is perfectly able—and I am sure that it will choose—to introduce a bill in the near future to reinstate those provisions. I am more than a little disappointed by the way in which the Government has gone about trying to deal with this. I thought that the approach that was taken with the amendments in the first grouping was a very constructive engagement to address legitimate concerns about the bill. However, the approach that has been taken to section 6 of the 2012 act falls far short of that. I will not be supporting the amendments in this group.

I take the polar opposite view, because I think that the amendments that the minister has lodged are vital. That was something that we teased out in the stage 1 debate. I disagree with Liam McArthur, because I think that there will be a gap in the law. We heard that in evidence that was given directly to the committee. The Crown Office told us about three specific areas where there will be a gap in the law if the 2012 act is repealed. We need to have the time to ensure that there is no such gap. We heard some examples during our evidence, and it is an area that I do not think we can let go. None of the concerns that were expressed in the stage 1 debate were addressed during that debate. We need to take adequate time to address all the concerns that were raised about section 6 of the 2012 act and to do it right. That is why I will be supporting the amendments.

To back up what my colleague Mairi Gougeon said, I think that it is eminently sensible to have that delay, given the importance of section 6 of the 2012 act. It will fill the gap until a new bill can be introduced.

I will be supporting the amendments for similar reasons. There was some debate about other sections of the 2012 act in our stage 1 evidence, but there was an almost unanimous view that the repeal of section 6 would create a gap in the law. For the stakeholders who were concerned about section 6, I think that preserving the provisions until a replacement can be found is a very sensible approach.

Does anyone else have any comments? My only comment is that I do not accept that there would be a gap in the law and therefore I consider that the act should be repealed in its entirety. Section 38 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 has been proposed as an alternative. There is also concern that the bar was set so high—with intent being the test—that it was very rarely used. I am certainly not in favour of the amendments.

First of all, I did not agree with Ben Macpherson when he implied that it was almost universally accepted in evidence to the committee that there would be a gap in the law with the repeal of section 6. That was not the view of the Law Society of Scotland or Professor Leverick.

I think that Ben Macpherson’s point was that the committee was unanimous but, as the convener has pointed out, she disagreed that there would be a gap in the law. I accept that the committee was unanimous that section 6 presents a different set of circumstances from sections 1 to 5, but that is not the same as a unanimous opinion that there would be a gap in the law if section 6 were repealed. I hope that that clarification is helpful.

I thank Liam McArthur for that. The issue was discussed in the stage 1 debate, when Mairi Gougeon made some cogent points. After that debate, I reflected on the arguments and looked seriously at whether there would be a gap in the law. The specific issue that Mairi Gougeon raised related to the sentencing powers in section 6, under which cases can be brought in which people can be sentenced up to five years—a provision that does not exist in the Communications Act 2003. However, the Law Society has pointed out that section 38 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 provides for cases to be brought on indictment, with sentences up to five years for threatening and abusive behaviour, and there is case law that backs that up. HM Advocate v McGinley is a breach of the peace on indictment.

My second point is on cover for crimes of religious hatred. Religious aggravation can be added to section 38, as was the case in Love v Procurator Fiscal, Stirling. Having seriously considered the issues raised in the stage 1 debate, I am content that not only is legislation in place to avoid a gap in the law but case law backs that up—a point that was made by the Law Society and Professor Leverick in evidence.

On the minister’s point about protection of minorities, section 6 is an unused provision. There was only one prosecution in the most recent year for which statistics are available. It is not correct to argue that section 6 offers protection to communities when it is unused, so therefore—

Would the member accept that the committee heard evidence from other sources, including the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, that there would be a gap in the law? Further, a lot of protected groups and minorities came to the committee and told us that they felt that section 6 was a protection.

Since the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications Act 2012 came into force, there have been 4,655 prosecutions for hate crimes relating to sexual orientation, only eight of which have resulted from the act. As I said, there has been only one conviction in the past year under the act, so section 6 is an unused provision.

