Health and Sport Committee

Meeting date: Tuesday, February 9, 2021

Official Report 573KB pdf

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Subordinate Legislation

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Health Protection (Coronavirus) (International Travel, Public Health Information and Pre-Departure Testing) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2021 (SSI 2021/34)

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Health Protection (Coronavirus) (International Travel, Prohibition on Travel from the United Arab Emirates) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2021 (SSI 2021/52)

Good morning, and welcome to the fifth meeting in 2021 of the Health and Sport Committee. We began our meeting in private session and now move to the public agenda items. We have received apologies from Alex Cole-Hamilton.

I ask all members and witnesses to ensure that their mobile phones are on silent and that all other notifications are turned off during the meeting.

Agenda item 2 is consideration of two made affirmative instruments relating to coronavirus and international travel. The instruments have been laid under section 94(1) of the Public Health etc (Scotland) Act 2008.

The 2008 act states that regulations under section 94(1) are subject to affirmative procedure, but it also provides that the Scottish ministers may make regulations urgently, if they believe that to be necessary, in which case emergency regulations must be laid before the Scottish Parliament. Such regulations cease to have effect on the expiry of the period of 28 days beginning with the date on which the regulations were made unless, before the expiry of that period, they have been approved by a resolution of the Parliament. It is for the Health and Sport Committee to consider the instruments and report to Parliament accordingly.

Today, we will have an evidence session on the instruments with Michael Matheson, the Cabinet Secretary for Transport, Infrastructure and Connectivity, and his officials. Once we have asked all our questions, we will move on to the formal debate on the motions on the instruments.

I welcome to the committee the cabinet secretary and his accompanying officials from the Scottish Government. Craig Thomson is border measures review team leader, David Pratt is policy lead in the health performance and delivery team and Peter Brown is from the police enforcement, liaison and performance team.

I thank the cabinet secretary for joining us today. Given the nature of the regulations, we intend, with his agreement, to ask questions on both instruments in the same session and then proceed to debate the motions on them together. Questions may be general in nature, but a few will undoubtedly be specific to the terms of individual regulations.

I invite the cabinet secretary to make an opening statement.

Thank you, convener, and good morning, everyone.

The country changes in the regulations are all related to the variant of Covid-19 that has been identified in South Africa. Four more African nations have been added: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda. Those countries have been assessed by the joint biosecurity centre as being at risk of probable transmission of the new variant.

The United Arab Emirates was also made subject to the additional restrictions on high-risk countries. That is because cases of the South African variant have been identified in England that have a travel history in the UAE but not in Africa. The implication is that people have become infected with the new variant while in the UAE.

The regulations also restrict passenger flights from the United Arab Emirates, and there are also technical changes and clarifications relating to the passenger locator form, pre-departure testing and definitions of “aircrew”.

I am more than happy to respond to any questions that members may have.

Thank you. Perhaps you could start by indicating your view of the South African variant and whether the provisions have been put in place timeously. Is it the Government’s view that they will prevent the spread of the variant in Scotland?

Before you answer that question, I ask committee members who wish to ask questions to enter an R in the chat box now.

The South African variant is one of several variants that are causing concern, given the way in which it can potentially re-infect individuals who have had Covid. There are therefore concerns about the possible implications of the South African variant for our vaccination programme.

It became clear from the evidence that the joint biosecurity centre provided that we had to move quickly to try to reduce the risk of the South African variant entering the United Kingdom. At that point, the decision was made to move to the red list system. Countries where the South African variant had been identified were put on the list, meaning that flights were banned and any UK nationals coming from those areas were required to self-isolate.

That was the initial approach, but it was clear from the clinical advice that I received from the chief medical officer for Scotland that it would not be adequate to further reduce the risk of the new variant’s introduction and that we would have to move to a form of managed quarantine for those coming in from countries that are considered to be high risk. That is why we agreed to move towards using managed quarantine, or managed isolation, for those coming in from countries rated as red, or risk, countries.

However, from the discussions that we have had with the CMO, it is clear that a system that is designed to respond to the identification of new variants is a reactive system. We know where variants are only because of genome sequencing that takes place in a country. For example, we know about the variant in South Africa because that country carries out a significant amount of genome sequencing. The problem that the JBC and our chief medical officer have highlighted is that, often, mutations circulate that we are unaware of because of the lack of genome sequencing internationally. We can therefore further reduce the risk of the introduction of a variant such as the South African variant only by having a comprehensive system of managed isolation or managed quarantine.

