Meeting of the Parliament

Meeting date: Wednesday, May 2, 2018

Official Report 954KB pdf

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Nuclear Weapon Transport (Civil Contingency)

The final item of business is a members’ business debate on motion S5M-11539, in the name of Mark Ruskell, on civil contingency in nuclear weapon transport. The debate will be concluded without any question being put.

Motion debated,

That the Parliament understands that the Ministry of Defence regularly transports nuclear weapons on public roads in convoys that pass through or close to communities in the Argyll and Bute, Dumfries and Galloway, East Dunbartonshire, East Lothian, Edinburgh, Falkirk, Glasgow, Midlothian, North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, Scottish Borders, Stirling, South Lanarkshire, West Dunbartonshire and West Lothian local authority areas; believes that there is an inherent risk in transporting high explosives and radioactive material together on public roads; understands that information on what to do in an emergency involving a nuclear reactor is regularly circulated to residents close to the Coulport and Faslane bases but that no equivalent information relating to an incident involving nuclear weapons is available to communities along the regular convoy route; believes that although defence is a reserved matter, it would be for the civil authorities such as police, fire and rescue and local authorities to attempt to respond to any emergency as so-called category 1 responders, and notes the view that these civil authorities must have sufficient assessments and plans in place to respond.

17:04  

I thank members who signed the motion. Many members, such as Bill Kidd, have been champions of nuclear disarmament throughout their political careers. I started campaigning on the issue when I helped briefly to detain a nuclear convoy in Stirling back in the 1990s. However, tonight’s debate is not about the campaign for nuclear disarmament, supportive of that as I am, but the responsibilities that come with maintaining a nuclear deterrent and whether we discharge those responsibilities in line with the law.

I pay tribute to David Mackenzie, Jane Tallents and their network of citizen monitors in Nukewatch UK, as well as to the investigative journalism of Rob Edwards, which has been critical in exposing failings over many years. I was pleased to help out with Jane and David’s recent report, “Unready Scotland”, which analyses the critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons in Scotland.

Convoys run between Coulport naval base and the atomic weapon plants in Berkshire around eight times a year. Apart from the odd training run, they generally carry nuclear warheads for maintenance or replacement that consist of radioactive plutonium and uranium alongside explosives. Under civil regulations, it is illegal to carry explosives together with radioactive material, but that is not the case in a military convoy. The Ministry of Defence admits that a detonation of the explosive would have an impact radius of 600m with a dispersal of radioactive material over at least 5km and potentially even further, depending on prevailing winds.

Convoy routes are well known and the advent of social media has meant that they are the United Kingdom’s worst-kept secret. In Stirling, they park up at the Defence Support Group barracks in Forthside behind a flimsy chain-link fence next to a Nando’s and the Vue cinema—it is a disaster movie waiting to happen. They regularly run by Stirling castle, passing bemused tourists, and on to the A811 through Arnprior and Buchlyvie.

The risk of a catastrophic incident is mercifully small but, should it happen, the impact of a serious accident or terrorist attack could be devastating, and even a low probability over many years and decades is a persistent risk.

“The consequences of such an incident are likely to be considerable loss of life and severe disruption both to the British people’s way of life and to the UK’s ability to function as a sovereign state.”

That sounds like hyperbole, but those are not my words. They are the words of the Ministry of Defence, which were revealed through a freedom of information request in 2006.

All decisions over the UK’s defence policy, including the operation and renewal of Trident, are of course fully reserved to Westminster. Even in the event of a convoy incident, the responsibility to secure and contain the site would lie with MOD personnel. However, managing the impact beyond the immediate vicinity of the convoy would primarily be the responsibility of councils and emergency services in their roles as category 1 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and the Scottish Government holds responsibility for ensuring compliance.

Replacing the Civil Defence Act 1948, the CCA brought in a new approach, requiring civil authorities to identify potential threats, examine the risks and list them on public registers, while ensuring that the public have appropriate information to respond should contingency plans ever have to be enacted. There are two main opt-outs under the CCA that identify when authorities do not need to inform the public. The opt-outs apply if national security could be compromised through sharing sensitive information, and if information was likely to cause public alarm.

Providing live information about convoys would be inappropriate, but, as I said, the existence of the convoys is not a secret and they park next to a Nando’s. The culture of secrecy surrounding the convoys and a failure to acknowledge and plan for the risks is in itself cause for public alarm. The admission by Police Scotland officers under oath during the trial of a protester last year that they had no idea about what is contained in the convoys alarms me. I want the emergency services to have a clear idea of what they would be dealing with.

There is also a starkly inconsistent approach in the level of public information that is provided about radiation hazards around the Clyde naval bases and the dearth of information that is provided on the nuclear warhead convoys. Under radiation emergency regulations, residents who live in areas surrounding the bases are informed every three years with just enough information to prepare them should an incident ever occur. Threats are listed under local resilience partnership risk registers for naval bases and civil nuclear power stations.

In 2016, I asked local authorities on convoy routes what risk assessments had been completed. The answer was none; nor had any council communicated with the public about the potential threat. Councils are clearly breaching the responsibilities that they have under the CCA to assess risk, plan and inform. Several of the surveyed councils did not even seem to be aware that they had convoys running through their areas.

If councils are relying on generic risk assessments produced by resilience partnerships, it is concerning. Convoys pose a unique set of risks because they contain explosives and nuclear material travelling together. If councils are relying instead on the MOD for risk assessment, again that should concern us. Even if those assessments exist, they are not available to councils, and the MOD has no role beyond dealing with containment at a convoy incident site.