On the Procurator Fiscal Service’s point that there would be a gap in the law, I have gone through, in substantial detail, why I believe that there is legislation in place and case law to prove that there is not a gap in law. I do not believe that proper protection can be given to minorities by a provision in an act that has not been used because the legal threshold is too high. On that basis, I oppose amendment 9.

10:45  

I invite the minister to wind up.

Thank you, convener. There is no question about the fact that there would be a gap. We need to remind ourselves of the evidence from the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, which clearly indicated what the factual position is—of course the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service deals with such matters day in and day out. Repealing section 6 without allowing the Government any time to mitigate the negative impact of that would take away from Scots law the specific statutory offence of the incitement of religious hatred. That repeal would take us backwards rather than forwards and would put us out of kilter with the rest of the UK. That threat was responded to very strongly by a number of organisations of which the committee will be well aware—the Equality Network, Stonewall Scotland, Victim Support Scotland, the Scottish Women’s Convention, the Church of Scotland, the Scottish Council of Jewish Communities and the Equality and Human Rights Commission, to name but some—and they all had serious concerns about the issue. Further, the Crown Office pointed out that the section 6 provision allows extraterritorial effect.

The minister is right about the evidence that we heard from a range of groups. That is why all of us were seized of the need to approach section 6 and its repeal in a way that was different from how we approached the potential repeal of sections 1 to 5. However, it is also incumbent on us to test the evidence that we hear against what appears to be the case in practice. As James Kelly has highlighted from his discussions with the Law Society, statutory provisions and case precedent exist, so there appear to be protections in this regard. The concern that was expressed vividly by the range of organisations to which the minister referred was about the message being sent out that repeal of section 6 would remove protection. Is the minister not then complicit in reinforcing the message that somehow there is a gap and that there will be an absence of protection, given that James Kelly has pointed out that that will not be the case because of the other provisions that are in place and case precedent?

No, I do not accept that. Section 38 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 does not provide a statutory offence of stirring up religious hatred, and it is simply wrong to say that it does. It is important to remember a specific example that the evidence session with the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service threw up. It said:

“Section 6 also provides for greater sentencing powers than those in the”

Communications Act 2003.

“we have had a case in which an accused person posted comments that were supportive of a proscribed terrorist organisation—ISIS—and the view of the sentencer was that the severity of those actions should be reflected in a starting point of 24 months’ imprisonment. That starting point for the sentencer would not have been available in the alternative charge under the 2003 act.”—[Official Report, Justice Committee, 3 October 2017; c 7.]

I think that that states the position very strongly indeed.

Yes, but provision for that sentencing exists in section 38 of the 2010 act, as does provision for bringing forward a relevant charge in relation to threatening communications. Although the minister’s comparison with the 2003 act is valid, it is not valid in relation to section 38 of the 2010 act.

Section 38 does not contain the specific statutory offence of the incitement of religious hatred. That is the key issue with section 6 and that is why all those equalities bodies—

Will the minister take an intervention?

I would like to finish my point.

As I said, that is why all those equalities bodies and certain faith bodies put forward their very strongly held concerns. I say to Mr McArthur that I am not complicit in stirring up concerns; I am saying how it is. As a responsible Scottish Government minister, I am doing my best to mitigate the negative impact of the move to repeal section 6 and to ensure some continuity of protection.

Again, just for the record, the Law Society has pointed out that a charge of religious aggravation can be added to the section 38 offence, so that gives cover in relation to religious hatred and deals with the arguments that the minister is trying to submit.

At the moment, we have a specific statutory offence of incitement of religious hatred. Mr Kelly is proposing to take that specific offence out of Scots law, putting us out of kilter with the rest of the UK. That would be a step backwards, not a step forwards.

We have had a good debate and a thorough one. The 12 months’ continuity of protection that we seek is entirely reasonable. We have not plucked the period of 12 months out of the air. Someone suggested that alternative legislation could be drummed up overnight, but that is not the case. We have had advice that, at the very least, a period of 12 months would be required to come up with an alternative legislative provision to deal with the circumstances covered by section 6 of the 2012 act. Therefore if the amendment were to be agreed to, we would be narrowing the gap in continuity of protection by at least 12 months.