That is why we made the decision, which the First Minister announced last week, that, rather than just having managed isolation for those returning from what are classed as risk countries, all international travellers arriving in Scotland will be required to use managed isolation. By doing that, we can help to reduce the risk further.

That approach has limitations, because there is cross-border flow between England and Scotland. I have made representations to the UK Government on that and said that we think that there should be managed quarantine across the whole UK, but the UK Government has taken a different view. However, we are taking forward an approach in Scotland that we believe is the most robust approach that we can take in the present circumstances.

Thank you. David Stewart and Sandra White have questions.

Good morning, cabinet secretary. I have a wider strategic question. You might know of my interest in the development of an internationally recognised digital Covid passport. The idea has been raised by the Greek Prime Minister, is actively being considered in Europe and has also been raised by the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. In a slightly ambiguous way, it has also been raised in the United Kingdom Parliament. As you will know, the idea is that a Covid passport will get the economy back to work, will be recognised across the world and will be a big boost to tourism. Frankly, it will happen with or without politicians, because companies such as Qantas are already introducing it.

I appreciate that there are technical issues and some civil liberties issues regarding a Covid passport, but we can see from the work that was done around the European health insurance card that such a thing can be done if there is a willingness to do it. You will be aware that the UK will host the G7, which will be a great opportunity to show leadership on the issue. What is the cabinet secretary’s view? Has the Cabinet discussed the idea?

Good morning, Mr Stewart. I am aware of the idea of an electronic vaccine passport, but I am not persuaded that it is the right approach at the moment. Given the challenges that we face with new variants and our understanding of how the vaccine operates in respect of the transmission of the virus, I do not feel that, at present, the introduction of an international vaccine passport would be an appropriate alternative to the use of managed quarantine for individuals who are returning after international travel. It may have a role to play at some point in the future, but we are not at that point yet.

I agree that there are some civil liberties issues that have to be worked through. For example, there could be a good reason why someone has not taken up a vaccine from the vaccines that are available.

It may be that, at some point in the future, a vaccine passport would have a role to play in helping to support international travel. However, I do not believe that, at present, it would be a way for us to reduce the risk of the importation of new virus and new variants.

I appreciate the cabinet secretary’s honesty and openness on the issue. I simply make the wider point that it is not a zero-sum game—in other words, a passport could be an additional longer-term strategy. No one is suggesting that it would be an alternative to quarantine hotels.

With regard to civil liberties, I was interested to find out that in America, where my son happens to live and work, in situations where individuals had not gone ahead with the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine—as we know, there were some issues in that regard—nurseries and schools refused to accept young people who did not have the vaccine. In a sense, the issue of whether or not people choose to have the vaccine is not for us to consider today; I merely make the point that there will be implications and effects as a result of such decisions. I therefore see a vaccine passport as an additional long-term strategy, not as an alternative to test and trace or to quarantine hotels.

I agree with David Stewart on that. It could be one of a number of aspects that could form part of a longer-term strategy to support a return to international travel. The challenge will be to identify when we arrive at that point. The reason why that is a challenge is because different countries will be at different points in their vaccination programmes and in suppressing the virus, and they will take different approaches in how they go about achieving suppression. I agree that international co-operation will be needed in introducing such a scheme, but we have to wait until we arrive at a point where we think that it may be right to introduce it.

As part of a longer-term strategy and as one of a suite of measures that we can put in place to support international travel when it is safe to do so, a vaccine passport could have a part to play.

Good morning, cabinet secretary. I have some questions on quarantine hotels, if that is what we are calling them. I acknowledge what you have said about the JBC highlighting the need to reduce the risks. To my mind, we should have locked down international travel a lot earlier, but we are where we are.

I am interested to note that, while we in Scotland are talking about international travellers who come up to Scotland via Heathrow or wherever having to isolate in quarantine hotels, Westminster does not agree with that approach. I am disappointed about that. What impact will there be with regard to international travellers who come into Scotland via Heathrow? How will that be managed? Budget-wise, will the Scottish Government be responsible for paying for quarantine hotels if Westminster is not on board with what we wish to do?