A number of councils pointed to guidelines that were produced by the MOD about what to do in the event of a convoy incident—the local authority and emergency services information, or LAESI guidelines. However, it is clear that first responders face huge challenges in following the guidelines on a range of issues, from communications to cordon access. For example, no evacuation procedure on the scale of a 600m cordon has been planned or trialled in Scotland. The guidelines for providing shelter from radioactive material within 5km also pose major problems. They require people to stay indoors and for ventilation systems to be shut down. Do hospitals know that? They require schoolchildren to be kept indoors and not be picked up. Do schools know that?

In closing, I turn to the role of the Scottish Government. So far, the response to the “Unready Scotland” report has been very disappointing. The position of the Scottish Government on Trident, although welcome, is largely irrelevant to this debate, which is about dealing with the responsibilities that we have here and now under the current devolution settlement.

I hope that I have demonstrated that resilience partnerships are woefully ill prepared to deal with a convoy incident and are failing to discharge the legal duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Only a review that is headed up by the Scottish Government and involves the MOD, the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, Police Scotland, the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, Scotland’s national health service and expert stakeholders can start to address the failings. That is the call on the Government tonight, and nothing less will do. [Applause.]

I would prefer it if those in the public gallery did not show appreciation or otherwise during the debate. Thank you.

We move to the open debate. There are a lot of requests to speak, so I ask for speeches of a strict four minutes, please.

17:12  

I will not take even four minutes, because I have just one thing to say that I think is important to say. First, though, I thank and congratulate Mark Ruskell for achieving this important members’ debate. I declare an interest in the subject of the debate, as co-convener of the Parliament’s cross-party group on nuclear disarmament and, internationally, as a co-president of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

It was in the latter role, last July, that I was the only elected representative of any body in the UK to attend the United Nations conference that passed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Sadly, not even the UK’s appointed ambassador attended the conference. However, 122 nations voted in favour of the prohibition of nuclear weapons, with one against and one abstention. While there, I presented a statement of support for the historic treaty from our First Minister to the president of the conference. It reiterated the Scottish Government’s call for a world that is free of nuclear weapons, with our contribution to be led by Scotland having Trident removed from its land and waters as quickly and as safely as possible.

Therefore, I am confident that the Scottish Government takes the issue of nuclear weapons seriously. I know that it takes the issue at hand—Ministry of Defence convoys transporting high explosives and radioactive materials along public roads—very seriously. That issue needs to be addressed by both Holyrood and Westminster assessing the preparedness of the areas in Scotland and England through which those convoys travel. From Burghfield in the south of England to Faslane in Argyll, no one should be ignorant of what those convoys carry past their homes and communities or of the potential dangers that an accident or an incident would pose.

To that end, I ask the minister to consider the Scottish Government setting up a group with the specific remit of conducting an open review of the readiness of all Scottish areas through which nuclear weapons convoys travel in order to ensure civil contingency preparedness across the board. That should be done to ensure the defence of our population, our environment and the futures of our young people along every route of these despicable convoys, until we achieve the removal of Trident from our country.

17:15  

Before I begin, I declare that I was a soldier in our armed forces. I served in Germany in the 1980s and 1990s, during the cold war, when nuclear weapons formed part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ offensive plan and thus had to form part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s strategic defence plan. Before anyone asks whether I was happy with that, my response is that I believe that deterrents work. I accept that many in the chamber, including Mark Ruskell, will probably not agree with me, but I respect their opinion and I hope that they will respect mine.

I have listened carefully to the concerns that have been raised by Mark Ruskell, but I question where he got his information from, because the information that I have is very different. I will run through that information and look at the nuclear facts as I understand them.

Fact 1 is that when nuclear weapons are transported, they are not armed and ready to explode. They are transported in a manner that means that they are fully contained and inert.

Will the member take an intervention?

I will finish my point and bring in John Finnie before I get to fact 2.

The transport containers for nuclear weapons are designed to be robust and are sealed. The UK Government stated in 2015 that weapons are

“transported in a benign configuration and secured in a custom-designed container that is tested in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency standards to protect against a range of scenarios, including impact on a motorway at speed, a drop from height and a fuel fire, among others.”

Are you able to say what the source of that information is?

I remind members to always speak through the chair.

The information came from a UK Government statement that was delivered in 2015. Various papers from the UK Parliament relate to the transport of nuclear weapons.

Fact 2 is that nuclear weapons are inherently stable. They are not like old explosives such as nitroglycerin, as many people believe. They do not explode when subjected to heat, shock or flame. They are stable and basically benign when they are transported. Providing that they are well-maintained, which our weapons are, there is no risk of exposure to the materials from which they are made.

Fact 3 is that when nuclear weapons are transported, the physical security is extremely high. We will never know the extent of that security, nor should we. What I know is that what we see is what we are meant to see. What we do not see is what we are not meant to see until it is needed. That is based on the evidence that I have from when I was a soldier and involved in moving nuclear weapons in Germany.

Fact 4 is that contingency plans are extremely high and involve all the key services—military and civilian. I know that plans are in place and I know that they are practised. To be clear, all civil authorities are consulted before a nuclear weapons convoy begins its journey.

Fact 5 is that the transportation of nuclear weapons through residential areas is assessed rigorously and governed tightly by international and national regulations.

The transportation of nuclear weapons and materials by road in the UK has been taking place for more than 50 years and, in that time, there has never been an incident that has presented a risk to the public or the environment. Although I respect Mark Ruskell’s opinion, I am afraid that I do not agree with it. Let us argue on the facts and not argue about anything else. Let us stick to the facts while we have the debate.