In response to Liam McArthur’s point, I say that my door has been open from the outset, but no one has sought to come through it.

It now transpires that amendments 9, 10 and 12 are not about avoiding the creation of a gap—the existence of which we disagree on—but about narrowing the period during which there will be a gap in the law. Your argument is that 12 months at the very least will be needed and you are suggesting that the amendments will not achieve what you say they intend, which leaves us scratching our heads. It may be that you want to bring the amendments back at stage 3, but you do not appear to be in a position to argue for them convincingly at stage 2.

We are trying very hard to respect the will of Parliament at the same time as acting as a responsible Government. We accept that, if we had proposed an amendment today to deal with the specific issue by introducing a provision that would remain in place for two years, it would have been anathema to at least some members of the committee. We were trying to have a reasonable position and consider what was the shortest period of time that might be required to come up with alternative legislation. We decided on 12 months and working very hard to ensure that we met that timescale.

That is the position of the amendment. If we had proposed a much longer period, I am sure that Mr McArthur would have come up with other arguments against that and said that it did not respect the will of Parliament. We are trying both to respect the will of Parliament and to mitigate the negative impacts on some of our most vulnerable communities by ensuring continuity of protection.

It is simply foolhardy to repeal section 6 without putting an alternative in place. Amendment 9 would allow us to ensure that continuity of protection.

The question is, that amendment 9 be agreed to. Are we agreed?

Members: No.

There will be a division.

For

Adam, George (Paisley) (SNP)
Gougeon, Mairi (Angus North and Mearns) (SNP)
MacGregor, Fulton (Coatbridge and Chryston) (SNP)
Mackay, Rona (Strathkelvin and Bearsden) (SNP)
Macpherson, Ben (Edinburgh Northern and Leith) (SNP)

Against

Corry, Maurice (West Scotland) (Con)
Finnie, John (Highlands and Islands) (Green)
Johnson, Daniel (Edinburgh Southern) (Lab)
Kerr, Liam (North East Scotland) (Con)
McArthur, Liam (Orkney Islands) (LD)
Mitchell, Margaret (Central Scotland) (Con)

The result of division is: For 5, Against 6, Abstentions 0.

Amendment 9 disagreed to.

Section 5 agreed to.

Section 6—Commencement

Amendment 10 moved—[Annabelle Ewing].

The question is, that amendment 10 be agreed to. Are we agreed?

Members: No.

There will be a division.

For

Adam, George (Paisley) (SNP)
Gougeon, Mairi (Angus North and Mearns) (SNP)
MacGregor, Fulton (Coatbridge and Chryston) (SNP)
Mackay, Rona (Strathkelvin and Bearsden) (SNP)
Macpherson, Ben (Edinburgh Northern and Leith) (SNP)

Against

Corry, Maurice (West Scotland) (Con)
Finnie, John (Highlands and Islands) (Green)
Johnson, Daniel (Edinburgh Southern) (Lab)
Kerr, Liam (North East Scotland) (Con)
McArthur, Liam (Orkney Islands) (LD)
Mitchell, Margaret (Central Scotland) (Con)

The result of division is: For 5, Against 6, Abstentions 0.

Amendment 10 disagreed to.

The next group is on commencement generally postponed for two months from royal assent. Amendment 11, in the name of the minister, is the only amendment in the group.

Amendment 11 adjusts section 6 of the bill, which deals with the commencement date of the act. The current default commencement provision in the bill is that the act should come into force on the day after royal assent. Amendment 11 would change that such that the act would commence at the end of two months beginning from the date of royal assent. An implementation gap of two months between royal assent and commencement is standard practice.