Sandra White will be aware that I will be making a statement to Parliament to set out some more details of the methods and process for taking forward managed isolation over the next week. I believe that a comprehensive UK system is the safest and most effective way to reduce the risk of the importation of new virus or variants into Scotland and the UK as a whole, and is in all our interests.

11:00  

The UK Government has decided to take an approach to the issue that is different from ours, and to target managed quarantine only at those who come in from the red list high-risk countries. We will introduce managed quarantine for all travellers who arrive at Scottish airports from an international destination. It is clear that a challenge remains around those who arrive at English airports and travel on to Scotland. We are working with the UK Government to see whether we can introduce a mechanism that would allow those individuals to carry out their managed quarantine at the point of entry into the UK, no matter where that is, but we have not been able to get agreement on that.

The system that we are putting in place is the most comprehensive that we can put in place, given our powers and the scope of our ability. However, if it were applied at the UK level, that would make it even more effective. We are continuing to discuss the issue and to ask the UK Government to consider expanding its approach in order to capture a greater number of people who come into the UK as a whole. Members can be assured that we are taking forward an approach that we believe is the most effective means by which we can reduce the risk of importation of new virus and new variants into Scotland.

The cost—it is a fixed cost—is borne by the traveller who uses a managed quarantine hotel or managed isolation. We will underwrite hotel provision. We will block book the hotel facilities through a joint agreement with the UK Government, so that there is one contract for all the hotels—that is being taken forward on our behalf. Hotels will be block booked to the levels that we believe are necessary. Those who will have to use them will have to pay the daily rate that goes with that. Part of the money will therefore be recovered from those who have to use the isolation hotels.

I apologise: my internet went down for a couple of minutes.

I have a follow-up question. How will those travellers be identified? Will people who are getting on a flight be asked questions? Will they fill in something to say that they are travelling on from Heathrow, for instance, to Scotland?

A person who comes to Scotland on a flight will need to have completed a passenger locator form, which is a digital Home Office form. That information will be passed on to Health Protection Scotland. We will get information about individuals who travel directly to Scotland from an international destination from the Home Office, and that will allow us to identify individuals who require to use managed isolation.

Good morning, cabinet secretary. I want to pick up on what Sandra White said about managed quarantine. I have an interest in internal flights and on-going travel, whether that is by air or even by ferry. A person could go to Dublin from an international destination, for instance, and into Scotland through the port of Cairnryan.

I appreciate that you will make a statement this week. Last summer, we almost had zero Covid in Scotland. I agree with Sandra White that travel restrictions should maybe have been put into place months ago to prevent people from coming in.

How much pressure can you put on the UK Government to show that, for managed quarantine, the first stop for an international arrival needs to be the place where virus transmission can be really reduced? That is a concern for me, because any on-going travel poses a risk of virus transmission.

You make a good point about the risk of onward transmission. The most effective means of quarantining is at the point of entry to a country rather than waiting until travellers get to their end point, for the reasons that you outlined, which relate to the risk of transmission from someone travelling by whatever means to their end point.

The point of entry is the best place for quarantining. We have made representations to the UK Government, with which I will have a further meeting on Thursday, when we will cover such issues. There are different views about how to proceed, but we will continue that engagement and continue to explain that the system should be more comprehensive across the UK, because that is the most effective means of dealing with the spread.

You made a point about people coming from and moving around the common travel area, which includes the Republic of Ireland. We have raised that issue, as have the Welsh Government and the Northern Irish Government, and the UK Government is now engaging with the Irish Government. The COVID-19 Genomics UK Consortium report that was published at the beginning of December highlighted that a significant amount of virus importation into parts of the common travel area came from people moving between Scotland and England and between England and Scotland and elsewhere.

We must continue to look at what measures we can put in place to reduce that risk further. We are keen to establish a means of helping to reduce the need for people to travel around the UK. However, we are some distance from agreeing on what that would involve.

Given the evidence from the COG report, there is no doubt that progress needs to be made on the issue. We continue to discuss that with the UK Government. All four nations of the UK recognise that action needs to be taken; the question is about the method for acting to address the issue.

I am curious about one issue. When we talk about managed quarantine hotels, what projected numbers are we talking about? Will tens, hundreds or thousands of people need to be put up in hotels?