17:19  

I thank Mark Ruskell for bringing this issue to the chamber today. I also thank Nukewatch for its consistent work on this issue, and Rob Edwards and many others. I commend the members of the public who dedicate their time to this issue. It is often civilian watchdogs who hold our Governments to account on these guarded issues. I should also declare an interest as a member of the cross-party group on nuclear disarmament.

While we still have weapons of mass destruction in this country and the requirement to transport them, it would seem absolutely obvious that every eventuality should be planned for robustly and consistently. Inconceivably, however, that has been revealed not to be the case. The “Unready Scotland” report shows the routes that the warhead convoys take, and many of the communities that I represent across South Scotland are on those routes. I am disappointed to say that, at the moment, there are no nuclear-free local authorities in South Scotland.

The Scottish Government has responsibility for community safety and emergency planning. Like some of my constituents, I have concerns about the failure of local authorities to ensure compliance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. That failure puts people at risk—people in communities and in the emergency services.

Although an accident is unlikely, a series of credible scenarios could trigger fire explosions and a breach of plutonium containment—I differ from Edward Mountain in that view—resulting in radioactive materials possibly leaking from warheads. I do not want to be alarmist about this, but that is the case.

Before they became entirely redacted in 2015, the reports from the Ministry of Defence were concerning. In 2006, the MoD reported that convoy crew fatigue could cause hazards; in 2010, it said that the risk of accident was getting progressively worse due to spending cuts; and, in 2014, it reported a threat to safety as a result of a shortage of engineers. Those are, of course, questions for the UK Government, but they also highlight the need for the Scottish Government to ensure that it is prepared. We are talking about a unique threat to our emergency services, which would likely be the first ones on the scene. I fear that it is a failure of transparency—as well as a failure of legal compliance—that the general information on the convoys is not made public. There are obvious reasons why that information should not be spread widely and why up-to-the-minute updates should not be given, but national security surely does not justify a failure to inform the public of the existence of convoys. We all have a democratic right to know.

I would welcome a comment from the Scottish Government on rail convoys, which also pass through the region that I represent.

The Ministry of Defence says that the risk of nuclear weapons convoys is

“tolerable when balanced against the strategic imperative to move nuclear weapons”.

While nuclear weapons remain in the UK and across the world, such ugly judgments will have to be made. Nuclear weapons are not someone else’s problem; they are utterly inhumane, militarily useless—as stated by many senior military figures—morally unacceptable and, in my view, illegal, which Scottish Labour recognised in 2015.

However, this is not a debate about nuclear weapons; it is about the safety of their transportation. Everyone with responsibility for that needs support, and the civilian partnerships need to be well interlinked. I ask the minister to highlight in her closing speech how that is being approached—not in detail, obviously, for national security reasons. We all need to be able to reassure our constituents that, although nuclear weapons are trafficked through their areas, it is done in as safe a way as possible.

I thank Mark Ruskell not only for his work but for his wise words and the information that he has provided us with. Like him and others in this chamber and beyond, I call on the Scottish Government to consider the open review of the preparedness of Scottish civil authorities to deal with serious nuclear weapons convoy incidents. The Scottish Government must act on this and show the people of Scotland that it is doing so.

17:24  

I, too, thank Mark Ruskell for bringing this important debate to the chamber today. It is also a pleasure to speak after my colleague Bill Kidd, who undoubtedly speaks on the subject with greater authority than most people. As Bill Kidd made clear, we in the Scottish National Party are resolute in our position that nuclear weapons are abhorrent, are financially unjustifiable and do not protect us against the threats that we face today. Such weapons of mass destruction have no place on our planet, have no right to be housed in Scotland and should in no way be transported on our busy roads.

A little under three years ago, my former Rutherglen Westminster colleague, Margaret Ferrier, held in the UK Parliament a debate on transportation of nuclear weapons. As she outlined then from research that had been conducted by Nukewatch, nuclear warheads were transported through the Rutherglen and Hamilton West constituency at least three times between January 2014 and January 2015. On those occasions, the weapons were moved in large convoys of about 20 vehicles travelling along the M74, through my constituency, then on to Glasgow city centre.

Trucks carrying nuclear material can be on motorways or main roads at any time of day or night without residents on the route ever knowing. More recent figures that have been collated by Nukewatch show that the number of Trident warheads being transported to and from the Clyde increased fivefold between 2015 and 2016. Therefore, it is very likely that nuclear weapons have continued to be moved within my constituency and at a more frequent rate than was previously imagined.

Members will be aware of the Ministry of Defence’s document entitled “Local authority and emergency services information (LAESI) Edition 11”, which outlines the many council areas in the UK through which the nuclear convoys may travel. It names 21 of the 32 local authorities in Scotland, including South Lanarkshire Council, Glasgow City Council, the City of Edinburgh Council and North Lanarkshire Council. As Mark Ruskell’s motion correctly points out,

“no … information relating to an incident involving nuclear weapons is available to communities along the regular convoy route”.

It is frightening to think that if an incident were to take place, our authorities would be poorly prepared to take swift action.

We are incredibly lucky that no major incidents have occurred in the 50 years for which nuclear weapons have been transported. However, there have been a number of near misses. For example, in 2007, several vehicles in a convoy were separated and became lost in the Stirling area due to heavy fog. It was reported that it took several hours for the convoy to regroup. In that time, anything could have happened to its cargo. However, such problems are not new. In 1987, 30 years prior to that, two vans, each with two nuclear warheads, came off the road after skidding on ice. Fortunately, the weapons were not damaged in the accident, but it took the authorities about 18 hours to recover the vehicles.