The reason why an implementation gap of two months is standard practice is that the date on which royal assent is received is not easily predictable. Linking commencement to a specific period after royal assent therefore provides for greater predictability as to the date of commencement, which, in turn, provides certainty and time for all those affected by the bill to take account of its provisions and make all reasonable adjustments that are required of them before the date on which the new legislation comes into force.

I move amendment 11.

I oppose amendment 11. If we look at the timetable, it is important to understand that—obviously, the scheduling of a stage 3 debate is a matter for the Parliamentary Bureau—the normal time period between a bill being passed at stage 3 and receiving royal assent is around two months, although we cannot be exact. If stage 3 was before the end of March, that would take us to the end of May. Crucially, that is the end of the football season. After that, there would still be a two-month period for prosecutors and the police to carry out any preparatory work that the minister argues is necessary. Amendment 11 is therefore not necessary.

I have argued throughout the bill process that the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012 has been discredited. It has been argued against not only by supporters but by legal experts. I have therefore sought to repeal it as quickly as possible. I do not support amendment 11.

Seeking a two-month period from royal assent is not odd or unusual; in fact, it will ensure that the bill is brought into line with accepted, tried and tested practices. Until the stage 3 debate has been concluded, it is perhaps slightly presumptuous to assume the outcome, so those who are affected by the changes in the law need time to take account of those changes. The date of royal assent is not certain, so a two-month period will give everyone a clear date to work to and ensure the orderly management and administration of our justice system.

Our aim is to ensure that any transition from the current legal framework to a new set of circumstances is achieved as smoothly as possible, and it is right that organisations on which the change will impact have time for a period of adjustment to ensure that their houses are in order and they are ready for the implementation of the change on a fixed and clearly identified date. That the repeal bill will take away rather than add legislation does not make any difference to the fact that those who need to take account of the changes need time to ensure that policies, procedures and operations are amended in good time in order to fully enact the new legislation from the day that it comes into force. As the date on which royal assent is given is never certain, it is entirely reasonable that those who need to prepare for the repeal can work to a known date and have due notice of it.

The question is, that amendment 11 be agreed to. Are we agreed?

Members: No.

There will be a division.

For

Adam, George (Paisley) (SNP)
Gougeon, Mairi (Angus North and Mearns) (SNP)
MacGregor, Fulton (Coatbridge and Chryston) (SNP)
Mackay, Rona (Strathkelvin and Bearsden) (SNP)
Macpherson, Ben (Edinburgh Northern and Leith) (SNP)

Against

Corry, Maurice (West Scotland) (Con)
Finnie, John (Highlands and Islands) (Green)
Johnson, Daniel (Edinburgh Southern) (Lab)
Kerr, Liam (North East Scotland) (Con)
McArthur, Liam (Orkney Islands) (LD)
Mitchell, Margaret (Central Scotland) (Con)

The result of the division is: For 5, Against 6, Abstentions 0.

Amendment 11 disagreed to.

Amendment 12 moved—[Annabelle Ewing].

The question is, that amendment 12 be agreed to. Are we agreed?

Members: No.

There will be a division.

For

Adam, George (Paisley) (SNP)
Gougeon, Mairi (Angus North and Mearns) (SNP)
MacGregor, Fulton (Coatbridge and Chryston) (SNP)
Mackay, Rona (Strathkelvin and Bearsden) (SNP)
Macpherson, Ben (Edinburgh Northern and Leith) (SNP)

Against

Corry, Maurice (West Scotland) (Con)
Finnie, John (Highlands and Islands) (Green)
Johnson, Daniel (Edinburgh Southern) (Lab)
Kerr, Liam (North East Scotland) (Con)
McArthur, Liam (Orkney Islands) (LD)
Mitchell, Margaret (Central Scotland) (Con)

The result of the division is: For 5, Against 6, Abstentions 0.

Amendment 12 disagreed to.

Section 6 agreed to.

Section 7 agreed to.

Long title agreed to.

I suspend the meeting briefly to allow for a change of participants.

10:59 Meeting suspended.  

11:04 On resuming—