I am in danger of pre-empting my statement to Parliament this afternoon. Three airports in Scotland—Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen—still receive international arrivals. Some are more associated with the oil and gas industry—that applies particularly to Aberdeen. We are working to project numbers on the basis of the number of international travellers into Scotland per week. We are looking to have managed isolation available for those who need to undertake it. Some individuals will be exempt if they have a critical role in a certain sector—for example, if they are air crew. The scheme will have exemptions, but we are modelling a system that is based on the number of individuals who have travelled into Scotland in the past couple of weeks. We will ensure that we have sufficient rooms available for those who will have to complete managed isolation.

I will follow on from Sandra White’s questions about the Scottish Government’s requirement for everybody to go into quarantine after international travel. My question is about onward travel on an internal flight after an international flight—Emma Harper raised that issue. Surely we have a system in place that tracks the origin of travel. We must be able to do that quite simply, so that when people arrive in Scotland, no matter where they have flown in from, we should be able to identify them and ask them to quarantine.

The passenger locator form, which the Home Office put in place, is the way in which we get that information. Every traveller coming into the UK is required to complete a passenger locator form before they arrive. It sets out where they have travelled from, where they have travelled through, and where they are going.

If someone is transferring through Glasgow from Heathrow after an international flight, we would have that information on the individual. However, my preferred system would be for that person to carry out their managed isolation at the point of arrival, rather than go on to a domestic flight and complete their managed isolation at their destination. There are very obvious reasons for that, including the risk that it creates. That is one of the points of discussion that we are continuing to pursue with the UK Government. We would prefer those individuals to complete their managed isolation at their point of arrival into the UK rather than at the end of their journey.

The PLF is the form that provides us with the data and information on individuals who might be required to carry out managed isolation.

I understand that you are saying that you would prefer those people to isolate at their place of entry into the United Kingdom, and that there is a difference of approach. Is there any way in which the Scottish Government can insist that someone like that cannot board an internal flight following an international flight until such time as they have been quarantined? Is there any way in which we can insist on that, if you like?

The system depends on the passenger putting the correct information about where they are going and whether they are going on to an internal flight on the PLF in the first place. If they have come by road or by bus, they might not complete the details of their end point. For example, they might land in London and travel on from there but not give that information. There are, therefore, some challenges within the system.

To make what you suggest a requirement would require the UK Government to make regulations to require travellers who are looking to travel on to Scotland to complete their managed isolation at a hotel in England. Legal provision would need to be made by the UK Government to facilitate that. That is part of the discussion that we are having with the UK Government. In our view, the UK Government should be looking to put that in place, but we cannot force it. The UK Government will have to agree to implement that, because it would require legislation.

Thank you.

There are no further questions. I am confident that Michael Matheson will have enough new information this afternoon to satisfy the Presiding Officer in his statement.

We now move on to the next items on the agenda, which are the formal debates on the main affirmative instruments on which we have just taken evidence. Are members content with a single debate being held to cover both of the instruments?

Members are content. We therefore move to the debate. We are no longer in question-and-answer mode. I invite the cabinet secretary to speak to and move the motions.

11:15  

Given the discussion that we have already had, I will go straight to moving the motions.

Motions moved,

That the Health and Sport Committee recommends that The Health Protection (Coronavirus) (International Travel, Public Health Information and Pre-Departure Testing) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2021 (SSI 2021/34) be approved.

That the Health and Sport Committee recommends that The Health Protection (Coronavirus) (International Travel, Prohibition on Travel from the United Arab Emirates) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2021 (SSI 2021/52) be approved.[—Michael Matheson]

Does any member wish to contribute to the debate? Brian, do you want to come back in, or does your request to speak relate to the question session?

It relates to the debate. I want to highlight that, given the discussion that we have had with the cabinet secretary, and the straightforward way in which he has answered all the questions, the issue that is raised again is our inability, technically, to do what should be quite simple—to track somebody who is coming into the UK, and their onward travel. From a technical perspective, we do not seem to be able to deal with that. That was my only point.

Thank you very much. No other members have indicated that they wish to contribute to the debate, so I invite Michael Matheson to sum up and respond.

Convener, I recognise the concerns that Brian Whittle has raised. That is why we need to continue to work with the Home Office—[Inaudible.]—the passenger locator form and how that information is shared with us. The matter is a concern for us and is part of our on-going discussion with the UK Government. I assure the member that we will try to identify ways in which we can improve the system and how it operates.