The weapons should not be in transit in the first place, especially not during challenging weather conditions. The Ministry of Defence admitted in 2016 that, in the three previous years, 43 safety incidents had been reported to it. Accidents can and do happen, and the risk that the UK Government continues to take is not a risk that is worth taking.

I repeat the calls that other members have made. The people of Scotland, civic Scotland, the Scottish Trades Union Congress, Scotland’s churches, the Scottish Parliament and the majority of Scotland’s MPs do not want the Trident nuclear weapons system to be renewed. If we want our constituencies to be clear of nuclear weapons, I suggest that we all urge the UK Government to scrap its nuclear obsession.

I note that quite a few members still wish to speak, so I am minded to accept a motion without notice to extend the debate by up to 30 minutes.

Motion moved,

That, under Rule 8.14.3, the debate be extended by up to 30 minutes.—[Mark Ruskell]

Motion agreed to.

17:28  

I thank Mark Ruskell for securing this important debate. It is important for the communities that I represent because, up to eight times a year, a convoy of Army vehicles carrying nuclear warheads and weapon materials uses the Edinburgh bypass as it travels between Coulport, where the UK’s nuclear weapons are stored, and the Atomic Weapons Establishment plant in Burghfield, Berkshire, where the weapons undergo maintenance, refurbishment or decommissioning.

On Monday 26 March, the second nuclear convoy of this year travelled along the Edinburgh bypass through my constituency just yards from communities from the Calders in the west, to Baberton Mains, Juniper Green, Bonaly, Torphin, Colinton, Oxgangs, Swanston and to Fairmilehead in the east. However, the people who live there have never received any information on what to do in the event of an accident involving transported nuclear weapons. The convoys carry radioactive material consisting of plutonium and uranium, which in the event of an accident have a potential dispersal range of at least three miles, which would require total evacuation of almost all my Edinburgh Pentlands constituency, including schools, a college and two universities.

That is not just some hypothetical situation raising unnecessary fears. The City of Edinburgh Council was the lead authority in exercise senator 2005, which simulated damage to a convoy transporting a nuclear warhead on the Edinburgh bypass, resulting in a hypothetical release of radiological material over a wide area of Edinburgh. The council also took part in a similar exercise in 2011 in North Lanarkshire, in which an accident involving a nuclear convoy was simulated.

In addition, a report by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons that was compiled using freedom of information requests, on military convoys carrying nuclear weapons, highlighted that 180 mishaps and incidents, including collisions, breakdowns and brake failures have occurred during the past 16 years. Thankfully, none of the incidents resulted in a release of radioactive materials.

Despite taking part in two exercises, and despite the reported potential dangers, the City of Edinburgh Council, in response to a survey that was carried out in 2016 by Mark Ruskell, admitted that it had

“not carried out an independent assessment of the risks to Council residents specifically relating to the transportation of nuclear weapons”,

and that it had

“not communicated with its public in regard to the risks associated specifically with the transport of nuclear weapons.”

The Scottish Government has a resilience division that supports organisations to work together to build Scotland’s resilience to emergencies, with staff based in Edinburgh, Perth and Glasgow. Its website, Ready Scotland, explains that there are three regional resilience partnerships, which are broken down into 12 local resilience partnerships. It states:

“These groups bring together all the relevant organisations in an area to develop an effective approach to dealing with emergencies. They have robust plans in place to respond to all kinds of events. These plans are regularly tested in joint exercises and during real emergencies.”

However, on searching the website, I found no reference to nuclear accidents involving MOD vehicles. Why is that? The UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces highlighted in a Westminster Hall debate in 2015 that the Scottish Government and local authorities are not given advance notice of convoys, and that the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 apply only to areas surrounding nuclear sites and not to road transport.

In addition, legislation that was passed by the UK Government back in 2004, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, places constraints on authorities’ ability to keep the public informed—first, in order to avoid conveying “sensitive information”, which covers information that is deemed to be harmful to national security or public safety, and secondly, in order to avoid alarming the public unnecessarily. As the House of Commons library stated in its briefing on nuclear convoys:

“The MOD is reluctant to give too much information about the transportation of nuclear material”.

That veil of secrecy and UK Parliament acts and regulations make it virtually impossible, in my view, for any local authority or the Scottish Government to prepare for a nuclear accident. If we cannot prepare properly for a potential nuclear accident, let us ban transportation of nuclear warheads as a first step towards removing weapons of mass destruction from Scotland.

Just because we have an extra 30 minutes, it does not all have to be used up. Maurice Corry can have a little bit of extra time, in the interest of fairness.

17:34  

I thank the Presiding Officer, and I thank Mark Ruskell for this members’ business debate. Although I know that I will never get Mark Ruskell to agree with me on the wider issue of nuclear weapons and the vital role that they play in preserving world peace—and I am sure that he knows that he will not get me to agree with his position on nuclear weapons, either—the issue is important and we need to discuss it.

I declare an interest; I live in Helensburgh, 5 miles from Faslane—I was born and bred there—and I am fully aware of many matters that have been mentioned in the debate. I start with something on which I agree with Mark Ruskell: local and civil authorities should consider the transportation of nuclear weapons on roads through their areas. Those bodies should risk assess the potential for danger to the public as part of their wider contingency planning procedures and I am sure that that work would find that the risk to the public was low or negligible.