Are members content that we put a single question on the motions? I can see that members are content.

Motions agreed to,

That the Health and Sport Committee recommends that The Health Protection (Coronavirus) (International Travel, Public Health Information and Pre-Departure Testing) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2021 (SSI 2021/34) be approved.

That the Health and Sport Committee recommends that The Health Protection (Coronavirus) (International Travel, Prohibition on Travel from the United Arab Emirates) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 2021 (SSI 2021/52) be approved.

That concludes discussion on those made affirmative instruments.

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Human Tissue (Authorisation) (Specified Type B Procedures) (Scotland) Regulations 2021 [Draft]

The next item is consideration of more subordinate legislation—this time, a draft affirmative instrument.

For this item, I welcome to the committee Mairi Gougeon, the Minister for Public Health, Sport and Wellbeing, who is accompanied by Sharon Grant from the health protection division and Caroline Mackintosh, from the legal directorate of the Scottish Government. I thank you for joining us today and invite Mairi Gougeon to make brief opening remarks on the instrument.

Thank you for the opportunity to make opening remarks.

I think that it is important—and I hope that it will be helpful to the committee—that I set out the context in which the draft regulations have been laid. The committee will be aware that the Human Tissue (Authorisation) (Scotland) Act 2019 introduced a statutory framework for the authorisation and carrying out of medical procedures that facilitate transplantation, which are termed “pre-death procedures” in the act. They are defined in the act as the medical procedures that might be carried out on a person for the purposes of ascertaining the suitability of an organ for donation or of

“increasing the likelihood of successful transplantation ... after ... death”,

and which are not for the purpose of

“safeguarding or promoting the physical or mental health of the person.”

The committee will recall that, in cases of donation following circulatory death, which account for around 40 per cent of deceased organ donation, such procedures must be carried out before, sadly, the donor dies.

The framework for carrying out pre-death procedures is an important part of the new legislative regime for donation and, essentially, provides transparency for the public about such procedures, which are already a necessary part of the donation process in order to ensure the health and safety of organs for the transplant recipient.

I turn to the regulations. Parliament passed equivalent regulations for type A procedures in March last year. Those procedures are more routine and less invasive, and are regularly carried out in order to facilitate transplantation.

In some circumstances, if the clinical situation requires it, further diagnostic procedures are available to clinicians to assess the health and safety of organs—for example, if there is a possibility of malignancy, which requires further investigation. The type B regulations, which are now before you, list those procedures that, unlike type A procedures, are not expected to be frequently carried out in order to facilitate transplantation but might sometimes be required as part of the donation process.

Such procedures are not unusual in the wider context of patient care in a hospital setting. However, because of their non-routine nature in the context of transplantation, and the fact that they are more invasive than type A procedures, the act permits the setting in secondary legislation of additional safeguards that must be met before a type B procedure can be carried out.

I will briefly set those out. The regulations include a requirement that, unlike type A procedures, which are authorised automatically by virtue of the donation itself being authorised, a type B procedure must be explicitly authorised before it can go ahead. Given the circumstances in which donation takes place, in which the patient will usually be unconscious in an intensive care unit, that authorisation will be sought from the patient’s family. Further, in line with the approach that is taken in the 2019 act, before that authorisation is given, the views of the potential donor must be taken into consideration so that such procedures are not carried out if they would be against the donor’s known wishes.

As well as requiring that explicit authorisation, the regulations require that, further to the safeguarding conditions in the 2019 act, two conditions have to be met before a type B procedure can be carried out. First, the regulations state that a type B procedure can proceed only if two doctors agree to the procedure being carried out, having both considered that all the conditions set out in the 2019 act have been met. In feedback from the consultation, stakeholders requested that the regulations specifically exclude doctors who are involved in the transplantation process from performing that role, and that is reflected in the regulations. The regulations also require that one of the doctors must be the doctor who is responsible for the patient’s care. Those requirements reflect current practice in decision making on a patient’s care in relation to donation, and they provide certainty and transparency around the process.

The second condition is that in order for the procedure to be carried out, the two doctors must also conclude that a lesser intervention—a type A procedure—cannot be used to provide the necessary information for transplantation purposes. That reflects the general approach to the carrying out of medical procedures and ensures that the minimum intervention is made to facilitate the transplantation.