I do not agree with the words in Mark Ruskell’s motion that the transporting of nuclear weapons is “an inherent risk”. If it is done safely, as it is in this country, the public has nothing to fear. It is important to note that there has never been an accident involving defence nuclear materiel in the UK that has led to, or come anywhere near leading to, the release of radioactive material into the environment.

Maurice Corry, as Mr Mountain before him, seems to suggest that, because there has never been an accident, there never will be an accident. Does the member not believe in the precautionary principle and that we must make sure that communities are as well prepared as they possibly can be, in the event of such an horrendous occurrence.

I could not possibly disagree with that point.

Mark Ruskell’s motion speaks about the organisations that would be responsible for responding to an accident, and gives the impression that local and civil authorities would be left to their own devices. I follow on from what Edward Mountain said earlier and note that within every convoy is embedded an immediate response force—or IRF—which is specifically trained to deal with such situations. The convoy commander would take over as the incident co-ordinator and be in charge of co-ordinating the response. That means that, at an incident, there would immediately be sufficient equipment and trained personnel to alert and brief the police, fire and ambulance services to assess whether or not there had beena release of radioactive material and to assist the police in establishing an initial safety and security zone.

Additional measures that would be put in place would include trained personnel to co-ordinate with the police in providing information for the media and public—the media are very strong here. Convoy personnel are also cross-trained to enable them to undertake other roles.

I acknowledge the resources and expertise of the personnel that the MOD would have in connection with a convoy. However, the debate is about the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and what happens beyond the immediate site of a convoy and the 600m cordon that would require evacuation and the 5km zone where schools and hospitals would have to shut down. That bit is the devolved responsibility.

I appreciate those facts and I am just coming to them.

Those arrangements are, of course, just at the site. On a wider national level, every time a convoy moves, a joint operations cell—or JOC—monitors all road movements of defence nuclear materiel and would activate any additional response needed to support the IRF. The JOC would contact the police immediately in the event of an emergency and provide them with precautionary public protection advice and discuss any additional support requirements. That would include going further out into the boundaries that Mark Ruskell spoke about in his intervention.

With regard to contingency planning by local and civil authorities, the Ministry of Defence deserves some credit. It has made information available on what actions should be taken by local authorities and emergency services by creating named documents, such as the one that was referred to earlier—“Local Authority and Emergency Services Information”—an example of which I have in my hand, from when I was an Argyll and Bute councillor. We had the Clyde local liaison committee, which met annually and had a calendar of emergency exercises. That calendar now goes from 2018 to 2023, and those exercises address the areas that Mark Ruskell has spoken about, beyond the Clyde base and beyond 5 and 10 miles. I was trained as a nuclear defence instructor in the army, so I am well aware of how those things progress and exercises go forward.

In Argyll and Bute, in relation to Her Majesty’s Naval Base Clyde, exercise evening star is held annually, and a larger scale exercise called exercise short sermon is held every three years. Those include the local residents as well as community councillors, councillors and indeed members of Parliament.

Will the member take an intervention?

I will.

Please be very quick.

I thank Maurice Corry for his indulgence in giving way yet again. That is the point. Why do we not have the civil contingency approach to convoys that we have around the naval bases on the Clyde?

That is a fair point. In Argyll and Bute, we have been very used to this. It is certainly something that I would commend to the minister if she wanted to go and look at what happens in those two exercises, because we also address the question of incoming and outgoing convoys.

The JOC would contact the police immediately in the event of an emergency and provide them with precautionary public protection advice for the areas outwith the cordon. If we take an incident to include convoys as well—apart from the base situation of, for example, an overheated reactor on a nuclear submarine going red, which is sometimes how the exercises are performed—then we could use the same process for them. There is no reason why we could not transfer that process to the convoys, and I would certainly go along with that.

On engagement with the MOD’s document “Local Authorities and Emergency Service Information” by the local and civil authorities, my experience in the Ministry of Defence in supporting local government suggests that it would be open and willing to engage with contingency planning officers in the local authority areas, not just in relation to individual places but in relation to convoys and in addressing other planning issues.

One of the problems is that, as elected councillors move on, the collective memory is sometimes lost, so a lot is imposed on the emergency planning officers for each local authority. As far as I am aware, they are the ones who should keep the councils up to date and provide the necessary planning.

In conclusion, I think that this is an area where local and civil authorities can improve, but I believe that the current arrangements for transporting nuclear defence materiel are safe and that the public should have no fears about that. I think, however, that we need to look at what is done in certain areas, such as Argyll and Bute, which I know quite a lot about, and progress it elsewhere.

17:42  

Like others, I warmly congratulate Mark Ruskell on bringing this important debate to the chamber this evening. I also thank Nukewatch UK for its interesting and important report “Unready Scotland: the critical gap in our response to the transport of nuclear weapons”, which highlights the dangers that communities are put in by the nuclear weapons convoys, including communities in places in my constituency such as the city of Stirling, Gargunnock, Arnprior, Buchlyvie and Drymen.

One of the reasons why I joined the SNP—now too many years ago to remember—was because of its strong ethos in opposition to nuclear weapons. Tonight, I could talk about the eye-watering amount that the UK Government has committed to spending on these status symbols at a time of austerity. I could talk about the moral absurdity of considering using nuclear weapons and the fact that, today, they are strategically more useless than they have ever been at any time in history.

However, this debate is an opportunity to highlight the everyday danger that they present to the people who live in ordinary communities in Scotland, and especially my constituents, who, among others, have Trident weapons convoys passing through their area regularly. Any accident or terror attack involving those warheads, particularly during a convoy through populated areas, would pose a potential serious risk to public safety, not to mention the potential long-term health and environmental damage that the radioactive poison that is contained in a Trident warhead could inflict.

Of course, the presence of nuclear convoys through the peaceful communities of the Stirling area encourages protest. Just last year, a man was fined £200 for laying underneath a Trident truck in Stirling. So much for security. What a terrifying prospect: a regular member of the public can actually get up and touch one of these things and interfere with its progress.

As the Nukewatch report points out,

“The risk acceptability gap between civil transport and the nuclear weapon convoys is ... vast.”

Mark Ruskell touched on that. Civilian vehicles are prohibited from carrying explosives in conjunction with radioactive material. The reason for that restriction is clearly the heightened level of danger, and yet the risk of an attack or accident in relation to a Trident convoy does not prohibit them from carrying radioactive substances inside missile warheads.

With an estimated eight nuclear convoys a year travelling through Scotland, the Nukewatch report questions how ready our country is for a major incident involving such convoys.

My question is, how ready can we really be? These things can never be safe as long as they travel through local towns and villages—they will always pose a potential threat to safety. As the report points out, assessing a risk means that we combine the likelihood of an event with the severity of its impact. Even if the likelihood was to be reduced to an insignificant amount, the severity of an accident involving nuclear warheads would be so great that the risk remains very high. That does not relate to whether anything has happened in the past; it is about what could happen in the future.

It is interesting that the response from Stirling Council to a consultation that forms part of the report suggested that nuclear convoys are arguably less at risk during times of rest stops at MOD Forthside in Stirling city. I say to Mark Ruskell, never mind the Nando’s and the Vue, my office is much closer to that base than those fantastic establishments are. It is obvious that there is far less risk of an attack at an MOD facility than there is on a public road. However, the UK Government is set to close MOD Forthside entirely in 2022. Where will the convoys be expected to take rest stops thereafter? What would the findings of a risk assessment be then?

I am seriously concerned about nuclear convoys travelling through my constituency as well as other parts of the country. What does the future look like? Once the closure of MOD sites such as Forthside takes place, how can such convoys continue to operate, including with secure rest stops? Will the goal posts simply be moved again to make the risk more acceptable in those circumstances?

Those are hard questions that I put directly to the MOD ahead of today’s debate and I look forward to getting a detailed response from it as soon as possible on this important matter.

One thing is absolutely certain: the best way to reduce the risk posed by the transportation of nuclear weapons is to rid ourselves of those obscenities once and for all.

17:47  

I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in the debate. I thank Mark Ruskell for bringing this important issue to the chamber, although I do not think that I will ever look at a Nando’s in quite the same way after this—the situation that Mark Ruskell described certainly has the quality of a disaster movie. I was particularly struck by his reference to “bemused tourists”. Clearly we want to encourage as many people as possible to come to Scotland, but that is one tourist attraction that we could do without.

I will pick up on a couple of points that have been raised. I am sure that Edward Mountain will correct me if I misheard him, but I understood him to state that all civil authorities are informed of nuclear transportations. However, as I understand the situation, there is no obligation for local authorities to be informed of them. I say that because I was in contact with Renfrewshire Council about the matter this afternoon. My constituency of Renfrewshire South does not have nuclear convoys passing directly through it. However, as the convoys make their journey west towards the Erskine bridge on the M8, they pass nearby.

I commend Nukewatch for its work, although I do not think that it received a response from Renfrewshire Council, if I recall correctly. I am sure that Mr Ruskell will correct me if I am wrong. The council made it clear to me that it takes its responsibilities as a category 1 responder very seriously and that it seeks to work collaboratively with category 2 responders. The thing that I will take from the debate is that I will seek to engage directly with my colleagues in the local authority to make sure that they are up to date.

The questions that are raised about devolved competencies are these: should we have a refresh or a review of existing procedures and should members of the public be informed?

I am of a generation of people who were born towards the end of the cold war. I did not grow up with the persistent threat of the mushroom cloud and nuclear Armageddon—although given political developments over the past few months, my generation might experience that threat. Mark Ruskell talked about civil defence; we talk about civil contingencies now. Awareness of the risk of nuclear war and civil defence in particular situations was second nature for my parents’ generation, but it is not for mine, so there has perhaps been a commensurate decrease in awareness of the risk that is posed by nuclear weapons being housed in Scotland. I will be interested to hear what the minister has to say about whether there is a need to refresh civil contingency measures. There is certainly a need to increase awareness among parliamentarians and members of local authorities. Maurice Corry made that valid point. Many councillors in my local authority area are probably closer to my age and might not recollect the threats of a bygone age. Perhaps it is just a question of making people more aware of the issue, without being alarmist.

There are specific concerns in my Renfrewshire South constituency. Glasgow airport is on the doorstep and any event that resulted in extended closure of the M8 or surrounding roads would be massively disruptive. I am keen to hear what the minister says in response to such concerns and to learn what action, if any, the Government seeks to take.

I am more interested in how you will justify accusing me of being from “a bygone age.”

I would accuse you of no such thing, Deputy Presiding Officer.

17:51  

I thank my colleague Mark Ruskell and Nukewatch for their work in preparing the “Unready Scotland” report, which lays bare the danger that nuclear weapons convoys pose, not just to the communities that they pass through but to communities such as those in Tom Arthur’s constituency, which the convoys pass close to.

The report shows the inadequate preparation by local authorities, which in many cases do not seem to realise—either through genuine misunderstanding or a deliberate attempt to evade their responsibilities—that they have a clear responsibility in this context, which Mark Ruskell outlined.