Those additional conditions, taken together with the requirements in the 2019 act and the requirement for explicit authorisation, seek to ensure that, in cases in which it is necessary to carry out a type B procedure so that an organ can be safely transplanted, there are appropriate safeguards in place to ensure that the interests of the donor are protected. In practice, the requirements in the 2019 act and in the regulations mean that a type B procedure will not go ahead without family involvement or authorisation, and that it will not go ahead prematurely or if it is not absolutely necessary to facilitate transplantation.

In developing the regulations, we have worked closely with and taken the advice of clinicians who work in intensive care and across the donation and transplantation pathway. I am grateful for their input in helping to ensure that the specified procedures and additional requirements that we have in place are appropriate. We also consulted publicly, and the draft regulations before the committee take into account the responses to that consultation. I am happy to take questions from the committee.

Thank you, minister. The committee took a good deal of interest in the matter when the Human Tissue (Authorisation) (Scotland) Bill was before us two years ago. I invite members who wish to ask questions to type R in the chat box in the usual way. We start with questions from Sandra White.

I certainly took a great deal of interest, as did members of the public, in the type B pre-death procedure. It came as news to me, not being a medical professional, and I think that the committee did a good job of looking into the situation.

I am happy with what the minister has said. The committee looked at the additional conditions with regard to doctors. The consultation was very important with regard to issues around patients, the families, authority and so on.

During the consultation, some religious groups were still concerned. Do we know whether any people or groups who were involved in the consultation are still not happy with the procedure? As I say, I am not moving against it—I think that the committee has done a grand job—but I wonder whether some people still have misgivings on the issue.

In developing the draft regulations, we took into account a lot of the points that had been made during the consultation process, and we tried to make the whole process a lot more transparent. As a result of some of the issues that came out of the consultation, we put in place, along with some other changes, extra conditions to require registered medical practitioners to authorise the type B procedures and to specify who those practitioners should be.

Sandra White mentioned the religious element and some concerns around that, too. That aspect was, of course, taken into consideration throughout the consultation process. My officials might have more to add on that point.

Would Sharon Grant like to add anything on that?

We sent a consultation specifically to faith groups and we did not receive any responses.

Our implementation team has been carrying out a series of webinars, on a weekly or fortnightly basis, with the help of Kidney Research UK. They are held with Muslim, Sikh and Hindu faith groups and faith leaders, who explain the content of the 2019 act and what tests can take place. I am taking part in one today after this meeting. So far, no one has asked any questions specifically about pre-death procedures.

It might help the committee to know that we have a mail drop to every household in Scotland. The letter goes into detail on the type A and type B procedures, so that the public will be aware of the whole donation pathway.

Thank you.

Minister, the final words in your statement might have already answered my question. As a former liver transplant nurse, I know that many specialists are involved in communicating with family members about pre-death procedures. My question has to do with the transplant specialists and the teams that are engaging with family members—especially those of minority groups, which Sharon Grant mentioned. The legislation will ensure that specialists will be given adequate education to update them on the specific provisions for type A and type B procedures. I am sure that the clinicians are knowledgeable already, but are they being given the support that they need to carry out their specialist jobs?

Yes, a lot of training has been done. I add that type B procedures in particular are rarely used, and, because of the conditions in the regulations, explicit authorisation is needed for the procedures to proceed.

My officials might want to come in again on this point, but I know that a lot of training has been done. NHS Blood and Transport has on-going training and additional support. There is also an e-learning tool, which I know that people have found really useful so far. That process is under way and will continue.

Comprehensive training on the whole 2019 act is taking place, as well as on the pre-death procedures framework. Clinicians have told us that they are really pleased with the training so far. All the training is now being done online. We, NHSBT and the Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service are also offering additional training and support to clinicians. As the minister said, we have developed an e-learning tool, with which the clinicians are really happy. It explains the processes and is something that they can use whenever they are not sure about some aspect. That will be accompanied by supporting guidance.

As members have no further questions, we move to agenda item 6, which is the formal debate on the SSI on which we have just taken evidence. As normal, I invite the minister to move motion S5M-23852. If any member wishes to contribute to the debate, they should enter an R in the chat box.