We should be absolutely clear what the convoys contain, why there is a risk and where the responsibility lies. The convoys transport nuclear warheads, with the dangerous radioactive materials and explosives that are required in combination to create a viable weapon of mass destruction. The immediate risk is not detonation of one of the warheads, which Edward Mountain was right to highlight. It is exceptionally hard—almost impossible—to detonate a nuclear bomb by accident. The risk is that as a result of an accident or an attack on a convoy we could face what equates to the most powerful and dangerous dirty bomb imaginable. An accident that involved a convoy would risk releasing radioactive material and dispersing it into the surrounding area. The immediate area within 600m of the accident could be contaminated. Wind could carry radioactive particles a further 5km, and many people suggest that that is a conservative estimate.

Any release of radioactive particles would be devastating for local communities and for Scotland and the UK as a whole, but most people are not even aware that the convoys pass through our cities, towns and villages: people are entirely unaware that convoys drive down the streets in which they live. On leaving Faslane naval base and Helensburgh, in my region, the convoys often travel to the A82. That takes them through Balloch, Alexandria and Dumbarton and all the way to the Erskine bridge and on to the M8. From there, they travel along the M8, passing Paisley, Renfrew and the south side of Glasgow. We are talking about hundreds of thousands of people in the danger zones.

The convoys travel through a number of local authority areas—Argyll and Bute, West Dunbartonshire and Renfrewshire—as well as close to the border of East Dunbartonshire when they return along the M80. The journeys take place half a dozen times a year, and sometimes a couple more times.

What is really worrying is the inconsistency in local councils’ preparedness to deal with an accident and the potential release of radioactive material. No local authority—not one—has carried out specific risk assessments for the convoys, although councils should have done that. Some authorities seem to be unable even to explain generalised emergency response plans.

As members have said, the convoys are primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence and the UK Government. However, being prepared for an accident involves local councils and other public bodies in Scotland. All public bodies that are category 1 responders should be prepared.

Argyll and Bute Council provided us with some information on its risk planning. That should be expected of the local authority that houses the naval base that contains the weapons. Maurice Corry provided the chamber with useful information on that council’s preparations with regard to the base. It has worked in partnership with other local councils, including East Dunbartonshire Council, in its regional risk partnership. However, such a generalised approach still falls short of a satisfactory risk assessment for nuclear convoys.

To make matters worse, as Tom Arthur highlighted, Renfrewshire Council—which is not alone; West Dunbartonshire Council is another—provided no information at all. Instead, West Dunbartonshire Council stated that the matter is the responsibility of others including the MOD, Police Scotland and the Scottish Government. Yes: they are all responsible—but so is the local authority. Under the relevant legislation, which is the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, such councils are category 1 responders and so are obliged to maintain emergency plans. Not a single local authority in Scotland has such a plan for the convoys.

Given that the convoys go through a number of local authority areas, the Scottish Government has a role here, and an opportunity to step in and co-ordinate a review of the preparedness of our civilian authorities. We must ensure that all responsible bodies are prepared in the event that the worst happens. That is not something that could—or should—be left to chance. It is not responsible to pass the buck to the MOD when the 2004 act places clear obligations on our civilian authorities. After all, what would happen in the event of an accident involving one of those convoys? Would the residents of Balloch, Alexandria, Dumbarton, Erskine, or any of the other towns and villages that they pass through, be well served by those whom they expect to serve them? My constituents should expect those who are responsible for their safety to be prepared.

Given that the convoys are a known risk, there is no good reason for councils across the central belt and the south of Scotland to be so completely unprepared for that specific risk. By raising the issue today, I hope that we can prompt them to take the actions that they should have taken some time ago, and to live up to their responsibilities for community safety.

I call Annabelle Ewing to respond to the debate—for seven minutes or so, please, minister.

17:56  

I, too, congratulate Mark Ruskell on securing this important debate. The importance of the issue is well illustrated by the number of members who sought to make their contributions.

In responding to the debate, I reiterate, at the outset, that the Scottish Government is firmly opposed to the possession, threat and use of nuclear weapons. We are committed to the safe and complete withdrawal of Trident from Scotland, and have repeatedly called on the UK Government to cancel plans for its renewal.

As has been noted in the debate, the responsibility for transportation of nuclear warheads lies with the MOD. However, the Scottish Government expects any such transportation to be carried out safely and securely, and has made that expectation clear to the UK Government. Indeed, public safety is our absolute priority, and we have sought assurances from the MOD that robust arrangements are in place to ensure the safety and security of nuclear convoys at all stages of the transportation process.

Although, as members have said, there has never been a defence nuclear transport incident that has posed a radiation hazard, I can well understand the concerns that members have expressed tonight and, indeed, the public concern about such convoys. I would like to take this opportunity to stress that we in the Scottish Government take the matter very seriously indeed, which is why very significant resilience planning is in place. I will clarify what that is, because there are certain misapprehensions about how it operates in Scotland.

Members might wish to note that Scotland’s three regional resilience partnerships—which include local authorities but are, in fact, led by Police Scotland and the SFRS and supported by Scottish Government resilience co-ordinator teams—are not in the woeful position of having no plans in existence. Rather, they regularly undertake a risk and preparedness assessment process. Moreover, resilience register work is maintained, which enables the resilience partnerships to identify and assess the main risks that are relevant to their regions and determine how prepared they are to deal with the consequences of those risks.

I thank the minister for outlining the work of the resilience partnerships. Does that work specifically include assessment and planning regarding nuclear convoys?

Yes. My understanding is that that is the case. The resilience partnerships look at a number of risks, including those presented by nuclear convoys. Therefore, although I understand Mark Ruskell’s determination to find out what is happening in Scotland, relying simply on the response, or otherwise, to his survey might not give him the full picture.

The UK national risk assessment and national risk register, as well as the Scottish risk assessment and resilience partnership community risk register arrangements, provide an evidence-based priorities approach to risk at the UK, Scottish and local levels.

The national risk register, which is produced by the UK Government, is publicly available and seeks to inform the public about the range of risks that the UK may face. The community risk registers are published by the three resilience partnerships to communicate the key risks for the north, east and west regions of Scotland. Those are also publicly available, and provide advice on what to do and who to contact in an emergency.

In common with other countries, we in Scotland practice integrated emergency management. That concept recognises that the most effective preparation for any event rests on planning for a range of consequences rather than the characteristics of a specific event. The Scottish Government is satisfied that, through the use of integrated emergency management, Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, which are the lead agencies, local authorities and other category 1 responders are well prepared to deal with a diverse range of emergency events.

As I have advised, Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service take the lead on resilience planning for nuclear convoys in Scotland. Local authorities, as category 1 responders, have, as has been mentioned, a duty, along with Police Scotland and the SFRS, to warn the public and to provide information and advice if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred, under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2005. However, as has also been said, in performing that duty, they must take account of the importance of not alarming the public unnecessarily.

As far as the MOD is concerned, it maintains wider arrangements to respond to any incident, which includes the nuclear accident response organisation and the necessary contingency plans to deal with any accident. The MOD has provided assurance that the routes adopted are carefully selected as part of a rigorous risk assessment process and are regularly reassessed for their continued suitability. Moreover, the MOD has provided assurance that operational planning always takes into account such factors as road and weather conditions. Given that we are not privy to all the detailed information on which the MOD bases its judgments, we are not in a position to independently corroborate all those assurances.

As far as notice is concerned, the MOD provides that to Police Scotland and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service but refuses to share details more widely, on what it says are grounds of national security.

On operational planning and guidance, it should be pointed out that preparing Scotland provides guidance for any emergency, regardless the cause. The guidance deals with preparing for, responding to and recovering from emergencies in Scotland and forms the basis of emergency arrangements. It takes cognisance of the MOD’s publicly available document “Local Authority and Emergency Services Information”, which provides information for the emergency services, local authorities and health authorities on contingency arrangements to be implemented in what the MOD views as the unlikely event of an emergency during the transportation of defence nuclear material.

You might be seeking to reassure us, but there is a huge gap between what you say, minister, and what is in the “Unready Scotland” report. Do you recognise that the Scottish Government must address that issue?

Always speak through the chair, please, Mr Finnie.

In response to Mr Finnie, I say that I am trying to say where we are at the moment and what we might be thinking of doing, going forward.

I tried to say gently to Mr Ruskell that I understood that he, in good faith, conducted a survey and got the replies that he did. However, the resilience structure is not quite as the results of that survey would suggest. The resilience structure is not headed by local authorities; as the member will be aware, at the very top, the resilience structure is headed by Police Scotland, which works closely with the SFRS, alongside the resilience partnership first responders, such as local authorities. It is important to understand that structure when putting the survey result into context. [Interruption.]

Excuse me, but I am still here.

Sorry, Presiding Officer.

On emergency response arrangements, emergency services in Scotland have plans in place for responding to any major incident, regardless of the cause. There are well-established resilience structures in place to manage the consequences of any emergency. The structures have been and continue to be robustly tested, and proven, through exercises and real events.

The Scottish Fire and Rescue Service has plans in place and has made pragmatic preparations to deal with incidents involving defence nuclear material, including convoys of such material. Similarly, Police Scotland can give assurance that up-to-date plans are in place to deal with all major incidents, including nuclear incidents, and that its procedures relating to defence nuclear material are current. Its resilience staff liaise regularly with the MOD police on a range of matters.

As I said at the outset, the Scottish Government believes that nuclear weapons are immoral, illegal, and a colossal waste of money. We wish to see the Trident replacement programme scrapped and we have called repeatedly on the UK Government to do that.

Absent reclaiming power here for this Parliament, we in Scotland are reduced to being lumbered with whatever the UK Government decides. That is the unenviable position that Scotland is in—I hope not for too much longer. In the meantime, we see the transportation of nuclear weapons on our roads continue, because we have no power to stop it.

What the Scottish Government can do is to ensure is that we take our resilience responsibilities with the utmost seriousness. That is witnessed in the on-going resilience work of our police and fire and rescue services and in the work of the three regional resilience partnerships.

I have listened carefully to the concerns raised by members and I can confirm that I will be writing to Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary in Scotland and to Her Majesty’s fire service inspectorate in Scotland to ask them to consider conducting a joint review of the resilience work of Police Scotland and the SFRS. That review would be able to look at the close working arrangements with local authorities and the other responders in Scotland’s regional resilience partnerships to ensure that response arrangements are indeed up to date and current, because we all want to have that assurance. I trust that that will provide members who have participated in the debate and, indeed, our guests in the public gallery with some reassurance about the serious approach that the Scottish Government takes to these matters.

Of course, to pick up on a point that Bruce Crawford made, as far as nuclear convoys are concerned, the only way to really deal with the issue once and for all is to ensure that powers over such matters—that is to say, the powers of a normal independent country—lie with this Parliament.

Meeting closed at 18:07.