Motion moved,

That the Health and Sport Committee recommends that the Human Tissue (Authorisation) (Specified Type B Procedures) (Scotland) Regulations 2021 [draft] be approved.—[Mairi Gougeon]

Motion agreed to.

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Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Amendment of List of Responders) (Scotland) Order 2021 [Draft]

The seventh item on our agenda is consideration of more subordinate legislation—another draft affirmative instrument. I again welcome Mairi Gougeon, the Minister for Public Health, Sport and Wellbeing and her officials from the Scottish Government. On this occasion, she is accompanied by Iain MacAllister, who is deputy director in the mental health and social care directorate; Paula Richardson, who is a team leader in that directorate; and Carolyn Magill, who is a solicitor and head of the social care, NHS workforce and structures unit. I invite the minister to make a brief opening statement.

As was noted at your committee last year,

“Health and social care partnerships are not designated as first or second responders in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, which governs the overall structure of the resilience programme for local, regional and Scottish resilience partnerships.”—[Official Report, Health and Sport Committee, 7 June 2020; c 5.]

Therefore, although integration joint board chief officers have already been contributing to local emergency and resilience planning—including, notably, during the Covid-19 pandemic, in areas such as personal protective equipment hubs and supporting those who are shielding—they have done so formally only through their roles as directors of health boards and local authorities, and without the appropriate reference to their accountable officer status in the integration joint boards.

Following that meeting in 2020, the Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport confirmed to the committee that, given our recent experience of mobilising services to respond to Covid-19, it is recognised that IJBs should be included as responders in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and that we would make arrangements for that change to be made in legislation. We subsequently laid the SSI on 18 January 2021.

As the committee will be aware, the integration joint boards are responsible, as a minimum, for planning a significant proportion of the adult health and social care functions that are being delivered. Ensuring that IJBs are at the centre of emergency planning enables all the bodies that are accountable for community health and social care services to be appropriately represented.

By including IJBs as category 1 responders, we will ensure that, where there is risk of an emergency that will impact the functions that are delegated to IJBs—including in relation to our on-going pandemic response—formal, co-ordinated and appropriate arrangements will be in place for emergency planning, information sharing and co-operation with other responders, as well as for joined-up information sharing and advice for the public. The amendment to the 2004 act will therefore provide an overall structure for resilience planning that will ensure that our health and social care partnerships are built into the framework.

A consultation about including IJBs as category 1 responders took place on Citizen Space between 12 October and 22 November last year. The purpose of that was to ensure that the inclusion of IJBs would have no significant wider impacts or unintended consequences under the Equality Act 2010, including the fairer Scotland duty. An equality impact assessment was undertaken, as was a fairer Scotland duty assessment. After considering all the responses to the consultation, the Scottish ministers concluded that there are no clear equality, operational or strategic planning barriers to progressing the proposal and legislating for the inclusion of IJBs within the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as category 1 responders.

The inclusion of IJBs will ensure that formal, co-ordinated and appropriate arrangements are in place for emergency planning to support local communities. Members will be aware that the Delegated Powers and Law Reform Committee considered the technical, legal and drafting points of the proposed change and did not make any comments on the instrument.

I thank the committee for the opportunity to speak to the SSI. I am happy to take any questions that members might have.

I invite members to indicate in the chat box if they have a question.

As the minister said, we considered the issue at our meeting on 17 June 2020 and wrote to the cabinet secretary on 25 June to seek confirmation that steps would be taken to alter the legal designation of health and social care partnerships. I take it that the measure meets in full the suggestions that the committee made to the cabinet secretary on 25 June.

Yes, that is right. Some concerns were raised through the consultation, but it is important to remember that the order will formalise an arrangement that should already be in practice. It is not expected that it will result in any additional burdens on IJBs, which is one of the concerns that was raised. As I said, it formalises the process and ensures that IJBs form part of any emergency response and are integral to the process.

There are no further questions, so we move to agenda item 8, which is the formal debate on the order. I invite the minister to move motion S5M-23920.

Motion moved,

That the Health and Sport Committee recommends that the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Amendment of List of Responders) (Scotland) Order 2021 [draft] be approved.—[Mairi Gougeon]

Motion agreed to.

That concludes consideration of the instrument. We will report to the Parliament accordingly. I thank the minister for her attendance.